I’m not talking about an engineered transport, I’m alluding to the hypothetical I mentioned a couple of times upthread:
At some moment my exact brain configuration, by chance, arises in another universe. From that point on the two brains diverge; I die in this universe, but that brain in another universe continues.
ISTM that if in the transporter hypothetical I actually transport, and it’s not merely the creation of a duplicate, then in the other universe hypothetical the same must be true.
And while we cannot even transfer information to the other universe, or even know it exists, sentient beings can apparently be transferred there.
It’s a little like the idea that in an infinite universe, the “same” things happen many times. So there’s another “us” out there somewhere, having the same thoughts and experiences.
I don’t find it satisfying as a form of “transportation” because there’s no causal relationship. I can’t ever come back from that trip to Disneyland and show my friends the pictures I took. It’s a one-way trip. (Like death!)
It lacks testability. It isn’t falsifiable. We can’t ever know if it’s the case or not. It doesn’t offer us any benefits, whereas a standard transporter – or even a duplicator – offer signal benefits to us as individuals and as society.
I see it as nothing more than an empty and useless speculation, like “alternate history” universes. Maybe there’s a world, where, like, Hitler was recognized for his art, and never was active in politics. Maybe there is…but we can never know of it, or go there, or learn anything from it.
It’s a reductio ad absurdum; I’m showing that the “You are transported” logic leads to an unacceptable conclusion when applied to another situation.
And all your talking around the fact, calling it “empty and useless speculation” I take to be a tacit concession. Because if you had noticed some error in my reasoning, no doubt you would have pointed it out.
So you agree that consciousness can jump across universes, even while even a single bit of information cannot…
What’s special about consciousness? Is it love?
We can tease out additional questions even within our own universe with another thought experiment:
Let’s assume that we live in a deterministic universe and that there is a 50% chance that it is bilaterally symmetrical (i.e. the starting conditions of the Big Bang were such that it created the other “side” of our universe to be a mirror image of our own).
So, there’s a 50% chance that there’s an exact, perpetually undiverged duplicate of you way out there somewhere.
What we all agree on is that, if there is another **Trinopus **out there, he is indeed you to all outside observers (in his neck of the woods) and certainly also to himself.
What we don’t all agree on, is what does it matter to the **Trinopus **in our neck of the woods whether or not the other one exists? Can you tell whether or not he exists? Does his existence or non-existence matter to you in any way?
If it *does *matter, how so? If it *doesn’t *matter, then you shouldn’t step into a transporter because there’s no significant difference between the two scenarios.
Yes, he is me. And he is real. But I am not him. I never was him.
To everyone else in the universe, you are correct, no physical difference only a philosophical one. But there is one person whom that is not true for… the guy who stepped into the transporter. He’s dead. I don’t know if that’s a physical difference or a difference in personal experience, but it sure is a hell of a lot more than a philosophical difference.
Here’s the real difference between pro-teleporter and anti-teleporter worldview:
The “pro” people reject that they have a unique stream of consciousness in the universe. Whatever it is that ties me-right-now to the me-that-wakes-up-tomorrow, they reject that any such connection exists, other than shared memories.
The “anti” people recognize that life is an experience that exists as a steady movement through time. If your consciousness is ended through death but recreated somewhere else, we’re not down with that.
Here’s the really mind-bending part though. If someone secretly teleported us at night, or even made a perfect copy of our mind and put it inside a computer simulation, we wouldn’t even know it. We would BE person #2 and all our experiences from person #1 would be copied memories. But even though I am person #2, does that mean I’m OK with ending my existence and letting person #3 (another copy) take over? Nope. And what if this is happening every single night while I sleep? Would I just let it happen or fight against it? I would try to stop it. I prefer to continue experiencing life.
There’s a Black Mirror episode similar to this, the Christmas episode. It deals more with the morality of how we treat the copied mind though.
A very different situation. I can interview James Kirk before and after transportation. I cannot interact in any way with your hypothetical “other you” in some other universe.
Noting that it is empty of any possible testing or observational falsifiability is pointing out a logical flaw.
