# Teleportation would destroy the world. **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 27, 2013, 8:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285 "2013-08-27T08:53:03Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 14
**Author:** ![Mangetout](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mangetout/32/19_2.png) [@Mangetout](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mangetout)\ **Post date:** [September 4, 2013, 10:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/261 "2013-09-04T22:14:16Z")
> [@VarlosZ](#): > > That’s the leap I’m talking about. It seems prima facie obvious that there’s less likely for there to be consequences for “me” from a nap on the couch than from _having my brain obliterated_, even if the two things are similar in certain respects. > Say that someone breaks into my house while I’m away, diddles with my computer, cuts and pastes the exact state of my hard drive, processor, etc. into identical hardware (down to how much dust is on the connectors), then installs the new hardware in my laptop, atomizes the old hardware, and leaves. I wouldn’t be able to tell the difference, so the new hard drive would be functionally the same, but it wouldn’t be \*actually \*the same. > > I shouldn’t really care since, as said, I wouldn’t be able to tell the difference, and I’m pretty sure the hard drive doesn’t have a distinct experience of “self” that ends when I wipe it. That’s sort of what I mean about the observer. If “I” am simply the collection of my memories, etc., then nothing is lost in the transporter, just as nothing is lost in transferring my software from one hard drive to another. OTOH, if there’s a “Me” in here, experiencing my experiences, then smashing my brain is likely to have consequences for him (me). > \*\*Mangetout \*\*gets it, although I don’t think this Me has to be anything immaterial. Unique identity/self-experience could depend on the more-or-less persistent operation of a distinct, particular central nervous system. And it seems rather presumptuous to equate the gradual replacement of atoms constituting said system, or a temporary cessation of function (such as in a near-death experience), with the wholesale obliteration of the system followed by the construction of a duplicate. Actually, I’m arguing to the contrary. If something that is materially and functionally the same, is somehow _different than it would have been_ because the material and function was interrupted, then perfectly resumed, then that difference must by definition be immaterial. If the mind, personality and consciousness of ‘me’ is solely a product of the configuration and behaviour of my physical material, then an identical configuration of material, behaving in an identical way, is the same thing. If it’s different, then the difference _is by definition immaterial_. Inadvertently or otherwise, the folks who are saying that interruption makes a difference, even after perfect restoration, are arguing for the existence of what amounts to an immaterial soul. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 12:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/262 "2013-09-05T00:34:54Z")
> [@Learjeff](#): > > . . . But I have to admit I see the other side’s point, even though I disagree. It’s an issue I had to struggle with for years before abandoning what I now think of as a prejudice based on an illusion of continuity. Personally, I think any good amateur philosopher ought to be able to argue either side of the issue with approximately equal facility. The “continuity” argument is not without value. If anyone here had been foolish enough to say, “It’s obvious that the person is the same after transportation as he was before, and only an idiot could think differently,” I’d be disagreeing with them, too! It isn’t obvious, and I hold it to be raw folly to say “only an idiot would think differently.” (Note the very subtle difference, there, between idiocy and folly!) > [@Mangetout](#): > > Actually, I’m arguing to the contrary. If something that is materially and functionally the same, is somehow _different than it would have been_ because the material and function was interrupted, then perfectly resumed, then that difference must by definition be immaterial. . . . Yes: that’s the problem, above, with the claim that people would “feel” the difference. Which specific physical sense is used, and what difference is being sensed? If it isn’t a physical sense, then the argument would seem to be based in some supernatural quality or other. My old college philosophy professor argued that telepathy is impossible – on similar grounds to what we’ve read, above. He said: suppose Albert has a thought, and, somehow, Bill can ‘read his mind’ and know this thought. Well, it’s no longer Albert’s thought: it is Bill’s. So Bill can never know Albert’s thoughts, only his own. I objected, saying that this makes communication impossible! (And, since then, I have met people who hold that communication is impossible! You can never truly convey one of your thoughts to my mind, only put forward a signal that causes my mind to develop a thought that is no more than coarsely similar to your thought. My mind will never hold the fullness of your thought, only something that vaguely echoes it.) Again, a good amateur philosopher ought to be able to argue pro or con. The philosophic method is very different from the scientific! ---
