Unless you are hoping to move to a point where there is, in fact, no disagreement about morality at all, I don’t see the point of this question.
If it is not all of the time, and if people persist that define and value things differently, then I don’t see the point of this yet. Please continue.
So we can intuitively demonstrate that all moral questions must take place in the context of survival. Well color me surprised. So must mathematics, and science, and lovemaking, and prostitution. They all require survival to be practiced.[ol][li]Are there other methods of valuing moral systems, actions, and so on?If so, do we have a way to compare systems without rejecting our answer to “1”?[/ol]Apparently you want to avoid answering (1) and answering two directly by saying “evolution!” Of course, the only way you can answer (2) is by answering that there are other methods of evaluation. So which is it? If there are multiple methods of evaluation, then how can we choose between them without a method of evaluation that we’ve already admitted is plural? If there are not multiple methods of evaluation, then there is nothing to choose between.[/li]
By inspection, there are multiple methods of evaluation. At the very least, we may appeal to laws in various states, or laws in various countriesnot all of which are moral, but some of which areto see differences in how men should behave. You propose a way to sort through these differences as a privileged system of evaluation: see what works ie what “survives”.
Thus, you seem to be requiring a sort of recursive process. You say, to (1), that there exist multiple methods of evaluation, but that because of the ‘yes’ to (2) some will be selected against. However, this does not avoid the first question at all, which is, “Besides this ‘evolution’ principle, are there other methods of evaluation?” Well?
Or not. Every time I ask whether the same act can be considered moral in one society and immoral in another, based on the underlying reasons and surrounding circumstances, you claim that no two acts can actually be “the same” if they have different underlying reasons and surrounding circumstances." That’s not answering my question, it’s simply redefining the terms. If you want to talk about morality and ethics, you need to use the terms as they are commonly used by everybody else who is discussing the issue. Perhaps I should ask, “can an act which most people would consider to be ‘the same’ be considered moral in one society and immoral in another society according to your theory?” If so, then your theory is one which most people would consider to be a form of moral relativism.
Which claim is that? I agree with the end result of your theory, to wit, that the validity of a society’s moral system can only be judged with reference to that society’s particular circumstances. I disagree that compatibility with evolutionary principles is the sole (or even best) means of making that judgment, but that’s not what I’m discussing here. And I vehemently disagree that your theory is form of “moral absolutism,” since it directly contradicts the established definition of that term.
I agree with you 100%. That’s why I don’t subscribe to moral absolutism. That doesn’t change the fact, though, that it is what moral absolutism is defined as, and it is what most people who use the term are referring to, and it is what most people who call themselves moral absolutists mean when they talk about their own beliefs.
Right now we’re still just arguing over terminology, since it’s impossible to have a meaningful discussion if people are using different definitions for the same words (and please don’t tell me that two words cannot be “the same” if they are used for different purposes). Only when we can agree on a common language can we discuss the merits of your argument. I propose that this “common language” be traditional usage. Call me old fashioned, what can I say…
WRT your last post, I think that is a very good point, godzillatemple. Since evolution itself selects methods away then there really is no way to choose which method is best one’s self, except perhaps by historical reflection. This does not seem like a particularly useful principle (that is, quite literally, one can’t use it), but then, that’s based on my own opinions about what a moral system should be able to do.
And, I forgot to add, it is not clear yet whether evolution is the privileged system; if it isn’t, then I happily reject it; if it is, then I’d like further development of why this is the case.
hi elfkin, I seemed to have lost you in the evolution debacle here. Apologies.
This may be the case, and in fact relativism has nothing to say on the matter. What you might want to ask yourself, though, is if there are enough of these to constitute a complete moral system. If there isn’t, we must reach a point where morals diverge. Here relativism pipes up and says its piece.
This is relativism’s strength, actually, that it can account for debating legislation, some of which in fact enforces morals. Without it, democratic governments are fundamentally illegitimate, IMO.
** Not practical. It’s the “aliens in Central Park watch the chess games” problem.
** We can begin to discard sets and categories of belief as being innately self-defeating.
We don’t need to know the Ultimate Method for bridge-building to know that some methods just aren’t any good.