I don’t agree; the claim is not addressable in any possible way. I agree it might happen…but it also might not, and you cannot provide a micro-smidgen of evidence.
Also, I’ve never actually said there is anything special about consciousness, let alone love.
(“So you agree…” with something one doesn’t actually agree, with is a very shoddy debate technique. Straw-men are for feeding cattle, not constructing a debate.)
His existence or non-existence does not matter to me in any way. I can’t know if he exists. I can never interact with him. The proposition cannot be tested.
Huh? I believe it “doesn’t matter” – and I believe that the transporter transports people without “killing them.” Note, as above with Mijin, that I can actually interact with Jim Kirk before and after he transports. I can perform scientific tests. I can judge for myself if he is “the same” or not. None of that is possible with the guy in another universe.
Arguing from one to the other is, in my opinion, a failure, on these grounds. The two models aren’t the same.
This was not a requirement previously. Many times previously you’ve just said as long as the brains are identical and the person at the destination thinks he’s me (which he would here), that’s sufficient.
Do you wish to add an ad-hoc requirement now?
Well, we can’t make a star-trek style transporter, and likely never will. Certainly an identical-to-the-atom copy looks impossible, but I’ve been happy to accept that as a premise because it’s an interesting philosophical debate. Let alone all the other thought experiments alluded to in this thread.
So there has been no testability requirement up to now, and I see no reason why we need to add one. Apart from to allow you to continue to avoid biting the bullet or conceding the point.
Your position is treating consciousness as a special case. It’s saying it’s the one thing which can cross universes. You haven’t denied that, all you’re saying now is it “might” happen.
So there was no straw man there, I clarified something.
This is a nonsensical position. It attacks reason.
There’s a universe out there where there is someone identical to you in all ways…except for the butterfly wings tattoo on his back. Is he “you” or not? How about the guy who is identically you except for the hart antlers on his forehead? Or the guy who is you except that he is devoutly Jewish.
All of those universes “exist” exactly as much as your own hypothetical one, where there is someone who is identical to you in all ways. Yet they’re all pointless universes, nonsensical, and totally speculative.
Yes, the one that the scientific method depends upon: until you present observable evidence for your proposition, it is meaningless to us.
And it might not. You have no evidence for it. You’re speculating. That leads nowhere. And I am not treating consciousness as a special case. You won’t be able to point to any post I’ve ever made that posits that consciousness is different from any other material thing.
Welcome to this thread. This kind of question is absolutely within the terms of this thread.
Once again, you’ve had no issue with such a philosophical thread up to this point.
No-one can give any empirical evidence at all for any position in this thread. Including yours.
My argument is showing that it follows from your logic. If an identical brain is sufficient for a being to actually transport (not merely be a copy), then consciousness can transport across an impossible barrier between universes, unlike anything else.
I’ll say at this point that many years ago my own position on the transporter problem changed. A good thought experiment came up which challenged my own “common sense” solution to the problem. Of course, such an argument had no empirical proof, same as any on this subject, but I couldn’t refute it.
You may want to consider doing the same, and consider the implication of the argument, instead of trying very obviously to avoid answering.
In the predicated world, where teleportation machines exist, scientific tests can be performed. No tests can possibly be performed regarding postulated other universes where people resembling us might exist.
You are using a different model of “transportation” than I am. You’re using the “zoom” model, and I’m using the send-and-receive model. I do not believe that “I” automatically “zoom” to some other mind somewhere else in another cosmos, even if he is absolutely identical.
(I also disagree with the “unlike anything else” clause. Why would consciousness be able to “zoom” in your described way, but matter not? The matter, too, has “zoomed.” The calcium atoms in your body are also now the calcium atoms in his body. They exist in two places, just as the consciousness does. If the two persons are truly “identical” then that is true of their matter/energy as well as their information.)
I have explained the difference, as I see it, many times; you still disagree. Okay, fine, we disagree. Do not claim that your view “follows from my logic” because it does not. Do not claim I’m “avoiding answering,” because that, too, is incorrect. I’ve answered a score of times or more.
