My own conciousness is self-justifying in that in trying to question it I have to be concious of my own conciousness. This is self-evident. I can objectively know this, but I cannot objectively prove it to you. That conciousness as a general concept breaks down is irrelevant to the primary point. Indeed, that objective conciousness cannot be proven, is of no support to the idea that objective morality can.
Keep your accusations of a ‘vacuous style of argument to yourself’, that you find it ‘vacuous’ is as of little interest to me as you are.
Ironically enough, you don’t recognize that as a fallacy.
You are ignoring all of the complexities of ontology and philosophy of mind with pat, circular reasoning. One could easily develop a computer program that would ask “is this computer receiving and reacting to internal and external stimuli” and the formulate a response and call that consciousness. Hell, you could develop a computer program that would not actually perform that analysis but would still provide a “yes” answer and produce fabricated evidence in the computer’s memory banks. That does not, however, mean that the computer could pass a Turing Test, for example. Nor does it get at the nature of that program as an individual ‘ego’ rather than a routine in a larger whole. Nor does it get at the status of the ‘ego’ while the ego-program is not in use. And so on. Despite your drive to congratulate yourself on an unassailable position and to ignore all the flaws in your position, you have actually not done all that much other than point at Cartesian concepts and try to declare that the discussion is over. And while you would like to handwave it away, rather obviously the fact that consciousness breaks down is quite relevant when discussing consciousness.
And of course, you haven’t dealt with these issues in post 59, or any other post, which is part of the problem. If you would prefer to elevate your style of argument from vacuous rhetoric and self-congratulatory snideness, you will have to actually deal with the shortcomings in your argument rather than attempting to ignore inconvenient errors. (I notice that you also haven’t retracted your argument’s bit of bombastic bluster when you tried to accuse me of ‘feigning naivety’ and tried to change the record on your own posted words).
Fair enough, you seem to have a point regarding the flaws in my argument as regards the computer example. I’d rather you’d have done that from the beginning; I have repeatedly ask that someone, if they believed there were flaws present to suggest where the lay - this is the first I’ve seen that has actually made me see a fault, as opposed to just necessitate me to reiterate my point.
Fundamentally, the original point being the subjectivity of morality as opposed to an idea of an objective morality, that we cannot even objectively prove our own conciousness appears to irrevocably preclude an objective morality since it calls into question any concious thought and ergo perception. That one can accept the existance of the mind a priori nevertheless does not make it objectively provable and therefore must the same not follow for morality?
Getting back on topic, reviews of the latest leaked Assad emails seem to reveal someone who is breathtakingly callous and unconcerned with what is going on in his country. Either that or he believes his own bullshit.
While his army was slaughtering his people, he’s been shopping, and getting round sanctions to download music.
Simultaneously he’s been flirting with an anonymous sexy chick and taking media advice from a sexy chick. (Something tells me there may be some kind of connection between those two articles.)
Banal and privileged while murder committed in his name continues.
I don’t think that’s entirely true. There are observable outcomes, even if they can’t be completely quantified.
I think that’s why people of..ah…a certain analytical mind…have so much trouble with human interactions. You can’t really quantify attraction or love or annoyance. Yet these feelings exists.
So what defines “right” and “wrong” if everything is subjective? Much of it is defined by culture, but just because a culture supports slavery or beating women and children doesn’t make it right. The individual can decide based on mutual benefit, but what if that individual is a psychopath. And few would consider a Darwinian natural law of the jungle just or fair.
Sorry to take so long, I’ve been doing stuff all weekend - sad I know.
To address your points:
In the absence of concious beings, there can be no issues of morality - that is, morality has no existence independant of concious beings, since it is a function of the interaction of concious beings.
You ask “how something which has no independent existence outside of our minds can be said to be part of (or possess) objective reality”. I’d say quite easily. Consider conciousness itself. It has no " independent existence outside of our minds", yet it verifiably exists in “reality” (at least, as much as anything else does) in that we can test for its presence in others with some degree of objective certainty. Leaving aside for the moment those IMO extreme philosphies that propose that no-one else in the universe has objective existence.
It is the presence of conciousness in others, and our ability to comprehend, objectively, that others posess conciousness like unto our own, that creates moral duties.
Therefore there is no need to propose god-like entities to “create” morality. It is a function of the existence of conciousness itself, not of gods.
Are you saying that there is more to life than these boards? Now that is a provocative claim!
Thanks for your reply - I have a clearer sense of what you’re saying and why. In fact, when looked at in the way you’ve described, I cannot argue against the ‘objective reality’ of morality (any more than I can argue that I am not conscious). Still, this part of your answer seems unjustified:
I would say that rather than creating moral duties, this line of thought creates a logical need to consider creating moral duties; it does not compel us to embrace them, however.
Well, sure; perhaps I should specify what I mean by moral duties. Really, they are nothing more than variants or elaborations of the Golden Rule. They cannot specify moral actions with exactitude, though they do provide some guidance.
The reasoning goes something like this:
I am concious. I know I have needs, wants and desires.
I know on a reasonably objective basis that certain other beings are concious, like me.
Therefore, I should engage them with empathy and reciprocity. I should not treat them like things, but like people - that is, like the concious beings I know they are.
As the great Rabbi said, “all else is commentary”.
Here’s my take on how morality can be operationalised. It can certainly be discussed logically (though not through propositional logic) and rationally.
As for Nietzsche: I abhor the guy. Every principle of his. I was interested in his philosophy until I actually read it, when it struck me as utterly devoid of empathy. It was the perfect explanation for why an intelligent person could fail to notice simple conclusions. For example: the necessity of the idiots in the square. If they didn’t exist, he would have no-one to write to. This critcism is more trenchant than one may assume: the existence of efficiency in agriculture allows for a redundant population (warriors and priests): namely one that does not have to toil for the majority of the day to produce their own means of subsistence. Most starving people don’t have much time to inveigh against moral absolutism. The second is the trite conflation of physical supremacy and intellectual vigour caused by his reactionary admiration of Plutarch’s Spartans. Of course, he wouldn’t have survived infancy in a Spartan society and certainly wouldn’t have had time to play Pindar in anywhere other than an Athenian society. I far prefer Orwell. Instead of fantasising about the philosopher-kings, he went out and shot and got shot at in defence of his ideals.
As for “socialisation”: not necessarily. Deindividuation can replicate psychopathy (which is probably the result of a malfunctioning limbic system) and quickly reverse conditioned behaviour.
