# The Aesthetical Jesus, Part I **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 16, 2009, 3:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611 "2009-05-16T03:40:24Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 15\ **Page:** 7
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 3:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/121 "2009-05-22T15:40:28Z")
**Lib** and\*\* Revenant Threshold\*\* - **Revenant Threshold** ’s earlier posts bring up an interesting point. I, too, use to have some OCD issues, knew they were neither rational or effective, but still had ‘em anyway. Lib, you’ve explained how things like obsessive loops caused by misfiring neurons, external circumstances, etc., are factored into the _pursuit_ of one’s values, but how are they factored into the _identification_ of one’s values? Seems to me that OCD could greatly muddy those waters. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 3:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/122 "2009-05-22T15:45:46Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > It is important to identify, if at all possible, the thing that is of _greatest_ value to you. All other choices you make are merely a subset of it, or a means to it. Waitaminute. Are you saying that everyone has exactly _ **one** _ overarching value, whether they have overtly identified it or not, that drives _ **all** _ their actions and subsequent assigments of value? ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 5:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/123 "2009-05-22T17:22:30Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > **begbert2** , I’m curious as to why you assign (aesthetic) value to actions. From your description, it seems that any given action is moot; that actions have no _intrinsic_ value and are merely a potential means of pursuing an underlying (aesthetic) value or values. Robbery is one of a zillion actions one could take to pursue an underlying value of “feeling confident and wealthy”, and for some, robbery will not leave them feeling confident and wealthy in the slightest degree. > > Assigning the value of “feeling more confident” to a robbery would be like me assigning the value of “feeling satiated” to the act of opening a bag of pretzels; I don’t value “bag opening” per se, it’s just how I get to the damn pretzels. > > (The above assumes, of course that I’ve read you correctly. Which I may not have.) I’m assigning the value to actions because I have to assign it to _something_, and I think attributing value to actions is a more accurate description of the manner that humans make decisions than to attribute value to objects (or abstract concepts). If you want to assert that actions have no intrinsic value, I can turn around and assert that objects don’t either, and thus step on the neck of our discussion together and put a bullet in its head. I’m not seeing a lot of point to that though; instead I say that people assess value in both objects _and_ actions, and and assess the actions based on, among other things, the value of objects, and then make their decisions based exclusively on their assessments of the value of the actions. As for the robbery/pretzels, you value the action of opening the bag because you anticipate it will facilitate your being able to engage in the action of eating the pretzels, which you value because you value the experience of tasting the pretzels (and possibly being less hungry). Actually now that I think of it you only value the pretzels as _objects_ as a _side effect_ of associating an action that you value to them. Hmm, I think you just _undermined_ my opinion of focusing on the valuation of objects rather than actions when assessing human motivations. > [@Liberal](#): > > Heh. 🙂 I don’t mean to gloat, but now you understand better, perhaps, why disciplines borrow from the common vernacular but then redefine the terms for their particluar usage. There’s no point screaming at the PGA that a driver is a person who pilots an automobile, and where do they get off calling a stick with a big head on it a driver? Oh, I’m not conceding that we have to be happy about it - I’m just complaining that it’s nearly unavoidable. And on reflection, it’s better to consistently use a _new_ term (“begbertian pleasure”) than to co-opt an old term (“pleasure”, unqualified). > [@Liberal](#): > > A begbertian treatment of aesthetics would make a wonderfully interesting topic for discussion, and I would willingly enjoin it. At this time, however, let’s stick with mine. In the case of the sandwich, I’m going to describe it for now in terms of a sickness or disease and a symptom. If a person is hungry for a particular sandwich, it could mean not just that they value sandwiches — and as someone who absolutely LOVES sandwiches made with home grown tomatoes, I can attest to assigning them great worth — but that they value eating in general. Whatever sandwich they happen to desire at a given time is only a symptom of their greater aesthetic. Honestly I’m not sure there _is_ that much of a difference between the begbertian view and the Liberalian view - the main difference I’m seeing so far is that you are (or seem to be) assigning the value to the object, thereby obscuring the fact that the value is _really_ based in the agent actor; specifically their needs and desires. It seems to implicitly impart an ‘aura’ of objectivity to the object’s ‘aesthetic value’ which I’m _fairly_ sure is actually entirely subjective to the agent, even in your Liberalian aesthetics. Other than that distinction, I’m not sure there’s much difference. > [@Liberal](#): > > As I explained before, given that you have assigned great worth to a particular thing, then other things that lead you to that wonderful thing are themselves wonderful (but less so) if only as a path to the wonderful thing itself. If you value going to movies above all else, then naturally, you are going to value tickets someone gives to you. But if you value only certain movies, say romantic comedies, then a ticket to the Exorcist might be trash as far as you’re concerned. Whereas I’m pretty sure that the assignation of great worth to something is nothing but mental and linguistic shorthand for the assignation of