# Taking a stand on moral relativism **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 24, 2003, 6:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288 "2003-08-24T06:06:10Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 12
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 2:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/221 "2003-09-07T02:50:30Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by godzillatemple \* > \*\*So, if a society exists, that means it has survived and is therefore successful in an evolutionary sense. Does that mean that every action in that society must be considered “moral” since the society as a whole has survived? Or is it possible that some actions are moral but other actions (which do not offset the other actions enough to kill the society) are immoral? If so, how can judging the validity of an entire society’s ethic system lead one to decide whether particular acts are good or bad? \*\* Few societies have come up with truly innovative strategies. We can usually look at societies that have attempted to deal with similar problems in similar ways, and see how things worked out for them. In other cases, we can attempt to apply logic to known variables and deduce outcomes. This is a limited method, prone to error due to insufficient data and user bias, but it’s all we’ve got. (It wouldn’t have taken a rocket scientist to tell the original natives of Easter Island that they shouldn’t’ve cut down all their trees, for example.) There are a few general principles that can be gleaned from observing developing systems that are sometimes useful. For example, sacrificing long-term goals in favor of immediate payoffs is rarely advisable. > [@](#): > > \*\*Limited accuracy, eh? Extremely limited to the point of uselessness perhaps? Or just mostly useless? As mentioned above, if the validity of a society’s ethic system is determined based on whether the society as a whole has survived or, how does one practically decide if particular acts are moral or not? Or do you really think that if a society permits a single “bad” act to be considered “good,” the society will therefore inevitably fail? \*\* You mean, if the society acts in a way that will eventually cause it to fail, the society will inevitably fail? Well, yes. Obviously. > [@](#): > > **But the very fact that a society exists demonstrates that it has "evolutionary success."** Um, no. Is a species evolutionarily successful because it has at least one member living at one particular time? > [@](#): > > \*\*Therefore, since there are many different societies that have existed for long periods of time and which have different systems of ethics, there must therefore actually be different “right” ethical systems according to your theory. And whether a particular ethical system is “right” or not can only be determined relative to the particular society that holds that system, correct? \*\* No, the rightness of a particular ethical system can only be determined relative to the workings of the universe. Do I have to keep explaining the same answers over and over again? > [@](#): > > \*\*Only possibly? Shouldn’t that be definitely? Again, if the measure of a “correct” system is that it allows a society to survive, doesn’t the fact that there are many different societies, each with a different ethical system, _mandate_ that there are many correct systems under your theory? And if you say that we can’t judge the evolutionary success of a particular society in the short term without waiting to see if it eventually fails, then I again ask how such a theory can be of any practical use? \*\* Why do you keep asking the same question over and over again when it’s been answered pages ago? > [@](#): > > **What “limited conclusions” would those be?** As mentioned before, sacrificing the future to benefit the present is a pretty bad idea. The aspects of the environment that appear most harmful in a balanced system are the most vital to its survival; the beneficial aspects can be the most dangerous All behaviors can be reduced to selfishness, but the definition of ‘self’ is not always obvious. Certain sustainable growth is better than uncertain nonsustainable growth. To produce the most adaptive ideas, place as few restrictions as possible on their generation, but make the selection criteria stringent. Don’t put all your eggs in one basket. There are more, but most of them are difficult to describe in only a few lines, and many apply to specific scenarios. > [@](#): > > \*\*Have there actually been any societies that have survived long enough to qualify as being valid enough to draw conclusions? \*\* Yes, actually. And it isn’t always chronological time that’s important. Evolution is best measured by generational time. > [@](#): > > \*\*And, if so, how can we tell which of the actions sanctioned by such a society’s ethical system are determative of the society’s survival? \*\* Well, the _best_ way is to try variations on the society’s theme, but lack of time and resources usually prevents this. We’re often forced to resort to logic and minor experimentation. > [@](#): > > **Thanks for answering th questions directly, by the way. It’s much appreciated.** I try to respond to all posts, but they pile up so quickly… and it doesn’t help when posts are repeated. [taps toe rebukingly] ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 3:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/222 "2003-09-07T03:14:37Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by TVAA \* > No, the rightness of a particular ethical system can only be determined relative to the workings of the universe. > > Do I have to keep explaining the same answers over and over again? Actually, explaining them once will do. > [@](#): > > As mentioned before, sacrificing the future to benefit the present is a pretty bad idea. Really? A **bad** one, eh? And, pray tell, how do we arrive there? **Is there only one way to arrive there?** > [@](#): > > Well, the _best_ way is to try variations on the society’s theme, but lack of time and resources usually prevents this. We’re often forced to resort to logic and minor experimentation. And, recognizing this, what does it tell us about the plurality of moral systems and selecting between them? ---
