# Some federal election law ideas **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [July 10, 2005, 7:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871 "2005-07-10T19:43:59Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 13\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 4:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/21 "2005-07-15T16:19:19Z")
> [@](#): > > I find this idea not only abhorrent morally,but pointless. We should be encouraging more speech, not controlling it. Which idea? ---
**Author:** ![Maeglin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/8baadc/32.png) [@Maeglin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Maeglin)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 5:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/22 "2005-07-15T17:07:15Z")
> [@Gadarene](#): > > Very interesting. I think you overestimate the breadth of a politician’s donor base in a world of bet-hedging – and, specifically, the extent to which the interests of bet-hedging donors (who are invariably, on the federal level, large corporate institutions) are addressed through public-minded policies. I doubt it, though this is an empirical question rather than a theoretical one. I took a quick look at [opensecrets.org](http://opensecrets.org), and every single top industry was a big hedger. This is hardly a rigorous survey, but to my eye, it looks like everyone who can pay wants some shot at payback. Donations to PACs are even more evenly hedged between left-leaning and right-leaning. By the way, when I say “public good”, this is not necessarily “public-minded.” [/quote] I also think your speculation about what would happen in a non-bet-hedging landscape is only one of a number of possible outcomes [/quote] Here is where the mathematics would be our friend. We could characterize the equilibrium and derive results that would eliminate speculative outcomes. I will give some serious thought to making a model of this and seeing what happens. > [@](#): > > – sure, each institutional donor might pick a candidate and stick with him, halving the contributions of each side. Or institutional donors might play it safe and weigh the marginal value of their contributing to one side (especially in elections where the conclusion is not foregone) as less than the benefit that they could expect to get if their guy happens to win, and withdraw entirely. Though I cannot prove it unless I write some equations, I just _know_ that this cannot be a stable result in equilibrium. Corporation A strategically chooses its contribution level based on its expected utility from contributing which takes into account the probability that his contribution will be pivotal. Suppose that we follow your logic, that every corporation’s contribution converges to 0 in a closely fought election. But as this occurs, the probability that Corporation N’s contribution is pivotal _increases_, thus increasing the utility he gains from contributing. If he strongly suspects that none of his competitors will contribute, he improves his utility even if he tosses in a buck to a candidate chosen at random in a closely fought election, since it is very likely that his marginal buck will be enough to swing the vote since no one else is kicking in. I am sure you see where this is going. In any stable equilibrium, there will always be nonzero contributions. > [@](#): > > Similarly, competing candidates might be drawn together centripetally in order to maximize their appeal to all donors, if bet-hedging were prohibited, or they might seek to separate themselves and stake out newly distinct policy positions. Median voter theory says they already converge, and for the most part, I believe this is true. Contract the donor base even further and the individual donors care less about policy and ideology as long as their checks are getting cut. > [@](#): > > There’s also the likelihood that bet-hedging as it currently exists is essentially a prisoners’ dilemma situation, where the status quo is sub-optimal both for the politicians (who have to spend all their damn time raising money – literally half their waking lives, on the national level) and for the donors (who are, after all, just trying to keep up with JonesCorp). Maybe nobody wants to spend (and raise) twice the money that’s otherwise “needed”; they just can’t withdraw from the system on an individual basis without substantially disadvantaging themselves. I don’t think this has anything to do with a prisoner’s dilemma, but I take your point when you say that it is sub-optimal. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma involves voluntary cooperation. I do not think there are any good ways to induce this kind of cooperation in an agonistic political setting. > [@](#): > > It’s very possible, too, that bet-hedging would work best in the context of black box campaign finance reform (the subject of my first ever Straight Dope thread, back in March 2000!), in which all political contributions are made anonymously. Anonymous donations, I believe, would yield to probabilistic policy decisions. This is not perhaps the kind of leadership that this country needs. > [@](#): > > Regardless, I should e-mail you my paper on bet-hedging; I’m getting ready to send it out to get it published, and I’d love to get specific feedback from ya. Please do, I am looking forward to it. [SIZE=1]She is rather direct like that. I do, however, have the opportunity to take long weekends during the summer. I imagine I might be able to arrange a trip down your way, too.[SIZE] ---
