Well, we would have to define this hypothetical world where a person only goes to church once in his or her lifetime and how many of those people would not now take this one time trek because of the law that indirectly affect churches.
That’s another reason the standard is somewhat recursive. As Bricker noted, other areas of constitutional law use the phrase undue burden, but those are discussing laws of general applicability which otherwise indirectly infringe on the right itself.
Stealing again from Scalia, nobody would say that a 1 cent tax on religious books would survive constitutional scrutiny as it is meant to directly infringe the first amendment. A state sales tax which collect a 6 percent tax on all consumer products, including books, and therefore religious books, is judged on an undue basis standard. But one can easily see the difference. The question is whether a general law that applies to everything nevertheless imposes an undue burden on religion.
In the abortion context these laws are directed towards the right. Waiting periods, parental consent, informed consent laws, abortion medical standards laws, bans on partial birth abortion, etc. are all laws which directly speak to abortion. The Casey Court established a standard where the state can pass these types of laws only so long as the laws are woefully ineffective in their stated purpose.
Suppose the scientific evidence showed that 90% of women exercised their free choice to carry the fetus to term after reading a required pamphlet. A court would have to conclude that it imposed an undue burden on abortion rights. If, say, only 2% of women likewise changed their mind, then the law would survive. IOW, the state needs to draft a very poorly written pamphlet lest it be struck down. So we have a standard that collapses under itself. Some judges might put that number at 10% and others at 50%. Nobody knows what an undue burden is.
[QUOTE=Bricker]
I did initially support the 24 hour waiting period, but as it happens, the rate of women changing their minds as a result is vanishingly small, so I have reluctantly concluded that the effect of this rule is simply to hamper. not allow for useful reflection.
[/QUOTE]
So since the waiting period is ineffective, its purpose is to hamper? If it was strongly effective, would it then be a good law? It might be, but then it would impose an undue burden.