I think you and I are arguing different, but related points.
‘For any number of reasons that for most people, don’t need to be logically justified.’ is the point that I’m getting at - the perception of morality as knowledge - most people know that it is wrong. Well, in reality, they believe that it is wrong, it’s impossible to know it to be wrong as it’s an objectively valueless act. I agree that most of us believe it to be ‘wrong’ (I’d phrase it as ‘I do not agree with it’) but that is different from the concept of objective morality, which in my opinion is a fallacy. You can’t actually know that which isn’t true.
I’ve already explained why I don’t agree with objective morality, so I’m not going to rehash an old point. You disagree with my conception of morality for the reasons you’ve outlined, and I’ll accept that you’ve made some useful argument as to why. I do not agree, the example of slavery being inherently contradictory - why did anyone ever think it was okay? Why did anyone think cannibalism is okay? Why did anyone ever think that rape and plunder is okay? Why are some people opposed to war on moral grounds (pacifism) why do some people believe war is justified in some contexts? Why do different religions have different moral codes? However, I don’t think either of us is going to convince the other on this point.
The ‘emotional charge’ idea is like this: people observe something they don’t agree with. They have been socialised to accept a moral narrative about the negative value of this action/event. This moral narrative is intertwined with people’s emotions. People feel an emotion and then justify their moral viewpoints as ‘I feel angry/upset about this, it must be self-evident that what I am angry/upset about is bad’. Yes it IS subjectively bad - you do not enjoy it nor agree with it. However to then decide that your subjective reaction denotes an inherent objective value for the action is a false assumption.
I’d also say that I’m not sure your point about psychopaths is true. My opinion (could be wrong) is that they’d be more likely to know that you and society feel that something is wrong, however to them it carries no such value whatsoever, either subjectively or objectively.
Perhaps someone making a wrenching decision damning themselves, that is committing some horrible act, knowingly and willingly, for what they truly believe is a non-self-interested greater good - and then taking the consequences.
An example of this I can think of is in the movie Fail Safe, where an American General personally nukes New York to avert a nuclear war - and then commits suicide. That seems the opposite of ‘just following orders’ for atrocities and then going home to watch a sitcom and eat pizza.
You are missing the point here. Your position is that morality is learned and socialized, and nothing more. Mine is that, while most people do indeed simply follow the rules as laid down by society, there is in fact a way to objectively test those rules - hence, an objective morality.
Moral change invalidates your theory while the fact that most societies’ moral rules permit what I would term morally incorrect acts does not invalidate mine.
The basis of moral change is invariably some variant on the Golden Rule. The anti-slavery campaign was explicit on this - “am I not a man and a brother?”.
Seems like a wholly fallacious argument to me, relying as it does on a presumed but unprovable account of the motives for and process of moral reasoning. Essentially amounts to an ad hominum concerning those who have come to a different conclusion.
If I was to say “moral relativists are just people who wish to do whatever they want, and then justify it by claiming morality doesn’t really exist”, it would be no more correct.
I occasionally litter. This occurs because the consequences do not concern me. I do not want people to litter outside my house, because the consequences concern me. You can call that hypocritical, but it is not - I am entirely consistent in the fact that I am concerned by the consequences when they concern me. Many things in life are like this. If the Golden rule was objectively true, everyone would feel bad doing things that they don’t wish done to them. Have you ever speeded when driving? Littering and speeding are small examples, but that is a result of the fact that most people observe social norms and hence do not tend to commit large examples for me to point to. Have you ever been irritated by people playing loud music? Have you ever played loud music yourself? This ‘Golden Rule’ is nice on paper but is not applied to life except in the most wide-ranging examples (murder etc) which I’ve already previously talked about.
Moral change does not explain anything, it seriously weakens your argument, but you don’t seem to see it. If there were objective morality, no-one could have done these things in the first place. Slaveowners thought it was morally fine - we do not. Where does this dissonance arise from? Moral relativism. We do not think it is acceptable to expose babies to the elements to see if they are strong enough to survive - some civilisations have done. Where does this dissonance arise from? Moral Relativism. Soldiers drop bombs out of planes on to civilians in Iraq - I seriously doubt they want bombs dropped on their family. People very often act in ways they do not wish for people to act towards them. This should be evident but apparently not. This Golden rule could be an objective moral rule, the same way Christianity could, if you consider it to be true, however that does not affect whether it is true in practise.
What I’ve argued is certainly not ad hominem. If that were the case, it’d be impossible to say you believed anyone is wrong, because it’d be casting aspersions about the ‘wrongness’ of someone else’s thoughts. If you disagree with my appraisal you’re free to express so. Casting aspersions about my intentions is lazy. If you find my explanation ‘fallacious’ you’re free to, but it is the belief I hold. Yours seems entirely fallacious to me, but I’m happy for you to believe it. Further I find your appraisal of point 2 to be entirely incorrect - we are not arguing for empirical scientific fact, so proving something is not the aim. Morality is an abstract human concept, it is not possible to prove very much of anything about it.
Huh? Are you seriously arguing that the existence of hypocritical acts or self-interested behaviour invalidates the existence of an objective morality?
That’s absurd. People do bad stuff all the time. Sometimes they know it is bad and do it anyway because they don’t care, in other cases because they don’t know any better. It isn’t because there is no such thing as “bad”.
People in the Bible thought the Earth was flat, and was made in six days. We do not. Where does this dissonance come from?
It can’t possibly be because they were more primitive than us and therefore objectively wrong on these points, can it? You would not accord a Bronze Age priest equal status with a modern scientist on the issue of whether the earth is round or not, would you?
I say the Bronze Age piest is wrong and the scientist is right - and that being incorrect can extend to matters of morality as well as to matters of science.
