Taking a stand on moral relativism

Great Debates
21

Let me see if I can rephrase myself a little better here.

All moral relativism requires me to do is realize that others may have a subjectively better truth than I. Doesn’t mean they necessarily do, but it requires my own thoughtful consideration. I cannot simply say “Thats wrong because my way is always right”. It requires me to remain open to the fact that I may be the one in the wrong after all and adjust accordingly. If, after what due consideration I am able to apply, I still feel an action being taken is wrong then I may choose to intervene. Moral relativism does not mean I can never take action against another person, only that I remain open to the other person’s point of view.

22

Not at all. The morality you chose to illustrate with a relativistic account held that it was ok to destroy other cultures. Now, yes, if the entire world were cultural relativists, and furthermore always felt the agent’s perspective was appropriate to judge from, and one culture held a moral code about deserving to destroy other cultures, then I suppose you have indeed created a world where might-makes-right. To them, of course. To me talking about it, they’re wrong. :wink:

Yes, it is a fact of human life that people will disagree. This is why we have moral systems: to guide our actions in times of distress, which may very well include disagreement, for what we hope are better days ahead.

Priam, I think that’s a good way to say it, yes.

23

TVAA: I concur that you can also go the other way. If confronted with a clash between feeling and moral system, people have been known to take either way out.

I believe that this can be illustrated with examples from highly religious people, who are forbidden to get vaccination and/or blood transfusion with fatal results. Sometimes people still believe that they did the right thing and it is not up to them to question God, sometimes they see this as proof that God doesn’t exist and that his moral commandments are void.

24

Permit me a little rumination here if I may…

The problem with codes of morality is, I believe, that they are often created to deal with specific circumstances and then become set into stone long after the circumstances have changed.

If it were possible to come up with a “universal” moral code, I think the closest we could ever come would be “morailty requires that all sentient beings be treated with equal respect, wherever practical.” This allows for different cultures to have different exceptions to the general rule, based on their specific circumstances, but also allows members of other cultures to make valid judgements as to the validity of other cultures’ moral codes.

As an extreme example, let’s assume there is a primative nomadic society whose existence depends on being able to follow game as it migrates throughout the year. If the society as a whole is unable to uproot at a moment’s notice and follow the game, then everybody will suffer. As a result of this circumstance, it is considered “moral” within this society for the elderly and inform to be left behind during migrations, even though this consigns them to certain death. In fact, the eldery and infirm are taught that they have a moral duty to the rest of the society to stay behind. In this case, their exigent circumstances provide an exception to the general moral rule that everybody should be treated with the same respect.

Now, move ahead hundreds of years. The society has evolved into a more agrarian society, able to cultivate fields and keep livestock. They are no longer nomadic, and no longer need to uproot at a moment’s notice to survive. However, the moral code that was developed in nomadic times has become so ingrained, and people have forgotten the reasons behind the development of the code, that the elderly and infirm are still abandoned to fend for themselves as being “drains on society.” If somebody is unable to care for himself, he is kicked out of the city. At this point, the exception to the general moral rule can no longer be justified by practicality, and outsiders can therefore validly judge the society as being immoral.

In short (and I think I need to write a book on the subject to explain what I really mean), when the question arises as to moral relativism, I think we need to ask three questions if we are to attempt to judge the validty of a particular moral system:
[ol]
[li] Does the moral system in question attempt to follow the “universal” principle regarding equal respect toward all people?[/li]
[li] If the moral system in question provides for exceptions to the general principle, are those exceptions based on practical concerns (as opposed to, say, ignorance or superstition)?[/li]
[li] If the moral system in question does have excepetions based on practical concerns, are those concerns still valid today? [/li][/ol]
I’m sure there are lots of flaws to the above argument, and it definitely needs a lot of finessing, but I hope there’s at least some value to it.

Regards,

Barry

25

Basically I’m in agreement with what you wrote, godzillatemple. Lately I’ve been reading up on some contemporary moral philosophers who espouse similar positions. Onora O’Neill, for one (Towards justice and virtue, Cambridge 1996), advocates to work out a practical morality on the basic criterium that its moral principles should be adoptable by all persons concerned. That seems quite similar to your universal principle of equal respect (though the ‘equal’ may lead to all sorts of trouble). To be true, her criterium allows for some latitude in different moral principles, but it is not entirely powerless as a criterium.

