# The Best of all Possible Worlds

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [September 9, 2010, 3:46pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190 "2010-09-09T15:46:04Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 13

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**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\
**Post date:** [September 28, 2010, 11:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/242 "2010-09-28T11:57:53Z")

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> [@begbert2](#):
>
> The whole damned point of your argument is to slyly infer that in _our_ possible universe, the car is white,

No. Really, it isn’t. Not in the slightest. It needs only be possible for the car to be white – for there to be an optimal universe in which evil exists – to rebut the (logical) POE. I’m really not sure what the problem is. Perhaps just try to tell me where this paraphrase of the argument:

[QUOTE=me]  
Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil; Leibniz says, well, even an omnipotent god can’t do anything he wants (like, for instance, create worlds with square circles, or Königsbergs where you have to cross each bridge only once), so your conclusion doesn’t follow.  
[/QUOTE]

goes wrong. (By the way, Leibniz implicitly asserts the same logical impossibility, when he argues that the absence of evil and free will/variety/whatever are inconsistent; I merely take this back one step.)

That’s also pretty much the distinction between the logical and evidential POEs: the logical one asserts that it’s flat inconsistent for a being possessing omnimaxness to exist when there exists evil, since said being, owing to its omnimaxness, is both capable and willing to eradicate all evil (this capacity, obviously, being what Leibniz’ argument casts doubts upon). The evidential POE on the other hand merely argues that based on the amount and severity of evil, the existence of an omnimax god seems unlikely – it just begs belief that such a being could not have done at least something to make things a little less sucky.

> [@](#):
>
> I mean, what is your argument if you **AREN’T** trying to prove this? It’s a nine-step process to prove that…both our current world and at least one optimal world are both possible. Which are both things that can be accepted  
> axiomatically. This alone doesn’t disprove the POE, **obviously**.

On the contrary, if an optimal world that includes evil is possible, then the logical POE is disproven (as, obviously, it is then not impossible for god to exist if the world includes evil).

> [@](#):
>
> The POE certainly doesn’t say that optimal worlds are impossible. Heck, the lemma is usually included that optimal worlds _with no evil at all_ are possible!

That isn’t a lemma, it’s the _claim_ of the POE.

> [@](#):
>
> So clearly when you claim the POE says that optimal worlds are impossible, you are strawmanning it to turn it from the impervious proof it is into something you can deal with.

The impossibility in the paragraph you quoted referred to the impossibility claim made by the POE – that omni-god and evil are impossible to coexist.

> [@](#):
>
> Um, omnipotence? Remember omnipotence? Omni-potence? That thing with the O and the P in it? That thing?

That thing doesn’t even allow god to walk all the seven bridges in Königsberg without crossing one twice, and I’m supposed to believe it allows him to do all the stuff you claim based on merely your say-so?

> [@](#):
>
> Given 1), an entity is omnipotent if and only if that entity is able to change the universe to any possible world-state at any time, at will, without limitation. That is, if a configuration of reality is logically possible, the diety can make the universe be in that configuration, instantly.

Only if it’s logically possible for the entity to do so. And yeah, you’re gonna say it’s obvious, or perhaps **obvious** or even _ **obvious** _ that this is the case, but really – that don’t make it so.

Just pretend we’re in Königsberg pre-Euler. Somebody might argue: “God is omniscient, so he knows the way to walk the bridges without crossing one twice; god is omnipotent, so he can walk that path. Hence, god can walk across all seven bridges without crossing one twice. Conversely, if he can’t, he’s either not omniscient or not omnipotent.” I might answer, much as I do now: “Well, there’s obviously some things god can’t do, like creating square circles, even though he’s omnipotent. So he might not be able to walk across the bridges without crossing one twice, and still be omniscient and omnipotent.”

That’s pretty much the POE – asserting the impossibility of god being both omniscient and omnipotent and yet unable to walk each bridge only once vs. asserting the impossibility of god being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent and yet unable to create an evil-free world – and Leibniz’ answer – pointing out that even given omnipotence, there are things that god can’t do. The argument is unsound when applied to the Königsberg problem, and it is unsound now; the premise, that an omnipotent being can do all it wants to do, just isn’t true.

> [@](#):
>
> And finally…and this is subtle…if the entity _has_ sentience and a will, then whatever happens cannot _contradict_ their will, because if it begins to do so the entity will just alter the universe’s state to something more palatable.

Only if it is able to.

> [@](#):
>
> As might be obvious, this is just the POE with the ‘omnibenevolence’ and 'evil generalized to ‘what God wants’ and ‘what god doesn’t want’. And in my opinion, it’s an even more telling argument than the POE itself: it proves that not only do babies dying show that there is not an omnibenevolent god, they also show that if there _is_ an omnipotent omniscienct god, that _liked it that babies did_.

Regardless everything else, this isn’t right: if a mother inoculates her child against some sickness, she doesn’t want (or like) that it has to suffer being stung by a needle; she wants it to be resistant to some disease. You can’t judge intent without knowing the ends.

> [@](#):
>
> God’s the observer. Call that solipsism if you like, but he can still slice to his heart’s content.

Since he can do everything he wants…?

> [@](#):
>
> That is **not** what Leibniz says. The argument that it’s _logically_ impossible to reduce the amount of evil in the observable universe is bullcrap, and he doubtlessly was smart enough to know it.

He just as much asserts a logical impossibility: that it is impossible to achieve whatever higher purpose without evil happening.

