STEM Dopers, how Do you View Social Sciences?

That’s the same as a hypothesis, though. Otherwise known as a SWAG (scientific wild-assed guess). There has to be some idea of what a mathematician or scientist is working toward, but until they have much more solid evidence, it remains a guess. The difference only arises with theory vs. proof, where both require significant outside vetting, but a theory is usually just the best available explanation for something, whereas a proof is treated as True in some deep way.

Both are falsifiable, because while proofs are generally pretty solid, they are nevertheless human creations and it only takes one identified counterexample or missed step to demonstrate that a proof is incorrect (which of course shouldn’t be conflated with proving that the opposite is true).

A hypothesis in my book is a bit higher than a SWAG (and below a theory). A SWAG is what you come up with in the shower. Usually you self-refute it before exposing it to others. You can do a little research and find counter-examples without even doing experiments. If you can’t find any, then it might be a hypothesis and you can try to falsify it through experiment.

I’d say that a hypothesis that got falsified is still a hypothesis (though a wrong one) while a proof which gets falsified is not really a proof at all, but something mislabeled a proof. I’ve seen plenty of examples.

No, I don’t think it is. There are conjectures for which there is a great deal of evidence, but evidence and proof are fundamentally different things in mathematics, and no mathematician would put such a conjecture in the same category as theorems that have been proven true.

??? That’s not remotely what I said.

A hypothesis in science is the starting point for something that evolves into a theory. The evidence may be weak, or even seemingly contradictory, but it is something that is thought to be a potentially compelling explanation for some phenomenon.

A conjecture fits into just the same place. It’s not a proof, and while there may be indicators that it’s true, it needs to be developed more before it’s anything but an educated guess. It is a starting point, though, in the same way that a hypothesis is.

Of course, the standards for “evidence” are different between math and science–but then, the same is true between different branches of science. My point is that hypothesis->theory is the same basic pattern as conjecture->proof, in that there is a weakly-supported starting point that nevertheless establishes a framework for further work into something more widely accepted.

Well, I suppose that’s true in a tautological sense, but nevertheless there are many proofs in the history of math that were later shown to be false, or at least had a much narrower scope than initially thought, or depended on unstated axioms.

Sure, there’s some gray area. Though I’d posit that a SWAG (and not a WAG) has some evidence in favor of it and isn’t just a shower thought. Back of the envelope, at least…

I would say there is a step change between what amounts to a guess, with varying degrees of evidence, vs. a theory, in which all of the niggling details have been worked out, and it has passed a peer review process, and it has established itself as being an essentially correct explanation. And even though the sciences cannot truly prove things in the way it’s possible in math, they are still obligated to be mathematically consistent (especially as you get to the theoretical physics end of things).

I find engineers are one ones with the biggest zeal to stratify fields into grades of “science-y-ness” in order to then denigrate pursuits they don’t understand or appreciate as “less than”. It reeks a bit of overcompensation, likely because they don’t know enough to know how much they don’t know.

I think that you could fairly say that, say, the Goldbach Conjecture has been extensively empirically tested, and even therefore say that it’s a theory. Or, if that’s not practical enough to be considered a theory, you could say that it’s a theory that P ≠ NP. So there is room for there to be theories in mathematics.

It’s just that mathematicians don’t concern themselves overly much with theories, because unlike scientists, they have access to theorems, which are even stronger.

Yeah, engineers are the worst of the applied sciences. Pure sciences laugh at them and all their empirical evidence.

Speaking as someone with an engineering degree… :wink:

Most science and engineering students tell friendly jokes about the subject. As an engineering student, they can occasionally take this too seriously, but this generalization only applies with broad brushes because many STEM students actually have interest and aptitude in social subjects. Feynman’s (paraphrased) quote best reflects the truth - The moon is beautiful to both physicists and poets, but understanding its gravity and orbits makes it more beautiful, not less so.

In fact, the push to make social subjects sciences usually came from the other direction. Economists and others wanted to better understand their disciplines and also desired people take them more seriously. There were many efforts to find “laws”, use mathematical models and experiment within the limitations of the field. These differ in how much they mimicked “science”, were sometimes successful and sometimes less so. Since these fields are better established, making the distinction should not be important. But it still probably is, sigh, due to research funding, perception, enrollment numbers and ego. Statistics is important in most disciplines.

And I’m saying there are several steps between SWAGs and theories. (I’m assuming the person making the SWAG has enough background to know of some evidence that might support it. I’m not interested in the WAGs of the totally ignorant.) You try to falsify it. You talk about it to a few colleagues who try to falsify it.You do a seminar. In my field you can show it at a workshop which is for ideas and does not count as a real publication. You can send it in to a journal. You can redo the experiment when you get rejected. You publish. If it is significant someone pays attention. Then you might have something close to a theory.
I was on a committee once that defined the different stages of a project development process and which gave more funding the further you were along it. Not quite SWAGs (which get recognized) or theories, but analogous.