** Well, yes, but survival doesn’t necessarily require them.
** There are lesser models, yes. There are many physical theories, but that doesn’t mean that they’re all correct. There’s one and only one theory (at most) that accurately describes the laws of physics.
** That’s a fairly accurate summation. The worth of the system can be determined absolutely, but only by the universe; we can only imperfectly judge things based on limited data.
Evolution is the deepest, most fundamental form of judgment. It determines the validity of, say, human judgments.
What moral principles allow us to do this? Point of the question: to demonstrate an underlying system of moral judgment in framing how you are handling moral judgments.
I completely agree: we only need a method. What bridge-building principles guide us in doing so? Are there several principles to bridge building that may be used? Are some of them mutually incompatible? If we say yes or no, what principles are we using to determine this? Is there only one correct way to do that?
Of course not, it wasn’t meant to indicate a biconditional. It was only meant to illustrate the point of view that morality takes place within the context of survival, not strictly that it is moral to survive. That is, it might be a good thing for me to die. Would you reject this, then?
Given the assumption that the universe follows a definite set of knowable laws, sure. Given the assumption that humans follow a definite moral pattern, there is an absolute morality. What justifies either of these assumptions? Can they, in fact, be justified? If not, how do we handle cases where others hold a different assumption in its place? In morality, don’t we see that other cases arise?
That is a mouthful. I have two questions here that do not depend on each other.[ol][li]…we can only imperfectly judge things based on limited data.[/li]
Since we have limited data, won’t we always be in the relativistic position of multiple ethical theories that cannot be decided between? The existence of a privileged ethical system is not necessarily rejected by relativism, only [strictly speaking] that we can know it (relativism is an epistemological position, even if only restricted to moral epistemology).[li]The worth of the system can be determined absolutely, but only by the universe…[/li]
This certainly has practical appeal. However, this does little to actually motivate how moral agents are to go about making moral decisions, specifically moral decisions that choose between moral systems. If an absolute moral system cannot be applied or utilized by moral agents, wouldn’t you say the point is a wee bit moot? In fact, doesn’t that remove it from consideration as a moral system altogether?[/ol]
I don’t doubt you think so; I have yet to grasp why this is so.
Contradict much? If there is no such goal, then every organism is one that “[doesn’t] have that goal”.
My point remains. Game theory examines strategies of play with an inherent implication that “success” conditions are evaluated by correspondence to game values (winning, not losing, ammassing resoures, etc.) There is a very clear assumptive basis required in order to assert that game theory provides insight into the evaluation of moral strategies.
Interestingly enough, that assumptive basis is itslf a moral valuation. This means that every game-theory evaluation of a moral system is, while potentially useful as a mechanism for testing the “fit” between a rule-set and a moral ideal, inescapably circular with regard to the question of what moral ideals are right/correct/valid/tasty/less-filling/whatever.
Nonsense. Under that system a belief may be correct at one time and not at another (depending upon the belief sets of the people in question), but unless you want to argue that a belief can never “reappear” then this says absolutely noting about the “correctness” of the belief in any absolute sense.
If I am the last person to hold a belief, and I am about to die, then the belief is still “correct”. After I die, it is “not correct” until some other person believes it once more. At that point, it becomes “correct” again. Similarly, your model would demand that whatever morality ws held by the last man left alive was ultimately "correct’ If that man happened to be alive becase he had murdered and eaten the last woman alive, well, then that was obviously the “correct” thing to do. Now, personally I find this model pretty silly, but that’s beside the point. It’s your thought experiment, you can define it as you wish.
What you imagine that any of the above illustrates about an absolute standard of moral valuation through survival is a mystery to me.
True. Also irrelevant to questions of morality, unless said population felt it was their moral duty to jump off of cliffs and fly.
Again, what you imagine that this illustrates about moral valuation through survival remains a mystery.
Why, I gues that is the TVAA method of trying to escape a question for which he has no good answer.
To be fair, I supose I should admit the possibility that you imagine that it is possible for us to “try” every conceivable moral system in every human context. Whether that would demonstrate a lack of imagination or a lack of mathematical intuition is anybody’s guess.
