Harumph. Well…that’s the last thing about which I expected to receive a correction. Being unfamiliar (in the extreme) with Strauss’ work, that was an enlightening article that I would recommend.
Of course, it should be pointed out that Shorris makes the case that Straussians are decidedly not philosopher-kings (understood as “rulers that do not desire power”):
I also found the following to be particularly noteworthy, especially as I don’t recall Plato endorsing the “noble lie” (slavery, sure; perhaps I need to re-read The Republic):
Finally, I think the following snuggles up cozily to Hamlet’s post, with the bolded part explicitly accomodating Shodan’s flaccid objection:
The system of government with checks and balances, the media should serves as one of the checks and balances. If the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government are meant to function as a check and balance of the each other, it can’t work with purchased lawmakers and pervasive corruption aided by a media controlled by corporate interests.
Well, that is a bit over-stated. The mere fact that each of the examples cited were demonstrably wrong doesn’t show that the Bush administration is above reproach; merely that much of the criticism leveled is beneath contempt.
And that when whiny-assed nonsense is refuted, grotesquely foolish strawmen follow.
It’s a bit of an odd argument to say that it’s okay to not get a warrant so long as you tell a judge you’re going to do it, but yes, they secretly briefed the presiding judge in 2001. Here’s what he had to say about it:
Shodan, attempting to knock holes in others’ criticisms of the Bush Admin is certainly not inappropriate to this thread, but I notice you have not yet expressed, let alone defended, any opinions about the proper role and limits of presidential power, what (if anything) to do about the “imperial presidency,” etc. Do you think you could you try to make some more constructive contributions?
In response to the OP, I think that it is a genuinely difficult balance. It is true that historically our system has allowed the President to make constitutional judgments about the execution of laws and to expand his Article II powers in times of war. Jefferson, for example, pardoned everyone convicted under the Alien and Sedition Act–functionally ending it even though it wasn’t struck down by the court for 50 years. It is a short jump from pardoning everyone to writing a signing statement saying at the outset that the law will not be enforced in an unconstitutional way. Lincoln took a ton of extra-constitutional authority during the Civil War (though he had the good sense to go back to Congress to get it all retroactively affirmed).
There are powerful arguments to be made for this strong executive model, and it is almost certainly what the Framers intended. They wanted three co-equal branches, each swearing an oath to the Constitution and defending it will all the power they were given. The idea that the court’s interpretation would trump the interpretation of Congress or the President was an idea created by the court itself (how convenient, right?). Similarly, the framers feared for our common defense much more than modern interpreters suggest. One might argue–and some very smart people have-- hat the common defense was the primary impetus for the rejection of the Article of Confederation.
But the problem with this model is well represented by the current administration. If a President can hoard power in times of a legitimate existential threat to the United States (the civil war), what’s to stop a President from doing so in the face of a non-existential threat (Iraq)? We have developed a system, over time, in which the court’s opinion on the Constitution is elevated above that of Congress and the President, and in which a humble executive is more appropriate than a Lincoln executive. Today, I think a President should enforce the law without regard to his personal reservations until such time as the courts rule on the matter.
We live in a time when Congress can be called to session in very short order, when we have a 24/7, constantly alert national security apparatus, and when we can devote enormous resources to planning for unexpected contingencies before they happen. All of this mitigates the need for the kind of executive the Framers initially sought to create: a mold made for a man like Washington, not Bush.
I know that doesn’t answer the issue of control over bureaucracy, but this post is already too long.
Regarding Hamdi…isn’t it a little strange to argue that the fact that Hamdi had his day in court exonerates the administration, when the very point that the administration was advocating was that Hamdi wasn’t entitled to his day in court?
Padilla ultimately wasn’t allowed to plead his case - the U.S. Supreme Court never did reach the merits. His subsequent civilian court prosecution was wholly due to a unilateral decision on the administration’s part to transfer him to civilian courts just days before their deadline for filing arguments in the Supreme Court. They did so because they didn’t want the case to go before the U.S. Supreme Court and have them issue a definitive ruling on what the limitations of presidential powers were.
What’s strange is the argument that the Bush administration doesn’t want to argue its case in court, followed by links in which the Bush administration argues its case in court.
And there’s one of your strawmen – no one is arguing that the Bush administration isn’t, can’t, or won’t argue its case in court. Everyone is arguing that they don’t want to, are actively avoiding it, and are also taking whatever (possibly underhanded) steps they can to rig the system.
Yeah, but the fact that they’re still willing to argue a case in federal court isn’t exactly a ringing endorsement. Even Nixon did that.
The position they argued in Court was that they didn’t have to argue in Court. They stated that the President was entitled to make a determination of unlawful combatant status and indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen without any oversight whatsoever, and that he wasn’t allowed access to counsel or the courts. They were hoping to nip this whole “arguing their case in court” thing in the bud once and for all. That’s a position one can legitimately disagree with without resorting to “whiny-assed nonsense.” Eight of the nine Justices did.
Brain Glutton, without looking it up, this sounds very similar to a book I read once called “The Imperial Presidency,” or something close to that. It was written in 1987, so it doesn’t cover any Bush administrations. It was COMPLETELY nonpartisan, so nobody need worry that they would be offended. The author made the case that the Executive Branch has been steadily gaining in power, sometimes without even the knowledge of the President. Certainly not something I approve of.
“Short of a constitutional amendment?” I have a hard time seeing that. Sometimes, I have a terrible fear that something REALLY godawful is going to have to happen to curb Executive power. Other times, I’m more optimistic. Maybe we CAN get the necessary amendment(s). I sure don’t trust the Democrats to hold back if they have the authority to declare martial law.
1973, by Arthur Schlesinger. Mainly about the Nixon Administration, in which Cheney served. Savage’s thesis – fairly well-documented in his book – is that Cheney deplored the reaction to Watergate that led Congress to rein in the “imperial presidency” and devoted the rest of his public life to trying to restore the presidency to what he – and Nixon – saw as its properly broad powers; getting tapped by W gave him the opportunity.