I had no idea Warthogs were so spiritual!
Goddammit 
And I *know *that one, too !
What if that priest and his buds were singing “Row, Row, Row Your Boat?”
Here’s one that goes round the world: File:John bull sphera mundi.gif - Wikipedia
Gotta be able to see what’s coming up behind you!
Some pilot, some where, said they do not. 
The Air Force is now not in quite as much of a hurry to get rid of the A-10, given the F-35 delays and reduced acquisition rate.
Good news - thanks!
Were you citing vaguely this thread? Do jet fighters have rear-view and side-view mirrors?
I read it, I do not recall where, the 'Dope, elsewhere on the web, or an antique book or magazine.
I do think that the survivability of the airframe and the incredibly rugged tub of steel the pilot sits in in an A-10 is often overlooked. Those things can sustain serious damage and still make it home.
The fundamental issue here, as has been discussed up thread, is that the Air Force has two, somewhat competing strategic mission sets.
On the one had, they have strategic missions that include global attack, mobility, and air superiority and engagement which includes nuclear deterrence. The Air Force fully embraces these missions, it’s what makes them viable and it’s their core. It’s nuclear weapons, pointy end supersonic jet fighters baby!!!
But they also have combat support, which the A-10 is part of. When push comes to shove, the Air Force (and all the services really) want to do what they perceive as critical and sexy, and wants to do less of the grind it out, non-cool support stuff. Especially non-cool support stuff for other Services.
This is exacerbated by the budget cuts all the Services have taken over the last few years. When there was more money, the Air Force was more willing to take on these non-core missions. When funding is reduced, they are protective of the core and are more willing to shed the support. That’s the A-10.
There was some poker being played in that the Army could have pushed funding to the Air Force for the A-10 but they chose not to do this. Partly because they are short of money, but mostly because they don’t want to set a prescient.
So both the Army and the Air Force are at fault to some degree for this.
(The other part, which I’m not going to get into is that the A-10 is overrated and expensive to keep in the air.)
Overrated an expensive? You are going to have to get into it, because I think that statement is poppycock. The A-10 is the cheapest of the Air Force’s active duty fighters to keep flying - $17,000 per flight hour. Compare that to:
F-22A — $68,362
F-15C — $41,921
F-16C — $22,514
The A-10 is also one of (if not the) most effective air frames in the USAF arsenal, by any measure.
Theres an easy solution to this, let the Air Force keep their sexy fast movers and stealth mission. Let the Army buy and operate dirt cheap turbo-prop CAS planes like the Super Tucano. Ground troops are generally only brought into play after the US already has total air superiority, so theres no need for anything more. The Army already has rotors and the Marines do their own CAS, why shouldn’t the Army do the same with cheap turbo props?
Because the Army has literally zero interest in paying for such new capabilities.
The Army has just divested itself of the Kiowa Warrior helicopter, in favor of using Apaches as scout helicopters. This was done for purely budgetary reasons. There is no scenario whatsoever in which the Army is disposing of hundreds of helicopters to avoid huge cuts to brigade combat teams, and then decides to take money out of brigade combat teams to buy its own air force. It will never, never happen.
I should have said “increasingly expensive to operate.” Air Force argues that the cost per hour to fly this is increasing at too high level as it ages.
In terms of effectiveness, you’ll generally read how this has supported Army troops well, as it did in the Gulf War and is a “national treasure” as if the A-10 is some old hound that needs to be kept at the foot of the barcalounger due to it’s loyalty. My Air Force friends believe that it’s a target looking to get shot down. YMMV (and apparently does).
I’m not here to argue either case. Just trying to explain why the Air Force views this as expendable.
That was mentioned earlier: the “fast-mover mafia”. If it’s not zoomie, it’s not worth keeping.
I say this as a 21-year veteran of the Air Force. This is fundamental, was so during my entire career, and was so even through my father’s 25-year career before me. CAS is the ugly redheaded stepchild, the Air Force seems to nurse an institutional grudge against the Army (probably from the abusive upbringing the Army gave the Air Force in all the years that the Air Force was part of the Army), and when forced to support CAS the Air Force leadership will do as cheap and shitty a job as they can to acquire tools and tactics suited to the mission… and God forbid it be a weapon system they can only used for CAS.
In other words, your report is accurate: Air Force leadership doesn’t value this weapon system. The reasons they do so, however, are not entirely objective; they’re largely ideological, based on certain historical biases and not on a clear-eyed assessment of doctrinal or operational needs.
You see the same thing in the Navy, of course. To an attack submarine type, anything on the surface is just a target. The difference is that the Attack Submarine Cabal isn’t running the Department of the Navy.
Surprisingly enough it is. The last two Chiefs of Naval Operations are fast attack Sailors.
General Welsh was an A-10 pilot. I think the “Air Force leadership hates the A-10” meme need to explain why the Chief of Staff of the Air Force hates the aircraft he used to fly. That seems the total opposite of what every pilot - and especially A-10 pilot - has ever said in the history of aviation. I think they put Kool Aid in the coffee maker that convinces every pilot that the airplane they fly is the best ever at what it does, with some very rare exceptions.
The Chief of Staff doesn’t get to select systems, or even steer the requirements process, on the basis of personal preference. When the consensus forms, it’ll coagulate around the idea of a fast-mover that can do CAS along with other stuff, like the F-35.
My limited interactions at Air Staff level tells me that you get a brain replacement when you join the staff; the thought processes are that different between Leadership and Line.
This isn’t an issue of resquirements, and even if it was, the CSAF is the boss of the guy who represents the Air Force on the JROC.
This issue is well within the responsibilities of the service chiefs statutory authority to organize, train and equip. You clearly disagree, so who does own the recommendation to retire the A-10?
Maybe ACC? You think the CSAF can’t tell ACC-CC to pound sand?
Or maybe the Air Staff? The people who literally work for the CSAF are the ones who tell him what to think?