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 5:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/23 "2005-07-15T17:38:13Z")
> [@](#): > > I doubt it, though this is an empirical question rather than a theoretical one. I took a quick look at [opensecrets.org](http://opensecrets.org), and every single top industry was a big hedger. This is hardly a rigorous survey, but to my eye, it looks like everyone who can pay wants some shot at payback. Donations to PACs are even more evenly hedged between left-leaning and right-leaning. > > By the way, when I say “public good”, this is not necessarily “public-minded.” But “every single top industry” != a broad swathe of the public. By and large, individuals do not bet-hedge, and the less wealthy an individual the more likely that his or her political contributions will be both minimal and directed to only one side. To the extent that donations buy access (a thoroughly unshocking observation), your average Joe and Jane Constituent are, individually, afforded a disproportionately small proportion of a candidate’s time and thoughts. And that’s an understatement. Catering to all industry is not the same thing as enacting policies in the public good. > [@](#): > > Though I cannot prove it unless I write some equations, I just know that this cannot be a stable result in equilibrium. Corporation A strategically chooses its contribution level based on its expected utility from contributing which takes into account the probability that his contribution will be pivotal. Suppose that we follow your logic, that every corporation’s contribution converges to 0 in a closely fought election. But as this occurs, the probability that Corporation N’s contribution is pivotal increases, thus increasing the utility he gains from contributing. If he strongly suspects that none of his competitors will contribute, he improves his utility even if he tosses in a buck to a candidate chosen at random in a closely fought election, since it is very likely that his marginal buck will be enough to swing the vote since no one else is kicking in. I am sure you see where this is going. In any stable equilibrium, there will always be nonzero contributions. I can buy that; let me refine my scenario. Say a bet-hedging donor gives $x to Candidate A and $y to competing Candidate B, where both amounts are the product of some presumptively rational calculus in which the donor takes into account the likelihood that each candidate will win, the amount (and proportion) given to the candidates by other donors, the ideological resonance of each candidate with the donor (on the one hand, a resonant candidate will be more likely to pursue policies favorable to the donor without a large contribution; on the other hand, giving a lot of money to a non-resonant candidate might be utterly futile), and so on. Now say bet-hedging is prohibited. The donor can a) give money to one of the two candidates; b) give money to neither of the two candidates; or c) violate the law and give money to both of the candidates. Assuming decent enforcement mechanisms, let’s discount the likelihood of c). My assertion is that even if the donor chooses a), it is extremely unlikely to continue to donate $x+$y. (Although, as you point out, the closer the election the more likely it would be that the donor would give as much in a non-bet-hedging world as it would in a bet-hedging world.) The calculus is completely different. It’s hardly even clear, to me, that the donor would necessarily give $x or $y to the candidate; the revised donation amount might be smaller than either. All of which is to say that I believe a prohibition on bet-hedging would remove some money from the system – maybe a **lot** of money. Whether that’s normatively desirable, or what the unintended consequences would be, are completely different questions. (Sorry if this is sorta muddled…I’m doing it at work, on the fly, and with one eye out for my judge.) > [@](#): > > Median voter theory says they already converge, and for the most part, I believe this is true. Contract the donor base even further and the individual donors care less about policy and ideology as long as their checks are getting cut. Could you explain this further? > [@](#): > > I don’t think this has anything to do with a prisoner’s dilemma, but I take your point when you say that it is sub-optimal. The solution to the prisoner’s dilemma involves voluntary cooperation. I do not think there are any good ways to induce this kind of cooperation in an agonistic political setting. I’m no longer sufficiently versed in game theory to articulate what I mean. 🙂 If everybody gives (or solicits) because everyone else gives (or solicits), while secretly wishing they didn’t have to give (or solicit), why wouldn’t there be a way to force cooperation? Wouldn’t a blanket prohibition accomplish exactly that? > [@](#): > > Anonymous donations, I believe, would yield to probabilistic policy decisions. This is not perhaps the kind of leadership that this country needs. Even if true, I think it’s preferable to policy decisions prompted on behalf of the interests of the monied to the exclusion of others. But there’s some good argument fodder there. > [@](#): > > Please do, I am looking forward to it. It’s done; check your gmail. ---
