True… The problem is that there isn’t much to disagree with when discussing those issues. It would change the world’s economy and societal outlook, much the way the advent of air travel did. We can predict some of the implications, but not all of them. Early in the thread, we rejected the premise that it would “destroy the world.” No one has argued for that, so that part, at least, of the OP is dead.
Like drunks looking for a fight, we zeroed in on the place where we disagree.
It’s a straw man because I’ve never made such a claim.
What I’m saying is that I disagree with this idea of the physical state being just one snapshot of time and saying we can just forget about how we arrived at that snapshot. There’s no reason to think that, and lots of reasons for thinking otherwise.
I called out the hijack when it happened, and apologized to the OP.
Only when it seemed the OP had run out of gas (no-one was posting on the topic of the OP any more) did I re-engage with the transporter discussion.
And again note that despite how hard some people are trying, to make the claim that it is “My position vs the souls position”, there are several strictly Materialist interpretations of the transporter thought experiment, and these are the ones we are debating.
Actually no. I’ve said several times that the strongest philosophical position at this time is that there is never any form of persistence.
I’ve been defending positions like BC here just because the arguments people have given against it have been flawed.
This is just an issue with how some words are used formally and colloquially.
“Unconscious” in everyday terms just means not being aware of external stimuli.
It does not mean your consciousness (i.e. thoughts, qualia etc) is switched off.
For a long time it was thought that in sleep the only time there is subjective experience is during REM sleep. But a number of studies have shown forms of consciousness persisting even through very deep sleep.
The one causally connected to me, e.g. in the same location that I just was.
If you “continue” then there is persistance.
I really can’t square what you are saying now with what you opened this post with:
A transporter copy of you would be causally connected to you, or else it would be a random heap of atoms or an inert dead body. The (hypothetical and likely impossible) transporter scenario posits that all causes in progress at the point of transmission would have to be captured and replicated in the same state in the copy.
There’s an extra link in the chain of causality (the transporter apparatus) but so what?
Even if I accepted this new version of Causality, where if things have the same qualitative properties they must share a causal history, the “or else” is a complete non-sequitur.
Again, I don’t accept this redefinition of causality.
There is no concept of “capturing” a cause.
I dispute that it’s an extra link, I would say it’s a completely separate chain.
When I use the word, I mean it’s when my qualia is switched off: when I’m not aware of anything. When the “I” that I’m talking about here ceases to exist. (There’s another “me” which is represented by my memories and the structure of my brain including what I’ve learned.)
Regardless, I’ve experienced what seems to be a complete “reboot” from a complete lack of consciousness. I don’t think I’m not who I was before, just because of that.
I’m attributing no significance to that, from either objective or subjective point of view. I could be wrong, but I can’t conceive of any experiment that would prove me wrong. Can you?
Right, just not “unique” persistence. I’m only arguing against uniqueness. If there are two copies, there are then two me’s that continue (each from its subjective point of view).
I don’t see any contradiction. Perhaps the previously omitted “exist” shifts the meaning. I originally intended it to mean “continue living” but “exist” works better.
To clarify, there are two things I think of as “me”. One is the awareness created by my brain, that I witness now as I type these words. That disappears when I’m unconscious. The other “me” is the one that has the memories, experiences, brain structure, of me, the guy sitting here typing these words. That one persists.
Both can, in theory, be duplicated. Ethically speaking, both copies are equivalent, IMHO. We may need a legal distinction (to identify which copy owns my stuff after a transporter accident), but that’s another matter entirely.
Your point is that one copy is actually the same physical entity. I don’t dispute that. I just don’t think it has any special properties from the subjective viewpoint, compared to the duplicate. If the duplication works while the original is conscious, then the first type of “me” above has a continuity with the original, but that particular continuity is lost every time I go unconscious anyway, so I don’t give it much weight.
Sorry if I’m just repeating myself. I admit the argument isn’t compelling; it relies on assumptions. But I believe it’s consistent, and if there’s any experiment that can disprove the assumptions, I’d like to know about it!
