Taking into account what's going on in Ukraine...what do you think would happen if China invades Taiwan?

In My Humble Opinion
21

What exactly are they going to do that’s not a major amphibious invasion? They can’t realistically do it by air, and they can’t do a small scale invasion with any likelihood of success.

They’ll have to bring it if they want to be victorious, and they’ll have to do it over a distance of 97 nautical miles, which is very similar to the distance from Portsmouth to the coast near Bayeux.

All that points to any sort of invasion of Taiwan to pretty much necessarily be a large-scale amphibious operation. And nothing points toward any serious Chinese capability to move and transport multiple divisions of troops onto contested landing beaches over a nearly 100 mile distance and keep them supplied and reinforced in the face of hostile naval forces.

22

I feel China has been working on a long term plan and not all of the pre-conditions are in place yet.

  1. Build up a network of third world client states so they’ll have support in the UN. Check.
  2. Develop and deploy a credible threat to American military power (like their East Wind missile system) in the region. Check.
  3. Use Hong Kong and Macau as showcases of their MSAR program. Yeah, they dropped the ball on this one.
  4. Settle some of their various claims for minor island chains on favorable terms to create some diplomatic precedents. Working on that.

So I predict we’ll see a Chinese push in the South China Sea before we see a push against Taiwan. The stakes are lower there because the world is going to be less concerned about some small uninhabited islands. But China will score some important symbolic victories and get international diplomatic momentum moving in their favor.

23

I would add ‘get in a number of important UN committees, including the Human Rights one, and so can block any inconvenient narratives or initiatives they don’t like’. Check.

As long as they ‘ensure plenty of propaganda about how great their weapons and systems are’. Check.

‘Simply buy off or bully nations in the disputed territories, even those who have gotten international claims ratified’. I think this is mainly a check at this point. They are there. No one is moving them out. The US is one of the only countries challenging them wrt freedom of navigation.

I doubt it. No point, really. The SCS is to give them strategic depth and push the US back in that region from being able to support Taiwan. It’s a win/win in that it’s also a great resource area for China, with tons of fish and oil/gas they can swipe, plus a huge zone for shipping and trade going through the region, so they can hold it hostage. But it’s all to potentially push the US back from being able to assist Taiwan coming from the south.

They are in the process of scoring some of those right now over Ukraine. They are playing to the US’s desire to put more pressure on Russia and also trying to portray themselves as the one power that can bring peace. All the while, they are supporting Russia under the table with things like Huawei assisting the Russians in stabilizing their internet, as well as other assistance that is flying under the radar. It’s the best of all worlds…or, win/win with Chinese characteristics. That said, I think they are getting less traction than they used to on these fronts, as countries are wising up. In addition, their own economy seems to be having major issues, especially with the current (albeit, again, heavily downplayed) covid infections rocking Hong Kong and, in theory anyway, the mainland too.

24

One approach that might work (I think it was discussed in Forbes or some other publication) would be massive airlift by helicopters. China has 1,500+ helicopters and Taiwan is only a hundred miles away, so this is feasible.

This approach has several advantages:

  • Taiwan, for the time being, still has relatively few Stinger missiles and helicopters might fly low enough to evade most of Taiwan’s SAMs (which are meant to strike high altitude jets)
  • Helicopters travel much faster than ships, so you could get troops to Taiwan within 1-2 hours as opposed to 4-6 hours by sea.
  • Helicopters can transport Chinese troops to all kinds of places within the island - directly on top of targets and key locations - whereas amphibious troops would be massed at a beachhead that would be easily encircled and also vulnerable to artillery barrage. Helos therefore bypass many defenses, such as fortified beaches, and get straight to the vulnerable center of Taiwan.
  • The number of troops transported this way wouldn’t be much less than an amphibious invasion. 1,500 helicopters each carrying twelve troops and doing eight round-trips in a day would mean over 140,000 Chinese troops on Taiwan at the end of Day One (this would be the most optimistic projection, though, it assumes everything goes without a hitch and Chinese helo losses are minimal)
  • With a thousand helicopters, you can approach and converge on Taiwan from all directions at once, whereas an invasion fleet has to follow a more or less constricted, predictable route, landing at only one or a few beaches.
25

They have de facto control of the islands. But at some point they’re going to push for de jure control with international recognition of Chinese sovereignty. The path to that will go through the United Nations. At some point, when China is sure it has the votes lined up, it will “agree” to putting the dispute before the UN and win recognition.

By doing this, they’ll have set a precedent. When they invade Taiwan a few years afterward and establish control of the island, they can invoke these precedents as a means of settling any arguments over their claimed ownership.

26

How are you going to keep them supplied though? I doubt you could keep a heliborne resupply operation like that going for long.