**Author:** ![Kevbo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/e47774/32.png) [@Kevbo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kevbo)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 6:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/24 "2005-07-15T18:20:40Z")
Just a brainstorming idea I had a while back: Suppose we could somehow come up with a way in which campagne donations could ONLY be made anonymously. (difficult premise, I admit) You could then make revealing the fact that you made, or will make, a donation de-facto bribery. You make ASKING for a donation de-facto solicitation of a bribe. Doners can still make donations. The point is that EVERY freaking pol and every freakin’ doner swears up and down that they are not buying influance. Which we all know is crap. If they are not buying influance then there is no reason the pols need to know where the money came from, no? ---
**Author:** ![Maeglin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/8baadc/32.png) [@Maeglin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Maeglin)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 6:31pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/25 "2005-07-15T18:31:23Z")
Good grief, I am getting nothing done today. I have to keep an eye out for my boss, too. > [@Gadarene](#): > > But “every single top industry” != a broad swathe of the public. By and large, individuals do not bet-hedge, and the less wealthy an individual the more likely that his or her political contributions will be both minimal and directed to only one side. Suppose for a minute that this were true. Suppose also that you successfully prohibited bet-hedging. Suppose once again that your intuition were right, that prohibiting bet-hedging chases a lot of corporate money out of politics. Now consider Joe Blow’s strategic campaign contribution decision problem. He knows that bet hedging is not legal. He believes that big corporations are giving less money. He reckons that in a world of less corporate money, his candidate will be a lot more thankful for his fifty bucks than she would have in the previous world of bet hedging. So in the Brave New world, he thinks that his fifty bucks has a higher probability of influencing the election outcome and securing him some ex post benefits, whereas in the previous world, fifty bucks would have been swamped by the unending tide of corporate money. So he donates it. Every other Joe Blow facing the same decision problem donates, too. Corporations are not stupid and can solve Joe & Co’s decision making problem. They don’t particularly want the little man having any more say than he did before, in the previous world. They want their access and subsidies. So they donate enough to secure them the kinds of ex post nuggets that they need. Joe & Co aren’t stupid either, and they know how to solve the corporations’ decision making problems. Joe knows that no matter how much he gives, the corporations will swamp it. But he also knows that the corporations can only back one horse. So maybe, depending on how we specify the game, Joe does decide to kick in his money, because even if the corporations drown out his bet, perhaps half of them are going to back the wrong horse. And so do Joe & Co. And, of course, so do the corporations. The result is that more _people_ engage in ex post seeking behavior and _perhaps_ the total pool of donated money increases in equilibrium. Once again, you need the math to work out the exact numbers. This is my response to your refined scenario. > [@](#): > > All of which is to say that I believe a prohibition on bet-hedging would remove some money from the system – maybe a **lot** of money. Whether that’s normatively desirable, or what the unintended consequences would be, are completely different questions. I think these elements cannot be excluded from the discussion, as per my scenario above. > [@](#): > > (Sorry if this is sorta muddled…I’m doing it at work, on the fly, and with one eye out for my judge.) Heh, you and me both. > [@](#): > > Could you explain this further? You mean median voter theory? [This](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Median_Voter_Theory) is not spectacularly informative, but it gets the job done. Result is that all ideological profiles converge upon the median voter’s, no one votes, the election is decided by a coin toss. > [@](#): > > I’m no longer sufficiently versed in game theory to articulate what I mean. 🙂 If everybody gives (or solicits) because everyone else gives (or solicits), while secretly wishing they didn’t have to give (or solicit), why wouldn’t there be a way to force cooperation? Wouldn’t a blanket prohibition accomplish exactly that? I do not believe it would in the real world. All this accomplishes is raising the costs for bet hedging. If the costs are higher and the participants are fewer, the rewards will also be higher, which, of course, in turn affects the corporations’ strategic contribution decisions. Regulation and prohibition rarely change the structural incentives of anything. If we know anything at all, we know that people respond to incentives. > [@](#): > > Even if true, I think it’s preferable to policy decisions prompted on behalf of the interests of the monied to the exclusion of others. But there’s some good argument fodder there. This is actually a really good point. 😉 Interestingly enough, it is also something that can be modeled. One can test whether policy outcomes based on probabilistic calculations of future support from a population with private preferences are more optimal than outcomes based on a public preference profile that contains preferences associated with “monied interest.” Hmm. ---