The context-dependence of morality (in particular its dependence on the existing societal institutions) is also getting greater recognition these days. Of course, all this goes against the current in public opinion that very much stresses the existence of absolute moral standards. It looks like most of us are in agreement in this thread that such a position in itself is not tenable.

If I understand erislover correctly, I agree with his standpoint that from a practical as well as a theoretical standpoint it is bad form to address a differing morality as simply being wrong; it is far more productive to try to figure out what drives it, and appeal to shared or at least acceptable principles and statements for criticism.

Pity though that agreement does not make a lively debate. :wink:

26

It is equally right to kill all moral relativists as it is not to kill them, yes? Therefore, what is the basis for ascribing any moral approbrium to such mass murder? Or is it murder at all? If all moral stances are equal, then what is the basis for deciding among them all? If there is any basis, then does that not mean that the contention that they are all equal is false. Essentially, moral relativism boils down to the flat dogma that no moral criterion is universally valid. In that case, that must mean that no moral decision can be legitimately made. Even “use what works for you” imposes a universal criterion, albeit a squishy one.

27

Dogface, I hope you don’t think that any of us in this thread subscribe to that kind of moral relativism. If you want to do more than a drive-by post, I suggest you actually read the thread, or at the very least the OP.

28

At first glance this seems rather difficult to adopt, but perhaps the additional qualifications she would give by appeals to practicality would help clarify the matter.

It reminds me of Kant. Didn’t he require, in his construction, a similar principle?

I think, though, that universal applicability as a criterion helps reinforce the idea of absolute morality. Witness America’s, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal…” Such a construction seems, logically, to demand the recgnition of an absolute morality. Of course this isn’t the case, but even that is not clear at first glance.

Indeed, I think it is the only way to make progress. Recognition that context is necessary and observing that contexts are transitory pretty much requires that moral discussion is recognizd as constructuve and necessary. Coupled with the notion that people themselves can only have limited understanding, I think it shows moral relativism to be the only honest way to construct a moral perspective.

29

Well, I’m not familiar with Ms. O’Neill, but it sounds like I’m in good company. The thoughts I posted on this subject were just that – my thoughts. I’m not at all surprised that other thinkers have come to the same conclusions as I have, though.

Personally, I don’t think that “moral relativism” means abandoning all moral codes or even accepting all moral codes as equally valid. Instead, I would argue that it means being aware that morality has never developed in a vacuum, and that you need to understand the special circumstances of each society to appreciate the validity of their moral code. And even if a society’s moral code is valid based on particular circumstances, an outsider can still find fault with the moral code if the underlying circumstances change and the moral code does not.

Regards,

Barry

30

Following up on what Barry said, would it make sense to include the factor of an ethical justification for whatever practice is at issue? To continue with the theme of old people, a society that randomly killed old people would be considered immoral by most, while a society that for instance expected old people to go into exile and certain death because of critical resource shortages would be considered more moral. As mentioned, changing circumstances might change this, and more sophisticated ethical arguments might change it also. So, one might consider a society practicing what is considered a moral wrong without a strong ethical justification is immoral even under relativism.

I’d also argue that religiously based moral absolutism is just as relative. Consider practice a culture that considers practice P to be immoral because their god G has forbidden it. They then run into a culture worshipping god H which makes P a sacrament. The morality or immorality of P then depends on which god, if any, exists. (I’m assuming no ethical justification or objection to this practice.) Moral absolutism then becomes not a justification for believing in a god, but rather a consequence of the existence of a god. I’d think that firm proof in the existence of a god would have a large impact on this argument.

On the other hand, would Christian absolutists believe that absolute proof that Baal is the creator of the universe be justification for child sacrifice? Assuming they don’t, would that make them moral relativists or immoral? I’d say no, because they would have good ethical reasons against that practice which they would no doubt fall back on in condemning it even against the wishes of a monster god.

thanks for the very cogent OP, eris.

Good post for #500!

31

Voyager, the point about relativism versus absolutism is, I think, an interesting one in that, under relativism, one can see absolute systems (systems that say they are absolute) can exist, but under absolutism no relative system can exist. The power of relativism, in my opinion, comes from the notion hat it has no trouble dealing with variable (context-dependent) interpretations or varying (schism in ideology) interpretations. All may be addressed by appealing to the limitations of human understanding, and providing a framework around which to debate such issues as whether it is moral to have a slave, even if the bible (for example) seems to allow it. This becomes important in two cases; one, the one you mention, where there are various religions for someone to choose from (or summarily reject, as the case may be), but another is where the major religious text is vague or even silent on issues that modern people face though their biblical ancestors wouldn’t.