worth to a particular interaction with the object. You value the tickets because what you _actually_ value is the anticipated action of trading the tickets in to get to see the movie, and you value the movie because what you _actually_ value is the anticipated action of watching it. When the ticket ceases to be associated with the anticipated action (for example, if you miss the movie it’s associated with), the ticket immidiately loses all value as a result, despite being exactly the same ticket it was before. > [@Liberal](#): > > It is important to identify, if at all possible, the thing that is of _greatest_ value to you. All other choices you make are merely a subset of it, or a means to it. Whoa whoa whoa. I reject the assertion that people each have a single ‘greatest’ drive/desire/valuation which is the font of all other drives/desires/valuation - unless you define “satisfying their own needs and desires” as that action and sweep everything under that one rug. In actual fact, people have a variety of largely unrelated (and occasionally conflicting) drives/desires/valuations, each of which contributes separately to the decisions people make. > [@Liberal](#): > > Okay, but you are slip-sliding juuuuust a bit into ethics here, for which I prefer to wait until my treatment of aeshetics is fleshed out to everyone’s satisfaction (i.e., those who wish to participate in discussing them). But let me just say this for now: if your reponse to the little old lady is triggered by how it would make you feel, then by Liberalian aesthetics, it is feeling that way which you value greater. You could achieve the same feelings perhaps by doing something else. Even by playing games in which you get to rob and kill virtual people. So, if you don’t mind — and I do believe we’re almost done with this part of it — hold off just a bit longer for the ethics side of things. Let us say for now that aesthetics is ethically neutral (even though it’s not). It’s kind of like people solving physics equations pretending, for convenience’s sake, that there is no wind or turbulence or other weird factors that might complicate their calculations. I don’t see what this has to do with ethics particularly; best I can tell ethics are just the codification of particular types of actions and responses. They only effect the decision making process if the person has a need or desire (probably desire) to perceive themselves as an ethical person. (Whether the ethical system’s definititon is itself informed by a direct desire to help humanity is a separate issue, but regardless we can discuss ethics later.) And when you start about valuing “feeling that way”, Liberalian aesthetics starts to fold into the model of needs/desires that prompted me to coin the term “begbertian pleasure” to indicate satisfaction of needs and desires. When what you’re finding aesthetic is the state of having your needs and desires fulfilled, we’re literally talking about the same thing. When you start about assigning aesthetic value to the old lady, I think you’re talking about something else, which I think is a symptom of the decision-making process, not a cause. > [@Liberal](#): > > You probably despise me by now for seeming to be so picky, and I will deal with your example, but let’s please steer clear of words and concepts like “desire”. For our purposes, desire is nothing more than a predicate of the general aesthetic. In other words, I desire what I value most. I also desire things that will _lead_ me to what I value most. But in your example, we cannot overlook the people, more numerous than we’d like, who do rob their beloved grandmothers — even rape and kill them. And as well, their wives. And even their children. But quite honestly, that’s neither here nor there at this point. Such people are valuing _something_ so much that for them, killing their children is a means of pursuing that thing, whatever it may be. Heh “general aesthetic”. That’s what you take to numb the pin, right? 😃 Sorry, I couldn’t resist. Anyway, I don’t despise you for being picky, though I do question the merit of restricting word use this much. If you want to overload the word, just tack a predicate qualifier on the overload (‘Liberalian desire’), and then we don’t have to worry about the english-defined word getting mixed up with it. And I don’t think that we desire what we value most; I think we value what we desire most. (Or rather, we value things that will satisfy our desires/needs/wants.) I think your causation’s backwards, in other words. And as for killing grandmothers and family, it’s pretty clear that while some people just don’t value their family much, in many cases it’s instead the case that a momentary flux in their perceived desires (the desire to releive frustration through violent action, for example) trumps any valuation they have of their family and causes them to destroy that which they value. Which works fine with the ‘needs/desires’ models, but perhaps not so well with the Lerberalian aestheitic model? Or do you have another way to account for crimes of passion? > [@Liberal](#): > > For a bit if insight into this, let’s digress for a moment to discuss Austrian economics. (Strange, I know, but bear with me.) > > \ > > Okay, so why the diversion into microeconomic theory? Because it closely relates to the topic at hand. You wrote, “In my opinion, people _don’t_ really pursue things that they do not feel satisfy a need or desire,” and that mistakes in judgment or failed risk accounts for much abberant behavior. While that may be true (and I’m not sure there is an actual sequitur there), it is beside the point since, in Liberalian aesthetics, aberrant behavior is explained not by any needs or desires, but by the pursuit of (to us) strange and weird things that they value, or else strange and weird things that will help them attain what they _most value_. And they value them more than they value whatever it is they have at hand. The point I was making was that people often take actions based on _expected_ results of actions, and thus act in ways that do not result in the satisfactions of their desires. For example, there are people buy lottery tickets for the express purpose of making money, not for the thrill or fun of it. (My Grandfather is one of these.) Clearly he is wasting his money without satisfying his desires - but that doesn’t mean that his desires aren’t driving his decision to play the lottery. This is exactly analogous to a person considering the lottery ticket to have Liberalian aesthetic value due to an overoptomistic assessment of its, uh, value. (Assuming there’s a physical ticket to _have_ the Liberalian aesthetic value , anyway.) I really don’t think we’re in disagreement on this _particular_ point. > [@Liberal](#): > > Obviously, if they already had what they most valued, their pursuit would be ended. And if that happened, wouldn’t they just stop doing _anything_, _ever_ again? If there actually was one, single ‘greatest’ valuation from which all other valuation sprung. Which I kinda think there isn’t. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 5:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/124 "2009-05-22T17:35:47Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > But let’s be clear about something — and I blame myself for very poor exposition — it is not always the case that we necessarily pursue, in the literal sense of chasing after or driving toward that which we value most. It may be that circumstances actually prevent us from doing so. Consider the man who values music above all else, but has gone deaf. Even though he might still be able to “feel” rhythm and volume and such, he cannot really pursue his highest valued thing. Not just now. And there are many other (and probably better) examples as well. OK, that makes more sense - “what you value most, you will \*try \*and pursue the hardest, even if it doesn’t work out”, not “what you _end up_ pursuing the hardest, regardless of desire, is what you value most”, is that it ? I can get behind that. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 6:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/125 "2009-05-22T18:06:25Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > … And I don’t think that we desire what we value most; I think we value what we desire most. (Or rather, we value things that will satisfy our desires/needs/wants.)… I think this is where I’m getting confused. Under **begbert2ianism** , where exactly do desires/needs/wants come from? I can see desire, wants and needs arising in response to, and being directed toward, something we consider valuable. But if we do not consider something valuable, why would we desire, want or need it? ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 6:17pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/126 "2009-05-22T18:17:44Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > I think this is where I’m getting confused. Under **begbert2ianism** , where exactly do desires/needs/wants come from? > > I can see desire, wants and needs arising in response to, and being directed toward, something we consider valuable. But if we do not consider something valuable, why would we desire, want or need it? Needs are hardwired (ie: “I need to eat or I’m gonna die”); wants are encoded in one’s mental state (in one’s preferences and opinions, ie: “I want to be tasting a tasty sandwich” or “I want the Republicans to win”.) Basically, the conventional definitions of the terms. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 6:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/127 "2009-05-22T18:41:15Z")
> [@begbert2](#): > > Needs are hardwired (ie: “I need to eat or I’m gonna die”); wants are encoded in one’s mental state (in one’s preferences and opinions, ie: “I want to be tasting a tasty sandwich” or “I want the Republicans to win”.) > > Basically, the conventional definitions of the terms. Yep, I’m still confused. If wants are based on preferences, where exactly does preference come from? I can see preference arising in response to, and being directed toward, something we consider valuable. But if we do not consider something valuable, why would we prefer it? ---
**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 6:59pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/128 "2009-05-22T18:59:05Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > Yep, I’m still confused. If wants are based on preferences, where exactly does preference come from? > > I can see preference arising in response to, and being directed toward, something we consider valuable. But if we do not consider something valuable, why would we prefer it? Best I can tell, it’s preset in the brain state. I mean, there are some flavors you like, right? Why do you like them? You just do, right? No particular reason. It’s certainly not the case that you like the flavor of bananas because you think the bananas are esthetically pleasing for some other reason than that you happen to like their flavor. ---
**Author:** ![NoJustice](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/n/ecb155/32.png) [@NoJustice](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/NoJustice)\ **Post date:** [May 22, 2009, 11:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/129 "2009-05-22T23:33:05Z")
> [@MrDibble](#): > > I don’t have a homunculus problem. I don’t believe it exists. Did you think I was just making it up? Anyone who wants to know what a homunculus is can easily look it up, but since **Half Man Half Wit** didn’t seem to be able to figure out how what I was saying _wasn’t_ a homunculus argument, I suppose I’ll try to explain it in the specific context of this discussion in particular. But let’s start at the beginning. It started when I asked about the seeming implication that one could evaluate one’s own mind through any means but perception. Eventually there was a grudging admission that any evaluation required perception. That is, there was perception of things coming from the senses, and there was perception of the internal state of the mind. Once everyone admitted that knowledge of the state of the mind would have to be perceived by the mind be evaluated, the resulting model seemed to be somewhat like this: ```auto ------ ---------- --------- =>|senses|===>|perception|===>|awareness|===> ------ ---------- --------- /\ || || || ================= ``` Perception of things entering from the leftmost arrow would be sensory perception, whereas the looping back arrow would represent information about the mind itself which is perceived. **Half Man Half Wit** thought this was a homunculus argument, apparently because he associated the looping of information from awareness back into perception with the infinite regress of the homunculus. But there’s a big difference. So what is this homunculus thing about? Well, let’s say I were to try to speculate as to what’s happening inside that box labelled perception. If I said maybe, when I see something, what happens is something like this: ```auto ------------------------------------ | perception | \ | | \ ____ \| ------------- ---------- | ____ __ \ ____ /|==>|visualization|==>|??????????