I’ve come to the conclusion that the term “good” and others like it are inherently subjective, due to their meaning. What does it mean for something to be good? As I understand it, something is good if it supports, improves, enhances, or betters ‘something’. The “something” in the definition makes the term inherently sujective. As has already been suggested, to a fly a pile of crap is good; to a chef, not so much. I further propose that once you take the fly and the chef out of the equation, you actually deprive the word “good” of meaning, since you’ve deprived it of the context upon which it relies.
Now, to examine that all-powerful god and his relation to “good”. The god could, for example, declare that pile of crap to be “good”. What would this mean? I can see three possible cases:
He’s declaring it in his own, subjective opinion. The chef still doesn’t like the crap, of course. In this case, there is still no “objective good”.
He declares that the pile of crap is objectively good; therefore, by definition, it’s good for everyone. The chef now likes the pile of crap. This clearly hasn’t happened; everybody doesn’t agree on everything (or on anything, really).
He declares that the pile of crap is objectively good; therefore, by definition, it’s good for everyone, but the chef doesn’t notice, because he’s a moron or otherwise defective. You think you don’t like the taste of crap? Nonsense, you actually like it, eat up.
To some limited degree, case 3 sounds reasonable; sometimes people really don’t seem to know what’s good for them. However in actuality case three is nothing more than assuming that everyone who disagrees with you is an idiot, unable at any level to ascertain what is good or valuable. This is a repulsively selfish and egotistical position, despite being a central concept behind certain churches.
Aside from being repulsive, the problem with this position is that defining an objective good does not ‘undefine’ subjective good. God may declare waterfalls or piles of crap to be sublime, but that (demonstrably) doesn’t mean that everyone else agrees. Meaning that for everyone who might disagree, a thing has two different “good” values: the subjective opinion and the “objective” opinion. This couldn’t happen if the “objective” opinion was truly objective; therefore, by definition the “objective” opinion is just another subjective opinon, distinguished only by the fact that it’s held by someone repulsively selfish and egotistical. Case 3 is therefore just case 1 all over again: there is thus no such thing as an actual objective good.
The short response to this is that Lewis is writing for humans and about humans. Cockroaches are not moral agents and therefore cannot make judgements about whether the waterfall is sublime or not. One could imagine a cockroach that was a moral agent, but that would only be a fantasy creation. Since human beings are the only moral agents in the physical universe, Lewis’ claim that the waterfall and certain other things demand certain moral responses means that they demand certain moral responses from humans. (Or as Donald Rumsfield might say if he took up moral philosophy, “You get moral judgements from the species you have, not the species you wish you had.”)
But that doesn’t make sense, considering that Lewis is a theist. He believes God is also a moral agent, and indeed The moral agent. Lewis’ claim that the waterfall and other things demand certain moral responses may mean that they demand them from God, or indeed vice-versa.
My point was in response to MrFantsyPants and begbert2, who both rejected the idea of a universally appropriate response to something on the grounds that insects would not have that response. Lewis never intended for his claim to apply to all animals, merely to humans. As he doesn’t mention God in “Men Without Chests”, that doesn’t play into the argument. (But if we asked him, he’d probably say that God feels the right way in response to everything.)
Easily countered, since my position doesn’t depend on insects; any two persons (living or dead) who disagree over the goodness of anything disproves an objective goodness for that thing, as far as my argument is concerned. I only kept the insect in to support the obvious dichotomy of debate over the goodness of a pile of crap. (If you prefer, simply swap the fly with a natural-fertilizing farmer.)
But we’re not talking about “a lot of religious people.” You made the claim that God could give something an objective value. I don’t think the phrase “objective value” has any more meaning than a nonsense word (for reasons begbert2 explained very clearly. Thanks, begbert2!). If you don’t have any meaning in mind when you use it, I think that would support my position. God may be able to do anything, but “flembling stoo” and “create objective value” aren’t part of anything. They’re nothing, without meaning or content.
But they do have context. If I say “murder is bad”, then there is the context of the killing itself, it’s relation to whether God is pleased or not by it, and indeed whether it is right in the context of the universe.
I don’t understand it either. But not understanding something doesn’t mean there is nothing to understand.
I’m not talking about context, I’m talking about meaning. You claim that there is some meaning to the phrase “objectively good” or “objectively bad.” This is your claim, and it is incumbent on you to defend it. If you don’t know what the meaning might be, then why do you think it has a meaning? Just because other people say the words?