We’re at an impasse because of an incompatibility of language and beliefs, not out of any personal dishonesty on either of our parts. Such accusations have no place in any respectable SDMB thread.
FWIW, in 1990 Canadian animator John Weldon made a 10 minute animated short, entitled “To Be”, dealing exactly with the philosophical issues being talked about in this thread. Enjoy!
I don’t know if this helps any… But let me try to show a difference as I perceive it…
I’m a frustrated novelist (I am!) and one day I write the sentence, “John Smith hit Jack Jones right on the point of his chin.” (I didn’t say I was a good novelist!)
By sheerest coincidence, a young English-language student in Karachi writes the same sentence in a novel he is trying to write. “John Smith hit Jack Jones right on the point of his chin.”
Identical.
Now, is there any meaning whatever to saying that the information in that sentence was “transported” from the U.S. to Pakistan? No. The information was created, in situ, de novo, and there was no transportation of any kind.
Meanwhile, I write the sentence in my browser and post it to SDMB. You, a SDMB member, read it. In that case, the information is transported. There is a clear causal relationship, that is not coincidental at all.
I believe the two scenarios are wholly different. One does not involve “transportation” in any way, and the other clearly does.
Others may disagree. The impasse seems to be irreconcilable.
FWIW, in 1990 Canadian animator John Weldon made a 10 minute animated short, entitled “To Be”, dealing exactly with the philosophical issues being talked about in this thread. Enjoy!
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Fun! Witty, saucy, jolly well narrated, with a loose and goofy animation style.
Mind you…I disagree with the reasoning! The bit about “delaying the destruction process” is one I’ve discussed earlier, in the context of the movie about the “escape from drowning” trick.
If one of the two individuals knows that he’s in Box 1, and about to be destroyed, while the other knows he’s in Box 2, and not about to be destroyed…then the two are not identical.
If the two are truly identical, then they both are “the real original,” and which one is destroyed doesn’t matter at all. Neither has any better claim to be “the real guy” than the other.
One of these two conditions – they are…or are not…identical – must obtain.
The film was an excellent presentation of one of the two points of view on offer in this debate. I wish I were as good a filmmaker! I’d create a rebuttal!
OK, now I follow what you’re saying. Let me sum up why I think you’re being disingenuous on this.
Many times in this thread, and in the old thread, you’ve said that as long as A and B are identical then they really are the same person, and the person could be considered to have transported. You’ve repeatedly asked people on the opposing side of the debate to point out what physical differences there are between the person at the source and the destination.
Then I put to you a thought experiment about transporting between universes.
First you said the transport “might” be me. Then you’ve thrown up a bunch of new requirements; there needs to be empirical data to support my thought experiment (rolleyes)…and now it matters whether there was a data connection responsible for creating the second brain.
You’ve never mentioned these requirements before. In fact, when I mentioned the possibility of becoming a Boltzmann brain, you were fine with that (but, OK, let’s assume you were not actually familiar with what a Boltzmann brain is).
And it rather flies in the face of your previous notion that being identical is sufficient.
If we allow this new ad-hoc requirement, then sure, it deals with my thought experiment as well as Tibby or Not Tibby’s variation. Well done.
Unfortunately though it raises a number of issues itself in how we define whether data was sent or not. e.g. If I send 80% of the data for Mijin’s brain, and you have to guess the rest, but whaddaya know, you guess exactly right, does that count as a transport?
Address the issues, but leave me out of this. Tell me what you believe, and why, but don’t make my personality an issue. Debate the point. Stop the accusations.
I don’t believe any actual “transportation” occurs between universes in your model. The two places, or people, are identical by coincidence, not by any causal link. I gave the example of two people writing the same sentence.
Actual “transportation” is causal. I write a message, it is converted to electronic pulses or sound waves, and then the recipient decodes it into the message again.
But the two people, no matter whether they are identical or not, have no linkage. They were both created by causes in their own universes, and were not created by signals from other universes.
If they are actually identical, then, yes, I would say they are the “same person.” But they are not examples of transportation, only of (amazing) coincidence.
I do not believe that the two can be viewed as similar, as they arise by entirely different means.