Let’s not forget that meteorology, which I think most of us would accept as a science, also has multiple contradictory models which may or may not work. And it’s easier than economics.
Except meteorologists admit they are wrong more readily.
There was a great article in the New Yorker after the beginning of the Great Recession where the reporter talked to a bunch of people in the Chicago Econ department, all of whom were wrong in their predictions and most of who refused to admit it. Then the reporter talked to Thaler (who is in the business school) who laughed at all of them.

Physics also has models not always compatible. The math and computer modelling involved in meteorology can be astoundingly complicated. It is right surprisingly often (with precipitation, say) and not so good at other things (earthquakes). The perception you can tell when it will rain by the appearance of the sky might diminish the deep science involved. The perception you can tell and modify the path of a hurricane through presidential fiat and cheap stationery diminishes everybody.

You are, of course, correct. Famously there was a “proof” in the 1880s of the four color conjecture that stood for a decade before the gap was found. And the eventual computer assisted argument was also widely doubted at first.

But the real point is that no amount of failure to refute a conjecture will lead anyone to accept it. 170 years of being unable to refute the Riemann hypothesis has not led anyone to accept it. Only proofs are accepted. Proofs, especially, of well known questions, will be examined closely.

Understood. My point was mostly related to the nature of a conjecture vs. hypothesis, which both exist in a state of “well, it’s interesting, but it needs a lot of work before we say it’s true.” The nature of that further work may differ.

Despite the differences between mathematical proof and scientific theory, I would still say that both are on the same spectrum. Science isn’t really about piling up evidence, after all–it’s about coming up with explanations. You use evidence to reject bad explanations. And in some cases, only to pin down some constants (for instance, starting only with symmetry arguments, you can derive special relativity–experiment is only required to figure out if the speed of light is infinite or some finite value). In some ways it is very much like pure math, starting with some assumptions and deriving as much as possible from them.

One of the core problems is that we are increasingly dealing with complex systems, and we are attempting to treat them as if they are merely complicated and can be broken down and understood through a process of reduction, like figuring out how a watch works.

This is not so much about STEM vs social sciences, but about using the wrong tools for the iob. Complex systems can be found in just about every field, STEM or otherwise. The thing is. as we learn more about complexity and its ramifications we should be more humble about our ability to predict future behaviour or understand in detail what’s going on inside them.

For example, economists like to break down complex interactions in the economy into aggregates like ‘labor’ or ‘unemployment rate’. But in reality there are many unemployment rates, and many different kinds of labor. The more you dig, the more you find. But aggregates are easier to work with in models and equations. It’s kind of like trying to understand a complex ecosystem by breaking it down into ‘animals’, ‘plants’ and ‘food’. Good luck.

Another example is the concept of ‘equilibrium’ - the assumption that variables in economies find an equilibrium, and when shocked tend to to return to that equilibrium. Handy, because we can then model the economy with differential equations and other math. But it’s not true. An ‘equilibrium’ is a temporary meta-stability or stable zone in a constantly adapting aystem. But sometimes a shock causes the entire system to reconfigure or collapse, or after a shock the system will find a new equilibrium different than the old one, and do it in completely unpredictable ways.

If the signals are strong enough, it can look very predictable - until suddenly it isn’t. Raise the price of something, and demand goes down according to theory, Keep doing it, and maybe at some point it exceeds the price of a better alternative and the demand suddenly and unpredictably crashes to zero. Or the price drives everyone to a completely different type of product, and the whole supply chain crashes.

This happened when the luxury tax was passed. Standard models showed that the tax would make money. What happened is that the tax was applied to products that have very elastic demand, and it nearly cratered entire industries until the tax was repealed.

I think we just went through such an event. A lot of peoole assumed that after the lockdowns and COVID things would go back to ‘normal’, or re-find our past equilibria. But that’s not what’s happened. After a long enough period of being in a ‘shocked’ state, the economy found new equilibria, and we are now in the process of discovering what’s different.

For example, large numbers of peoole are now refusing to work in offices. Some sectors of the economy have lost value, and others have gained it. It looks like some of the shifts may be permanent - office space is being converted to apartments in many cities, for example. Some people aren’t going to work at all.

Looked at in aggregate, we have very low unemployment. But that hides the severe dislocations that have happened in specific job sectors. Service jobs lack workers, factory jobs lack workers, but the job participation rate is down substantially since pre-Covid. Lots of people sitting at home while jobs need doing, because of a new mismatch between the jobs available and what people who trained for or are willing to do.

Complex systems have the characteristic that they can look simple from a distance, but get increasingly complex as you dive into them. In comparison, a watch can look very complicated (watch movemrnts are literally called ‘complications’), but as you take them apart and look more closely they get simpler. And if you can understand how the parts fit together, you can understand the whole watch.

It’s the opposite for complex aystems. And because complex systems’ behaviour is driven more by interactions between parts than the characteristics of the parts themselves, once you drill down to a certain point the behaviour of the system is no longer visible. Detailed study of a neuron will not tell you much about a mind and what it’s doing.