**Author:** ![Tibby](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tibby/32/17030_2.png) [@Tibby](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tibby)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 1:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/263 "2013-09-05T01:38:26Z")
> [@Mangetout](#): > > Actually, I think it would help if you ( **Tibby** ) could just say whether the ‘PI’ entity you’re describing is immaterial/metaphysical (before I go to the trouble of saying why I think your argument implies/requires it). Pish Posh. Immaterial? Metaphysical?? Where on Earth do you get the idea I’m trying to invoke any of that nonsense into an otherwise staid and scholarly debate??? …:mad:… …But, since you brought it up, God _ **is** _ part of the equation\*. There’s a little Baby Jesus in everybody’s skull and [Del]Casper [/Del]the Holy Ghost crosses the synaptic clefts of all of our neurons. And all of you damned materialist atheists who don’t believe that can just kiss my grits and burn in hell! …Ok, let’s get back to the debate… - John 3:16, Rom 8:28, Phil 4:7, Seymour Hiney 2:69 (just another joke, Trinopus) ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 2:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/264 "2013-09-05T02:14:03Z")
> [@Mangetout](#): > > . . . Is there anything about the PI that isn’t a result of the physical brain of the person? . . . I’ve lost track: what does “PI” stand for in this thread? ---
**Author:** ![Tibby](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tibby/32/17030_2.png) [@Tibby](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tibby)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 2:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/265 "2013-09-05T02:48:34Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > I’ve lost track: what does “PI” stand for in this thread? Pickle Integrity ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 4:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/266 "2013-09-05T04:09:38Z")
> [@Learjeff](#): > > But you didn’t answer the question. IMHO, teleporting is no different than losing consciousness. My answer to your questions would have been “I don’t know”. All the questions you ask are well-established, unsolved, philosophical problems. At this time, the most robust position is that consciousness is _never_ continuous. But since there are still fundamental aspects of consciousness we still don’t understand (e.g. how brains “make” qualia), I would say it is way too early to claim certainty on this, even in a philosophical sense, let alone scientific. > [@](#): > > The only problem is the duplication part. If we avoid duplication, does that avoid your problem with teleportation? The duplication _illustrates_ a problem, rather than creates it. If a person is happy to conclude that a duplicate is, and always has been, entirely separate to the original, then they would also have to conclude that the transporter does not transport you. Otherwise, they would get themselves in a mess trying to explain what “moves” between the original and duplicate when the original is destroyed. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 4:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/267 "2013-09-05T04:17:51Z")
> [@Mangetout](#): > > Actually, I’m arguing to the contrary. If something that is materially and functionally the same, is somehow _different than it would have been_ because the material and function was interrupted, then perfectly resumed, then that difference must by definition be immaterial. > > If the mind, personality and consciousness of ‘me’ is solely a product of the configuration and behaviour of my physical material, then an identical configuration of material, behaving in an identical way, is the same thing. If it’s different, then the difference _is by definition immaterial_. Inadvertently or otherwise, the folks who are saying that interruption makes a difference, even after perfect restoration, are arguing for the existence of what amounts to an immaterial soul. If there’s one bit of progress I wish we could make in this thread, it would be for people to stop saying the other position requires souls. As I said earlier, neither the “move”, “duplicate” or “consciousness is never continuous anyway” positions require souls (in their modern-day descriptions anyway). In terms of your question, there _is_ a clear physical difference: location. One body has had the set of events occur to it that results in it being here. Another body, with faked memories, has the set of events occur that results in it being created over there. ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 4:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/268 "2013-09-05T04:28:19Z")
> [@Tibby or Not Tibby](#): > > Pickle Integrity I guess I picked a bad day to stop drinking… ---