|==>| ____ __ / / | ------------- ---------- | / | /\ | | || | ------------------------------------ /\ / \ || ``` Looks OK right? Sure we don’t know what that mystery box there on the right is, but nobody’s claiming we have a complete model. But we know that if there were a visualization process, by which images from the eyes, and from the imagination are ‘seen’ inside the mind, that there has to be something between that process and awareness itself. Something which extracts _meaning_ from these internally ‘seen’ images. It’s incomplete but surely a partial model is better than just a big empty box with no idea of what’s in it. We’ve managed to fill half of it it right? The problem comes when we realize what that mystery box _has to be_, not by how it works but simply what it has to accomplish to bridge the gap between visualization and awareness. ```auto ------------------------------------ | perception | \ | | \ ____ \| ------------- ---------- | ____ __ \ ____ /|==>|visualization|==>|PERCEPTION|==>| ____ __ / / | ------------- ---------- | / | /\ | | || | ------------------------------------ /\ / \ || ``` So what’s the problem with having a perception process within a perception process? Well, to start with, we aren’t actually any closer to explaining what’s inside that 1st box labelled perception, since we’re left with an identical 2nd box labelled perception. We have the exact same unexplained process to fill in the details of before we have a complete model. We are left struggling with the exact same mystery we started with. And _ **ANYTHING** _ we could possibly come up with to fill in that 2nd box labled perception, would just as easily fill in the entire 1st perception box with no reason whatsoever to speculate about any visualization function in the first place! I believe some guy from a place called Occam said something about cluttering up theories with unnecessary entities. This model is no closer to complete than just leaving the 1st box labelled perception with no speculation of what’s in it. It’s undeniable that such speculation is utterly worthless. …and THAT is the homunculus problem! Was this what **MrDibble** meant by these ‘virtual senses’, with which he supposedly ‘sees’ things in his mind? I actually don’t know. It certainly sounds like it, but it was just some random term he made up so there’s no telling what he really meant by it. I suppose I should have given him the benefit of the doubt, and asked what he meant rather than assuming it had to be the invalid concept it sounded like. Of course, it’s worth noting that I had already tried once to give him the benefit of the doubt on his made up terms, and all I got for my trouble was repeated accusations of ‘semantic games’. I really have no interest in proving anyone wrong, I originally just wanted to address a tangent that arose out of **MrDibble** ’s response to **Liberal** ’s “_question of whether sensory input is required to evaluate the value of a thing_”. I believe I’ve proven my point, and proven that my point is not a homunculus argument. As for the issue with **MrDibble** , I’ll happily assume I misunderstood whatever he was trying to say. And since I have no interest in finding out what he _was_ saying… I consider the entire matter closed. We now return you to the original non-topic of this thread. ---
**Author:** ![MrDibble](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mrdibble/32/114_2.png) [@MrDibble](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MrDibble)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2009, 8:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/130 "2009-05-23T08:38:29Z")
No, I didn’t mean there is _no such thing as_ a homunculus problem, I meant \*I \*don’t have it. I don’t think the _homunculus_ exists, was what I meant. The problem is right there in your diagrams - all linear, all compartmentalized. I don’t think cognition is like that. I’m with[Dennett](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiple_Drafts_Model) in saying that conciousness is a continuous, non-localized process. You \*can’t \*separate perception and awareness as you have in your first diagram. The only thing you can separate out are the initial physical impulses that intrude on your sense organs and cause their nerves to fire. But that hardly qualifies as “perception” in a cognitive debate. And to clarify what I mean by “virtual perception” - it is what is happening in your brain when your eyes are closed, but your visual cortex is reacting _the same way as if you were seeing something_, as amply illustrated in my earlier link to Kosslyn’s article archive. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2009, 4:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/131 "2009-05-23T16:40:57Z")