**Author:** ![Spiritus\_Mundi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/c68b51/32.png) [@Spiritus\_Mundi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spiritus_Mundi)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 3:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/223 "2003-09-07T03:20:09Z")
**Erl** Looking back, I see that I neglected to return your greeting. Sorry. I hadn’t intended to be rude. Hi. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 4:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/224 "2003-09-07T04:03:11Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi \* > **No. I meant quite simply that you contradict yourself. > [ol][li]There is no such goal. [/li][li]Organisms that don’t have that goal generally do not come to our attention[/ol][/li]The implication of (2), sinc you quite clearly think some organisms do come to our attention, is that there is such a goal, and some organisms have it.** Organisms that we find in the world are usually part of evolved ecosystems; as such, they don’t have those goals, or they wouldn’t have stuck around long enough for us to become aware of them. Interesting things happen when we start mixing ecosystems; new configurations often lead to catastrophic failures. It may be possible for an individual to have such a goal, but not normally a species. A species might be artificially created with such a goal, but it wouldn’t be around for long. > [@](#): > > **Not quite. It depends upon the criteria one uses to evaluate moral strategies. In other words: the underlying assumptions of the “game”.** You mean the laws that govern the workings of the universe? Yes, I agree – the effective strategies are indeed dependent on the laws of the universe. > [@](#): > > **Again, this isn’t really hard to see. But, since determining the “best” outcomes of a moral strategy is itself a moral decision (and a consequentialist one at that), any argument based upon such a model is inherently circular.** Not at all. _We_ don’t make those judgments, any more than our opinions as to the worthiness of a design has any effect as to whether it works. A flawed design is objectively flawed, even if we don’t perceive it. Likewise, a working design will work even if we’re convinced it’s flawed. > [@](#): > > **And this statement, too, is colored by your moral valuation that survival is the only proper measure of a morality. Others have asked you repeatedly why you feel this to be true/correct/inevitable/aesthetically pleasing . . . It’san interesting question. Perhaps one day ou will deign to answer it.** I have already answered it. Not only that, I consider the answer virtually self-evident; I’m having a great deal of trouble understanding why you all don’t understand it. [sigh] It’s trivially obvious that people who have certain beliefs find them appealing, satisfying, and correct (even when they’re not). Therefore, the worth of the moral system can’t be dependent on whether some person likes it; we can easily see that it’s always possible for there to exist some configuration of an organism that values some arbitrary things, much like it’s always possible to make a computational device that reaches some arbitrary conclusion. The question then becomes: what is the point of moral systems? What is their function? Surely when we know what they’re for, we’ll be able to tell which ones do it best. The classic example of the wolves in famine times demonstrates this perfectly well. The wolves don’t have enough to feed both themselves and their pups. Some wolves feed themselves, allowing their pups to starve. Hopefully, they’ll try to have pups again when conditions improve. Other wolves “altruistically” feed their pups. They starve, but their offspring are a year ahead. Which strategy is correct? It depends – if the advantage to the altruistic descendents is greater than the advantage to the selfish parents, the population of wolves will slowly become more altruistic. If it’s the other way around, they’ll become more selfish. If neither, they’ll remain partly selfish and partly altruistic. If the “correct” strategy is whatever the wolves say it is, then the correctness is determined by the ability of the strategies to persist through time. > [@](#): > > \*\*Yes, yes, we all understand the context of survival. The question is not whether the moral systems in question value survival. The question is why **TVAA** feels that **survival is the only valid measure of a moral system**. \*\* Because that’s the result I got when I analyzed the natural of ethics. It’s the same reason that I concluded “A=C” when presented with the statements “A=B” and “B=C”. > [@](#): > > **Thus far, it is a question without an answer.** Asked and answered. > [@](#): > > **How many times must you be asked why persistence is the only valid measures of a bridge?** Ask someone which is more important: that a bridge stays up when they try to cross it, or that the bridge has some other arbitrary property. Guess what they’ll probably tell you. Go on, guess. > [@](#): > > **All I did was explore the thought-experiment that you defined.