**Author:** ![Trinopus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/2bfe46/32.png) [@Trinopus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Trinopus)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 4:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/269 "2013-09-05T04:31:55Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > . . . Another body, with faked memories . . . Objection: argumentative. They are transported memories. For you to say they are “faked” you would have to demonstrate that they are “fake” – i.e., in some way inferior to real memories. But the assumption of the thought-experiment is that the memories are complete. No lacunae. No newly-appearing blackouts. The word “faked” is circular, as it depends on the assumptions which are in dispute here. I say they are just as real as your own memories are right now. (Possibly more real than my own are. Pickle Integrity? Wha…?) ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 4:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/270 "2013-09-05T04:41:02Z")
> [@Trinopus](#): > > Objection: argumentative. They are transported memories. “Transported” would be misleading also IMO. But call them whatever you want, it’s besides the point of what I was talking about. ---
**Author:** ![Mangetout](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mangetout/32/19_2.png) [@Mangetout](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mangetout)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 7:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/271 "2013-09-05T07:11:29Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > If there’s one bit of progress I wish we could make in this thread, it would be for people to stop saying the other position requires souls. I’m sorry about that, but I really think it does. I’m not going to stop saying it until I am convinced it doesn’t. - Because the argument boils down to “even though everything would be materially the same, \*something \*would be different” Given: [ul] [li]The mind is wholly a product of the physical material and operation of the brain (if not, what?)[/li][li]The physical laws of the universe are such that a consistent cause has a consistent effect[/li][/ul] Then the end result ‘G’ of a chain of cause and effect that goes (scenario 1): A→B→C→D→E→F→G Is the same as the end result ‘G’ of a chain of cause and effect that is broken in two, thus (scenario 2): [ul] [li]A→B→C→D[/li][li]Stop and perfectly capture all attributes of state ‘D’[/li][li](Time Passes)[/li][li]Perfectly restore state ‘D’ exactly as captured[/li][li]D→E→F→G[/li][/ul] The argument that in scenario 2, G is different because continuity has been broken, _ **even though every measurable/describable natural attribute of G is the same** _, demands that difference to be immaterial/metaphysical. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 12:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/272 "2013-09-05T12:43:58Z")
> [@Mangetout](#): > > I’m sorry about that, but I really think it does. I’m not going to stop saying it until I am convinced it doesn’t. Fine. But you should know that amongst philosophers the debate has long moved past this i.e. even proponents of the “teleporter moves you” position do not accuse the other side of assuming souls. So we would be treading old ground. The “moves” and “duplicates” positions are two different takes on physical continuity. > [@](#): > > - Because the argument boils down to “even though everything would be materially the same, \*something \*would be different” Some things are different: location and the causal histories. These are physical differences. Again, you never responded about the millions of light years hypothetical. If a brain identical to mine spontaneously appears a million light years away, and I die, do I now continue? Do I wake up further away from Earth than light could have got in my lifetime? > [@](#): > > The argument that in scenario 2, G is different because continuity has been broken, _ **even though every measurable/describable natural attribute of G is the same** _, demands that difference to be immaterial/metaphysical. Again, this still confuses “different” in the qualitative and numerical sense. _Of course_ there are no qualitative differences. But they are two, wholly separate entities the way two identical coins are wholly separate. If I had one coin, then I make a perfect duplicate elsewhere, we wouldn’t talk of the coin “splitting”. So to talk about consciousness in this way, is to make it a special case; the very thing you are accusing the other side of doing. ---
**Author:** ![Mangetout](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mangetout/32/19_2.png) [@Mangetout](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mangetout)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 1:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/273 "2013-09-05T13:27:20Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > Fine. But you should know that amongst philosophers the debate has long moved past this i.e. even proponents of the “teleporter moves you” position do not accuse the other side of assuming souls. So we would be treading old ground. > The “moves” and “duplicates” positions are two different takes on physical continuity. I swear I’m not just doing it to annoy you. > [@](#): > > Some things are different: location and the causal histories. These are physical differences. I think we can treat location as trivial. I can change my location already. And causal history is all water under the bridge. Its not something that has material existence of its own. Once something has happened, it’s history. Anything else that could have happened, yielding exactly the same effect, might as well be equally valid. > [@](#): > > Again, you never responded about the millions of light years hypothetical. If a brain identical to mine spontaneously appears a million light years away, and I die, do I now continue? Do I wake up further away from Earth than light could have got in my lifetime? I don’t think I understood it at the timesl. I’ll try now. The problem is the statement “Do I wake up…?”