Nope. You can assume a spirit, a soul, magic, whatever you want. Just explain what possible way “free will” is supposed to operate - in a purely logical sense, I’m not asking for a mechanism, you can just assume magic. How do you propose that things interact, how are events related, in a manner that comports with the intuitive sense of “free will”? There is either a causal relationship, that’s determinsm, that’s certainly not “free”. Or there is no causal relationship, non-determinisitc randomness - and the intuition of “free will” is not rolling dice.
So what is “free will” supposed to mean, operationally? There is just no coherent definition. Something nobody can even define sensibly should be discarded as nonsense. The intuition is an illusion.
I suggest that you do some serious academic reading on physicalism, consciousness, and free will, as you don’t seem to have much intellectual background in these fields.
You will find that the whole question is nowhere near as simple as you think. It’s highly complex, highly debatable, and there is no settled or accepted view.
There’s a whole body of knowledge and thinking on the subject that you’re probably unfamiliar with.
If someone says, ‘I don’t believe that gravity is due to the curvature of space, please explain to me why you think it is’, there’s no quick and glib answer you can give. You can only refer them to introductory texts on special and general relativity.
This is a different field from physics, but it’s still a very complex field that many hundreds of highly intelligent people have thought deeply about and discussed in great detail for a very long time. Hundreds of books and thousands of papers have been published on it. There’s no glib and simple way to summarize it.
Before even talking about free will, you need to be familiar with the ‘hard problem of consciousness’, but how is it possible even to give an overview in a few sentences?
The hard problem of consciousness is a genuine and interesting problem, but it’s orthogonal to the notion of free will. Moreover, consciousness is clearly a real phenomenon that requires explanation - we certainly know that we experience consciousness, even if it’s mysterious and we cannot fully explain it.
But no phenomenon that we experience corresponds to free will. We make choices, and we can articulate reasons for those choices. But doing things for reasons isn’t free will, it’s deterministic computation. The notion that we have free will really arises only after we make a choice, from a strong post hoc intuition that we “could have done otherwise”. Yet we have absolutely nothing concrete to support that feeling. All we experience is our actual choices, not the counterfactual hypothetical alternative choices that we feel intuitively that we could have made.
A closer analogy would be that someone claims to believe in god. And when challenged, they refuse to give a clear definition of what they mean by the word “god”, instead they resort to claims that this is a complex field, many thousands of people have thought deeply about it and discussed it in great detail for a very long time, hundreds of books and thousands of papers have been published on it… only sophisticated theologians could possibly even begin to talk about it. But, of course, that’s just deflective waffle. The fact that thousands of sophisticated theologians throughout history may have wasted their lives carries no weight.
But the analogy between god and “free will” breaks down beyond that - because at least god is a coherent concept. It may be implausible to suggest that some all-powerful being is running the universe, but we can certainly form a coherent hypothesis about god’s characteristics, and describe how our notion of god operates. God certainly could exist, and the concept is amenable to rational and empirical enquiry.
But “free will” lacks even a coherent operational definition, it’s in the not even wrong category.
The sole reason anyone entertains the notion of free will is because we have is a strong intuitive feeling that we “could have done otherwise”. Yet if you think more carefully about it, that intuition does not correspond to any observable phenomenon. All we actually observe or experience is the things that do happen, the choices we do make, not the hypothetical alternatives that we feel, after the actual choice has been made, that we were hypothetically “free” to make.
So if you claim that free will is a valid concept, the burden is on you to give me an operational definition. I claim there is none. If I “could have done otherwise”, how would that work?
Again, I’m not asking for a physical mechanism, I talking purely operationally. You can assume mind/body dualism, any kind of undefined magical process to exercise this purported “free will” that you wish, that’s unimportant. I’m asking at a much more basic level about the logical process by which any entity, physical or otherwise, exercises “free will” to make choices.
How does a “free” choice work? If I “could have done otherwise”, how do the two possible outcomes arise? Are the choice made for reasons? If so, that is deterministic computation, the output is determined by causal inputs. That is not free. If the choice is not made for reasons, then by definition it’s random. True randomness is certainly a valid concept, and could give rise to alternative outcomes. But randomness doesn’t correspond to the intuition of free will either, because nobody’s intuitive sense that they “could have done otherwise” comports with the idea of just rolling a dice to generate alternatives.
You can assume that I’m familiar with all the sophisticated philosophical arguments. So - stop copping out, and just tell me, operationally, what you think “free will” is supposed to mean?
We are getting off-topic here, but perhaps we can continue for a little, or start another thread.
Your question deserves a proper answer, but it won’t be short. I don’t think I’ll have a chance to finish writing it today, but I should be able to do it by tomorrow.
I’m not trying to avoid a discussion - on the contrary I find this fascinating - but I need time and thought to express my views fully and clearly enough. So I’ll get back to you, probably tomorrow.