Perhaps I have heard of both market forces and natural selection and recognize when someone is playing fast-and-loose with his terminology. Neither memes nor sand nor teddy bears are subject to evolutionary forces in the same sense that the word aplies to human evolution, which is the context that you argue defines the “validity” of morality and from which you make such (correct) statements as: “No species is ever “successfully adapted to its environment”. What appears to be stability is actually a balance between genetic change (whether due to mutation or recombination) and selection pressures.”. That is a true characterization of the conventional scientific view of biological morphogenesis. It is not a true characterization of the conventional scientific understanding of the propogation of information (which has not been demonstrated to contain a “genetic” core), the grinding of sand (which does not “balance” between internal adaptation and external pressure but merely yields slowly to external pressure), or the market success of teddy bears (which is guaged according to manuacturing and purchasing cycles that are overwhelmingly external in nature.)
Memes are hypothetical organizational units that may not even exist, much less survive. Sand is equally unlikely to either cease to survive or reproduce. Teddy bears, while sharing a convenient categorization in the department store, possessno directlyconservative element from on generation to the next.
“Evolution” is a powerful word. It can quite correclt be aplied to both the bioloical process of adaptation and speciation and to design changes in the household appliances. Both of these uses are correct, but one context justifies strong appeals to scientific authority; the other does not. Mixing references to many such contexts within a single discussion while appealing to the authority of scientific laws is, as I noted originally, quite often a sign that someone has left behind conventional scientific understanding and leapt bravely into wild speculation.
He’s shooting for an absolute methodology, the moral codes themselves are perfectly transitory. Of course, any methodology will also carry its own assumptions, which in this case would be moral, but apparently that isn’t stopping him.
Yeah – I got that. What I was trying to point out is yet another common “unstated fallacy” often seen when “evolution” gets tossed about in multiple contexts: directed progres.
Biological evolution (as opposed, for instance, to product alterations to meet market forces) is unguided. Speciation is a “progression” only in the sense of “sequence through time” not in the sense of “getting better” or “moving toward a goal”. Thus, nothing prevents a morphological adaptation that has ceased to be expressed in a genetic population at one time from reappearing at a later date. It’s called atavism.
If we follow **TVAA[/] on his foray into the “evolution zone”, then I have to ask what his “absolute methodology” says about moralities that exhibit an atavistic pattern. Is such a morality “absolutel correct”, “absolutely incorrect”, or “contextually correct/incorrect”. Only the last answer would seem consistent. “Relatively absolute” anyone?
** Beg pardon? Do you mean, “What if the laws of physics do not permit such a goal to be held?” I’m not sure I understand you, otherwise.
** It depends on what you consider the purpose of moral strategies is. In theory, there’s nothing wrong with a moral code that demands that its followers not spread the code and kill themselves. Not surprisingly, however, such moral systems rarely come into being, and they persist even more rarely.
In general, we do not have to deal with them, because they do not continue to exist.
A charismatic belief system in which people convert others into true believers and then kill themselves can certainly arise, in much the same way as a wildfire in a dry field or swarms of locusts in a verdent area.
** Ah, but that’s just my point: when the universe spontaneously produces random moral systems, the ones that lead to survival persist and accumulate. It doesn’t even follow that the systems must “value” survival, merely that they lead to their own perpetuation.
** If a belief is tried over and over, and it always dwindles and dies, that’s a good sign the belief is defective.
How many bridges do we need to build and see crumble before we conclude that the design is flawed?
** Whether the belief is given the label of “correct” in your mind is irrelevant.
** Nonsense!
You are making the grossly inaccurate assumption that human opinions are the only manifestors of morality.
** There’s a reason you don’t hear of many such people.
** Now I know you’re missing my point: the answer to that question is always, and I mean always, an empirical one.
Would you ask a scientist what the outcome of an experiment will be before it’s performed?
** There are certain conclusions that can be drawn from the existing data, but they’re no more definitive than any other hypotheses. There are even a few theories, although they tend to be somewhat personal.
** If I may interrupt for a moment, those things are not subject to biological evolution. The concepts of evolution are significantly broader when formulated in certain manners.
** The “genetic core” IS the information. What’s nifty about memes is that they’re notably unlike what we normally consider to be life: the physical manifestation of memes does not need to be constant. Information may be transmitted in a variety of different forms without changing. That’s why our words are able to be shared in bursts of electronic impluses.
