Is that how the get those little sailing ships into bottles?
i have a question for the pro teleporter group, especially those who insist that because the rest of the world cannot tell the difference, it doesn’t matter - if a person were to commit a crime, would you be satisfied if he were to be teleported to jail, while keeping the ‘original’ around?
[QUOTE=Tibby or Not Tibby]
Question (assume that you can separate self awareness from memories): would you rather have your self awareness with someone else’s memories (nice memories), or someone else’s self awareness with your memories?
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I think this one passed by without too much comment, so maybe we could examine it a bit more closely.
If you went to sleep tonight and woke up tomorrow as Lady Gaga, with all her memories and physical qualities, you (she) would start behaving as Lady Gaga and continue doing whatever it is she does. No-one would notice the difference - not her closest friends, or her fans, or anyone.
Extending this thought experiment even further, if everybody in the world exchanged self-awareness at random every time they went to sleep, no-one in the world would be any wiser - since no memories or physical qualities are associated with this mysterious entity called self-awareness, each person would continue to act exactly the same as before.
A world where everyone swapped self-awareness every night would be identical to the one we live in. That suggests to me that the concept of self-awareness is insignificant when considering identity. Self-awareness is something we do, a process, not something we are.
That just makes two criminals instead of one. If you copy someone after they have committed a crime, they are both guilty of that crime, so both should be punished.
Punishing only one would be doing half a job; less than half, because the free instance would be capable of committing more crime as if no punishment had taken place at all.
On the other hand, if the criminal law was amended so that anyone guilty of the most trivial crimes would be copied, with one fork being punished disproportionally and (perhaps) painfully, that would be a deterrent - because before the fork you would never know which copy you would end up as. Looking forward into the future you might be certain that you would be the unpunished instance - but looking backwards, as the punished copy, you would recognise that this certainty was misplaced.
consider - similar to how you could just reload if you were to die, would you be satisfied if he went to jail and had a pre-crime version reloaded?
. If a person is reloaded from a pre-crime back-up, they still retain the potential for criminality - but they are not yet a criminal. Such a potential criminal could be allowed to continue with their life - but the details of the crimes committed by their earlier counterpart should be explained to them, with a warning not to attempt anything similar.
If the crime is heinous enough, the restored back-up should be kept under close surveillance, or possibly even given some sort of psychological therapy - but I expect that for the worst crimes the back-up would be deleted, avoiding any such unpleasantness. Or maybe reincarnated as some sort of government hitman…
how do you reconcile the one instance where the copy is you, with the other?
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you want to take a trip to a galaxy, far, far away. a copy is made of you there, and a returning copy of you is made back home some time later. the second copy is accepted to be you.
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you commited a crime, a copy of you is sent to jail and another pre-crime copy of you is reloaded. the second copy is accepted to be not you.
If you make a copy and keep the original, they’re both separately as ‘you’ as one another. This might seem a foreign concept, because it is.
it is not merely foreign. if we master genetics to such a degree, we would be gods. and as gods we would be both callous and selfless. dingoes got your baby? no big deal, just reload. made a couple of extra Yous to expedite a project and now there could be only one? no big deal, who’d volunteer to disintegrate?
since we’re not gods, my question is to those of us now. are you really so selfless that you’re spending your vacation money so that a version of you could enjoy the trip? are you really so selfless that you’re happy to return to the ether knowing that a version of you somewhere still remains? perhaps some of you are, but i’m sure some of you don’t really understand what you’re getting into taking that trip to Betelgeuse.
I do find it interesting that you don’t believe “real time” exists, at least at the local level. What is that thing that divides the past from the future? Does nothing occur at that transition?
I believe that transition period is “real time” for whatever entity we are talking about, in this case, the subjective feeling of consciousness. It’s the tip of the spear; a razor sharp line between past and future (the thin “grey” line). I believe “real time” for a mind is that exact instant the signals from our senses (our conduit to the outside world) affect the CNS neurons. With that definition, there is no latency period, because we’re calibrating that instant to zero. Ultimately, that is the instant of final and primary “cause”, in what could be a long chain of “causes” (afterward, there will be a latency for the final “effect” to occur, in what could be a long chain of “effects”, but that doesn’t matter). It’s all how you look at “cause and effect.” In my heart attack scenario, the final “effect” is constriction of coronary arteries resulting in death. The “cause” isn’t really the supernova; that is simply the “cause” of the “cause”…of the “cause”…. Effect CNS neuron (real-time). Then comes the chain of effects: Stimulated CNS neuron…latency…constriction of coronary arteries…latency…brain hypoxia….latency…death.
We must agree to disagree on this point. I see consciousness as being the fire in an eternal flame, where the emitted photons are just metabolic waste.
I didn’t call Kirk schizophrenic (what, are you trying to get me lynched by the rabid trekkers?). I was insinuating that just because someone says something, and believes it to be true, it doesn’t mean it is true—psychotic or not.
