From the replies to this thread like the one above, it seems that few people understand how risk is assessed. Risk evaluation is not just based on the probability of the occurrance of a failure, and certainly not from posterior probability based upon a very limited data set. Risk has to be assessed based also on the extent and persistence of a hazard resulting from failure. The few number of deaths directly resulting from the explosion at Chernobyl #4 has been bandied about as an example of the low consequence of even a worst case failure. However, this argument fails to take into account several factors:
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[li]Chernobyl isn’t a “worst case” event; it is only the worst event that has occurred to date (arguably); the Windscale fire had the potential to create a long term persistent contamination of the environment if environmental factors had been slightly different, and the extent of morbidity and mortality from the 1957 Kyshtym disaster is still not accurately known thanks to Soviet coverup of this failure[/li][li]The Chernobyl plant was located in a remote area, with the only nearby town being Pripyat, which was purpose-built for workers at the plant and was readily evacuated; a commercial plant located adjacent to a more populated area (as with Fukushima) would have had a much greater impact[/li][li]While the number of deaths at Chernobyl were relatively few (and limited to workers attempting to contain the fire), the economic cost and political impact were so great that it both accelerated the insolvency of the Soviet economy and derailed many of the initiatives by Gorbachev to reform the Soviet economy and normalize relations with the West (including the ongoing strategic arms reductions); similarly, remediation of the Fukushima fire will cost vastly more than the value of energy produced by the plant[/li][/ul]
The level of “paranoia” with regard to the potential failures from nuclear power are based upon the impact and persistence of a catastrophic failure, which are much greater than food poisoning, a mine collapse, or even a large conventional explosion. You simply can’t look at the few number of deaths that have resulted from nuclear accidents to date and conclude that nuclear power is inherently safe. Of course, there is significant emotionality in regard to this topic on both sides of the issue, largely by people who are not familiar with the actual hazards and impacts, or the means to prevent or mitigate a failure. Such emotions are not useful in analysis, but they are unfortunately a part of the human condition, the perspective from which is totally inadequate to natively comprehend a system as complex as a nuclear power plant.
The notion of “out of sight, out of mind” for storage of hazardous waste is a prime example of the kind of “somebody else’s problem” thinking that has resulted in many ecological catastrophes. Even when the storage and containment methods are technically adequate, as with the storage of toxic waste in Love Canal by the US Army and later Hooker Chemical and Plastics Company, unmonitored long term storage can result in a loss of “tribal knowledge” and inadvertent exposure and contamination. Even if our current knowledge of the geological stability of a proposed repository indicates that it is geologically stable and any leakage is unlikely to contaminate the water table, the magnitude of hazard should a lack of containment occur over the tens of thousands of years the waste is radioactive bears strong consideration.
If we are going to produce waste from power generation, we should also have and use the means to evaluate and mitigate the persistent hazards of the waste. This applies of course not only to nuclear fission but fossil fuel combustion. With fission, we do have a potential means to process and remediate waste, including making use of it to produce far more energy than current methods. Dumping waste into a hole in the ground, or in a fragile desert ecosystem is not a responsible or conscionable manner of dealing with waste.
This statement is so distant from reality I question that you even have enough knowledge of the topic to express an informed opinion. Nuclear fission is far from “old” (i.e. mature) technology, and there are vast improvements that can be made over the current Generation II operating reactors, and even revolutionary improvements over the advanced Generation III planets. Current systems, even those that are passively safe, require constant monitoring and maintenance for safety and reliability, and as anyone who performs reliability analysis knows people are inevitably the weakest link in any reliability chain. Whatever your emotional or political position is on nuclear fission power, an knowledgable position is that there are dramatic improvements in safety, reliability, and efficacy that can and should be applied.
Stranger