** Not extraordinarily well, I’m afraid. > [@](#): > > \*\*Ah, but the question was not “how will we gather data.” You have repeatedly aserted that both morality and the laws of physics are ultimately subject to a “unified field theory”. I mentioned that, with regard to moral systems, the necessary incomlpeteness of the data set represents a fallacy to any such strong conclusion. \*\* So? This is the same problem with all attempts to understand the world: limited data produces uncertain resulst, and unlimited data is not theoretically available. > [@](#): > > \*\*You responded: “we’ll try them all out.” > > I responded: “that isn’t a good answer.”\*\* We could try finding an answer through logical assessment of the situation’s known properties, but that’s a second-rate solution at best. It’s like trying to determine the results of an experiment by sitting in an armchair and thinking about it. > [@](#): > > **I agree. Where I disagree is with the decision to assert those conclusions as if they were established fact or represented an overwheming consensus of scientific opinion.** It’s conceptually inevitable. Either our concepts bear no relationship to how the world works, or they do. If they do, my conclusion follows; if they don’t, my conclusion doesn’t follow, but this entire debate is pointless. > [@](#): > > \*\*Right. “Evolution” is a word that carries different connotations in different contexts. You appeal to biological evolution for appeals to scientific authority and in establishing a context of survival as validation. You then blus the distinction by drawing metphors from contexts in wcih evolutin does not carry quite the same meanings. \*\* Biological evolution is a special case of the more general meaning. Of course, ‘evolution’ means “change over time”. Combine the assumption of change with the assumption that some states are more difficult to change than others, and ALAKAZAM! we’re forced to a conclusion. > [@](#): > > \*\*Perhaps we should start a different thread to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the “Meme hypothesis”. If you mean to argue that memetic theory has the weight of current scientific consensus behind it, then I doubt that ou will be successful. \*\* Part of the problem is that there is no scientific consensus on the nature of life; consequently, it’s not surprising that scientists can’t agree on whether there are living ideas or not. Meanwhile, culture continues, science marches onward, ideas are transmitted and spread throughout the noosphere. To me, it feels like much like arguing over whether it’s theoretically possible for a bumblebee’s anatomy to enable it to fly when there’s a small swarm of them hovering around the mint outside my window. Either the answer is ‘yes’, or the theory is wrong. > [@](#): > > **I agree that “memes are nifty”. I do not agree that they exist in any rigorously meaningful sense.** With respect, sir, neither do you or I. Nevertheless, the conversation continues. > [@](#): > > \*\*“The grinding of sand” is a poor dialectical metaphor to illustrate a truth about evolution in a biological context. Creative? Perhaps, but I would have to see the rest of the poem to judge properly. \*\* It’s a good thing I wasn’t using it in a biological sense, then. [whew] > [@](#): > > \*\*I disaree. There is nothing at all extraordinary about market forces shaing a product in manners that are unanticiapted by manufacturers and not consciously appreciated by consumers. One could hardly express a more expected event in a dynamic mrket. \*\* Bingo! It’s as expected as the evaporative cooling of water, which is why it’s so remarkable. People find it obvious that the distribution of the water molecules’ kinetic energy will change in predictable ways over time, yet they don’t perceive that the distribution of belief in moralityspace will alter in predictable ways over time. “Intelligent” behavior arises from utterly nonintelligent behavior. This is simultaneously a wondrous thing, and utterly obvious. Ethical meaning arises from ethically meaningless principles. Wondrous, and obvious. > [@](#): > > **It is somewhat extraordinary that someone would claim that manufacturers did not consciously attempt to make products that their customers preferred. Or is your surprise simply that the preferences being met were not consciouscly and publicly declared by parents _before_ they were given a choice between “cute” bears and “beary” bears? Having done a bit of market research during my misspent youth, I’m afraid I cannot share your wonder at this event.** What’s so nifty is that the companies did not seem to be explicitly aware that the bears that looked most like human infants were preferred; indeed, they didn’t even seem to be implicitly aware of it. “Cute” bears didn’t dominate the market overnight in response to a study conducted by the toy makers, who found that they sold better. The nature of the bears simply shifted over time, as the manufacturers unconsciously adapted to the parents’ unconscious preferences. > [@](#): > > \*\*I repeat what I said before in a diferent context: **what you imagine that this illustrates about moral valuation through survival remains a mystery.** \*\* Again, I don’t understand why you don’t understand. > [@](#): > > \*\*No, what changes is a preferrd morphology as expressed in a series of market opportnities. I am quite certain that if you showed people an early model they would have no trouble identifying it as a teddy bear, just as they would have no trouble identifying a Model-T as a car or a tricorner as a hat. \*\* Let me rephrase that: what changes is the conception of a “desirable” teddy bear. I can almost guarantee that if I show someone a picture of a Model-T and ask them if that’s a car they’d like to own, they’d say ‘no’. > [@](#): > > **Make a case, not a metaphor.** All language is metaphor. I could attempt a Zen explanation, which would manifest the concept directly instead of referencing it obliquely with words, if you’d like. > [@](#): > > **I am less pleased that you imagine I have made any assertion about the boundaries of rationality.