Taking a stand on moral relativism

** Is the evolutionary fitness of a creature objective, or subjective?

In any event, morality would then be relative to the particular state a creature has evolved to. We haven’t escaped relativism, we’ve indicated the source. Or at least a source. I don’t see that appealing to a man’s physiological nature will tell us how we should act. I can see that in some cases we might appeal to this physiological nature to resolve specific dilemmas, but in which cases this is so is a moral question itself, is it not?

Why would you say that? Recognizing the source of a morality can help us recognize its applicative limitations.

How many people hold them is an objective way to evaluate. Why wouldn’t it be? Is counting in some way subjective that I’m completely not aware of?

Both, actually. Once a creature has survived and exists in a relatively stable way in an ecosystem, the question is no longer evolutionary as selective agents have selected all they can. That a species exists is objective; whether it is more fit than some other creature requires a method of evaluation. Choosing among various methods of evaluation, even if they are objective methods, is not an objective procedure, at least not in the general case. Or at least not that I can see.

Sure, I do. Frex, let’s take the case of some guy who is busted by the Feds for growing a few thousand pot plants in the back 40. Under Federal law, he’s a drug kingpin, so the Feds get around the rule preventing a spouse from being forced to incriminate a spouse from being forced to incriminate her husband, they threaten to prosecute her under RICO statutes unless she testified against hubby. But she had nothing to do with the pot and refuses to roll, and so the Feds prosecute her and get her jailed for ten years, even though they have no evidence that she was at all active in the crime, rendering the couple’s kids pretty much orphaned.

(I’m using this case because according to a Frontline documentary, this exact scenario has occurred quite a few times in the course of the drug war.)

Now, whatever your feeling about the morality of pot, it is definitely against the law. But this is definitely a case where some flexibility in morality is caleld for. The children of this couple are innocents, and there can be no doubt that the feds did them very great harm by orphaning them. While I recognize that you can’t go letting people commit crimes and get away with it just because they have kids who would be adversely affected by their being prosecuted, I think in a case like the one I just cited, a little flexibility would definitely be in order. Recognizing that the mother is only guilty by association and the kids are not guilty at all, the mother should be spared for the sake of the kids.

** Incorrect – an organism in a “stable” relationship with its environment is preserved by the constant action of evolutionary forces countered by mutation and recombination effects. It’s conceptually rather similar to a soliton.

The validity of a moral system is determined by whether it works, with working defined by successful propagation. The number of people who hold it is irrelevant.

So am I to understand that individual murders here and there are neither moral nor immoral because the overall survival of the species is maintained? Really, I’m not sure how to apply your criteria. In any event, how is this supposed to undermine moral relativism? Or is it not supposed to?

Evil Captor, I’m not sure what you’re driving at. Do you feel the view you’ve presented is not able to be encapsulated in moral relativism?

I would think that the number of people holding a moral theory has very little bearing on the moral theory at all. Should a moral theory be more correct simply because more people hold it to be true? Is a moral theory less correct just because the only believer of it is a hobo living on the streets of Sacramento?

Re: EvilCaptor

The only problem with allowing the woman to go free is that it sets a dangerous precedent.
A big problem I’d find with a flexible moral theory is that it could be easily questioned in most cases, and therefore would lack any substantial value in a decision-making process. Any conclusions could be questioned, argued against, etc.

I’d explain more, but I don’t think it’d be entirely relevant.

Subjective. To its environment. What is ideally suited for mountains may not handle the deep Sahara so well.

The big problem with inflexible moral theory is that it can’t.

Like Barry said, that’s quite a big thing to say. Yes, evolution has influenced our current set of morals, but in no way has it directly determined them. The idea is more of a Pavlovian thing I think. Throughout history and the evolution of our species, we were confronted with particular situations that required us to change our regular lifestyles to adapt to deal with it. For example, becoming nomadic so as to be able to find adequate food. Or a better example, the practice of abandoning the elderly and infirm so as to maintain an easily moved, nomadic tribe. Evolution had little to do with it, it was just action and reaction. And furthermore, we can’t rely on that to bring us to any sort of workable moral theory.