27

Presumably, once the troops were dropped off, they’d be on their own. They’d have to be carrying all the ammo and stuff they needed. Although getting food and supplies from the locality wouldn’t be hard (there’s like a 7-Eleven every thousand yards in Taiwan.)

28

That’s why such an assault would be unrealistic. You are talking about dropping off maybe 20-30k troops who would be all on their own in hostile territory controlled by a military with several hundred thousand…plus a hostile population of 10’s of millions. Spitting on a red hot griddle isn’t even a good analogy as to how fast those troops would evaporate. And this assumes they would actually be able to get in with that force…which, I doubt.

This is the sort of thing you do alongside a full-on invasion or other major operation, as a distraction or for specific goals, where you assume you’ll be able to support it once your major operation is successful. Think of D-Day where the allies dropped in paratroops as well as glider troops. They assumed, rightfully, that the invasion would go well and they could support those forces once they established a beach head. even so, those paratroops and gliders got chewed up badly in more than a few cases. Also, consider that Russia tried something like this in the early stages of this conflict, sending in airborne forces to take a key airport. That attack didn’t go well, to say the least.

29

And then think how much worse the airborne regiments would have been mauled if they’d faced modern anti-aircraft fire.

A helicopter assault would likely be a part of establishing a beachhead for an amphibious assault, but there’s no way it would be the whole attack.

30

Note: The Taiwanese have been preparing for most of the past 60 years for an invasion from China. It ain’t a walk over. And the vast majority of the population on taiwan are not necessarily anti-China, which is way different from welcoming the boot of chinese overlords ala Hong Kong.

Plus, it is my personal conspiracy theory that Tiawan has the bomb. Decades ago it it was made clear that you can destroy taiwan, but that also means destroying GuangZhou, Hong Hong, Xiaomen and Shanghai. Phyrric victory and all that.

For those of you playing at home, China invaded Taiwan in 1945 -1949. There is the most noticible but not only incident of feb 28, 1948.

Whilst taiwan may accept a gradual economic and political rapprochment, it sure as hell won’t accept political power from the barrel of a gun. This aint some Hong Kong pushover (but salute to the people of HK playing the best they could of a bad poker hand).

31

This is not the U.S. we’re talking about, where the civilian population is armed to the teeth. Civilian gun ownership in Taiwan is practically non-existent.

32

My family and I just spent the day yesterday with my wife’s friend “Bob”, who works as a Taiwanese foreign service officer, and his family.

As our kids played and wives talked, he and I spent the day discussing the Ukraine war, China, his experiences as a second lieutenant assigned as a staff intelligence officer in a combined arms brigade in the 90s, and modern Asian history.

It was a long discussion with someone who is well informed so this post will be lengthy, but hopefully interesting.

First, the greatest takeaway: Bob noted that the single greatest lesson that should be learned from the Ukraine war is that you need to be friends with the US, especially if you live next to a ruthless giant.

As for the 60 years of potential preparation time, it must be stressed that historically ROC army has not been that efficient or particularly effective in their training. He complained that much of their time was spent polishing brass and painting their “crappy tanks” (his words) to look better.

At the time, national conscription was a mandatory two year service. Now it’s four months, which isn’t really adequate. It’s just enough to get people used to taking orders but not sufficient to train people into really understanding their job.

Bob believes that if the brass polishing time were eliminated, that one year should be more than sufficient to build a potent reserve force.

Bob doubts the abilities of the PLA and sees a lot of weakness there. He rates abilities of the NCOs in the ROC army as better than Russian, but less than the US.

In the early 90s when he was serving active duty, the idea was still to crush the enemy on the shores, to throw them back to the seas. He noted that under US military advice, the idea then went on to try to prevent the crossing of the straits, and now has evolved to look at the potential to inflict damage at the locations when they massing their forces for an invasion.

As far as @China_Guy’s CT, I asked him directly his thoughts as @China_Guy has repeatedly brought this up. He thought that it wouldn’t surprise him if the news came out that Taiwan has the bomb as they should have the capacity to build a bomb, but he has doubts if they actually have any now. If they do, it would have to be with the blessings of the US.

However, his speculation is that as it would take time for the PLA to build up an invasion force, that may be enough time to assemble devices.

In the event of a war, a major job for the army would be dealing with infiltrators, and there would likely be Taiwanese infiltrators over in China as well.

The ROC army has come a long ways from the ugly days of complete corruption and ineptness which characterized it in China and after retreating here, but it still needs improving.

We both agree on the importance of Japan, and are watching as it inches closer to offensive capabilities.

His take on South Korea is that is a bit wishy-washy on China.