** As you appeal to scientific consensus. Gee, no implied value judgments there. [sigh] > [@](#): > > \*\*Good luck. \*\* Thank you. I’ll be seeing you in a million years… (Sorry, I couldn’t resist.) ---
**Author:** ![godzillatemple](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/49beb7/32.png) [@godzillatemple](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/godzillatemple)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 4:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/225 "2003-09-07T04:06:26Z")
**TVAA** : Posts are only repeated because you continue to dance around the issues without actually answering the questions. I thought you had learned your lesson briefly, but your last post indicates that I was (sadly) mistaken. Let’s try this again, shall we? > [@](#): > > _Godzillatemple_: Limited accuracy, eh? Extremely limited to the point of uselessness perhaps? Or just mostly useless? As mentioned above, if the validity of a society’s ethic system is determined based on whether the society as a whole has survived or, how does one practically decide if particular acts are moral or not? Or do you really think that if a society permits a single “bad” act to be considered “good,” the society will therefore inevitably fail? > > _TVAA_: **You mean, if the society acts in a way that will eventually cause it to fail, the society will inevitably fail? Well, yes. Obviously.** No, that’s **not** what I mean, and I can’t for the life of me understand how you could completely miss the point of my question and come up with that interpretation instead. Well, I actually can understand, but I’m trying to be charitable here and not accuse you of deliberate obfuscation. The question is whether your theory states that a moral system must be perfect in order to survive, or whether a society with a flawed moral system can still survive. If a society permits a single “bad” act to be considered “good,” _is_ that something that will “eventually cause it to fail”? Or can a society survive even though it incorrectly permits a single “bad” act to be considered “good”? Let me rephrase… You say that whether a particular society’s ethical system can be considered valid or not is determined by whether that system has allowed the society in question to survive. Now, forgetting all the other side issues such as how _long_ a society must survive in order to qualify as being successful, my question is how this theory allows one to decide whether a particular _part_ of a society’s ethical system is valid or not. The ethical system _as a whole_ may be valid in the sense that it allows the society to survive, but does this necessaily mean that every part of the system is valid? Or is it possible for an ethical system to permit survival while still being flawed? And, if so, how does one tell which are the flawed bits and which are the correct bits? Say you have a society whose ethical system says that murder and thievery are bad, but slavery and adultury are good. This society survives long enough for you to consider it an evolutionary success. Does your theory therefore state that, as prcticed by this particular society, slavery and adultury are “good” acts because the society has survived? Or is it possible that the society has survived _in spite_ of the fact that its ethical system condones slavery and adultury? If the latter, how can you judge which particular acts are good or bad? And if you can’t judge the moral value of particular acts with any degree of certainty or reliability, what is the utility of your theory? > [@](#): > > _Godzillatemple:_ But the very fact that a society exists demonstrates that it has “evolutionary success.” > > _TVAA_: **Um, no. Is a species evolutionarily successful because it has at least one member living at one particular time?** There you go with the whole answering a question with a question bit again. You yourself said that the evolutionary-based “unchanging and absolute standard” that determines the validity of moral systems is “existence.” Now, maybe you meant that it’s the existence of the “moral system” that determines its validity, but earlier you talked about the existence of the society that holds a particular moral system, and I didn’t think you were contradicting yourself here. Regardless, what does your question have to do with anything? A society no more exist with a single member than does a species. If you meant prospers and continues instead of exists, you shouldn’t have said “exists” in the first place. Regardless (once again), your argument leads to the conclusion that any society that currently exists (and feel free to redefine “exists” so that it includes the concepts of “prospers” and “continues” and “look very much like it will continue existing for the forseeable future” if it makes you happy) must be considered evolutionarily sucessful. Or, at the very least, that society’s moral system must be so considered. Which one again leads me to whether all parts of that moral system must necessarily be valid, or can some parts be invalid, and how does one tell which parts are which? > [@](#): > > _Godzillatemple_: Therefore, since there are many different societies that have existed for long periods of time and which have different systems of ethics, there must therefore actually be different “right” ethical systems according to your theory. And whether a particular ethical system is “right” or not can only be determined relative to the particular society that holds that system, correct? > > _TVAA_: **No, the rightness of a particular ethical system can only be determined relative to the workings of the universe.