Sure. But if we hadn’t evolved mechanisms for empathy and bonding with non-related humans, we would probably eat our elderly and infirm, desert nomads or not.

The importance of these questions is addressed in the OP, I believe.

That’s not morality, that’s machinery. If there can be no disagreement, is morality even applicable?

Perhaps The Aide was putting forth a possibility for an ultimate or absolute morality. The quote,

“Heaven lasts long, and Earth abides.
What is the secret of their durability?
Is it because they do not live for themselves
That they endure so long?”

can, I think, be read as an argument for altruism as the only morality worth striving for.

But what relation does that make between evolution and morality? Evolution merely gave us the physical and mental means (i.e. a brain + awareness) to accomplish that, we gave significance to it on our own. And as an aside, is there really anything so wrong with cannibalism? (given that the people are dead through natural causes of course, murder isn’t cool.)

Furthermore, we seem to be in a position where we have a greater awareness of our situation than any of those animals, and therefore we are aware of why we perform certain actions and can control what we do. A wolf might not necessarily feel mercy, but we do. Our own moral theories are hardly the result of evolution, but moral theories refined over the years through experience, logic, thought, mysticism, etc. Otherwise, religion would have to be considered some sort of evolution-related facet of our lives, which, seems, ummm…, bizarre. We can’t be governed by our instincts, partially because we have none, but mostly because we are capable of more. All the animals above operate primarily on instinct, whereas, we’ve mostly gotten rid of any natural instincts we have ever had -_-;.

I guess that’s probably why they haven’t come up with a workable moral theory yet :rolleyes: . Just to let you know, I’m big into the Kantian thing, although with my own, personal moral theory, I don’t take everything he says, I just tend to borrow heavily. I’ve always been of the idea that if something is wrong in one instance, it must be wrong in another. The moment you start making exceptions, the weaker your moral position becomes. At least that’s the way I view it. I can understand an argument for flexibility, but it seems that if you’re going to make a moral theory for everyone, you have to make it strong.

Well, I was more getting that the number of holders of a moral theory matters little to not. It should not be considered an objective way to evaluate because it simply tells you nothing of the moral theory. Just because more people hold it true, does not make it a better theory. It’s akin to saying that because more people attribute to a certain religion, that religion must be more correct or more ethical than another. Well, not quite, but I can’t think of any good examples.

Why? Is it nonsensical to suggest that the laws of physics apply to both men and molluscs equally?

It is nonsensical to think that molluscs are capable of differentiating something from ethically right and ethically wrong. Or even if they make those distinctions.

"Why? Is it nonsensical to suggest that the laws of physics apply to both men and molluscs equally?"

not at all, but the rather different lifestyles and ecological niches occupied by men, squid and shellfish would lead to them having different moral standards. I’m interpreting “a totally objective morality” as “a universal moral code”.

"It is nonsensical to think that molluscs are capable of differentiating something from ethically right and ethically wrong. Or even if they make those distinctions."

I assume you’re referring to the essential mindlessness of most or all molluscs. Point taken, molluscs may do nothing more complicated than stimulus-response. But…

Shine a bright light in my eyes and my pupils contract. An automatic mechanism, possibly similar to those found in molluscs.

Starve me for a day and I will feel the pain of hunger. A survival-based, built-in drive, that has evolved to ensure that I keep myself fed. I can over-ride it, but it’s there. Molluscs may have a related drive, although what a drive “feels” like to a mindless organism, I have no idea.

Sleep with my partner and I will feel the pain of jealousy. Another survival based built-in drive, that has evolved to ensure that I favour the propagation of my own genes over others. It will also shape my moral outlook, in that if I do not regard such actions as “wrong”, those individuals that do will tend to be more reproductively successful. The “sexual jealousy” trait is then preferentially propagated, and helps shape our morality. The 60’s “free love” culture attempted to override that trait, but never very successfully.

Giant clams are molluscs that reproduce sexually, but they spray their eggs and seed out into the sea rather than compete for mates. Their sexual competion consists of out-producing each other. If giant clams developed minds, I presume their sexual morals would be utterly different from ours.