. What happens is _someone_ wakes up, believing themselves to be you. But that’s all that happened to you this morning too. Yesterday is gone. Causal history is history. > [@](#): > > Again, this still confuses “different” in the qualitative and numerical sense. > _Of course_ there are no qualitative differences. But they are two, wholly separate entities the way two identical coins are wholly separate. > If I had one coin, then I make a perfect duplicate elsewhere, we wouldn’t talk of the coin “splitting”. So to talk about consciousness in this way, is to make it a special case; the very thing you are accusing the other side of doing. We might as well call it splitting as anything else. Nobody (including the coin) can tell the difference. ---
**Author:** ![Tibby](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tibby/32/17030_2.png) [@Tibby](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tibby)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 1:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/274 "2013-09-05T13:45:31Z")
> [@Mangetout](#): > > Actually, I think it would help if you ( **Tibby** ) could just say whether the ‘PI’ entity you’re describing is immaterial/metaphysical (before I go to the trouble of saying why I think your argument implies/requires it). No, I don’t believe there is anything immaterial involved in having a unique, continuous PI tied to brain matter. And, frankly, I don’t understand the resistance to accepting that as being a feasible, even probable, option. Let’s first examine those two exact nickels that were discussed upthread. Do you, or do you not accept the following characteristics as being true: they are not one object, but two; both are made of the same type and arrangement of particles, but they are not the same particles, otherwise they would occupy the same location in space and be one set of particles instead of two; both nickels were never one nickel (you could never look at one nickel and say that it is actually two nickels occupying the same space and each atom will not split, resulting in the two); if one nickel was made before the other nickel, it’s accurate to say that the second nickel did not exist before it’s particles were arranged into a nickel, even though the first nickel already existed; assuming they don’t touch each other, the appearance or disappearance of one nickel will have zero effect on the other nickel. So, they are identical nickels…but not the same nickel—they never were, they never will be, they never could be. They are unique objects in the universe. We accept that premise, and we do not view it as violating the materialistic model of reality. We did not have to include anything immaterial into the equation, like a soul. …so why need we treat consciousness any differently? Replace the word “nickel” with the word “consciousness” in the above paragraphs and it makes sense. Again, I maintain that it is the “memory” part of consciousness that bogs us down. For the time being, forget about memory and let’s give those two nickels perception and self-awareness. In the same manner that the nickels are objectively unique in the universe (see above), doesn’t it follow that they [Del]should[/Del] must also be subjectively unique? To get from this point to “Anti-Transporter”, just look at the 4 Cases I listed in post #249 (i.e. if Case 3 is true, then Case 4 must also be true, and if Case 4 is true, transporters kill). The “I’m not continuous in my own body/I die every day” issue is related, but different (and also discussed in #249). This is one of those thought experiments where you have to analyze and relate different cases in order to arrive at the complete answer. And still, we can only discuss probability since both sides are unfalsifiable. But, it’s still fun to do. ---
**Author:** ![Learjeff](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/94ad74/32.png) [@Learjeff](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Learjeff)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 2:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/275 "2013-09-05T14:13:26Z")
> [@Mangetout](#): > > If something that is materially and functionally the same, is somehow _different than it would have been_ because the material and function was interrupted, then perfectly resumed, then that difference must by definition be immaterial. > > If the mind, personality and consciousness of ‘me’ is solely a product of the configuration and behaviour of my physical material, then an identical configuration of material, behaving in an identical way, is the same thing. If it’s different, then the difference _is by definition immaterial_. Inadvertently or otherwise, the folks who are saying that interruption makes a difference, even after perfect restoration, are arguing for the existence of what amounts to