You’re not thinking creatively enough. Edges on grains of sand tend to be worn off faster than curves. Given enough time, of course, the sand will eventually be ground down to powder, but over intermediate lengths of time, the spherical grains are much more stable than irregularly shaped ones. As a result, the spheres accumulate while the edged grains are rounded down.
The “balanced” forces in this example are stasis and entropy. You are correct in that this isn’t a true balance: entropy always wins.
** When teddy bears were originally introduced, they looked much more like stylized bears. Researchers noticed that the morphology of modern teddy bears had changed dramatically away from their original form. They found that children had no preferences as to type: they played with long-limbed, long-snouted bears with smaller heads and larger bodies as willingly as short-limbed, flat-faced bears with large heads and smaller bodies.
Parents, however, tended to prefer teddy bears that looked more like human infants (big heads, short limbs and small bodies, big eyes; in short, “cute”). And since parents were the ones who bought teddy bears, their prefernces shaped the market.
What’s extraordinary about this is that there doesn’t seem to have been any conscious attempt on the part of either parents OR toy makers to create “cuter” bears that parents preferred. Instead, the market itself changed over time, as the toy makers based their products on successful products of the past.
It continues to exist; while not “survival” in the strictest sense, it certainly persists and accumulates.
** True. They don’t have to. What changes is the concept of “teddy bear” in people’s minds: the toy itself is the manifestation. Look at the moon, not the finger.
There is an element of truth in your critique, but don’t be so certain that you understand the boundaries of rationality.
I don’t intend to land; I intend to fly. I suppose we’ll just have to see whether I hit the ground or not.
Of course, there’s also the general question as to whether this whole notion of evolutionary based absolute morality, even if true, is of any practical use whatsoever. If the “absolute and unchanging standard” is unknown, and if the only way to tell if a particular ethic system is based on that “absolute and unchanging standard” is to see if that system “leads to continued existence over infinite time,” then what’s the point?
Or, to put it another way, if the abolute principles are unknowable and the only way to judge the validity of a moral system is empirically over long time periods, how does that help us make moral judgments? What use is a moral theory that doesn’t actually tell you what you should or should not do in certain situations?
To determine the probability represented by flipping a particular coin, it’s necessary to do it an infinite number of times.
So what’s the point in flipping it a limited number of times, then presuming that it will approach a specific number? Why would we bother testing it at all if a finite test can still contain error?
Well… I’m just too damn sorry I missed this discussion.
I was away for a long time, but I’m back now…
Anyway I recall this discussion from some some months ago with loinburger etc
I must admit I haven’t read everything, it’s too much right now, but I will offer my opinion anyway.
You might feel that this does not belong right here, and that I’m not talking directly to anyone. This is because I have a pretty firm understanding of this myself. But feel free to point out “errors” in my post.
Well, here goes.
Morals are made in the human brain. When several people agree on a certain morality, it becomes ‘objective’.
Since we have so many people running around with different moral stands, it seems agreeable that morals are indeed not absolute, on any level, but rather subjective.
I like to think about morality as bubbles.
You got a group of people, and a green morality bubbles floats around them, telling us they agree on things.
While some other place, a red morality bubble floats around them.
If a person from the red bubble enters the green bubble, the green people will tell eachother the red one is objectively wrong.
“For gods sake you can’t steal peoples things like that! It’s just wrong!” “Oh is it now? I learned that every man stands for himself and I really needed 200 bucks. Well I’ll just go back to my red bubble then. HAH.”
To put it into a more ‘weird’ scenario.
You live in a computer, and you’re getting deleted. He doesn’t need you anymore so he’s just gonna go ahead and press that ‘delete’ key.
If you happened to be cognitive/sentient(which can’t be determined from outside that system) you would of course be appaled that he would delete you.
I mean, he’s killing you.
Well, let’s say the operator of this very strange computer didn’t know you were cognitive, would it be objectively immoral for him to delete you?
Is there a rule that says “thou shalt not delete cognitive things.” somewhere?
If the operator is nature, the flow of bits is time/space, and the contents of these bits is your conscience, how/who could say “do not delete these bits, for they have <special attribute>”.
Consider the Shakers. You all might not be convinced of the immense value of their belief structure, but I’ve always been extremely impressed by it.
