No, I mean: how can the me of tomorrow be me? I’m me, now. He’s over there - I’m here.
Yeah, I answered it. There’s bodily continuity for one thing.
You may disagree with bodily continuity, but there is no inconsistency here.
There is no inconsistency in saying this coin here is not that coin there, but nonetheless this coin can move through spacetime and still be this coin.
OK, so what if, between now and tomorrow lunchtime, we replace each and every one of the atoms in my body with new ones of the same flavour, one atom at a time?
Tomorrow, there will be a copy of my current body, standing in my place. What does this mean?
It means you’re trying to skip out on paying the bill.
Waitress: That’ll be £34.99, sir
Mangetout: *Goodness no, ma’am, I’m afraid that bloke who ate the Lincolnshire Haslet, Cornish plaice and Mrs Beeton’s snow egg is no longer here. He looked a lot like me, but has entirely different atoms. *
Much as I like your joke answers in this thread, I start to wonder if they are just a deflection tactic.
I don’t know.
Even if we understood PI well enough to answer such questions – and we don’t – I suspect it would still depend on the physical means by which we were replacing the atoms.
I mean, we can imagine freezing time and such, but in reality the nuts and bolts of how we actually do the procedure could be the critical factor.
I haven’t claimed to be able to answer every “what if”. What I’m trying to illustrate is that for every common-sense “here’s why the other person is you” argument, there’s an equally compelling one for “here’s why it’s just a duplicate”.
I mean, we haven’t even got to imperfect copies/transports yet; which are very problematic for the Move position.
And I’m also defending all sides from the accusation that they assume the existence of a soul. Because they don’t. There are good arguments for all 3 main positions without assuming, or implying, souls.
no matter how often the teleportation threads appear, no matter how many pages it gets everytime, none of the posts is able to convince me that people would truly, willingly kill themselves for their believe in brand identities.* if they did, there wouldn’t need to be so many hypotheticals and restrictions on the teleporter. they wouldn’t need a duplicate that is true to the exact moment, nor one that uses the same atoms or whatnot. that they insist for such means that they are merely deluding themselves into believing in personal identities in a hypothetical where the existence of multiple identical yet independent identities would make them split personalities at best.
- or whatever it is called. the idea that all versions are “you”, and that “you” will carry on so long as a version exists.
And what I am trying to illustrate is that both are true. We’ll have to start getting used to this sort of double-think, if this sort of technology ever becomes available, justr as we accept the wave-particle duality.
I doubt that we’ll ever get perfect human copies, but we will probably get perfect AI copies in the medium-to-long term, and if so any person who is also an AI will need to be accustomed to being copiable.
shijinn: your post seems to take issue with one side or the other…but it doesn’t actually say which side. All I get is a drive-by saying “Nobody is persuading anybody.”
What’s your actual view in this debate?
This seems reasonable. If you keep your own body, but lose all your memories and gain those of Lady Gaga, you won’t become Lady Gaga, because your body retains a great number of memories and reflexes of its own, not the mention the obvious physical attributes. But exchange your body for hers, and you are gone and she it there. There simply is nothing left of you to be you rather than Lady Gaga; this suggests to me that the ‘personal integrity’ or whatever you want to call it is an illusion of the body.
Change the body so that none of the residual, somatic memories remain, and you change the person.
Conversely copy the body and memories and you copy the person.
Perhaps more interesting are the social effects… Legally, would a copy have a claim on any of the original’s property? Can a duplicate vote? Does a duplicate have any legal rights?
If an extremist court ruled that you “die” when you transport, then couldn’t transport passengers simply be buried and bulldozed over, without trial? The dead have no rights! Under such a ruling, sending someone through a transporter is murder, and would be punished appropriately.
If a more moderate court ruled that duplicates have “some” rights, but not a full claim on the property of the original, we have a charming mess! Poor “Tom Ryker” has to go off and make a new life for himself; he doesn’t have any claim on “Will Ryker’s” pension fund, even though he remembers working hard to pay into it!
Why wouldn’t a government train up a SEAL team of the most exceptional and dedicated military personnel – hone them to the height of readiness – then clone a whole damn Army Corps of them! If the technology permits, keep the pattern in storage, and copy them the next time war breaks out. And…then what? When they win the war, do you give them education, land, and money? Or just kill 'em?
Variant: what if the copying process used “unstable matter.” Copies automatically degrade after a period of time. (“Who Censored Roger Rabbit?”)
The idea of a temporary is explored in David Brin’s Kiln People. The Dittoes die after a day or so, and their memories can be reloaded (inloaded) into the original’s mind. I suspect, but obviously can’t prove, that such a merging of two sets of memories would be even more difficult than the duplication process.
If the way that I phrased those two alternatives didn’t sound mutually-exclusive then I phrased them poorly.
We are talking about the difference between whether I continue to experience or not. Or whether I exist or not.
The idea of both being true doesn’t make a lot of sense. If you ask me, the thing we should accept here is that not every philosophical problem has an answer at this time.
I was summarizing the “bodily continuity” (BC) position, which isn’t my position, but I was defending it against the incorrect charges that it is inconsistent.