FWIW, I believe that we have “volition” and can make choices, and, in fact, do, every single day. Many of these could, in fact, easily have gone otherwise. Most of us are consciously aware of the process of “making up our minds.”
At very least, can we all agree that Newtonian predeterminism – my choice to post today was inherent in the mixture of particles at the Big Bang – is wrong? I’m pretty sure that information is created, and all the universe’s information was not encoded somehow from the origin of time. Someone knowing the position and velocity of every particle at T=0 could not have predicted the results of the last Super Bowl.
Agree 100%. The definition of free will itself – to the extent that it’s ever concretely defined – is self inconsistent. It’s describing a reasoned action that is somehow also not casually connected to reasons.
So I’m firmly in the “no free will” camp, as long as we’re clear that the non existence of this self inconsistent thing has no relevance to understanding decision making and our degree of autonomy.
Thanks for the link. I’m familiar with Sabine, but I hadn’t seen this video. Obviously my own views on free will are completely aligned with hers, and she says things far more eloquently.
The only thing in her video that I’d take issue with is when she talks about materialism/physicalism. Her argument is that you can’t just wave away materialism, because that is the way the universe works. But I’d make a stronger statement. I don’t think that anything in the dismissal of free will as incoherent depends upon accepting materialism. The dismissal does not rest on the assumption that our brains are just interacting particles like everything else in the universe (even though of course I agree with her that this is in fact the case). Even if we grant that our mind could be a mysterious non-physical entity that has “free will”, and even if we haven’t the faintest idea how this entity works, all the fundamental logical arguments about the operational process of this entity “choosing” still apply. Either this entity makes choices for reasons, in which case it is not free, it is carrying out deterministic computation; or it does things for no reason, and generating a non-deterministic truly random outcome is not free will either.
There’s where we bump: I define free will (volition) as decision making and autonomy! That’s what free will means! Maybe I’ll go to work Monday…or maybe I’ll call in sick. I have that choice.
Well I don’t see any reason to conclude that that’s wrong, so I would still take the “don’t know” position on that.
But I think more importantly, the notion that if I can predict an action, it’s not free, is a misconception right from the start.
Say I offer you a choice of coffee or tea. You reflect upon the fact that you enjoy coffee more, and pick coffee.
The fact that a perfect knowledge of all physical states could have predicted that choice is neither here nor there since a) such perfect knowledge is impossible and b) the prediction necessarily involves modeling your consciousness. We’re essentially running a model of your brain and asking it what it wants to drink.
We already have an undefined term “free will”. “Volition” just seems like another undefined term.
We make choices in the sense that we do things for reasons - we carry out computation.
What evidence do you have that any of these choices could have gone otherwise? For a given prior mental configuration, and precisely the same inputs, explain operationally how two possible outcomes could arise, other than by introducing truly random elements.
Absolutely. I am not diminished as an autonomous entity, as a conscious person, by saying that “all” my brain is doing is deterministic computation. All that really means is to state the obvious - that when I make choices, I make those choices for reasons. That seems to me to be a virtue, not something to have an existentical crisis about.
Not exactly a fair question, because identical situations never occur in the real world. What proof do you have that Last Thursdayism is wrong? You’re asking a nonsense question with a nonsense premise.
The only evidence I have for volition functioning is that my decisions vary in similar situations, and other people, also in highly similar situations, sometimes choose the way I do and sometimes choose the way I don’t.
Also, I believe randomness plays a part. Otherwise Burridan’s ass starves to death.
These situations never occur - exactly. The only phenomena that we observe are the actual choices that we make. And these are fully explained as deterministic computation, making choices for reasons.
I’m saying that no phenomenon exists that corresponds to the ill-defined intuition of free will. If you disagree, the burden is on you to point out that phenomenon.
I comfortably disagree, being aware of my own conscious volition.
Also, are you talking Newtonian determinism, where knowledge of position and velocity of all particles would determine the outcome of events for all time, and “today” was encoded, somehow, at the time of the Big Bang, or a different kind of determinism, where events are determined, perhaps a microsecond in advance, but not farther? The word has these two meanings. To which do you subscribe?
I don’t know what distinction you’re drawing. The way the universe works is a combination of determinism - cause and effect, things happen for reasons - with a sprinkling of non-determinisim, the true randomness apparently inherent in QM where nothing has any influence on the outcome. In fact, I’d go further - these are the only two logical possibilities that events can relate to one another, the only way any universe could work. Things that happen either have a causal deterministic relationship or they don’t.
The point is that neither determinism nor random outcomes comport with the intuitive notion of free will.
On a sort of tangential note, given that mass is mediated by a particle (Higgs boson) and gravity is mediated by a (theoretical) particle (graviton) and the cohesion of quarks in a hadron is mediated by gluons, and paradoxes are mediated by tachyons, when will a theoretician come up with “tyon”, the entanglement particle?