> [@Revenant\_Threshold](#): > > I’d actually say that’s true of all cases. Humans being what we are, we don’t have perfect recall, so really even in cases where we truly value something, to the extent of immediate desire to go and experience it, we’re not actually thinking about that experience in its entirety. If we could do that, we wouldn’t need to go seeking. Very much like a dream, we have a vague notion of the experience in question, which is what we value. In addition, it should be pointed out that every evaluation of worth leads ultimately to an experience of some kind. It may be tiresome by now to read, since this will be at least the third time I’ve mentioned it, but there are practically infinitely many means by which we can experience that which we value most. As many as the universe will allow. > [@](#): > > And in a sense we can add another layer of dream to it. The experiences we have are as much a product of ourselves as they are of an object - a painting may move you when it does not move me because, being different people, our perspectives on it differ. And even the experiencing of something for the first time changes us into a new person, arguably the more affecting experience creating a more different person. So in effect what we value is a vague notion seen through the eyes of a someone else. In that sense, we are _all_ prevented from truly achieving what we desire to experience. I think I might agree, although that is more of a metaphysical argument. I do agree that we are molded — formed — by our experiences. Psychosis and many other mental illnesses stem from denying our experiences or imagining ones that never actually happened. But if we must stop and pin down at least a portion of the metaphysical aspect, then we might as well do it right now. I will be holding (and I would appreciate it if you’d hold off arguing about this until part III, just so that we can all come to understand Liberalian aesthetics first) that a person’s existence is individuated by what Miller calls his “bounds”. One basic implication is that the person you are today is not “different” from the person you were yesterday. Your experiences have expanded, and therefore your bounds have expanded, but nothing about your bounds of yesterday has changed. Your new experiences might modify, say, some belief you hold — for example, you might see a painting and, whereas you had previously thought Picasso was a worthless hack, you suddenly “get it”, and so today you hold Picasso to be of great worth. But only because the new Picasso that so moved you fit into the aesthetics judgments you were already making. So if it is at all possible to restrain yourself for now, I promise you a whole boatload of discussion about this sort of thing later. (We’ll come back to Kant again, because we _have_ to. If you’re not yet familiar, you can be reading up on his treatment of existence as not being a predicate — in particular the straw man he argues against, which was so cleverly cloaked in reasonableness that it was centuries before anyone even figured out that it was a straw man indeed.) > [@other-wise](#): > > **Lib** and\*\* Revenant Threshold\*\* - > **Revenant Threshold** ’s earlier posts bring up an interesting point. I, too, use to have some OCD issues, knew they were neither rational or effective, but still had ‘em anyway. Lib, you’ve explained how things like obsessive loops caused by misfiring neurons, external circumstances, etc., are factored into the _pursuit_ of one’s values, but how are they factored into the _identification_ of one’s values? Seems to me that OCD could greatly muddy those waters. I’m really not expert enough to comment on that. I can only give my personal experience as an officially diagnosed OCDer with an extreme case requiring strong medication. What I’ll say is that, if anything, my pursuit of what I valued was greatly enhanced to the extent that I did not realize my effects on the lives of others around me. Like my wife, for instance. I do think I understand what you mean, though. And as an OCDer, I highly valued order and perfection. (Coffee cups, for example, had to be stacked perfectly with their handles turned at 30 degree angles from the right perpendicular.) But this was not may overarching thing of value at all. In fact, it was a nuisance in pursuit of what a I valued much more — like a good relationship with my wife for example. Just image being her, coming home from a daily two hour commute and eight our job only to be greeted by a foot-tapping crazy person who, before she could even go pee, asked her to account for the particular cup whose handle was at a 45 degree angle. Probably a much better example would be more severe damage to the brain, such as that caused by physical trauma. Automobile accidents. Falls off rooftops or ladders. That sort of thing. According to studies by VS Ramachandran, we really don’t know what sort of effects these kinds of injuries have on a person’s persona. Often, the personality will change. A kind and gentle man might become a complaining old badger. Or a bold and brilliant thinker might become an almost childlike idiot. But what we do not know is whether what they value most has changed. There really is no scientific method for determining the winner in the battle between essentialism and existentialism. Perhaps the complaining old badger, each time he curses someone, deeply regrets his action internally. Perhaps inside, he is still the same kind and gentle man whose brain injury renders him helpless in self expression. We can no more blame him for what has befallen him than we can blame the aforementioned suddenly deaf man who valued music above all else. > [@other-wise](#): > > Waitaminute. Are you saying that everyone has exactly _ **one** _ overarching value, whether they have overtly identified it or not, that drives _ **all** _ their actions and subsequent assigments of value? Yes. You are ready now for part II. > [@begbert2](#): > > I’m assigning the value to actions because I have to assign it to _something_, and I think attributing value to actions is a more accurate description of the manner that humans make decisions than to attribute value to objects (or abstract concepts). Again, I believe we come back to Schopenhauer’s two-sided coin. Certainly, one must act in some manner to attain what one values, even if it is nothing more than sitting still in the right place at the right time. And to be clear, I’m not saying at all that an action is not something a person can value. I believe I already cited the serial killer who gets a thrill from his deed, and thus values the act of committing murder. We cannot, however, ignore the corollary implication that he holds his victims to be worthless as moral objects. They are nothing more to him than a means to an end. It is in the same way that some people argue that your cat doesn’t “love” you. You are simply the necessary evil that the animal must endure in order to have a steady supply of food and shelter. > [@](#): > > If you want to assert that actions have no intrinsic value, I