BC doesn’t state that you stay you as long as you keep most of your memories. It basically says you go where most of your brain goes. (Yes, this causes a problem when we can splice brains or whatever, but splicing actually causes big problems for all the main positions on PI).
Whether you agree with BC or not, it’s pretty clear what the response is to your hypothetical: replace me completely, and it’s not me. Copy me, and it’s not me. And there is no “illusion” in either case.
Let’s say we’re replacing the atoms in flight - whatever the original atom was doing, or about to do, the replacement atom is made to duplicate with exact precision.
That may be, however the PI and BC positions do seem to be arguing in support of entities with soul-like properties - that is:
[ul]
[li]Discrete entities; "me’, as opposed to a system or collection of systems manifesting a phenomenon calling itself ‘me’.[/li][li]Entities that exist independently (or at least distinctly) from a local, current, measurable cause.[/li][li]Entities that have a unique and persistent identity that is not beholden to any of the intrinsic physical properties or behaviours of the system hosting them.[/li][/ul]
This still does not specify a physical mechanism.
And, perhaps you parsed what I just said incorrectly: I said we neither have the understanding nor have we specified a physical mechanism. So just having the latter will not change my response from “I don’t know”.
Yeah, and you can put the “transported person is you” position in similar terms and claim that it is arguing for a soul:
[ol]
[li]In a universe where particle collision occur for eternity, it implies that I will be immortal, since it is only a matter of time before random collisions will create a brain like mine. Alternatively, there is the notion of quantum immortality within a single universe.[/li][li]Proponents often talk of consciousness “splitting” but there is no physical mechanism for this.[/li][li]It implies FTL connections, since an identical brain to me might be created outside of my light cone.[/li][/ol]
Incidentally, PI is not a position, it’s just a term for this field of discussion.
These are all thought experiments, so the honest answer to all of them is ‘don’t know’. That hasn’t stopped us enjoying 8 pages of debate so far - does it really represent a dead end now?
Not sure it does, because:
Agreed. And I don’t see why this should be a problem, or require a soul - only a viewpoint which regards itself as continuous on the basis of a retrospective memory view.
Again, if there’s nothing more than current state plus memory, then splitting is merely two systems with similar/identical states and memories, where previously there was one.
If I bake a cake and someone else on the other side of the galaxy bakes an identical cake, does that imply some essence of cake-ness moved at superluminal speed? I don’t see why it should.
I don’t have an answer to every “what if”, in some cases not even a gut feel.
True, but remember you said that BC implied to you soul-like properties.
IOW, no smoking gun, nowhere it explicitly claims the existence of souls, just stuff that to you rings alarm bells.
Well, the same is true of immortality.
What you’re describing is not splitting though. If I buy the same make and model of car as you, you wouldn’t say your car was “split”. I have a new car that happens to have many of the same properties as yours.
That’s exactly what someone on the Duplicate side of this would say.
If these cakes are self-aware there is no sense in which we can talk of one cake becoming the other cake. They are, and always have been, separate.
Gotcha! (kidding :D)
But, just to be clear, let’s explore this a little deeper. Interestingly, you answered the same as I did: no measurable physical difference between Case 1 and Case 2. First, let me explain what this means to me, and tell me if it means the same to you. Case 1 involves two physically identical sentient beings each with a subjectively separate personal identity (you can use the terms self-awareness or consciousness if you wish). Case 2 involves what I believe to be the position of the pro-transporters: two physically identical sentient beings without subjectively separate personal identities. I assume pro-transporters believe both subjects each have a personal identity, but somehow they are the same. But, the important thing is that we imagined the other side’s premise, compared it to our own and found no measurable difference between the two…nothing added…no ghost in the machine…nothing metaphysical. That’s a step in the right direction, I believe.
Now, I’m confused again. What you just wrote is what I believe, but I’m an anti-transporter.
[Addressing the Tripopus on Earth, reading this now]: If you believe your duplicates don’t “matter” to each other, or to you, more than anyone much matters to you, doesn’t that equate to your duplicates having no affect on your life, any more than a complete stranger, particularly if none of you interact with each other (e.g. on different planets or countries)? Doesn’t it also follow that if someone doesn’t matter to you, you would not expect to live on subjectively in one of their bodies in the event you died (because, I assume that would matter to you)? Is there any difference, physically, between one of your duplicates and you coming out of the arrival pod of a transporter? If the answer is “no”, then it should not matter to you (in the departure pod) who comes out of the arrival pod, correct? It could be your duplicate or a duck, neither should matter to you.
So, if it doesn’t matter who comes out of the arrival pod, and the person in the departure pod is deconstructed (i.e. killed), I can’t fathom why you would travel in a transporter? It seems rather suicidal. Unless, possibly, you also believe (as I think you do), this:
Can I accurately expand this to meaning: the “me” of tomorrow will never be me and I will never see through his eyes? The “me” of tomorrow matters no more to me than a duplicate of me or a transported me, and none of them matter to me more than “anyone much matters?”
