Well, yeah, you TRY. But the idea that one can have a secular prayer is silly. It’s an oxymoron. It’s not possible. It’s pretending, in order to get away with prayer.
It may not be establishment, but it’s still prayer. At least those people don’t pretend it’s “secular prayer.”
The phrase in quesion is one of the most famous in the history of American
jurisprudence, and someone of Breyer’s stature should not really be needed to
legitimitize it. However, his approval comes in handy when there are amateurs
(or incompetent professionals) about who could profit from some guidance in
the art of informed debate.
And it does not matter how the court eventually ruled in the Koran case. The point
is that Justice Holmes’ immortal phrase is still relevant and useful today. It always will be.
Okay, okay, calm down. Go ahead and use it, just please don’t use it like some kind of magic words that prove whatever wild exception you dream up to the First Amendment.
Sorry if I lumped you in with people who do that. I see it on *every single debate *about the First Amendment.
It certainly is useful. I would expect something so ‘immortal’ not to be mischaracterized and misspoken so often.
A Supreme Court decision is not legislation. An analogy is not legislation. An article, even by Stephanopolous, is not legislation. Speculation by a current Supreme on how a theoretical case might be decided by this or another court is not legislation.
I do not know of an instance in which a person has falsely cried “Fire” in a crowded theatre; been arrested, tried, and convicted of a crime; appealed the case on the grounds that the conviction was an infringement of a right to free speech; and lost.
This is a bit of a hijack, but IMHO j666 is right about Schenck (link goes to a Wiki article with links to the full opinion). As others have noted, the case was about advocating draft resistance. In addressing whether the First Amendment is an absolute freedom, Justice Holmes (writing for a unanimous court) famously mentioned falsely shouting fire in a theatre as an example of how the freedom is not absolute. That’s all he meant, though, and all the Court could have intended, as the case didn’t involve those facts. This is why the passage is considered dictum. The Supreme Court did not make falsely shouting fire in a theatre a crime, and would have been quick to point out if asked that it doesn’t have such power. Rather, it suggested (in dictum) that such a law would be constitutional under the First Amendment. colonial makes decent arguments (see Post #78) for how the conduct might be illegal, but Schenck didn’t make it so. And didn’t claim to.
No, it’s not always relevant. Sometimes people bring up irrelevant things in debates, you know.
What I usually see is something like this argument:
“Hey, you can’t yell fire in a crowded theatre! That means there are allowable exceptions. Therefore any wild, ridiculous exception I dream up is allowable!”
Holmes is saying no such thing. You are projecting information that isn’t really there into his comment. Endangerment was not a crime at common law.
I just spent half an hour looking and found no cases where a conviction for endangerment was based on speech alone. The closest was a New York case where the defendant paid a homeless guy to do push-ups and sit-ups in the middle of a busy highway.
Well, the case where Holmes mentioned his hypothetical “fire” thingie, there was such a conviction based on speech alone (based on violation of a statute though).
AND that case was later overturned (properly, I think).
Actually, the idea of “God” in the motto IGWT being secular and not really a deity, is what the court came up with to avoid having to strike it down.
“Religious people,” as in the common folk on the street, don’t know this, and see the reference to God in the motto and in the pledge to be a ringing endorsement of their religion. That’s a big problem I have with the pledge and the motto - the courts say it’s not really talking about God, but the common people always bring that up as proof that the US is a Christian nation.
The court didn’t come up with it on its own, I don’t think - it was presented by litigants in the case. Not sure though. In any event, I’ll bet it is quoted religiously (so to speak) in any briefs since then by defenders of the slogan.
Yes, it’s very convenient. When religion conflicts with law, it’s simply not religion at that time. Voila!
“There are exceptions” is relevant point in every free speech debate.
It would be a bit dull if the “fire” example was invoked in every one
of those debates; there are other ways to make the point. However,
whether a subject is dull or not has no effect on its relevance.
So point out the error of their logic.
The syllogism:
Premise: There are exceptions.
Conclusion: Therefore all the exceptions I dream up are allowable.
is fallacious because the conclusion does not follow from the premise.
It is a non sequitur.
It would be no different, logically, if they were to say this:
Premise: There are laws.
Conclusion: Therefore all the laws I dream up are allowable.
I think Breyer is wrong by equating Koran burning with falsely shouting fire in a theater. Falsely shouting fire would lead a reasonable person to panic and cause others to be trampled. Koran burning merely shows contempt for Islam and may cause UNreasonable people to commit murder.
The test for whether speech should be allowed cannot be the actions of unreasonable people, because then pretty much all political speech can be banned. We can’t have an article critical of President Obama (or insert other political figure) because maybe a nut will read the article and attempt him harm?