can turn around and assert that objects don’t either, and thus step on the neck of our discussion together and put a bullet in its head. I’m not seeing a lot of point to that though; instead I say that people assess value in both objects _and_ actions, and and assess the actions based on, among other things, the value of objects, and then make their decisions based exclusively on their assessments of the value of the actions. Well, that’s fine. Needlessly complicated, but fine. Note that my treatment of aesthetics simply states that aesthetics are a judgment of worth, rather than of beauty (Rand) or feelings (Kant) or tranquility (Schopenhauer). Whether one is judging things or actions makes no difference to the point. > [@](#): > > Honestly I’m not sure there _is_ that much of a difference between the begbertian view and the Liberalian view - the main difference I’m seeing so far is that you are (or seem to be) assigning the value to the object, thereby obscuring the fact that the value is _really_ based in the agent actor; specifically their needs and desires. It seems to implicitly impart an ‘aura’ of objectivity to the object’s ‘aesthetic value’ which I’m _fairly_ sure is actually entirely subjective to the agent, even in your Liberalian aesthetics. > > Other than that distinction, I’m not sure there’s much difference. Sometimes, we tend to over dwell on semantical differences that amount to nothing more than which synonym we want to adopt. It may well be the case that there is some “objective aesthetic”, but at this stage, it isn’t necessary even to contemplate. > [@](#): > > Whereas I’m pretty sure that the assignation of great worth to something is nothing but mental and linguistic shorthand for the assignation of worth to a particular interaction with the object. You value the tickets because what you _actually_ value is the anticipated action of trading the tickets in to get to see the movie, and you value the movie because what you _actually_ value is the anticipated action of watching it. When the ticket ceases to be associated with the anticipated action (for example, if you miss the movie it’s associated with), the ticket immidiately loses all value as a result, despite being exactly the same ticket it was before. It is indeed the same ticket it was before in terms of the molecules that comprise it (save for a bit of wear and tear). But as you say, it is no longer of any value to you if it can’t help you to see the movie you valued. The ticket might as well be an ashtray. But it’s important to note that it doesn’t matter to me what you assign the value _to_, whether it’s seeing the movie or anticipating the movie or, who knows, just having the experience of adding yet another movie to the collection of movies you’ve seen. It makes no difference to me _what_ is valued; merely that something is. > [@](#): > > Whoa whoa whoa. I reject the assertion that people each have a single ‘greatest’ drive/desire/valuation which is the font of all other drives/desires/valuation - unless you define “satisfying their own needs and desires” as that action and sweep everything under that one rug. In actual fact, people have a variety of largely unrelated (and occasionally conflicting) drives/desires/valuations, each of which contributes separately to the decisions people make. I must insist again that these terms are NOT synonyms. A desire and an evaluation are two different things. It is not necessary that a person desire that which he most values. And likewise, it is not necessary that a person value that which he most desires. It is, in part at least, this sort of equivocation that causes some cognitive dissonance, I believe. There are people (as I think I pointed out) who engage in behaviors or have desire for which their consciences are guilty. And likewise, there are people with sociopathic consciences who, as far as we know (hold that one for the final part, epistemology Part IV), desire nothing and hold everything to be worthless. Again, apologies for the insistence, but since this idea is new (I have not found it anywhere in the literature, and I’ve read extensively on philosophy), it is very important that we stick to the thing as defined: an evaluation of worth (by implication, independent of desire or pleasure or that traditional sort of stuff.) > [@](#): > > I don’t see what this has to do with ethics particularly; best I can tell ethics are just the codification of particular types of actions and responses. They only effect the decision making process if the person has a need or desire (probably desire) to perceive themselves as an ethical person. (Whether the ethical system’s definititon is itself informed by a direct desire to help humanity is a separate issue, but regardless we can discuss ethics later.) Thanks. I appreciate that. Morality is a subset of ethics (at least, in the way I treat it). And it will be important in the next stage to discuss moral and ethical implications of the aesthetics described here. > [@](#): > > And when you start about valuing “feeling that way”, Liberalian aesthetics starts to fold into the model of needs/desires that prompted me to coin the term “begbertian pleasure” to indicate satisfaction of needs and desires. When what you’re finding aesthetic is the state of having your needs and desires fulfilled, we’re literally talking about the same thing. When you start about assigning aesthetic value to the old lady, I think you’re talking about something else, which I think is a symptom of the decision-making process, not a cause. It’s fine by me if you want to express it one way or another with the little old lady — whether it is that her mugger values hurting people or devalues her humanity really makes no difference at this point. Either way, you’re using the Liberalian model to discuss the aesthetics of the situation, and that’s fine by me. > [@](#): > > Heh “general aesthetic”. That’s what you take to numb the pin, right? 😃 Good one! 