That you have to refer to context at all is a strong clue that “goodness” is not objective. Remember, something that is objective is the same regardless of the context; context is therefore irrelevent to something objective.
Now for an example: Rather than speaking of murder in general, let’s examine a specific theoretical murder: suppose if Stalin had been murdered as a baby.
This murder would be:
Bad for the baby Stalin,
Good for his future victims,
? in God’s opinion,
and it would have no discernable effect good or bad on the universe as a whole at all.
Even before we look at God’s opinion of the matter, it’s clear that the goodness of the event depends on the context we speak of it in. Therefore, by definition, the goodness/badness of the murder is subjective. To speak of an objective, contextless ‘good’ value for it is like talking about the radius of a triangle; by defintion there is no such thing.
It’s not my claim. I don’t believe that anything is objective. My claim is that it is possible, nothing more. My support for the claim that it is possible is again the theoretical that a supreme being exists; if a being existed that could do anything, what’s stopping it from doing something we don’t understand?
Objectivity requires some context. We can’t just say “something” is good or bad. We need to actually pinpoint the thing that’s good or bad. Perhaps i’m using the wrong word; what I mean is that you need to refer to what it is you’re talking about in order to say anything about what it is you’re talking about.
Clear to me? Sure. But certain? Prove to me that all those things need to be taken into account. Prove to me that they all have implications for the goodness of the event. Prove to me, in fact, that I need to use any context besides referring to “a murder”. Or even “a killing”.
In this case, it’s the same thing that’s stopping it from making square circles.
If there’s an omnipotent being, then it could make something objectively good - but not by altering the definition of “objectively”. And that definition says that it is the same regardless of observer or context - meaning that everyone would agree on the ‘goodness’ of the thing. This has not happened in reality, for anything that I am aware of. So, there are no truly "objective good"s in reality.
My claim is that for “something1” to be “good”, it can only be defined as such with regard to its effect on a second something (“something2”). You have to define both somethings before you can speak of it as being objective. For example, baby Stalin’s murder would be objectively bad for baby Stalin. Similarly, baby Stalin’s murder would be objectively good for persons who would otherwise been his victims. But baby Stalin’s murder is not simply objectively good or simply objectively bad on its own, because by omitting the context of the person or thing being effected by the event, you require that that goodness be equally true for all possible contexts. Which has already been shown not to be the case.
Easy. By definition, anything that is objective needs to apply equally to all things; therefore everything has to be taken into account. By definition.
For personal, subjective use, you don’t have to refer to anything you don’t want to. If it’s good for you, then it’s good for you, and that’s all you need. If it’s good for society, it’s good for society, and you don’t have to worry about other things if you don’t want to. But the minute you apply the adjective “objective” to it, you have by definition included everything else in the mix too.
If the meaning of objectively was that everyone would agree on something, then logically there would be nothing that is subjective, nor any such concept as subjectiveness, because there would be no individual, different takes on a thing.
You’re assuming that Stalin’s killing of many victims is a bad thing. I would agree with you - but it is by no means a certainty.
Likewise, you assume that killing in order to stop more killing is a good thing. That’s not necessarily so; perhaps there is no moral justification for killing one in order to not kill many.
I don’t think i’ve made myself clear. It doesn’t need to apply equally to all things; only things which are that thing. A murder being objectively bad doesn’t mean that murder, stealing, snowball fights and dancing are bad. It means only that murder is bad, and that all murder is bad. “Everything” needs only to be taken into account if that everything affects the morality of the something. Which it doesn’t necessarily.
Um, are you saying that if one thing were objective, then nothing can be subjective? 'Cause that doesn’t make sense.
In actuality, there are some things that are objective, and some things that are only subjective, coexisting peacefully side-by-side. For example, it’s objectively true that if you were to compare the amount of mass in the statue of liberty and in the moon, the moon would have more mass. No matter who does it or the method they use to do the comparison, if their method actually conveys to them an accurate comparison of the relative masses of the objects in question then they will come up with the same result. That makes the result objective.
On the other hand, it’s not objectively true that cherries taste better than strawberries. The answer depends on the ‘subject’ making the statement; therefore it’s subjective. I think strawberries are tastier; when I make the statement, when I am the subject, it’s true. For some other people the statement is false. There is disagreement, so there is no objective truth value for the statement.
You’re confusing which “thing” we’re talking about. The statment under discussion (“Baby Stalin’s murder would be good”) is the “object”. The person assessing the statement is the subject. For any specific object, such as a specific event or thing, it is only objective if it is the same for all subjects (people or things assessing the object). If the answer for any specific object varies per subject, then that specific object is merely subjective.