No, I’m specifically saying that he does have Kirk’s memories—that’s the whole point of this thought experiment. Perfect replication of brain equals perfect replication of memories. But same memories does not have to equal same SA (PI).
No, I’m simply saying that the transporter kills the person who was in the departure pod. I just did so in a humorous way. Obviously, you didn’t think it was funny.
Well, I wasn’t actually addressing you specifically in my post, except for the schizophrenia slur you accuse me of making against Kirk (not true, Trekkers); I was addressing the you’s in general (kind of like the Royal “we”, only in reverse). But, I do maintain that many of “you” are concentrating on memory, when SA (PI) is the real meat of the argument.
This argument is entirely dependent on “point of view” (POV). The only POV’s that are important are those of the test subjects in the thought experiment (Kirk/Older Kirk; departure Kirk/ arrival Kirk; pre-replicated Kirk/post-replicated Kirk (s)). How they feel about themselves subjectively is all that matters. How their wives, kids and pets feel about them is irrelevant—pick any copy, they won’t know the difference. When I do mention “original” it is only to identify that person before being transported, or replicated. I’m not saying the original is any better, or special, I’m just saying he has a different SA (PI) than the others (as they have to him). If we can keep the debate to just test subject POV’s (no one else’s) and SA (PI) (forget memory), it would make things much easier to follow.
I’m Captain Kirk, your Captain Kirk, we’re both Captain Kirk, but you’re not me.
Well, admittedly “Billions” is a quite large number. But, it’s not quite in the same league as the ~600 trillion trillion atoms that remain in my brain who, if they were not busy supporting my consciousness throughout my life ;), would throw those billions of atoms a going away party.
Heirs, stay away from my stuff!—I plan to age, but not be transported!
A lot of people (no one in particular) like to trot out the trope that all the cells in your body are replaced every seven years or so. Well, some are and some aren’t. But, does it really matter to the continuity of your consciousness whether or not the cells in you colon last only 4 days? The only cells that matter are the neurons of your cerebral cortex, and they are quite persistent. In fact, my question is why are they the only type of cells that persist from somatic birth to death? Perhaps they evolved that way specifically to maintain a continuous personal identity throughout life?
Of course, cells are not atoms, they are just made of atoms. And some atoms are exchanged or replaced in the brain…but, others aren’t. I mentioned before that I can’t re-find the cite (maybe someone can help?), but I do recall learning that a significant number of atoms persist in the CNS neurons (including the DNA), and that many of those atoms that are exchanged are non-vital (e.g. metabolic waste). Personally, I don’t think persistence of atoms is absolutely crucial to the persistence of consciousness (I believe persistence of neurons at the cellular level is all that is needed), but you have persistent atoms if you need them, too.
Another thought experiment to consider:
I’ll treat this as though self-awareness survives transportation, aging and replication equally intact.
Let’s first compare the variation of form and function of a two year old Captain Kirk and the 80 year old Kirk in the same body. He looks a lot different, he thinks a lot different and he has a lot more memories as old Kirk, yet we accept that he is the same person, with a continuous PI.
Now, let’s replicate 600 trillion trillion Captain Kirks and scatter them throughout the universe. But, we will introduce the same (or less) amount of variability in the total set of Kirks, which we found in toddler/old Kirk.
*Psychiatrist: You claim to be the Captain of a Starship
Kirk: Yes, Captain James Tiberius Kirk, at your service, sir.
Psychiatrist: You’re a trim, 6’ tall, Caucasian on planet Earth?
Kirk: That is correct, sir. I was there just 15 minutes ago.
Psychiatrist: But, you’re a fat, black midget on a planet in the Andromeda Galaxy. (Nurse, get me my prescription pad and call the hospital). And, what’s that eight legged furry thing next to you?
Kirk: His name’s Spock.
*
The point is: the amount of variability between a toddler and an old man is huge, no more than that of many odd permutations of Captain Kirk. So, where do you draw the line between Kirk and someone else? If old Kirk has the same PI as toddler Kirk, then the Kirk we all know should have the same PI as replicated fat, black, midget…emotionally distraught…lesbian…Kirk. Is the variability between those permutations any greater than that between Kirk and his identical twin, with regard to similarity of type and arrangement of particles? No. And yet, no one here believes identical twins share the same consciousness. There are only two possible conclusions: 1) there is no difference between “toddler Kirk/old Kirk” and “replicated (or transported) Kirks” and none of them can survive into the other. 2) You can’t survive into your transported or replicated self because there is no persistence of matter/consciousness, but you do survive from your young self to your old self…because there is physical/mental persistence.