What does the molluscs’ ability to think morally have to do with the nature of objective morality?

I think the posts in this thread contain an implicit assumption: morality is psychologically subjective. Why is this assumption being made?

I’d like to hear the justifications for this position.

This is, at least, not the assumption of the OP. The assumptions of moral relativity are quite plain. Granted, most of the more popular forms or relativism adopt a subjective or limited-intersubjective view, but to say that pushing morality onto evolution avoids subjectivity is like saying it can’t be subjective that I think murder is evil because murder is an objective act, or that beauty isn’t in the eye of the beholder because everyone sees the same statue.

For myself, morality is subjective, though the justifications I would use to support various moral tenets could definitely appeal to objective knowledge (I see no way around that one, actually). I have yet to find a way to create a bridge between the is-ought gap. Objectively we can know what something is; it is not clear that we can objectively know what something should be, even if we utilize objectivity in some of our analysis.

The number of people that hold a particular moral view is objective: we simply count the number of people that hold it. Thus we could create an objective definition: whatever most people hold to be morally right is morally right. Moral relativism simply demands we always keep in mind: “But it is only right because that’s how we’ve defined it; there is no ‘rule of rules’ that can determine which definitions are better because to make such a judgment requires we already have a system with which to judge.” This is much like Fewl’s delicious rephrasing.

Another objective rule would be: “Moral statements that end in vowels are false.” Of course such a system is self-defeating, but it creates an objective standard by which to judge. Why is objectivity important to a moral system? Why is it better than subjectivity? Moral relativism says: “To answer this question requires a moral system.” So when Spiritus Mundi comes along and says, “Moral statements that end in consonants are false,” he has an objective way to evaluate moral principles as well as other moral systems.

To make an analogy to mathematics, one might say: “Is the axiom of choice more valid than a mathematical system without it?” The answer to this question presupposes a mathematical system from which to determine validity, but then the question can simply be asked regarding any of the axioms from that mathematical system. The upshot, of course, being that no mathematical system is privileged.

But to return to the question at hand, I would like to address why I feel that morality is subjective: because the smallest unit of moral-decision-making is a moral agent, i.e., me. I am responsible for adopting moral systems, as I am responsible for acting on them, if I do something that displeases other moral agents I am the one accepting or dealing with the consequences. The problem is already reduced to one in which I am the final judgment, the final arbiter of what I do. While it is easier to think of this in terms of a free will it isn’t strictly necessary: in all cases I am the one that is acting. If anyone asks why I did something, the answer would invariably be, “Because I think/believe/know it was right.”

If I am a moral agent, then my judgments will then always be, trivially, relative to me, even if there exists an absolute moral system that I use, because I chose to use it. Perhaps I had a small and woefully incomplete moral system that said what a moral system should be, and I used this to choose between what is presented as an absolute system and someone else’s perhaps abitrary system like the sentence-analysis given before. Perhaps I simply picked the first one that came along. In any event, I am the moral agent in question, and so my judgments are relative to me, and so ultimately subjective in that sense.

That is to say, to understand why I did something is to ask a subjective question: to limit the scope to one person’s perspective, no matter how much he used objectivity in his analysis. “Society”, “culture”, “law”, “nature”… any of these can provide us with objective means of establishing definitions and creating decision-making rules, but none of them actually do anything with respect to these rules. Society is made up of individuals, it is not monolithic. Culture the same. Law is a set of rules that we can all reference, but it is still up to individuals to do said referencing: the law cannot make them. Nature creates environments in which to live, and can shape the way man has to be (that, for example, he cannot flap his arms in order to fly, or breathe underwater without assistance), but leaves an incredible range of behavior open for what he could do. We, as individuals, fill the gaps these various conceptual entities leave for behavior with our own judgments, in addition to determining which may be most important to listen to.

I don’t know where you live, but in my country we have a government - and the morals of this country have been defined in the forms of laws.

Is this machinery? The whole point of living in a society is following rules and ideals defined for the good of the people.