If this is true, then isn’t it accurate to say that you (the one reading this) has no future at all? Instead of looking forward to waking up tomorrow, or traveling on a transporter, you’re attitude, IMO, should be, “I don’t care, they won’t be me…just give me a shot of whiskey and my anti-depressants.”
Deflection tactic? Me? In chess, maybe, but certainly not in debate!..but, speaking of persistence of CNS neurons throughout the life of a brain…
Indeed, it could also help in homicide defense:
Prosecuting Attorney (closing statement): Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this man (points menacingly at the accused) is responsible for torturing and killing 6,000,001 Captain Kirks. That makes him the most productive and heinous murderer in all of human history. Show this monster no mercy; find him guilty of all 6,000,001 charges of murder in the first degree! [The accused, Trinopus, squirms in is seat, the look of defeat on his face]
Perry Mason Moment: From the back of the courtroom, the heavy double doors swing open. All heads turn, eyes focusing on the man lumbering through the entranceway, as he bellows, “I…am…Captain James T Kirk…I am…alive! That man [points to Trinopus]…killed all of my replicates…but, he didn’t kill…me! My replicates and I…were one in the same…if one Kirk survives…all Kirks survive. Release this man immediately, he is guilty…of no crime! I am…Spartacus!
Something else to consider: Babies are not believed to gain consciousness until ~5 months age. They are aware and process information, but they are not yet self-aware; they have no personal identity. Imagine triplets in utero where two of the three fetuses have duplicate brains (for as long as you want through the emergence of consciousness). Were they at any time two individuals, or always three? Could they have started as two individuals and later become three? Would it matter if the two duplicate brains were perfectly matched before or after consciousness began? If the two duplicate-brain triplets were surgically or technologically manipulated to receive all sensory input via the same sensory organs before they gained consciousness, would they be one person subjectively (even to themselves) after they gained consciousness? Would they then split into two consciousnesses after the shared sensory devices were removed and they sensed the world from separate input devices? If that’s true, wouldn’t that mean environment alone can affect whether one individual becomes two?
Grin! Ya got me!
Yes, followed by no. The other guy is me. He lives on, carrying my ideas, my name, my identity. I’m also the guy left behind, who doesn’t care about the guy out there who is living on. If I, left behind, am sentenced to death, I am unhappy about it. Meanwhile, I, the guy on the alien world, won’t know or care when I (on earth) die. There are two of me!
That’s what “duplicate” means!
I’d prefer to know that the purpose of the duplicator is fulfilled. If I learn that only a duck came out, I would be disappointed, and would call the procedure a failure. I’ve got cheaper ways of obtaining ducks! But, in the ultimate sense, no, I don’t care. I, the “me” left behind, am not changed by the duplication process, whether it succeeds…or fails!
Because the “me” that is scanned and disintegrated doesn’t exist any longer, and thus is of no interest or importance to anyone, whereas the “me” that is reconstituted at the destination is “me” in every meaningful way, and can carry on my purposes. The scanning and disintegration is painless and nearly instantaneous, so I don’t have to worry about even a half-second period of pain. Meanwhile, I’ve avoided hours of tedious air travel, and arrived at Lisbon ahead of my competitor, so I’ll close the sale to the Portuguese client. Win win win!
Then I teleport home again, and meet you for drinks to celebrate.
Do you let me buy you a drink? Or do you say, “You’re dead. I don’t talk to dead people. If you’d taken the plane, I’d talk to you. But you took the teleporter, and so you don’t even exist. Never come near me again.”
(What if I then say, “Gotcha! I really took the plane!” What if that’s a big fib? Remember: you can’t tell the difference! And…neither can I!)
Both the future me and the teleported me are dependent on my actions now. But I don’t depend on them in any way whatever. I don’t spend all of my money now, but, instead, save and invest, all for the benefit of the future me – because I know I will be that future me some day! He “matters” to me, not in the abstract, but because my time-line is fulfilled in him.
Humans are capable of looking ahead into the murky future, and perceiving that, if we act unwisely, we will regret it. Since we don’t like the sensation of regret, we try to act wisely.
No one has demonstrated any unwisdom in using a teleporting machine.
No: as just expressed. I will become that future me, and thus it is unwise for me to act in ways that establish his misery.
Re my trial for duplicating and murdering Kirks, I’m still guilty of the crime, even though Kirk stands there, quite alive. Doesn’t matter. He’s alive and a murder victim, both at once. They were all really Kirk.
I have no idea. It could go either way. Does it matter? Honestly, I don’t see any possible way to address the question. You have to make up your own definition of “individual” and trust that it applies.
Yes, but let us not forget that the semantics of personality are probably strongly rooted in possibly unhelpful traditional views…
True, but we can also describe the ‘me’ of now and the ‘me’ of tomorrow as separated in time, rather than space; in that case, there is of course a causal link, which there would not be in the case of an accidental chance duplicate on the other side of the galaxy (the lack of causal link is a definition of the scenario, not a resulting problem), but when the ‘me’ of tomorrow is here. the ‘me’ of now will no longer be.
We could say that the only sense in which the ‘me’ of now becomes the me of tomorrow is that the me of tomorrow will believe it to have happened.