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 6:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/26 "2005-07-15T18:38:04Z")
> [@](#): > > Suppose we could somehow come up with a way in which campagne donations could ONLY be made anonymously. This is an excellent idea. See Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 837 (1998); Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Voting With Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (2002). **Maeglin** , your response to follow. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 7:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/27 "2005-07-15T19:04:40Z")
Oh, and also see [A Modest Proposal For Campaign Finance Reform](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=22558), posted by me five years ago. 🙂 **Maeglin:** > [@](#): > > The result is that more people engage in ex post seeking behavior and perhaps the total pool of donated money increases in equilibrium. Even if you’re right – that’s such a fun debate phrase, isn’t it? – even if you’re right, this is a normatively acceptable outcome for me. A ton of people and many corporations giving, say, $2 million to each campaign is better than very few people and many corporations giving a total of $1.5 million to _both_ campaigns. Especially if it means that neither the people nor the corporations are giving to both sides simply to ensure ex post access. Public participation is public participation. > [@](#): > > You mean median voter theory? This is not spectacularly informative, but it gets the job done. Result is that all ideological profiles converge upon the median voter’s, no one votes, the election is decided by a coin toss. Thanks. But no, I was more confused about the second sentence: > [@](#): > > Contract the donor base even further and the individual donors care less about policy and ideology as long as their checks are getting cut. Did you mean “candidates” when you wrote donors the second time? If not, I need some elucidation. > [@](#): > > I do not believe it would in the real world. All this accomplishes is raising the costs for bet hedging. If the costs are higher and the participants are fewer, the rewards will also be higher, which, of course, in turn affects the corporations’ strategic contribution decisions. Regulation and prohibition rarely change the structural incentives of anything. If we know anything at all, we know that people respond to incentives. Is this a variation of the petitioners’ argument in _McConnell_, “People are always going to find a way around existing campaign finance restrictions, so why have restrictions at all?” Or are you contesting my notion that perhaps neither the donors nor the candidates particularly like the practice of bet-hedging, and only do it because everyone else does? Or are you saying that, were bet-hedging to be prohibited, donors (seeking to gain an advantage) would invariably find some way to gain access to the eventual victor, whether pre-election or post-? > [@](#): > > Interestingly enough, it is also something that can be modeled. One can test whether policy outcomes based on probabilistic calculations of future support from a population with private preferences are more optimal than outcomes based on a public preference profile that contains preferences associated with “monied interest.” Hmm. Hmm indeed. ---
**Author:** ![Maeglin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/8baadc/32.png) [@Maeglin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Maeglin)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 7:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/28 "2005-07-15T19:49:17Z")
> [@Gadarene](#): > > Oh, and also see > > **Maeglin:** > > Even if you’re right – that’s such a fun debate phrase, isn’t it? – even if you’re right, this is a normatively acceptable outcome for me. A ton of people and many corporations giving, say, $2 million to each campaign is better than very few people and many corporations giving a total of $1.5 million to _both_ campaigns. Especially if it means that neither the people nor the corporations are giving to both sides simply to ensure ex post access. Public participation is public participation. Mon Dieu, there’s that horrible word “normative” again. By what standard is this a normatively acceptable outcome? If I can demonstrate that it is not pareto optimal, would it still be normatively acceptable? An environment in which everyone has to choose ex post seeking behavior and will achieve benefits probabilistically creates a serious drag on disposable income and will increase the price of goods consumed by political campaigns. How is this an optimal policy outcome? > [@](#): > > Did you mean “candidates” when you wrote donors the second time? If not, I need some elucidation. Ah, ok, requires a little bit of backtracking. You discussed the possibility that platforms converge. My thinking is that they already do. If you contract the number of supporters a candidate needs to have to win, you increase the number of possible policies a leader can implement that can still satisfy their private goods needs. A leader doesn’t need a balancing act as long as he can pay off his cronies. If he has to pay off a lot of cronies, the job is harder and he has less fewer policy options that satisfy all of them. > [@](#): > > Is this a variation of the petitioners’ argument in _McConnell_, “People are always going to find a way around existing campaign finance restrictions, so why have restrictions at all?” No. The fact that people are going to find