** So it doesn’t matter the particular circumstances of the society that holds a particular ethical system? Funny, I could _swear_ that’s not what you said a few pages back… > [@](#): > > _Godzillatemple_: Have there actually been any societies that have survived long enough to qualify as being valid enough to draw conclusions? > > _TVAA_: **Yes, actually. And it isn’t always chronological time that’s important. Evolution is best measured by generational time.** Really? Care to tell us what those societies are? Just idle curiosity, mind you… > [@](#): > > _Godzillatemple_: And, if so, how can we tell which of the actions sanctioned by such a society’s ethical system are determative of the society’s survival? > > _TVAA_: **Well, the best way is to try variations on the society’s theme, but lack of time and resources usually prevents this. We’re often forced to resort to logic and minor experimentation.** Ah, an answer of sorts (finally)! So, the “best” way is impractical due to lack of time and resources (I’m not sure what “resources” have to do with it, but it seems from what you’ve said that you would need infinite time to tell for sure whether a society is “successful” or not). Instead, we’re forced to resort to “logic and minor experimentation.” And how accurate would you say _this_ method is? More than 50% accurate? Less? Accurate enough to be of any practical use whatsoever? [Most “absolute moralists,” BTW, tend to believe that their theory of morality can pratically be used 100% of the time with 100% accuracy. Weird, I know, but then, that’s why I don’t ascribe to moral absolutism]. And remember – we wouldn’t have to keep asking the same questions over and over again if you would just answer them in the first place without constantly redeining terms, answering questions with questions, or making complete _non sequitors_… Barry ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 4:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/226 "2003-09-07T04:09:03Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by erislover \* > **Actually, explaining them once will do.** Then why do you keep asking the questions? > [@](#): > > \*\*Really? A **bad** one, eh? And, pray tell, how do we arrive there? **Is there only one way to arrive there?** \*\* How in the world should I know? How can _anyone_ know, without running the experiment and finding out what happens? As to why it’s bad: creatures, societies, and memetic patterns that do that have a nasty tendency to cease existing. > [@](#): > > \*\*And, recognizing this, what does it tell us about the plurality of moral systems and selecting between them? \*\* Um… that we need to use logic and experimentation to choose between them, while remaining aware that our judgments do not necessarily match those made by the universe? I give up – what does it tell us? ---
**Author:** ![godzillatemple](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/49beb7/32.png) [@godzillatemple](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/godzillatemple)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 4:24am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/227 "2003-09-07T04:24:29Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by TVAA \* > \*\*I give up – what does it tell us? \*\* Ooh, ooh, I know! I know! Your theory tells us absolutely **nothing** about the plurality of moral systems and selecting between them! Nada. Zip. Bupkis. Not an electronic sausage. Which is, of course, why it’s a completely impractical theory and why, on the whole, it’s a bloody useless waste of time to even be discussing it in the first place. So, what do I win? Good night, folks… 😉 Barry P.S. Next up is the question as to whether man is, in fact, controlled by evolution or whether the fact that he has intelligence sets him apart from all the other “organisms” out there that **TVAA** likes to constantly make reference to. What about the fact that man is able to change his environment to suit his needs rather than being forced to adapt to his environment like other “organisms”? All this, and more, when we return! ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 4:32am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/228 "2003-09-07T04:32:09Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by godzillatemple \* > \*\*No, that’s **not** what I mean, and I can’t for the life of me understand how you could completely miss the point of my question and come up with that interpretation instead. Well, I actually can understand, but I’m trying to be charitable here and not accuse you of deliberate obfuscation. \*\* Fascinating. I’ve been thinking rather the same thing, only with you instead of me and my answers instead of your questions. > [@](#): > > The question is whether your theory states that a moral system must be perfect in order to survive, or whether a society with a flawed moral system can still survive. If a society permits a single “bad” act to be considered “good,” _is_ that something that will “eventually cause it to fail”? Or can a society survive even though it incorrectly permits a single “bad” act to be considered “good”? \*\* Perfect in order to survive _for how long_? No organism is adapted to every possible contingency, only those circumstances that exerted selection pressures on the population and that the available genetic diversity could produce a solutioin for. In other words, no creature is perfect. As a result, creatures die constantly. Does evolutionary theory imply that no imperfect creature can survive for any length of time? ‘No’, you say? Then why do you ask me if my theory states that a moral system must be perfect in order to survive for any length of time?! It’s the same theory, folks. It’s just the general case instead of the specific. > [@](#): > > \*\*You say that whether a particular society’s ethical system can be considered valid or not is determined by whether that system has allowed the society in question to survive. Now, forgetting all the