State Ordinances vs. Federal Law (CO Baker)

[Darth_Panda]

@Sinisterniik

I did indeed come looking to be informed, but you’ve only given me your opinion -which I would have been happy to hear in GD. In GQ, however, I’m interested in either quantifiable facts or strong logical arguments -neither of which you have provided. So, when you simply tell me that I’m wrong and you know better, I just don’t believe you. Why should I? If you are indeed an expert, come up with relevant cases or cite texts. Or if you don’t have anything relevant to add, just don’t reply to the thread. I’m not trying to make an enemy, I just feel like our back and forth is extremely unproductive and a distraction from the rest of the thread.

You need to re-read the thread. I’ve provided many cites. You just don’t like them, because they don’t agree with your worldview.

For example, I’ve given you case law, that cited other case law. I’ve also given you state statutes, would you like to comment on why you don’t think that this is good law?

Your interpretation of this thread is as flawed as your interpretation of the law.

Quote:
Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not, ex proprio vigore, limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution. Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 386 U. S. 62 (1967). See also 407 U.S. at 407 U. S. 569-570.
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/fede...7/74/case.html

What cites have you provided?

[Darth_Panda]

More cites, with none of my own opinion. Just read the law.

@Sinisterniik

1. If this went to the highest court possible (Supreme, I presume), would federal law trump the CO legislation?

Page 358 U. S. 18
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the “supreme Law of the Land.” In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as “the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U. S. 177, that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3 “to support this Constitution.” Chief Justice Taney, speaking for a unanimous Court in 1859, said that this requirement reflected the framers’
“anxiety to preserve it [the Constitution] in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State. . . .”
Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 62 U. S. 524.
No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that:
“If the legislatures of the several states may at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery. . . .”

Cooper v. Aaron - 358 U.S. 1 (1958)

@Sinisterniik

2. In general, would this type of omission in a federal law trump a state’s attempt to expand the protections (That’s what I see going on here: not a specific contradiction of the law)?

Held:

1. This case is properly before this Court as an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). A state constitutional provision is a “statute” within the meaning of § 1257(2), and in deciding that the State Constitution gave appellees the right to solicit signatures on appellants’ property, the California Supreme Court rejected appellants’ claim that recognition of such a right violated their “right to exclude others,” a fundamental component of their federally protected property rights. Pp. 447 U. S. 79-80.

Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)

(b) The requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants’ property rights under the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, appellants having failed to demonstrate that the “right to exclude others” is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it amounted to a “taking.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164, distinguished. And there is no merit to appellants’ argument that they have been denied property without due process of law, where they have failed to show that the due process test whereby the challenged law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and the means selected must have a real and substantial relation to the objective to be obtained, is not satisfied by the State’s asserted interest in promoting more expansive rights of free speech and petition than conferred by the Federal Constitution. Pp. 447 U. S. 82-85.

Id.

[Darth_Panda]

Individuals with disabilities also may be protected by their state anti-discrimination laws, some of which are more stringent than the federal laws.

http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/disability/laws.htm

The Division’s prohibition against harassment is broader than federal antidiscrimination laws
and, as such, harassment may violate Division policy even where it does not rise to the level of 6
unlawful harassment in violation of federal law. Examples of harassment that may violate the
law and will violate this policy include:

http://www.justice.gov/crt/employment/eeopolicy2012.pdf

Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 331 U. S. 230 (1947). But as the Court stated in Rice:
"Such a purpose [to displace state law] may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 250 U. S. 566, 250 U. S. 569; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 236 U. S. 439; Charleston
Page 451 U. S. 747

Maryland v. Louisiana - 451 U.S. 725 (1981)

As the majority acknowledges, ante , at 11, under prevailing principles, any examination of the scope of a preemption provision must “ ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by … Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) ); see also, e.g. , California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316, 325 (1997) ; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 475 (1996) .

LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. v. REILLY ( Nos. 00-596 and 00-597 )

LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. v. REILLY

[Darth_Panda]

we ‘wor[k] on the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress’ ” (citation omitted)). Thus, when the text of a
pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily “accept the reading that
disfavors pre-emption.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
544 U. S. 431, 449 (2005).

ALTRIA GROUP, INC., ET AL. v. GOOD ET AL

07-562.pdf

Dual Sovereignty. There are three types of dual sovereignty:
…
(2) Direct andpositive conflict between state and federal
laws-a state law is valid unless there is a conflict
with a federal law on the same subject (e.g., Civil
Rights Act of 1964);

Federal Statutory Preemption
of State and Local Authority:
History, Inventory, and Issues

U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

a-121.pdf

[BigT]

@Sinisterniik

I did indeed come looking to be informed, but you’ve only given me your opinion -which I would have been happy to hear in GD.

No, he’s told you the facts. You’ve asserted that your opinion somehow trumps the facts. The fact is that the law sees a right as something that can’t be taken away, and you can stand until you are blue in the face quoting the dictionary or court rulings you don’t understand and it won’t change how the law works.

[Sinisterniik]

Thanks to almost everyone for thoroughly answering my questions.

[Darth_Panda]

@Sinisterniik

Thanks to almost everyone for thoroughly answering my questions.

After having your questions thoroughly answered, what is your conclusion?