Even standard methods of testing theories in economics are suspect. For example, predicting future behaviour by looking at the past behaviour of a complex adaptive system is fraught with peril. All you are really seeing by looking at the past is the particular directed random path the economy took before - an economy that no longer exists. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that even if you could go back in time and re-run events, the economy might respond in a completely different way. So not only can you not predict the future, you can’t even say that what happened in the past would happen again if you could do it over.

One caveat: Complex systems CAN be predictable in a certain range, if the forces are strong enough. Complexity happens ‘on the edge of chaos’. For example, if you swing a double pendulum hard enough, its behaviour is perfectly predictable at first. But as it slows down, eventually it will go chaotic and completely unpredictable. Then as it slows down further it becomes predictable again as it will just swing back and forth.

Like rhe pendulum, you can predict certain responses in complex systems when the changes are big enough. Raise taxes on boats 50%, and it’s almost certain fewer boats will be made. But from there, and over time as feedbacks happen and the economy adapts, it gets harder and harder to see what will happen. What will the economy look like ten years after the boat tax? No one knows. Anyone who says they do is lying, no matter how much math they use.

One reason why I believe ‘experts’ are losing credibility is because too many of them are claiming expertise over things where expertise isn’t possible - like predicting the GDP effect of a legislative change ten years down the road.

In fairness to many of these fields, they get a bad rap because of a media selection process. Predictions sell, so a reporter calls an economist and asks, “How will the new budget affect GDP over five years?” If the economist says “How should I know? I’m an economist, not a fortune teller,” the reporter will just keep calling economists until they find one willing to step out on a limb. Then the headline gets written as, “Economists say…”

And there is big incentive for being one of those guys. You get fame, the school gets fame, etc. You get to go on talk shows, and you can write books and make money. Try making money on a book titled, “The future? Hell if I kmow.”

And if you make enough predictions some are bound to be correct. So you downplay the misses, play up the hits, and it looks like you are expert in predicting what will happen.

That’s also how psychics do it.

How much do you think this is economists being simplistic and how much the expression of economics that we read about being simplified. Academics love to add variables, but if someone asks for a prediction of what would happen under a given policy they can’t really give them 10 page equations or massive computer models.
Again using the weather example, only recently has weather reporting at the local level (or the Weather Channel) explicitly laid out multiple models to show that they may predict very different outcomes.I suspect many viewers, who are confused about the probability of rain, are really confused by multiple models.
Let’s also remember that progress in complex fields is incremental. If people couldn’t publish unless they took into account the real complexity of a problem, nothing would ever get published. Look how much more complicated the expression of our genes is than anyone thought fifty years ago. If Mendel tried to experiment with the true genetic variation of his peas, he would have thrown up his hands.
When I started in my field we used a model for circuit faults based on an obsolete technology. Over 40 years we developed better models with incremental improvements. I once moderated a contentious panel about this. But given the state of technology in 1980 if we tried to use more accurate models we’d not have gotten anywhere.
Economics is a lot more difficult than this. Given the crash due to Covid, the government(s) arguably saved their economies by pouring in money. Would have been nice to accurately model the effects of this, but not worth people forced into the streets. And would economists have even tried to take supply chain issues into account? Toilet paper hoarding? Zoom?

There is always a limit on what you can do, and the model must be valid or else the results will be garbage, but what is wrong with a massive computer model incorporating 10 pages of equations? Seems like you can do a lot more of that for the same amount of money today than in 1980.

There is nothing wrong with it for the people doing the research. If an executive in the government asks for an explanation of a prediction, and you dump 10 pages of equations on them, how do you think that is going to go?
For weather, while each model is more accurate and can include more data and more complexity, no amount of computing power is going to tell you which model is best.
At one point in my life I was doing press interviews, and I learned that the way to make them work was to have sound bites ready. The people I spoke to were (mostly) smart, but they couldn’t be expected to be experts in my area. I had to bite my tongue and not give all the caveats I was thinking of. Was I inaccurate? Sure. But I could at least communicate the main point.

There are wicked problems which are genuinely hard to solve, and complicated problems which can be usefully simplified by picking the right variables making the biggest contribution. Any problem can be made impossibly detailed. Mathematical modelling does not have to be off by too much for the results to be garbage.

Part of the problem with economics is sometimes being overconfident in an oversimplistic approximation - which may presuppose untrue or unlikely things like perfectly rational people, competition, perfect market knowledge, ceterus paribus constants and so forth. The model may or may not work, but may not be useful or mislead as to how good it is. “Once in a millennium” things seem to be happening pretty often.

There will always be experts eager to talk to the media who think every nail needs the limited hammers at their disposal. The quality of these experts varies considerably, especially as they tout their correct predictions and conveniently forget or rewrite prior poor guesses…

Rather than calling everything “real” or “not real” science, I think it’s more like a sliding scale where some problems are more “tangled” than others, and this affects how concrete our conclusions can be. Predictive and explanatory power is always what we strive for, but with woolly problems we often have to do the best that we can and make generalizations, find correlations etc, for now.

But it is not something tied to a specific field. Most fields have a mix of concrete and woolly (for now) problems. Consider medicine. Is that “real” science? Because for a lot of drugs and treatments we don’t have a clear model of exactly how they work.