other side issues such as how _long_ a society must survive in order to qualify as being successful, my question is how this theory allows one to decide whether a particular _part_ of a society’s ethical system is valid or not. The ethical system _as a whole_ may be valid in the sense that it allows the society to survive, but does this necessaily mean that every part of the system is valid? Or is it possible for an ethical system to permit survival while still being flawed? And, if so, how does one tell which are the flawed bits and which are the correct bits? \*\* Respectively: Yes. Yes, for limited time, until the society faces a situation its code produces the wrong response for and is destroyed. By seeing if they work in other systems; if all systems including principle X fail horribly, principle X probably doesn’t lend itself to the survival of moral systems. > [@](#): > > \*\*Say you have a society whose ethical system says that murder and thievery are bad, but slavery and adultury are good. This society survives long enough for you to consider it an evolutionary success. Does your theory therefore state that, as prcticed by this particular society, slavery and adultury are “good” acts because the society has survived? Or is it possible that the society has survived _in spite_ of the fact that its ethical system condones slavery and adultury? If the latter, how can you judge which particular acts are good or bad? And if you can’t judge the moral value of particular acts with any degree of certainty or reliability, what is the utility of your theory? \*\* I’d take a look at other successful societies, and see if any of them held similar beliefs. I’d look at what happened to societies that thought murder, thievery, slavery, and adultery are bad. I’d try to analyze how the society survived, and attempt to understand how its values affected its survival. Basically, I’d undergo the same process everyone uses to learn things about the world: the scientific method, or a primitive version of it. > [@](#): > > \*\*There you go with the whole answering a question with a question bit again. You yourself said that the evolutionary-based “unchanging and absolute standard” that determines the validity of moral systems is “existence.” Now, maybe you meant that it’s the existence of the “moral system” that determines its validity, but earlier you talked about the existence of the society that holds a particular moral system, and I didn’t think you were contradicting yourself here. \*\* No, existence for infinite time. Everything else is just an approximation. > [@](#): > > \*\*Regardless, what does your question have to do with anything? A society no more exist with a single member than does a species. If you meant prospers and continues instead of exists, you shouldn’t have said “exists” in the first place. \*\* But what standards determine “prosperity”? Having lots of things that guarantee survival and continued existence? > [@](#): > > \*\*Regardless (once again), your argument leads to the conclusion that any society that currently exists (and feel free to redefine “exists” so that it includes the concepts of “prospers” and “continues” and “look very much like it will continue existing for the forseeable future” if it makes you happy) must be considered evolutionarily sucessful. Or, at the very least, that society’s moral system must be so considered. Which one again leads me to whether all parts of that moral system must necessarily be valid, or can some parts be invalid, and how does one tell which parts are which? \*\* I’m not aware of any societies that have achieved any kind of evolutionary equilibrium. Ancient human societies (the famed hunter-gatherers) certainly did; it would be useful to look at their societies in order to learn what lifestyles humans evolved to be best in. Besides that, we have to resort to logic. > [@](#): > > \*\*So it doesn’t matter the particular circumstances of the society that holds a particular ethical system? Funny, I could _swear_ that’s not what you said a few pages back… \*\* No, the circumstances determine what the correct behavior is, not the ethical system. > [@](#): > > \*\*Really? Care to tell us what those societies are? Just idle curiosity, mind you… \*\* Ancient Egypt is always a fascinating study. It lasted so long, yet it really changed so little… > [@](#): > > \*\*Ah, an answer of sorts (finally)! So, the “best” way is impractical due to lack of time and resources (I’m not sure what “resources” have to do with it, but it seems from what you’ve said that you would need infinite time to tell for sure whether a society is “successful” or not). Instead, we’re forced to resort to “logic and minor experimentation.” And how accurate would you say _this_ method is? More than 50% accurate? Less? Accurate enough to be of any practical use whatsoever? [Most “absolute moralists,” BTW, tend to believe that their theory of morality can pratically be used 100% of the time with 100% accuracy. Weird, I know, but then, that’s why I don’t ascribe to moral absolutism]. \*\* Accurate enough for use; indeed, it’s the most accurate method to be produced so far. (But how do I determine this? By seeing what works…) Otherwise, how accurate is the scientific method? More than 50% accurate? Less? > [@](#): > > **And remember – we wouldn’t have to keep asking the same questions over and over again if you would just answer them in the first place without constantly redeining terms, answering questions with questions, or making complete _non sequitors_…** But my answers are usually contained in them, like the story told by Lao-Tzu to the anxious official. ---
**Author:** ![godzillatemple](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/49beb7/32.png) [@godzillatemple](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/godzillatemple)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 4:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/229 "2003-09-07T04:55:25Z")
Hey, I have a better idea! Given that: [list=a][li]The purpose of this thread was to provide possible justifications for moral relativism,[/li] [li] **TVAA** steadfastly refuses to admit that his theory of evolution-based absolute morality is, in fact, a form of moral relativism,[/li] [li] **TVAA** apparently cannot explain how his theory has any practical real-world use whatseover when it comes to actually making moral judgments or selecting between multiple moral systems, and[/li] [li]Nobody else apparently agrees with **TVAA** ’s theory or, for that matter, thinks that it even states what he keeps claiming it states[/list][/li]I propose that we therefore table any further discussion of this theory and get back to discussing whether moral relativism can be justified or not. All in favor, say “aye”… ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 4:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/230 "2003-09-07T04:56:23Z")
> [@](#): > > How in the world should I know? Because you were the one who made the value judgment ‘bad’ in the statement, “As mentioned before, sacrificing the future to benefit the present is a pretty bad idea.” ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 5:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/231 "2003-09-07T05:05:29Z")
LOL **godzillatemple** , but he has explained, you see, _it is just like sand!_ And this poem. It’s all quite clear, really, so clear that it cannot even be stated in the logical form **TVAA** insists the entire universe and all moral structures follow. Whether or not I agree with evolutionary ethics, and I don’t, I do think it is clear at this point that it hasn’t offered us an escape from relativism. Even if we assume by hypothesis that a privileged system exists, as **TVAA** seems to indicate he does, the problem of plural moral systems remains and we cannot, in fact, gain access to this privileged system, so the point is rather moot. ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 5:07am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/232 "2003-09-07T05:07:03Z")
But it’s not a form of moral relativism. [Rather moral relativism is the thesis that morality itself, and not merely its public perception, can vary](http://www.philosophos.com/knowledge_base/archives_17/philosophy_questions_1771.html) [Moral absolutism — the belief or theory that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged](http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_absolutism) My theory is clearly a form of moral absolutism. I certainly can’t explain how my theory is workable when, as far as I can determine, none of you even understand what it _is_ yet. > [@](#): > > _Originally posted by erislover_ > **Because you were the one who made the value judgment ‘bad’ in the statement, "As mentioned before, sacrificing the future to benefit the present is a pretty bad idea."** The available evidence suggests that the adoption of such a strategy has a net negative payoff. Additionally, logic suggests that such a strategy isn’t such a great idea. Other than that, how should I know? Perhaps it actually works really well, and my data is just too limited or full of errors for me to tell. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 5:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/233 "2003-09-07T05:14:41Z")
You’re theory is that “good” means “conducive to survival”. ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 5:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/234 "2003-09-07T05:15:46Z")
Oh brother. 1. For the sake of argument, let’s accept that morality is determined by a cosmic opinion poll. 2. We quickly note that there are principles that affect what things are considered to be moral: specifically, basic evolutionary principles. 3. We note that preferred systems of morality are “evaluated” by their ability to persist. 4. The principles that determine which moral strategies are “best” are inherent in the nature of the universe. 5. Ergo, there are objective and unchanging standards by which systems of morality can be said to be judged; in other words, an ultimate “morality” not dependent on opinion. ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 5:30am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/235 "2003-09-07T05:30:26Z")
Let me state my theory as simply as reasonably possible. My theory is not that ‘good’ means “conducive to survival”. My theory is that, as time progresses to infinity, opinions about the nature of goodness will converge on that which is conducive to survival. Therefore, that which is conducive to surival is true goodness, just as the ratio of heads to tails in an infinite number of coin tosses is the true bias of a coin. Thus, I am claiming that morality is ultimately objective, universal, and unchanging; it is by definition a morally absolute claim. A morally relative claim would be that morality itself can change, not just claims about morality. That is the exact opposite of what I’m suggesting here. Ergo, I am necessarily claiming that moral relativism is wrong. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 5:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/236 "2003-09-07T05:37:30Z")
I have never denied that “there are objective standards by which systems of morality can be said to be judged”, but that “it is ‘best’ to equate ‘good’ with ‘survives’” (I mean lets not beg the question or anything) and that if we do equate ‘good’ with ‘survives’ that we are guaranteed **a single, privileged** system. ---
