I’ll buy most of that, though my (brief) reading of Duncan is that the court allowed the 1983 claims to go forward under the alternative grounds of 5th Am./Due Process. If you want authority that coercion is actionable under the Fifth Amendment, Duncan is your case, even if it isn’t binding on the Supreme Court.
Perhaps we’ll just have to agree to disagree on this one, minty. My reading of Duncan is just the opposite. My reading is that they pretty clearly indicated that Duncan did not even allege a Fifth Amendment violation, but rather a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation. As such, I would question whether it stands for the notion that coercion is actionable under the 5th Amendment without an attempted use at trial.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Regardless of which of our, most assuredly brilliant, legal minds is correct in this regard all we can really do is sit patiently and await the SCOTUS opinion in the present case to see if they tackle the issue or skirt it once again. At any rate, I appreciate the clarity of your thoughts and the fact that you have taken the time to cite to actual authority to support your opinions. That’s the most you can ask for when you just end up agreeing to disagree, right?
Once again, the USCA lets me down. 
Oh well, while there are plenty of cases saying Miranda violations don’t get you a 1983 claim, I haven’t found any affirmatively saying that actual coercion won’t get you there. Guess we’ll find out in a few months.
The Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Chavez v. Martinez today. Unfortunately, the Court split about six different ways, so it’s damn near impossible to figure out what the holding is. I think the upshot is that you don’t get to sue for a simple Miranda violation, but you do get to sue for a violation of Due Process if the Miranda violation is, like, really bad. Or something.
Like I said, damn if I can figure it out.
I think that’s a fair reading, minty, except that the Due Process speculation is dicta.
And if I may be so bold as to point out my own post of 11-27-2002, I would say I rather nicely predicted the analogy between compelled testimony and this case, and the SCOTUS quote above dovetails pretty well with what I said.
I would also take this opportunity to mention to the White House that, should a spot open up on the high court, I am available.
How many votes are there on that quote? Three?
Cheater! You quoted the headnotes! Plus I think the headnote refers to Part II-A of the lead opinion, which has, I think, the votes only of Thomas, Rhenquist, O’Connor and Scalia. I think.
Probably.
Bah. Of course I only quoted the headnote. If I tried to wade into the full opinion, I’d be sputtering “probably” and “maybe” just now.
Most likely.
Odds are.
Seriously, I think it’s fair to say that the Court left tantilizingly unanswered what sort of circumstances might give rise to a 1983 cause of action… although the shifting majority was in agreement that the Due Process clause is not implicated by the mere failure to read rights to an arrestee before you question him. The Constitutional trigger is pulled upon use of the resulting statements in a criminal proceeding, not before.
I think I have a handle on the case, but it is tenuous and may not be perfectly clear.
What ended up happening is that SCOTUS held that there is no 1983 action for a simple violation of Miranda, and that Martinez has no action for the alleged violation of his 5th Amendment rights. However, he may have a recognizable 1983 claim under Substantive Due Process, so they remanded it back to the 9th Circuit for further hearing on that issue. That’s what I think the holding is, however, getting there is a bit messier.
This is an extremely rare case where there would not have been a decision rendered, except for a compromise. The way I read it: Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Stevens would have affirmed the 9th Circuit and found that the interrogation violated both Martinez’s 5th Amendment rights and his Substantive Due Process rights. However, there would have been no disposition for the court to order unless they agreed with Souter’s decision to remand it back for hearing on the Substantive Due Process issue, so they were forced to agree in that specific disposition. It was only by conceding to the compromise that a disposition could be ordered.
It’s easier to understand the substance of the case by separating the issues into 3 issues:
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Is there a 1983 action for a simple violation of Miranda?
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Did Martinez have a 1983 action for a violation of his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination?
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Did Martinez have a 1983 action for a violation of his 14th Amendment Substantive Due Process rights?
The answers:
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Thomas, Rhenquist, Scalia, O’Connor, Souter, Breyer, Kennedy, and Ginsburg all agree that a simple violation of Miranda would not be sufficient to establish a 1983 action. The basically all agreed that it does not rise to the level of an actionable constitutional right. Stevens, however, wrote in his dissent that their opinion in Dickerson should have made it clear that Miranda is not merely prophylactic and a violation of Miranda should be actionable under 1983.
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Thomas, Rhenquist, Scalia, O’Connor, Souter, and Breyer found that Martinez did NOT have an action under the 5th Amendment (which is, I think, part of the holding of the majority). They focused on the fact that there is no violation of the 5th Amendment until the statements are used (as Bricker pointed out earlier in discussing the Verdugo case. Although Souter and Breyer wouldn’t be as strict about how to determine other cases, they agreed Martinez did not have a sufficient cause for action under 1983. Kennedy and Ginsburg, however, disagreed and would extend the 5th Amendment protections to not just their use, but also the collection of self-incriminating statements. They were of the opinion that Martinez did state a cause of action and did show that the officer violated his 5th Amendment rights, and he should win. Stevens agreed with them.
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Souter and Breyer found that the issue of whether Martinez had stated a proper 1983 action for violation of his Substantive Due Process rights was not decided and voted to remand the case back to the 9th Circuit. Thomas, Rhenquist, and O’Connor found that Martinez did NOT have a cause of action under 1983 for a violation of SDP, and voted to reverse the 9th Circuit. Scalia voted likewise, but wanted to write his own opinion to mock the majority remanding the case when the 9th Circuit seemed to have already decided the SDP issue and thus it should not have been remanded back to them. Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Stevens actually felt that Martinez DID have a 1983 cause of action for the SDP violation, and would have affirmed the 9th Circuit’s decision. That left the court with 4 justices voting to reverse, 3 to affirm, and 2 to remand. Since there is no clear majority to decide what action to take, Kennedy Ginsburg, and Stevens were forced to vote to remand with Souter and Breyer.
It is a pain to get through, but if anyone has any questions as to the substance of their findings, this outline of the opinions may be helpful.
I am posting this with the intention of clarifying my understanding of Miranda jurisprudence.
Minty Green in an earlier post you said it was a right to receive Miranda warnings and relied upon Miranda itself and Dickerson for support. Now I have had a Criminal Procedure class, just two semesters ago, and when you made this statement it sounded rather unfamiliar to me. So I decided to go back and re-read Miranda and Dickerson and I can’t find anything in either decision that states it is a “constitutional right” to be read the Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation commences. Rather it seems the Court articulated a constitutional “rule” but not a constitutional “right”. Is there a distinction? Apparently so.
The Miranda majority admits the Miranda warnings are not necessary so long as some other procedure is effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it. I have not read anything in Dickerson, admittedly in the edited opinion in my book, that changes this aspect of Miranda or transforms it into a right. Rather it appears Miranda made it a rule that in some form or another, whether by the Miranda warnings or a functional equivalent, to alert the defendant of a right to remain silent and the opportunity to continue to exercise this right.
Scalia in his dissent in Dickerson mocks the majority on this point when he says nobody on the majority can come out and say nor did they say in their opinion, "We affirm today custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States."
The fact Miranda is not a “constitutional right” is supported in part by Hamlet’s posting of Chavez v. Martinez where the majority held a simple violation of Miranda would not be sufficient to establish a 1983 action because it did not amount to a violation of a constitutional right. If this is true, then how can it be a right to have Miranda read before custodial interrogation?
I don’t think it is a right but rather a constitutional rule. Am I correct in my reading of Dickerson and Miranda or am I wrong? Is it a “right” to have Miranda read before custodial interrogation?