😃 > [@](#): > > Sorry, I couldn’t resist. Anyway, I don’t despise you for being picky, though I do question the merit of restricting word use this much. If you want to overload the word, just tack a predicate qualifier on the overload (‘Liberalian desire’), and then we don’t have to worry about the english-defined word getting mixed up with it. That’s fine, except that I don’t want to talk about Liberalian desire or any other kind of desire. Perhaps it is a Western world thin, but there are billions of people who do not equate desire with anything good, including value. In fact, they are attempting to eliminate all their desires, believing that desire is the source of all suffering. That might be a good discussion, but not here. > [@](#): > > And I don’t think that we desire what we value most; I think we value what we desire most. (Or rather, we value things that will satisfy our desires/needs/wants.) I think your causation’s backwards, in other words. That loses me completely. Once again, I think it’s best if we don’t try to analyze that aspect of it. And it really doesn’t matter. At this state, I am simply trying to establish a school of philosophy which holds that aesthetics is the evaluation of worth. All this chicken and egg business is really beside the point right now. (That is not to say that I don’t appreciate your views or even that I disagree with them, but that this line of discussion is an obstacle to moving forward, where discussing this sort of thing will take place.) > [@](#): > > And as for killing grandmothers and family, it’s pretty clear that while some people just don’t value their family much, in many cases it’s instead the case that a momentary flux in their perceived desires (the desire to releive frustration through violent action, for example) trumps any valuation they have of their family and causes them to destroy that which they value. Which works fine with the ‘needs/desires’ models, but perhaps not so well with the Lerberalian aestheitic model? > > Or do you have another way to account for crimes of passion? I honestly don’t know why aesthetics is the proper context in which to account for crime of any kind. That is certainly a question of ethics. But I would say — if we simply must discuss this now — that there never was any “trumping” going on. What you call a “desire to relieve frustration” can be expressed aesthetically as valuing frustration relief above family. > [@](#): > > The point I was making was that people often take actions based on _expected_ results of actions, and thus act in ways that do not result in the satisfactions of their desires. For example, there are people buy lottery tickets for the express purpose of making money, not for the thrill or fun of it. (My Grandfather is one of these.) Clearly he is wasting his money without satisfying his desires - but that doesn’t mean that his desires aren’t driving his decision to play the lottery. > > This is exactly analogous to a person considering the lottery ticket to have Liberalian aesthetic value due to an overoptimistic assessment of its, uh, value. (Assuming there’s a physical ticket to _have_ the Liberalian aesthetic value , anyway.) I really don’t think we’re in disagreement on this _particular_ point. > > And if that happened, wouldn’t they just stop doing _anything_, _ever_ again? If there actually was one, single ‘greatest’ valuation from which all other valuation sprung. Which I kinda think there isn’t. No. Not in my mind. I don’t see how that follows at all. The eye is on the goal (the thing you most value). If there is something between you and the goal, then if it is a facilitation of some kind, you will make use of it; if it is an obstacle, you will seek a way around it. As one example, I think it is a Western caricature of Islamic extremists to say that they are motivate to blow themselves up because of assurances that they will have multiple virgins they can fuck in heaven. I think they do it because they believe they are fighting for Islam, and they value Allah above all else. > [@MrDibble](#): > > OK, that makes more sense - “what you value most, you will \*try \*and pursue the hardest, even if it doesn’t work out”, not “what you _end up_ pursuing the hardest, regardless of desire, is what you value most”, is that it ? > > I can get behind that. Yes. Great. That’s three of us now who are ready to move on. As soon as begbert weighs in, we’ll have another. In addition, I think Revenant Threshold is ready as well. He’s just asking ancillary questions because he has the opportunity to do so. ---
**Author:** ![other-wise](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/o/4bbf92/32.png) [@other-wise](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/other-wise)\ **Post date:** [May 23, 2009, 9:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/132 "2009-05-23T21:44:27Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > … I do think I understand what you mean, though. And as an OCDer, I highly valued order and perfection. (Coffee cups, for example, had to be stacked perfectly with their handles turned at 30 degree angles from the right perpendicular.) But this was not may overarching thing of value at all. In fact, it was a nuisance in pursuit of what a I valued much more — like a good relationship with my wife for example. Just image being her, coming home from a daily two hour commute and eight our job only to be greeted by a foot-tapping crazy person who, before she could even go pee, asked her to account for the particular cup whose handle was at a 45 degree angle. Sorry, I wasn’t being clear. It seems to me that in Liberalian aesthetics, a person can have values which they hold quite strongly, and have their behaviors driven by pursuit of those values, all without necessarily having a clear knowledge or understanding of what those values are. Since OCD behaviors are so compelling and consuming, I was wondering if they might set up a sort of “red herring”, clouding a person’s identification of their values. For example, _you realize_ that “30 degree-angled coffee cups” are an OCD behavior driven by your high valuation of order and perfection. Someone else may also value order and perfection but not realize it as such. It may never dawn on them to ask “Why am I so obsessed with _order and perfection_?” if they get stuck on the painful, seemingly-obvious-question-to-ask-based-on-their-behavior: “Why am I so obsessed with _coffee cups_?” > [@Liberal](#): > > Yes. You are ready now for part II. \ ---
