It wasn’t a preposterous belief, up to November of 2002, when the UN inspectors were readmitted. But they quickly determined that both the defector’s reports and the CIA guesses from satellite photos were wrong. Every site identified as a possible WMD facility or stockpile was searched, and not only were they not what was claimed, in many cases it was obvious that they had been unused for years, or never suitable for that purpose (e.g., an alleged chemical weapons factory that didn’t even have running water).
The UN inspections continued. They used helicopters to travel to remote sites with no warning to the Iraqis, so there was no time to hide stuff. They used ground-penetrating radar to search for hidden basements and false walls, so there was no place to hide stuff. And by January 2003, it was clear to everyone that the dangers had been grossly exaggerated.
No problem so far. I don’t blame the Bush admin for believing the worst-case CIA guesses about their satellite photos, or the claims of Chalabi’s paid defectors, before the UN inspectors went in. In the absence of hard evidence to the contrary, you have to be ready for the worst.
But now we had hard, conclusive evidence that the CIA had been wrong, and the paid defectors had been lying. It was no longer reasonable to believe those worst-case scenarios.
The inspections continued, even in the formerly sacrosanct Presidential compounds. And on March 7, 2003, Hans Blix reported to the UN Security Council that the only questions remaining were ones of accounting, i.e. the destruction of obsolescent stockpiles was not properly documented. He said that the Iraqi government was cooperating proactively, even to the point of destroying some conventional missiles that flew a few miles farther than the UN-mandated maximum of ~100 miles (Iraq is ~8000 miles from the US), that it should take no more than a few months to clear up the remaining discrepancies, and that as long as the inspectors were there, the world would have plenty of warning if Saddam attempted to resume the manufacture of WMDs.
Security Council 7 March 2003
No inspection can be perfect in a country that size; in March, 2003, it was reasonable to believe that the UN inspectors had missed something, although years of further searching by a huge US team after it had occupied Iraq showed that Blix hadn’t missed anything significant in the five months his team ran the inspections.
So while it was still reasonable to believe there might be a stray mustard gas shell here or there, it was no longer reasonable to believe that Iraqi WMDs constituted a serious threat to the region, let alone the US.
Bush didn’t care. He wanted to invade, but the October 2002 vote authorizing invasion had a provision that for some reason is rarely mentioned today. Blix had just certified to the UN that the inspections had turned up no evidence of WMD facilities or stockpiles, and that Iraq was actively cooperating with the inspectors in resolving the remaining discrepancies. But the 2002 bill required that in order to use military force, Bush had to write and sign a formal declaration to Congress that all other measures had failed, and that nothing short of military force could remove the threat Iraq posed to the US.
No problem for Bush – he simply lied, and signed a letter to Congress stating exactly that — eleven days after Blix’s report proved that he was lying.
Presidential Letter
May he burn in hell forever.