an immaterial soul. That’s the nub of my position, although I do believe that the processes of the brain do create something immaterial, emergent, and transcendent, something totally awesomely new (subjective experience). Perhaps that new something has special properties – it definitely _does_ have special properties, to which we can all attest! But I doubt it has a special property of continuity of identity, other than that provided by memory. I admit that this is an unsubstantiated assertion, but it’s consistent in all thought experiements proposed. I admit it could be false, that there could be some unexplained feature of identity that’s retained across discontinuities. I see no evidence for that, though – and furthermore, it complicates the hell out of a lot of thought experiments. It makes it unethical to reload a sentient program on a new computer, without any actual evidence to support the claim that this causes a “death”. > [@Trinopus](#): > > Personally, I think any good amateur philosopher ought to be able to argue either side of the issue with approximately equal facility. The “continuity” argument is not without value. I agree. Still, I prefer the simpler explanation, which doesn’t require anything special. BTW, the continuity you’re referring to isn’t the continuity of the consciousness itself, which clearly is not continuous. So it’s some new thing you’re bringing into the equation. > [@Mijin](#): > > At this time, the most robust position is that consciousness is _never_ continuous. But since there are still fundamental aspects of consciousness we still don’t understand (e.g. how brains “make” qualia), I would say it is way too early to claim certainty on this, even in a philosophical sense, let alone scientific. No argument. > [@](#): > > The duplication _illustrates_ a problem, rather than creates it. I disagree. Without duplication, there is only one consciousness. Continuity disruption is common anyway, and I don’t see this as a special case. I see the special case only as the duplication. > [@](#): > > If a person is happy to conclude that a duplicate is, and always has been, entirely separate to the original, then they would also have to conclude that the transporter does not transport you. Right, but I never said that. I said that we end up with two instances, but there’s no basis for calling one the original. The fact that the atoms might be original is, in my view, irrelevant. > [@](#): > > Otherwise, they would get themselves in a mess trying to explain what “moves” between the original and duplicate when the original is destroyed. In my view, what moves is the brain state, and as soon as that brain state is “resumed,” that produces a subjectivity. > [@Mangetout](#): > > I’m sorry about that, but I really think it does. I’m not going to stop saying it until I am convinced it doesn’t. > > - Because the argument boils down to “even though everything would be materially the same, \*something \*would be different” > > Given: > [ul] > [li]The mind is wholly a product of the physical material and operation of the brain (if not, what?)[/li][li]The physical laws of the universe are such that a consistent cause has a consistent effect[/li][/ul] > > Then the end result ‘G’ of a chain of cause and effect that goes (scenario 1): > A→B→C→D→E→F→G > > Is the same as the end result ‘G’ of a chain of cause and effect that is broken in two, thus (scenario 2): > [ul] > [li]A→B→C→D[/li][li]Stop and perfectly capture all attributes of state ‘D’[/li][li](Time Passes)[/li][li]Perfectly restore state ‘D’ exactly as captured[/li][li]D→E→F→G[/li][/ul] > > The argument that in scenario 2, G is different because continuity has been broken, _ **even though every measurable/describable natural attribute of G is the same** _, demands that difference to be immaterial/metaphysical. Right: those who are against teleporters are claiming there’s something (Personal Identity = PI) that exists separately from the brain state (the latter of which can be duplicated). > [@Mijin](#): > > Fine. But you should know that amongst philosophers the debate has long moved past this i.e. even proponents of the “teleporter moves you” position do not accuse the other side of assuming souls. So we would be treading old ground. Right, so give it another name, call it “PI”, and Mangetout would be happy but consider that a “soul”. So, let’s dodge the semantic argument. The question here concerns the concept of identity when discussing processes rather than inert things. I’m not surprised that philosophers differ over this matter. I treat consciousness as more like an amoeba (where you can’t say which descendent is the original) versus minting an identical coin (where you can say it). I would say the same about any data processing situation: it’s an amoeba, not a coin. In any case, I’m not trying to convince you that you’re wrong, but rather to show that I’m being consistent, and challenge you to any type of test that would prove me wrong. I say that the only such test is to kill oneself, and that only answers the question if there is a soul that survives the death of the body – which nobody here is arguing. As a (more or less) logical positivist, I say that’s conclusive (at least, until someone comes up with a valid test). Those who aren’t logical positivists can disagree. ---