Qualia are what is present to our experience. We can’t say much about it other than that it exists, but I don’t understand denying its existence.
I could be wrong, though, if you’re actually the much discussed p-zombie! In that case, you’d write posts just as you do, but have no subjective experience, and thus, no qualia.
However, if you’re not a p-zombie, then you have qualia: you experience stuff, it appears in your world view, representing the reality that you’re looking at (or hearing, tasting, etc.) It’s just a name for something we all have. If you do not have experiences, then you have no need for the term.
In any case, this is beside the point of the discussion; all we have to agree is that we have awareness, without giving a name to the experiences of which we’re aware. Qualia are good for illustrative purposes here, but not necessary for our arguments (on either side).
Of course there is. Assuming we’re still talking about the material universe, cause is inherent in the configuration and state of the matter being transcribed.
For example, if we were to capture the configuration of a pool table just after I struck the cue ball, the motion of the ball is a cause (as well as an effect) - it can be observed and described.
When we rematerialise our copy of the pool table, we have to include and reproduce the motion of the cue ball, which then carries on rolling in the same way as the original.
What’s your definition of a cause?
11 pages. Dance puppets, dance!
Nothing to worry about. The nephew got the Erector set and decided against a teleporter and instead built a chicken-flavored air conditioner. Which is similar but different.
Is the conditioner itself chicken-flavored, or just the air that it conditions?
I could happily live in a place where the air has a bit of a scent of nice chicken soup.
But eating household appliances… That’s going a bit far!
Well, it may feel like that, but that is mainly because your memories are not being written while you are asleep. All indications are that a form of consciousness (I will accept that it is a less vivid and complex form of consciousness) persists throughout sleep.
I think maybe you are confusing the context of this with one of the others things we’ve been discussing, because your question doesn’t make any sense.
I was asked which one am I. I answered that IMO I am the entity that is causally connected to me.
Given this, of course there are differences from a subjective POV. If the entity causally connected to me is in Paris, and the other is in Venice, then which city I am in is a difference.
And my position is that if there are two subjective views then there are two entities; it’s irrelevant if their memories are entirely different, identical, or almost the same.
We were discussing whether the two entities have a different causal history.
We can capture the information about a cause. Then we can strike a pool ball exactly like another one we struck a moment ago.
Do the pool balls have the same causal history?
No, they were struck at two different times and/or in two different places: two different events, IOW.
Really, no-one would be disputing this outside of this discussion.
Likewise with the transporter. The atoms of the two entities have been “struck” in two different places at two different times by different events. The memories of one entity have been created in an entirely different way from the memories of the other.
They have a different causal history.
Argument from repetition?
It’s still the same guy who comes out of the transporter. He may have a different causal history, but he is the same man. His name is the same; his memories, his purpose, his will and volition. He is the same dude.
Transportation of this sort moves a person from one place to another. Unless you posit a magical soul, the guy who comes out is the same guy who went in. He has a different physical causal history: that isn’t a part of the definition of a person’s identity.
Cause and effect is just physics (maybe biology and chemistry too, but biology is chemistry and physics, and chemistry is also physics). The things we call causes are systems at work in physics. Unless you’re positing some metaphysical element to the nature of cause and effect (and you keep saying you’re not), then capturing all of the properties of a configuration of matter is capturing causes in progress, reproducing them is letting them take effect.
The apparatus that does this would be an additional link in the chain of causality (invisible to the system being manipulated)
Yes, that is a good demonstration of an argument from repetition.
Cause and effect is just physics, yes. “Capturing” causes is not science at all, and currently only exists within the philosophy of Mangetout.
You see the problem, then? Where the hell do we go from here? No one has offered anything new, it’s clear we don’t agree… Seriously, let’s kill it. Let’s just all back away slowly and go somewhere for sushi instead.
I don’t think teleporting would ruin the world if we can live with nukes and massive armies. It can throw a wrench in the gears for SOME industries, but making things happen more efficiently I doubt would disrupt them for long, and then a butterfly emerges.