One presumes that whether a given murder is bad has little or nothing to do with whether snowball fights are bad, and is only a small factor regarding whether murder in general is bad. This is true but has nothing to do with the objectivity of the various things’ goodness. The question is whether a given murder is good for every subject, every person or thing that it has an effect on or that can react to it. Agreements amongst those subjects is what determines objectivity or not.
I believe the problem is our different definitions of objective and subjective.
Something that is objective is the same for everyone. An object has one set objective status, while it may have many subjective statuses. However, “being” the same for everyone and “appearing” the same for everyone are two entirely different things. A cube, from one angle, may look only like a square. From another it looks like a cube. For everyone, it does not appear to be the same thing. But for everyone it is the same thing, in that it is a cube. Our different perspectives are subjective; it being a cube is objective. That I may think it’s a square and you may think it’s a cube has no bearing at all on the objectivity of the matter. It is a cube.
Right, that’s why I said “if their method actually conveys to them an accurate comparison of the relative masses of the objects in question” before.
Now ask yourself, what’s the definition of “good”? The only definition of “good” that I’m aware of refers to whether it’s good for somehing; that is, the definition of “good” itself presupposes a subject. The term doesn’t include a standard of measure or a yardstick to compare by; that’s left undefined until you know from whose persective you’re talking about it being “good” in.
That being the case, some people would tell you that a “supreme being”'s opinion on the matter can be objective. Unfortunately for those who wish to force their opinions on everyone (which is the real justification for declaring things to be “objectively good/bad”), unless the supreme being’s opinion changes everyone else’s opinions to match it, the presence of conflicting opinions rule out the possibility of the supreme being’s opinion being objectively true.
A supreme being’s opinion is just as subjective as anyone else’s. But, by nature of them being supreme, they can make it “good” for everyone else. It could also change their opinions, but opinions have no bearing on what is true or not. Opinions have no bearing whatsoever of any kind on what is objective or not. They do not influence it - except in the case of a supreme being, and even then their opinion itself means nothing in terms of objective truth.
But the word “good” is itself subjective; it depends on the measure being taken and the priorities used in the assessment. A “supreme being” might think it’s good for everyone to get into heaven, and he might cause that to take place, an objective occurence. But to even form the assessment that this event is good he has to be basing it in his own personal subjective opinion of what’s good and what’s not.
You touched on this yourself when questioning the assessment of Stalin’s death being better than the deaths of his victims (an assessment I never made, but nonetheless). Before you can decide if something is good, you have to define what good is in the given case. And that assessment is inherently subjective.
Yes, he would be. But he can make it objective. He could make it so that there is a particular set of criteria, priorities and the like, which are the objectively correct ones to take, should we wish to know whether something is good or not.
Yes, but this is about how we come to our own personal views. I don’t deny that in order to see whether something is good or not, we need to look at whether what we define good is present. But that’s in opinion forming! We need all that to decide whether something is good, yes. We don’t need all that for something to be good.
To go back to Stalin, imagine that killing him as a baby was “good”. Do we need to look at priorities, measures, and the like to make that good? No. We just need to do those things in order to find out for ourselves, or come to opinions if we’re wrong… Opionions, whether they are held or not held, have zero effect on what something is. They just say what we think it is.
No. This is what begbert and I have been trying to say over and over. “Priorities, measures, and the like” are what good is! You must have a very different definition of good than we do if you hold otherwise. When I asked you what your definition is, you claimed you didn’t know. Which means our definition is the only one we have to work with, and it defines you as being wrong! (To put it into a specific formula, I might say that good is “the subjective condition of being pleasing or beneficial to a given or implied person or intention.”) The only way God could make that objective would be to change the definition! If you have another definition, however, let’s hear it!
You misunderstand, I think. I would agree that we need to look at those things to try and figure out what it is ourselves. But we do not need to look at it in order to make it so. Something isn’t neutral until we come to look at it and judge it. If someone had tried to kill Stalin as a baby, whether it was good or not wouldn’t have hung in abeyance until we started talking about it in this thread.
Priorities, measures and the like are indeed what good is. My priorities, measures, and the like, are what my subjective idea of good is. The correct priorities, measures, and the like, are what the objective good would be. Your opinion, your definition, does not change what something actually is. I could define a fish as a carrot - is it now a carrot?
And i’m pretty sure you haven’t asked me what my definition of good is.