a way around them does not imply that no restrictions should occur. I think Mitch McConnell is a world class dickhead, btw. [/quote] Or are you contesting my notion that perhaps neither the donors nor the candidates particularly like the practice of bet-hedging, and only do it because everyone else does? [/quote] No. I think that the donors probably like it quite a bit. However, if you really think about this, another game theory problem unfolds. Suppose you hedge and give money to Candidates A and B. B wins a close fought election and comes to power. He goes to [www.opensecrets.org](http://www.opensecrets.org) to figure out who donated to him so he can write his payback checks accordingly. “Hmm, **Gadarene** gave ten bucks to me and ten bucks to my opponent. What a little shyster, he thought he could play both sides and didn’t really care who won. No pork for him! Now **Maeglin** , on the other hand, gave zippo to the opposition and ten bucks to me. He must have really wanted me to win. He has a high affinity for my politics, and will probably be a loyal sumbitch. I can count on his vote and support in the future. He gets a monorail in his village.” Campaign donation then becomes a signalling game. What is the optimal donation you can make given your preferences over outcomes, your beliefs about the candidates’ probabilities of victory, and your beliefs about what the rest of the pack is donating? If you hedge too much, you signal your lack of preference over outcomes and can be safely ignored by the elected leader. He will rightly believe that since you gave equally, you are such a greedy little bum that he can count on your support no matter what he does. The donor’s job is to signal to both politicians that you are going to be loyal. This is not an easy problem to solve. > [@](#): > > Or are you saying that, were bet-hedging to be prohibited, donors (seeking to gain an advantage) would invariably find some way to gain access to the eventual victor, whether pre-election or post-? Not saying that either. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 8:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/29 "2005-07-15T20:22:42Z")
> [@](#): > > Mon Dieu, there’s that horrible word “normative” again. By what standard is this a normatively acceptable outcome? If I can demonstrate that it is not pareto optimal, would it still be normatively acceptable? An environment in which everyone has to choose ex post seeking behavior and will achieve benefits probabilistically creates a serious drag on disposable income and will increase the price of goods consumed by political campaigns. How is this an optimal policy outcome? First off, acceptable and optimal are two different things. 😉 Second, what in the real world _is_ pareto optimal?? I do think it’s a pareto superior outcome, but I’d be happy to be shown differently. Third, normatively acceptable by my standard, although I’m admittedly not your dieu. 😃 And normatively acceptable for some of the reasons I’ve sketched out: increased public participation in the political process, corporate contributions having less marginal value than they otherwise would, less appearance of corruption (the prevention of which is, after all, a compelling governmental interest in its own right, causing as it does disaffection and apathy). > [@](#): > > No. I think that the donors probably like it quite a bit. Bet-hedging, you mean? Why? They’re spending $x+$y for, at best, $x or $y value, and run the risk (as you note) of being tarred as insufficiently loyal by the eventual victor and not given any spoils at all. > [@](#): > > “Hmm, Gadarene gave ten bucks to me and ten bucks to my opponent. What a little shyster, he thought he could play both sides and didn’t really care who won. No pork for him! Now Maeglin, on the other hand, gave zippo to the opposition and ten bucks to me. He must have really wanted me to win. He has a high affinity for my politics, and will probably be a loyal sumbitch. I can count on his vote and support in the future. He gets a monorail in his village.” Heh. Or the result of the information might simply be tree-shaking behavior by the candidate. Check out this testimony from a CEO, as quoted in _McConnell_: > [@](#): > > \*f you’re giving a lot of soft money to one side, the other side knows. For many economically-oriented donors, there is a risk in giving to only one side, because the other side may read through FEC reports and have staff or a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a certain committee has had their contributions to the other side noticed. They’ll get a message that basically asks: ‘Are you sure you want to be giving only to one side? Don’t you want to have friends on both sides of the aisle?’ If your interests are subject to anger from the other side of the aisle, you need to fear that you may suffer a penalty if you don’t give. . . . [D]uring the 1990’s, it became more and more acceptable to call someone, saying you saw he gave to this person, so he should also give to you or the person’s opponent. You’re right, though, that sometimes bet-hedging is frowned upon. To quote from my paper: For example, the Republican National Campaign Committee instituted the “75 Percent Club” explicitly to counter bet-hedging by business; the club gives “special access to political action committees that give at least [75 percent] of their donations to GOP candidates.” Mike Allen, Democrats Gain as Business Hedges Bets; House Campaign Arm Leads GOP in Money, WASHINGTON POST, October 17, 2000, at A11. > [@](#): > > Campaign donation then becomes a signalling game. What is the optimal donation you can make given your preferences over outcomes, your beliefs about the candidates’ probabilities of victory, and your beliefs about what the rest of the pack is donating? If you hedge too much, you signal your lack of preference over outcomes and can be safely ignored by the elected leader. He will rightly believe that since you gave equally, you are such a greedy little bum that he can count on your support no matter what he does. That’s one of the more interesting aspects of this – the possibility for signaling intensity. Why don’t most bet-hedging donors just give equally to competing candidates? Some give 60-40, some give 70-30 – some even give 90-10! In part it must be that the donors are either a) counting on the candidates not to know how much their opponents have been given, but to weigh the donation instead as against contributions by other donors to that candidate, or b) to understand that, relatively speaking, the NRA (for example) giving 15% of its contributions in a given race to the Democratic candidate is a big deal, and to be accordingly obeisant. To forestall your question about marginal value: Let’s say that no matter what, the corporate donors will contrive to give $100,000 more than the Joe Blows out there in order to maintain the weight of their contribution. Notice first that this is assuming that there’s no contribution ceiling, which is counterfactual on the federal level. If there’s a limit to the amount any one donor can give, then the problem you outline in the first place as your response to my refined scenario becomes easier to deal with. But assuming no ceiling, my argument is that a corporate donation of $100,100 in a world where Joe Blow donates $100 has greater utility to the corporation than a corporate donation of $500,000 in a world where Joe Blow donates $400,000. I don’t think it’s likely that Joe Blow will, or can, habitually donate $400,000. But 40,000 Joe Blows could, and I don’t foresee that having the effect you describe on disposable income and the cost of goods. > [@](#): > > Ah, ok, requires a little bit of backtracking. You discussed the possibility that platforms converge. My thinking is that they already do. If you contract the number of supporters a candidate needs to have to win, you increase the number of possible policies a leader can implement that can still satisfy their private goods needs. A leader doesn’t need a balancing act as long as he can pay off his cronies. If he has to pay off a lot of cronies, the job is harder and he has less fewer policy options that satisfy all of them. Now I gotcha. But I don’t know if I agree. Doesn’t it depend on the preference intensity of the donors and the range of policies desired? If I only need one donor to win, that donor is sure as shit gonna understand the leverage they hold over my campaign, and will expand their policy demands accordingly. Contrariwise, if you’re beholden to a number of donors, but each, recognizing that they’re but a small cog in your campaign machine, would be satisfied with relatively small favors (hell, even access by itself might be enough!) in exchange for their contribution, the candidate might end up freer overall as a result. ---
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 8:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/30 "2005-07-15T20:35:18Z")
> [@](#): > > “Hmm, Gadarene gave ten bucks to me and ten bucks to my opponent. What a little shyster, he thought he could play both sides and didn’t really care who won. No pork for him! Now Maeglin, on the other hand, gave zippo to the opposition and ten bucks to me. He must have really wanted me to win. He has a high affinity for my politics, and will probably be a loyal sumbitch. I can count on his vote and support in the future. He gets a monorail in his village.” One more thing. I don’t think your conclusions necessarily follow, above. If you’re a loyal sumbitch who the now-officeholder can count on for your vote and support in the future, you’re probably gonna continue to support him (or at least not support his opponent) even if you don’t get that monorail. Me, however, he can woo, in the hopes that next time around (assuming, as you care, that the officeholder cares about such things), I’ll see the error of my ways and support only him. Whereupon he can start taking me for granted as well. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 8:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/31 "2005-07-15T20:36:23Z")
…assuming, as you are, that the officeholder cares about such things… ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 8:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/32 "2005-07-15T20:49:35Z")
> [@Magiver](#): > > Nothing is perfect but the 2 party system has worked well over the years. What works well depends on what you’re working on I reckon. The system works well if you’re gunning for a duopoly. But it works pretty shittily if you’re an LP candidate. ---
**Author:** ![Gadarene](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Gadarene](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Gadarene)\ **Post date:** [July 15, 2005, 8:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871/33 "2005-07-15T20:57:41Z")
> [@](#): > > But it works pretty shittily if you’re an LP candidate. Or, indeed, if you’re an LP voter. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/some-federal-election-law-ideas/311871.md?page=1)