**Author:** ![Revenant\_Threshold](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/f1d935/32.png) [@Revenant\_Threshold](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Revenant_Threshold)\ **Post date:** [May 25, 2009, 4:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/133 "2009-05-25T16:28:02Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > In addition, it should be pointed out that every evaluation of worth leads ultimately to an experience of some kind. It may be tiresome by now to read, since this will be at least the third time I’ve mentioned it, but there are practically infinitely many means by which we can experience that which we value most. As many as the universe will allow. Actually, i’d say that since the target experience and the actual experience are different, it’s the other way around; many different experiences all reached via the same means. The subject is inseperable from the perspective, and undefinable outside of perspective-based concepts, so while there’s probably a true object, we never comprehend it. > [@](#): > > I think I might agree, although that is more of a metaphysical argument. I do agree that we are molded — formed — by our experiences. Psychosis and many other mental illnesses stem from denying our experiences or imagining ones that never actually happened. Do you mean that as a general reason behind such problems, or in some cases? > [@](#): > > But if we must stop and pin down at least a portion of the metaphysical aspect, then we might as well do it right now. I will be holding (and I would appreciate it if you’d hold off arguing about this until part III, just so that we can all come to understand Liberalian aesthetics first) that a person’s existence is individuated by what Miller calls his “bounds”. One basic implication is that the person you are today is not “different” from the person you were yesterday. Your experiences have expanded, and therefore your bounds have expanded, but nothing about your bounds of yesterday has changed. Your new experiences might modify, say, some belief you hold — for example, you might see a painting and, whereas you had previously thought Picasso was a worthless hack, you suddenly “get it”, and so today you hold Picasso to be of great worth. But only because the new Picasso that so moved you fit into the aesthetics judgments you were already making. > > So if it is at all possible to restrain yourself for now, I promise you a whole boatload of discussion about this sort of thing later. (We’ll come back to Kant again, because we _have_ to. If you’re not yet familiar, you can be reading up on his treatment of existence as not being a predicate — in particular the straw man he argues against, which was so cleverly cloaked in reasonableness that it was centuries before anyone even figured out that it was a straw man indeed.) Hey, i’m happy to restrain myself - just promise not to poison the well like that anymore before we get to it yourself. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [May 25, 2009, 10:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/134 "2009-05-25T22:47:49Z")
> [@other-wise](#): > > Sorry, I wasn’t being clear. It seems to me that in Liberalian aesthetics, a person can have values which they hold quite strongly, and have their behaviors driven by pursuit of those values, all without necessarily having a clear knowledge or understanding of what those values are. > > Since OCD behaviors are so compelling and consuming, I was wondering if they might set up a sort of “red herring”, clouding a person’s identification of their values. > > For example, _you realize_ that “30 degree-angled coffee cups” are an OCD behavior driven by your high valuation of order and perfection. Someone else may also value order and perfection but not realize it as such. It may never dawn on them to ask “Why am I so obsessed with _order and perfection_?” if they get stuck on the painful, seemingly-obvious-question-to-ask-based-on-their-behavior: “Why am I so obsessed with _coffee cups_?” Okay. Sorry about that misunderstanding. “Values” in that kind of syntax often refer to moral or ethical considerations rather than considerations of worth. But reading it with aesthetics as I defined it, I see that you “get it”. And I understand your question better now. I guess it’s pretty obvious, then, that I accept your notion that an OCDer (or similarly mentally ill person) can “set up” some sort of red herring that they value. I think my example with my wife points that out. And yes, I think its possible to set that up even without knowing you’ve done so. That’s an epistemological question though — what one knows, what the source of one’s knowledge is. And we’ll get to epistemology (Part IV). > [@](#): > > \ Me too! Can’t wait! There’s gonna be some grapplin’ galore! > [@Revenant\_Threshold](#): > > Actually, i’d say that since the target experience and the actual experience are different, it’s the other way around; many different experiences all reached via the same means. The subject is inseperable from the perspective, and undefinable outside of perspective-based concepts, so while there’s probably a true object, we never comprehend it. Do you mean that as a general reason behind such problems, or in some cases? Hey, i’m happy to restrain myself - just promise not to poison the well like that anymore before we get to it yourself. 😉 I can see that you’re very eager to discuss the metaphysical aspects. Me too. And if we continue to move along at this pace, we’ll get there soon (Part III). I’m going to go ahead and start Part II now. To all participants: Please post all future posts there. Please do not bring something from over here to respond to over there. We will begin a discussion of ethics and morality using the premise that aesthetics is the evaluation of worth. (A mod may close this thread.) ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [May 26, 2009, 2:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611/135 "2009-05-26T02:15:31Z")
[The Aesthetical Jesus, Part II](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=518838) and [Part III](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?t=519789) [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-aesthetical-jesus-part-i/496611.md?page=6)