**Author:** ![Learjeff](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/94ad74/32.png) [@Learjeff](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Learjeff)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 2:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/276 "2013-09-05T14:33:32Z")
Oh: also, dead people can disagree. If they can do anything, that is. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 2:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/277 "2013-09-05T14:49:45Z")
> [@Mangetout](#): > > I think we can treat location as trivial. I can change my location already. You can change your location using physical processes, and your current location is a physical fact. > [@](#): > > And causal history is all water under the bridge. Its not something that has material existence of its own. Once something has happened, it’s history. Anything else that could have happened, yielding exactly the same effect, might as well be equally valid. All this is debatable. I think I would lean on the side of disagree. Relativistic physics tells us that two observers can disagree about whether two events are simultaneous or sequential, _and both be right_. This is very hard to square with the idea of the past not existing, or it not mattering how you get from A to B. > [@](#): > > The problem is the statement “Do I wake up…?”. What happens is _someone_ wakes up, believing themselves to be you. But that’s all that happened to you this morning too. Yesterday is gone. Causal history is history. The positions “The transporter moves you” and “Consciousness is never continuous anyway” are two different positions. Which one are you taking here? I think you are flipping between the two, because the millions of light years hypothetical is very problematic for “The transporter moves you”. > [@](#): > > We might as well call it splitting as anything else. Nobody (including the coin) can tell the difference. We _don’t_ call or consider it splitting however, and have no reason to do so. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 2:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/278 "2013-09-05T14:53:22Z")
> [@Learjeff](#): > > The question here concerns the concept of identity when discussing processes rather than inert things. I’m not surprised that philosophers differ over this matter. I treat consciousness as more like an amoeba (where you can’t say which descendent is the original) versus minting an identical coin (where you can say it). I would say the same about any data processing situation: it’s an amoeba, not a coin. OK. So what is your answer to the millions of light years example? (Namely: if a brain identical to mine spontaneously appears millions of light years away, and I die, do I now continue? Do I wake up further away from Earth than light could have got in my lifetime?) ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 2:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/279 "2013-09-05T14:59:29Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > > [@Mangetout](#): > > > > We might as well call it splitting as anything else. Nobody (including the coin) can tell the difference. > > We _don’t_ call or consider it splitting however, and have no reason to do so. Oh, and forgot to say: Of course we can tell the difference; one is here, the other is there. ---
**Author:** ![Learjeff](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/94ad74/32.png) [@Learjeff](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Learjeff)\ **Post date:** [September 5, 2013, 4:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285/280 "2013-09-05T16:33:16Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > OK. So what is your answer to the millions of light years example? > > (Namely: if a brain identical to mine spontaneously appears millions of light years away, and I die, do I now continue? Do I wake up further away from Earth than light could have got in my lifetime?) Already answered: the same as if you did it two feet away. Why does the distance matter, unless it’s to disallow simultaneity? One Mijin continues in the new location, one Mijin does not, in the old location. If you want, we can treat this the same as duplicating first and then killing one. The dead Mijin won’t notice anything, being dead. The live Mijin will have been transported. The transported Mijin will feel as much “you” as you do. Since we’re talking about what happens from the subjective viewpoint, that’s what matters. I admit it leads to quandaries, such as the classic teleporter accident where the copy at the originating location doesn’t get disassembled, but nobody notices. Say, they thought the teleporter was broken and send Joe away until it’s fixed, but there’s another Joe out there. Nobody notices the problem until they both show up at work on Monday morning. That’s an ethical problem caused by duplication. In my view, both Joes are equally Joe, although we might adopt a legal convention giving one priority. In my view, that convention would be arbitrary. Hopefully Joe has transporter duplication insurance so the “legally new” Joe isn’t left high and dry. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285.md?page=13) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/teleportation-would-destroy-the-world/667285.md?page=15)