But, until we learn to die and come back to life and tell everyone whether 1 or 2 is correct, the debate is unfalsifiable. I just think the “transporter kills” thesis carries the predonderance of the evidence, and everyone else’s thesis is loony (that’s another attempt at humor, Trinopus ;))
I think I know why hostility is sometimes thrust at the “transporter kills” people:
Doper: “Mom, I wanna ride on the transporter, just like Jimmy!”
Mom: “Sorry lil’ Dope, Tibby said it’s not safe. Oh, and Jimmy’s dead.”
They are all Captain Kirk. Cite: Nena.
I mean that we do not perceive anything instantaneously - everything we experience is in the past.
Well, that’s interesting, because, like the light from a bulb, a flame is never the same thing twice.
Naw, you just need my cat-like reflexes to catch it.
…There it is, look!
Aw, you just missed it!?!
Ok, then it’s like angels dancing on the head of a pin…naked.
This is certainly a possibility. The advance of modern medicine has made us love our children more, today, than is possible in very primitive societies. We have a very high probability of surviving from birth to age 5. In other societies, especially those before the existence of medical technology, that simply wasn’t so. We value the elderly more today as well. Medical science has made life more valuable to us.
So, yes, it is possible that personal duplicating machines might make life less valuable. People might create a duplicate to go on an errand, and then eliminate him when it is done. Government’s might use duplicates as conscripts or slaves. If you think it’s an intrusion to have to do 100 hours of community service today as a high school graduation requirement, imagine having to give up one duplicate a year. Imagine being that duplicate!
Even this wouldn’t destroy our civilization. It would certainly change it.
Shrug. Obviously, I disagree. I’m not a humorless old stodge; I just do sometimes miss the point of a joke. Tone of voice is notoriously difficult to convey in flat text format. This is why emoticons and the occasional dialogue tag (“Just joking! Really!”) are so valuable.
Agreed. You’re the guy sitting on the blue chair. I’m the guy sitting on the red chair. But we are both James T. Kirk. “Me” is a local placeholder. “Kirk” is a full personal description.
The best of it is, both people will say, with equal justification, “I’m me.” You can’t look at one of them and say, “You aren’t, but he is.”
I can use the transporter to shave one guy bald-headed. He’s still Jim Kirk, he’s just hairless. You could use the transporter to tattoo serial numbers of people. But the problem now is that this changes the foundation of the thought experiment, namely that the duplicates cannot be distinguished. Now it’s a different thought experiment.
Shrug again. To date, no one has presented any evidence. For you to claim you hate the preponderance of it is remarkably facile. The fact that James T. Kirk is standing there, talking to you, and saying, “Listen, guy, I’m James T. Kirk, and the computer that controls the phaser banks recognizes my voiceprint,” is, to me, vastly more evidence than anything you’ve ever offered.
Humor has nothing to do with it: you have to tell us why you think Jim Kirk is dead…when he’s standing right there yelling at you that he isn’t!
Well, yeah. And that’s funny! But, seriously, how can you say Jimmy’s dead, when he’s over there taking the toaster apart to see what makes it work?
More seriously, my hostility is at the mind-set that says “XYZ is so,” without providing evidence for it, and, indeed, with the evidence firmly against them. That’s the weird thing. Your argument fails to explain something very important: Jim Kirk’s continued existence.
Now that I can get into! (This is actually a pretty good book…)
If Data powered down and was taken apart piece by piece to the level of the integrated circuits (or whatever he’s made of at the bottom), would be be the same Data when he was put back together?
Would he know it had happened?
If you told him it had happened, would that convince him that he was not in fact Data, but a different “person”?
All of the above require the assumption that Data is as conscious or self-aware as Kirk (or Picard, if you prefer).
If you woke up in a hospital and were told that you were a duplicate of the “original you”, what would you say? Do you have any evidence to refute that assertion?
A different question to the transporter, but also a debated metaphysical problem.
Again, no-one is saying the duplicate is qualitatively different to the original, or not a real person, or not entitled to call himself “Data”, or anything like that.
What we’re saying is that he is not one and the same entity as the original, the same way two coins are still two, separate, coins.
I would say “Oh, really?”, then start asking about the technology. The fact that I am conscious, have the same memories, and to me it feels like I have been alive for 34 years, doesn’t prove a thing. It means I have a memory of certain events, not that I was the entity that those events happened to.
Sounds just like a regular morning.
Why is that?
Consciousness is not simply “switched off” when we sleep (though the laying down of new memories usually is for much of it), contrary to popular assumption. Even if it was, it’s still a different philosophical question to the transporter situation.
I always feel like the pro-transporter folks in these arguments are assuming facts about consciousness that are not in evidence. So, the observer is, functionally, totally irrelevant? All that matters is the accumulated experiences, memories, and proclivities, along with the sensation of same?
And you’re sure about this? How did you find out? Because you may well be right – it’s really very Zen – but it seems like there’s a big downside if you’re wrong.