But as soon as I examined the details of their beliefs, I could tell they were doomed, even before I found out they were virtually extinct (and I believe are all gone, now): they didn’t believe in having children.
As such, they could exist only by accepting orphaned children and teaching them to be Shakers. In a sense, they were dependent on having other societies around them who didn’t share their beliefs in order to survive. Now they’re gone.
Imagine this: there are two Shaker groups. When it becomes clear that the number of Shakers is dropping, and the movement will eventually die out, these are their responses:
Group One: “We’ll continue as we always have, teaching what we have always taught. God will provide.”
Group Two: “Perhaps we should reconsider our teachings about having children. There might be a way in which we can live Godly lives, each respecting the other, AND men and women can have children together.”
Which group would still be around in a hundred years?
Hey, TVAA – way to (once again) completely avoid actually answering a direct question! :rolleyes:
Here’s a radical idea – instead of answering a question with a question, giving an obscure quote by a Chinese philospher, or derailing the conversation by redefining the terms, how about just answering the darn questions for a change? If you cannot answer the question, why not just say so?
Let me make it easy for you:
[ol]
[li]Can you explain what the evolutionary-based “unchanging and absolute standard” that determines the validity of moral systems actually is? If so, please do.[/li]
[li]Can your theory of evolution-based absolute morality actually be used in a practical sense to make moral judgments (i.e., can it be used to determine whether a particular act is “good” or “bad” in a particular situation)? If so, how? And remember, I said in a practical sense – saying you have to wait until a society that values an action as “good” collapses before you can decide retroactively whether the action really was good is decidely not practical. [/li]
[li]Does your theory allow that different societies can have different ethic systems, based on the different circumstances of each society?[/li][/ol]
Again, please try to avoid answering each question with a question, and no more obscure quotes in lieu of an answer, and no more redefining common terms and phrases to justify an assertion that the questions don’t make any sense in the first place.
Whattaya say? Willing to give it the old college try?
Existence. Or somewhat more precisely, survival. Evolutionary success.
Yes, with limited accuracy. In the same sense that we can derive tenative conclusions about the nature of physical law through observation and experiment, we can derive tenative conclusions about the nature of moral law.
Different societies can have different ethical systems, sure. Now, whether those systems are right is another matter.
Can there be more than one correct system? Possibly.
Should we respect a society’s ethical system merely because it has one? I’d say that if the ethical system doesn’t match the limited conclusions we can already derive, no, we shouldn’t. We might still be wrong in an absolute sense, but it’s the right thing to do given the available information.
So, if a society exists, that means it has survived and is therefore successful in an evolutionary sense. Does that mean that every action in that society must be considered “moral” since the society as a whole has survived? Or is it possible that some actions are moral but other actions (which do not offset the other actions enough to kill the society) are immoral? If so, how can judging the validity of an entire society’s ethic system lead one to decide whether particular acts are good or bad?
Limited accuracy, eh? Extremely limited to the point of uselessness perhaps? Or just mostly useless? As mentioned above, if the validity of a society’s ethic system is determined based on whether the society as a whole has survived or, how does one practically decide if particular acts are moral or not? Or do you really think that if a society permits a single “bad” act to be considered “good,” the society will therefore inevitably fail?
But the very fact that a society exists demonstrates that it has “evolutionary success.” Therefore, since there are many different societies that have existed for long periods of time and which have different systems of ethics, there must therefore actually be different “right” ethical systems according to your theory. And whether a particular ethical system is “right” or not can only be determined relative to the particular society that holds that system, correct? Not that I would ever accuse you of being a moral relativist, of course.
Only possibly? Shouldn’t that be definitely? Again, if the measure of a “correct” system is that it allows a society to survive, doesn’t the fact that there are many different societies, each with a different ethical system, mandate that there are many correct systems under your theory? And if you say that we can’t judge the evolutionary success of a particular society in the short term without waiting to see if it eventually fails, then I again ask how such a theory can be of any practical use?
What “limited conclusions” would those be? Have there actually been any societies that have survived long enough to qualify as being valid enough to draw conclusions? And, if so, how can we tell which of the actions sanctioned by such a society’s ethical system are determative of the society’s survival?
Thanks for answering th questions directly, by the way. It’s much appreciated.
No. I meant quite simply that you contradict yourself.