As another example of moral absolutism, consider the case of Objectivists (Randistas, as per Collounsbury) who hold that, verily, there is a proper way for man to act, that understanding what man is, and perhaps teleologically what he is meant to become, we can deduce how he should behave. Here, objective truth (and thus a turn from epistemological relativism) paves the way for objective ethics. However, no matter what Rand might think there are varous interpretations about just what man is and what his purpose may be, which then lead to various deductions that are quite likely different from on to another.

We see the same pattern in religious denominations, as well. About the only thing they tend to agree on is the names of their god or gods!

To an absolutist, it seems moral relativism cuts down the authority of their god or understanding of (what is apparently an) objective reality. But I agree with you that relativism offers us strength of interpretation here by not only giving us a source for “correctness” (by not abolishing moral judgment) but by offering us a structure for debate (by requiring the possibility of error via the "no uniquely priviged system) which needn’t be confrontational but constructive.

While it is one thing to say “My god exists” it is quite another to say “And I understand his commands perfectly”. The former is a matter of ontology, bu the latter encroaches on the ethical systems that are laid out by various interpretations of existing text. Needless, perhaps, to say, I am fine with the former, but the latter crumbles under even light skepticism.

32

Very perceptive. O’Neill has indeed studied Kant extensively. Even though she distances herself at several points from him, her approach is clearly influenced by if not modeled on the Kantian structure.

With respect to her basic criterium, it would go too far to explain it here. Basically she understands it as a low treshold to sift out evidently unacceptable principles: ‘acceptable’ is more like ‘not unacceptable’. A principle of discrimination for example would be unacceptable to the group being discriminated. But differential treatment might not in itself be unacceptable for people in- or outside the group. It would depend on the differences and the reasoning behind it.

33

Are relative ethics more correct, more valid, than absolute ethics?

34

Well thats the point, isn’t it? There’s no such thing as more correct or more valid objectively, only subjectively. Whats perfect for a desert society would break down handling an urban culture. You can have absolute systems that are better in context, but thats the beautiful part of relativism: co-opting what is better. If you realize your system simply is untenable in its current shape, you shift to make it closer to perfect.

35

If that’s truly the case, then why should one adopt moral relativism, as opposed to moral absolutism? If netiher one is truly more correct than the other, then one cannot legitimately object to the claim that moral absolutes exist.

36

Because moral relativism has one thing going for it that moral absolutism doesn’t, and that’s flexibility. Moral absolutism assumes that all cultures have the same needs and circumstances, and that is patently false. Moral relativism allows one to judge a culture’s morality in context. It doesn’t mean that you have to accept all moral codes as being equally valid, however.

With moral relativism you can still posit general moral principles that should apply to all cultures in the absence of extenuating circumstances (“practicality”), and then judge a culture based on whether the exceptions to the general principles are warranted or not.

Moral absolutism, however, doesn’t allow for exceptions to the genral rules. And, more often than not, the “absolute” rules themselves are based on one culture’s particular circumstances in the first place.

Regards,

Barry

37

if moral absolutes do exist, how do you know what they are?

38

Oh, that’s an easy one. God told us what they are.

[Just don’t ask which God, or which of the statements ascribed to God are really his word and which are merely the interpretations of men…]

Barry

39

If one posits anything, ANYTHING AT ALL that is not 100% spiffy and okie dokie “under the right circumstances”, one then has admitted to a moral absolute. If one has admitted to a moral absolute, then one can no longer be a relativist.

40

Um, isn’t the whole point of the OP (correct me if I’m wrong erislover) that being a moral absolutist and a moral relativist are not exclusive positions?

I can believe that I’m absolutely right and you’re absolutely wrong while knowing that you hold the opposite position. And, while knowing that I’m absolutely right based on all the information available to me, I can understand that you hold a different position based on the information available to you. I can also acknowledge that although I believe myself to be absolutely right from my perspective, my limited ability to apprehend the world prohibits me from saying that I’m absolutely right from all perspectives. The only way to arbitrate between us in a non-relative way is to start from a non-relative framework, in other words to actually be God.