**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 5:39am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/237 "2003-09-07T05:39:05Z")
> [@](#): > > My theory is not that ‘good’ means “conducive to survival”… [but] that which is conducive to surival is true goodness. Uh, ok. ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 7:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/238 "2003-09-07T07:34:00Z")
There is a significant difference between the two claims. The first is an unfounded assertion – a proposal for a moral axiom. It’s an opinion, nothing more. The second is a claim about an objective reality – whether it’s true or false, it’s inarguably a statement of fact. Which is the whole point of this mess: I am specifically claiming that morality is objective. Furthermore, I don’t understand the claims about what moral relativism is. If it’s not an aspect of moral subjectivism, then isn’t it necessarily objective? What middle ground is there between subjective and objective? ---
**Author:** ![godzillatemple](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/49beb7/32.png) [@godzillatemple](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/godzillatemple)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 1:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/239 "2003-09-07T13:29:39Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by TVAA \* > **There is a significant difference between the two claims.** Mayhap, but you seem to be the only one whose faculties of reasoning are subtle enough to perceive such a distinction. > [@](#): > > **Which is the whole point of this mess: I am specifically claiming that morality is objective.** Yes, but it’s an “objective” morality that cannot actually be used to make moral judgments without first gathering emperical data over infintiely long periods of time. Your theory, even if true, is wholly useless when it comes to making moral judgments on a day-to-day basis in real world situations. BTW, I forgot to ask this earlier, but with all your analogies to various “organisms” and what wolves do when faced with starvation, do you believe that the concept of “morality” applies to non-sentient beings in the first place? Are wolves making a “moral decision” when they decide to feed their offspring or not? If so, then I would suggest that you have defined the term “morality” in such a way that it contradicts common usage, and that may explain why nobody else here can grasp the “obviousness” of your theory. And, failing that, feel free to address the questions I raised last night in my penultimate post. To wit: > [@](#): > > Next up is the question as to whether man is, in fact, controlled by evolution or whether the fact that he has intelligence sets him apart from all the other “organisms” out there that TVAA likes to constantly make reference to. **What about the fact that man is able to change his environment to suit his needs rather than being forced to adapt to his environment like other “organisms”?** Barry ---
**Author:** ![TVAA](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@TVAA](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TVAA)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2003, 1:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288/240 "2003-09-07T13:56:47Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by godzillatemple \* > \*\*Mayhap, but you seem to be the only one whose faculties of reasoning are subtle enough to perceive such a distinction. \*\* Possibly. I prefer to think that I’m just more sensitive to certain linguistic concerns than the average person. > [@](#): > > **Yes, but it’s an “objective” morality that cannot actually be used to make moral judgments without first gathering emperical data over infintiely long periods of time. Your theory, even if true, is wholly useless when it comes to making moral judgments on a day-to-day basis in real world situations.** Pffh. The same problem exists with all scientific theories about the nature of the world. > [@](#): > > **BTW, I forgot to ask this earlier, but with all your analogies to various “organisms” and what wolves do when faced with starvation, do you believe that the concept of “morality” applies to non-sentient beings in the first place? Are wolves making a “moral decision” when they decide to feed their offspring or not? If so, then I would suggest that you have defined the term “morality” in such a way that it contradicts common usage, and that may explain why nobody else here can grasp the “obviousness” of your theory.** First of all, if it’s universal, doesn’t it necessarily apply to _everything_? Secondly, I dispute your implication that most human beings make their “moral decisions” through careful, reasoned thought and analysis. As far as I can determine, people tend to make their decisions based on instinct, custom, and “what everyone else is doing”. Rare is the person who approaches such problems logically. Thirdly, if we accept (as you seem to imply) that morality holds only for “sentient” creatures, what criteria define sentience? > [@](#): > > \*\*And, failing that, feel free to address the questions I raised last night in my penultimate post. \*\* Lots of creatures can change their environment to suit their needs. Admittedly, humans are “better” at this than most creatures. Humans are intelligent? By what standard? Can you actually take into consideration all of the different ways and methods of responding usefully to the environment and make a case that humans are the most intelligent of all creatures, which I’m presuming you intend to imply? Even so, what level of intelligence is required to be bound to morality? Why are you suggesting that morality isn’t universal? What about human being who don’t have the prerequisite level of intelligence? [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288.md?page=11) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/taking-a-stand-on-moral-relativism/197288.md?page=13)