[ol][li]There is no such goal. [/li][li]Organisms that don’t have that goal generally do not come to our attention[/ol][/li]The implication of (2), sinc you quite clearly think some organisms do come to our attention, is that there is such a goal, and some organisms have it.
This is a direct contradiction of (1). It isn’t really that hard to see.
Not quite. It depends upon the criteria one uses to evaluate moral strategies. In other words: the underlying assumptions of the “game”.
Again, this isn’t really hard to see. But, since determining the “best” outcomes of a moral strategy is itself a moral decision (and a consequentialist one at that), any argument based upon such a model is inherently circular.
And this statement, too, is colored by your moral valuation that survival is the only proper measure of a morality. Others have asked you repeatedly why you feel this to be true/correct/inevitable/aesthetically pleasing . . . It’san interesting question. Perhaps one day ou will deign to answer it.
Yes, yes, we all understand the context of survival. The question is not whether the moral systems in question value survival. The question is why TVAA feels that survival is the only valid measure of a moral system.
Thus far, it is a question without an answer.
How many times must you be asked why persistence is the only valid measures of a bridge?
Please try to pay attention to context. You made an assertion about a theoretical moral system. I answered it by honestly applying the rules you set out.
You are correct in one thing, though. If the hypotheticals you raise do not make the point you desire, it really doesn’t matter what labels are attached to the details.
Nonsense? Quite possibly. Peraps ou should ask you mirror.
I am making absolutely no assumptions. Do you recall these words: If we instead assume that “correctness” is whatever people believe it is, we quickly find that certain beliefs cease being held; thus, they are not correct. Those words are yours. All I did was explore the thought-experiment that you defined.
Undoubtedly. What implications this has for the validity of their morality, however, remains a mystery.
Currently, I have very little hope that you will ever share the chain of implication that you think ties the two elements together.
Ah, but the question was not “how will we gather data.” You have repeatedly aserted that both morality and the laws of physics are ultimately subject to a “unified field theory”. I mentioned that, with regard to moral systems, the necessary incomlpeteness of the data set represents a fallacy to any such strong conclusion.
You responded: “we’ll try them all out.”
I responded: “that isn’t a good answer.”
And so it goes.
No, but I would ask him if he were gathering sufficient data to support his hypothesis.
I agree. Where I disagree is with the decision to assert those conclusions as if they were established fact or represented an overwheming consensus of scientific opinion.
Right. “Evolution” is a word that carries different connotations in different contexts. You appeal to biological evolution for appeals to scientific authority and in establishing a context of survival as validation. You then blus the distinction by drawing metphors from contexts in wcih evolutin does not carry quite the same meanings.
That was my point. (One of them, at least.)
Perhaps we should start a different thread to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the “Meme hypothesis”. If you mean to argue that memetic theory has the weight of current scientific consensus behind it, then I doubt that ou will be successful.
I agree that “memes are nifty”. I do not agree that they exist in any rigorously meaningful sense.
Well, that’s one way of saying that I am not deviating from scientific consensus when appealing to he authority of science.
“The grinding of sand” is a poor dialectical metaphor to illustrate a truth about evolution in a biological context. Creative? Perhaps, but I would have to see the rest of the poem to judge properly.
I disaree. There is nothing at all extraordinary about market forces shaing a product in manners that are unanticiapted by manufacturers and not consciously appreciated by consumers. One could hardly express a more expected event in a dynamic mrket.
It is somewhat extraordinary that someone would claim that manufacturers did not consciously attempt to make products that their customers preferred. Or is your surprise simply that the preferences being met were not consciouscly and publicly declared by parents before they were given a choice between “cute” bears and “beary” bears? Having done a bit of market research during my misspent youth, I’m afraid I cannot share your wonder at this event.
It’s sand.
I repeat what I said before in a diferent context: what you imagine that this illustrates about moral valuation through survival remains a mystery.
No, what changes is a preferrd morphology as expressed in a series of market opportnities. I am quite certain that if you showed people an early model they would have no trouble identifying it as a teddy bear, just as they would have no trouble identifying a Model-T as a car or a tricorner as a hat.
Make a case, not a metaphor.
I am glad that you recognize the (or at least some) truth in my critique.
I am less pleased that you imagine I have made any assertion about the boundaries of rationality.