33

The main issue with Taiwan’s military is that it still resists, somewhat, the idea of an “asymmetrical” defense even though the US has been urging such an approach for many years and it’s Taiwan’s only realistic way to defend against an assault. Having many small things (dozens of small missile boats, thousands of Javelins) is far more practical than having a few big things (big warships, tanks). Unfortunately, Taiwan’s military is still deeply run throughout by the Kuomintang Cold-War era mindset which still thinks of everything in a 1960s mindset, and structures a military accordingly and resists change.

35

Here is a very topical piece courtesy of Al Jazeera. While it prolly over indexes on a positive outcome for Taiwan, the picture it paints is pretty interesting: How difficult would it be for China to invade Taiwan? (msn.com)

Secondly, if you’ve ever seen 130 pound Chinese conscripts walking along in high heeled plastic sandles, you prolly wonder how battle ready they are. That said, I’ve also seen truck loads of troops rotating out of garrison duty in Tibet. They were hard looking mother fuckers. They had crucified dead monkeys rotting on top of the truck beds (above the cab, not sure what that is called?). To be honest, I didn’t want to call attention to myself. Basically, took one look and put my head down so they couldn’t see I was a foreigner and certainly didn’t dare take out a camera for a photo. Right nasty looking crew they were.

36

If China decides to retake Taiwan, I believe they will achieve that goal with relatively little trouble of the kind the Russians are finding themselves in. China is immensely prosperous with a massive technological base and MIC. You cannot just sanction China to achieve any realistic political objective; they simply have too much power and resources and can overcome anything the West can currently throw at it.

Russia: Probably Putin and Xi already have an agreement to scratch each others’ backs when it comes to Ukraine and Taiwan, so I strongly expect Russia to openly support China in the event of a war with Taiwan. Russia might also materially support the Chinese as payback for US/Europe’s unwavering support for Ukraine.

India: A war with Taiwan would greatly prop up India’s status as the only significant Asian power capable of standing up to China over the long-term. This might mean a more rapid inflow of Western weapon systems, economic and security partnerships, and stronger political alignment. However India is an expert fence-sitter, having sat on a pointy fence throughout the Cold War tiptoeing around the US/West and the USSR. So expect strong condemnation from India (China is an adversary after all) but little else of substance. I do see India emerging as the long-term gainer from a Chinese-initiated war on Taiwan.

The US: Lots of bluff and bluster but too little involvement. China cannot be stopped unless the US deploys CBGs with an extremely clear-headed intent of doing whatever it takes to save Taiwan. I don’t think the US has that level of commitment. Hence the fall of Taiwan is inevitable.

37

Taiwan is harder to invade than Ukraine, but easier to pacify. With a 100-mile Strait and the Taiwanese having more precision weaponry/SAMs/artillery etc., there would be much greater bloodshed at the beaches and in the Strait, but if the Chinese forces did get a serious hold of Taiwan, there would be less of an insurgency, especially because it’s near-impossible for the US or others to ferry reinforcements like men, weapons and supplies into Taiwan the way Ukraine is receiving right now (due to land borders with NATO neighbors.)

38

I don’t know because there are so many factors involved and it really depends on the circumstances. Looking at Ukraine, the war could easily have gone the other way, and that country could have collapsed.

There are many factors which make it difficult to actually predict the future, so I think the most reasonable approach is to list factors and potential effects, recognizing the limitations of our crystal balls.

The US has to look at Taiwan from not only for the bilateral relationship, but also the question of where to stop China’s growing influence in Asia and if there is potential for further conflict. This is a serious consideration in Europe, not only is Russia’s actions in Ukraine examined, but also there is a need to stop them from further aggression.

Some Japanese politicians are worried that a China attack on Taiwan could lead to either attacks on the disputed Sekaku Islands or worse that could lead to a potential existential crisis where China would have to potential to disrupt the flow of oil from the Middle East.

If Japan decides to join the war, it would be much more difficult for the US to remain on the sidelines.

Another question would be the gamble China must make on a first strike against US military in the region. If China were to first attack US forces, it would certainly resolve the question concerning US involvement, but if it decides against that option, then it could possibly face forces sufficient to defeat an invasion prior to actual landing, or to reduce the China attack to where Taiwan could successfully resist, even if the US doesn’t actually land any troops.

This is similar to the problem Japan faced in WWII. Attack the US and hope to knock out the Pacific fleet long enough to make allow its grab of territory in Asia and the Pacific, or leave it alone and pray that the US remains neutral.

The initial calculation was the they could grab and fortify enough territory that the US would be willing to negotiate a settlement. OTOH, if they didn’t attack and then the US entered the war, they would have been in a really poor position.

China faces the same dilemma. The US is also building up its capacity to strike even without placing the carriers in jeopardy, especially with the rapid development of intermediate range missiles.

39

This is changing, as is frequently seen in the news.