That doesn’t mean that they were worse people than us, any more than thinking that the earth was flat makes a bronze age person stupider than us. They just lacked the benefit of generations of progress.
Same deal as above. Obviously people often act in ways I think are morally wrong. In fact, I may easily be wrong about whether any particular act they or I do happens to be morally wrong. That doesn’t mean moral wrongness ‘doesn’t exist’ any more that the fact that the theory of evolution is ‘just a theory and subject to constant change’ makes Creationism plausable, as some Creationists assert.
Huh? Much of what you write above doesn’t make sense.
My point is a simple one - claiming that someone else’s point is “illogical” because you assert they came to their position for emotional reasons is a fallacy. It does not address their actual argument, but simply impugns their motives for making it.
My second point is not an actual argument I’m making, it is merely offered as an example of why the reasoning-by-impugning-motives isn’t sound.
Thus - you claim those asserting objective morality do so because they are justifying a position they have arrived at emotionally (as in “That is simply wrong!”). I say this is no better reasoning than someone who believes in objective morality stating that those asserting relativism do so because they simply want to justify doing whatever the hell they want.
In both cases, the person making the argument is impugning motives, essentially arguing that the other person has no genuine logical basis for their argument but simply want to arrive at a point they desire - on the one hand to justify their emotions, and on the other to justify their desires.
Unsure whether this is a serious question or not, but in such cases I tend to err on the side of the benefit of the doubt. I’ll recommend my book when/if I eventually write one, other than that, I’m afraid I can’t.
What makes the ‘golden rule’ objectively true? Where does the certainty that morality exists come from?
Edit: As surprised as you seem to be by many of my points, I’m equally surprised that you are advocating moral objectivism. I didn’t think anyone actually believed stuff like that, unless they had a dogmatic justification for doing so. This isn’t an attempt at a personal jibe or anything, just a comment.
Fundamentally, you are insisting that right and wrong exist, and I am insisting that they do not and are human inventions. We aren’t realistically going to convince each other, I wouldn’t imagine. The idea that right and wrong/good or bad is anything more than an invented human dichotomous judgement on what are otherwise completely valueless acts seems absurd to me. However it is otherwise rationalised to me, or however inelegantly you believe I’ve expressed my view or indeed how wrong it is in your opinion, it seems fundamentally self-evident to me.
A study of philosophy and history. The totality of the exvidence.
Particularly cross-culturally comparative. The golden rule or some variant is a constant refrain across various cultures, many of which have no contact with each other. The most erudite moral philosophers of quite different cultures commonly summarize their position by reference to it. It is based on the concept of individual conciousness, which would appear to be valid across our species and inherent in the very nature of a species capable of moral reasoning - namely, that each individual conciousness has validity as a subject unto itself and not simply as an object. While this cannot be proved, it appears to come as close to being proved as any existential point - after all, one cannot prove the universe itself “exists”.
I’m not surprised by your points, I merely disagree with them. Moral relativism is nothing new, particularly on this Board.
Well, as someone once said in response to a claim that Apaches did not actually know the difference between right and wrong, “wrong an Apache and see how he reacts”.
Argument from self-evidence is usually what your ‘side’ accuses moral objectivists of doing. As in, ‘it is fundamentally self-evidently wrong to murder a little girl for your sexual gratification’ - to get back to the OP.
In any event, it is kinda graceless to ask for an explaination, and then in the very next post announce that none will be considered.
All this reasoning only makes sense from within the framework of moral objectivism. You presuppose that we are a species ‘capable of moral reasoning’; I hold that this is circular reasoning and that morality in and of itself is a faulty concept and a conflation of several different processes as previously described.
Further, I hold that existance and human life is without objective value so the argument that to me, subjectively, the nature of anyone else as a subject as opposed to an object is irrelevant and a false distinction; they are features of a world without meaning or intrinsic value and they are of concern only when their actions or views affect my subjective experience.
You’ve continued on in this debate with me, though I doubt at any point you were likely to reconsider your position, regardless of anything I said. I’m interested to see how you think, not wondering whether I am going to agree with you. Further, self-evidence is fine with me to an extent, I only know the subjective value of anything, I can’t however apply that to an objective model and that is my disagreement with moral objectivism.
See, the whole basis of (objective) moral reasoning is making the assumption that other people really exist and that they have “subjective experience” as well.
It is unprovable but appears a safe assumption, much like the existence of the universe itself. I accept the existence of the universe as axiomatic. I accept the existence of other people with their own subjective experience as axiomatic as well. From those two axioms flow objective scientific reasoning on the one hand, and objective moral reasoning on the other.
Even accepting the axioms up to the point of other people’s subjective experience, why should you behave in a ‘moral’ way to other people? How does it benefit you to consider other people as equal to yourself?
How does morality differ from utilitarian actions, other than the emotional element?
Does the justification for acting in any way simply boil down to ‘because it is right to do so’ or ‘because it is wrong to do so’?
It doesn’t, necessarily, benefit you directly to act in a moral manner. Nor does recognizing that other people have a subjective life of their own necessarily lead one to act as if they are equal to you. Rather, one should act with an awareness that others exist and with empathy for that existance.
Acting morally may have no “reward”. Perhaps indirectly, in that society is rendered better thereby, and you live in society.
Utilitarianism is the greatest good for the greatest number. It is based on a cost/benefit analysis.
Morality as I conceive of it is based on an awareness of the agency of others.
I rather like Kohlberg’s scientific analysis of the various stages of moral reasoning:
No. There to my mind a constant juggling of various factors that influence any decision. However. in some cases the result is clear-cut - as in the OP.