> [@](#):
>
> The disconnect is that your argument doesn’t do what you think it does. That is, the fact that there are possible worlds where evil is minimized is not a refutation of the POE - it’s a _necessary part_ of the POE! The POE notes that there are optimal worlds and then shows though various evidential-based arguments that we’re not in any of those worlds. If you remove the possibility of optimal worlds, that actually requires a change to the POE to handle it.

This is badly jumbled up. The logical POE asserts that the only world compatible with the existence of an omnimax god is one in which no evil at all exists – which, again, is shown false if there is no such world, i.e. if the optimal world includes some minimum amount of necessary evil. The evidential POE then attempts to argue that we’re not at a minimum amount, by noting that there’s a shitload of it around. Proponents of the evidential POE generally admit that it’s not a rigorous proof, just that the observed amount of evil has severely adverse effects on the likelihood of an omnimax god.

> [@](#):
>
> It doesn’t, any more than “it’s logically possible in theory that my car could be white” counters the argument “I’m looking at your car and it’s black”.

That’s just where you get mixed up; it’s merely intended to counter the argument “it’s logically impossible that my car could be white”.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> Ah, I see we’re at it again. **HMHW** , honestly, no offense taken. If you want to review my posts to decide whether to respond, those relating to the OP were Posts [#195](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12930648&postcount=195), [#197](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12933417&postcount=197) (second paragraph), [#206](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12938131&postcount=206), [#212](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12942096&postcount=212), [#218](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12946161&postcount=218) and [#235](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12954098&postcount=235). See also [Leibniz and the Problem of Evil](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-evil/), [The Logical Problem of Evil](http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/) and [The Evidential Problem of Evil](http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/). In a nutshell, my view is that the POE is an evidential one regarding intervention, not a logical one regarding creation. If you have the time, review the posts and articles. Let me know whether we have anything to discuss. If not, that’s okay.

Well, that’s a bit of a reading list; however, your first post, I think I replied to, and as for the rest, you seem to regard the logical POE – what I mostly discussed in this thread – as unimportant, and wrt the evidential POE, I’m not sure we’re that far from each other in views; basically, mine is that to the undecided, the evidential POE provides grounds to reject the existence of god at least on a likelihood basis, yet the believer may act entirely rationally in continuing to believe despite evidence, as from his point of view, this evidence is exactly what he should expect given that there exists an omnimax god.

I’m not sure where you make the difference between creation and intervention – I don’t think that one should assume different rules to apply to both, so that in both cases, god is similarly constrained, and may not be able to better the world despite his omnipotence.

---

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**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\
**Post date:** [September 28, 2010, 5:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/243 "2010-09-28T17:19:36Z")

</div>

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> **begbert2** , I can’t add much to the distinction between the logical and evidential POE than is discussed in the IEP articles. My understanding is that the the rules for each are quite different. As a materialist, I’m only really interested in evidential arguments. As regards the definition of benevolence, notice I complained about the global debate, not just this thread. IMHO, in an evidential inquiry, the broader definition makes much more sense. As regards Big Bang vs. LastThursdayism, ISTM the latter is strictly a logical argument, as no one actually believes it’s true. Indeed, the major Christian denominations (including the Catholic church) accept BB (and evolution). So, on that premise, we should look to intervention not creation as the nub of the problem.

No real religion believes the argument presented in the OP of this thread either, though: if the argument in the OP is correct, then there is no such place as heaven. It’s one of those “bait and switch” arguments, like the ‘first causes’ argument, where some G “God” is argued for that has no resemblence to the existing canon, which is then removed and replaced with the entirely of Christian belief once one has stumbled their way through their proof of ‘G’.

Besides which, Last Thursdayism relates rather directly to the current argument through the discussion of what it means to be omnipotent. I maintain that any god worthy of the title “omnipotent” _could_ have popped the universe into the state it was last Thursday, which raises the question, what did he put us through last Wednesday for? (And 9-11, and Katrina, and the Black Death, and Krakatoa…)

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> > [@begbert2](#):
> >
> > The whole damned point of your argument is to slyly infer that in _our_ possible universe, the car is white,
> 
> No. Really, it isn’t. Not in the slightest. It needs only be possible for the car to be white – for there to be an optimal universe in which evil exists – to rebut the (logical) POE. I’m really not sure what the problem is. Perhaps just try to tell me where this paraphrase of the argument:
> 
> goes wrong. (By the way, Leibniz implicitly asserts the same logical impossibility, when he argues that the absence of evil and free will/variety/whatever are inconsistent; I merely take this back one step.)

The argument in the OP doesn’t _show_ that there can be an optimal universe in which evil exists - it _asserts_ that, in proposition 8. There is no argumentive support for the statement whatsoever, anywhere at all in the argument; it’s merely a late-game-intriduced premise. Surely you can see this?

So if that’s the conclusion of your argument (and honestly, it’s hard to tell due to the extraordinarily informal presentation of it), then the argument is rhetorically fallacious in that it assumes its conclusion.

If that _isn’t_ the conclusion of your argument, (and as noted it’s hard for me to tell), then the argument isn’t rhetorically fallacious; it’s merely unsound. But that’s no better from the standpoint of disproving the (logical) POE.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> That’s also pretty much the distinction between the logical and evidential POEs: the logical one asserts that it’s flat inconsistent for a being possessing omnimaxness to exist when there exists evil, since said being, owing to its omnimaxness, is both capable and willing to eradicate all evil (this capacity, obviously, being what Leibniz’ argument casts doubts upon). The evidential POE on the other hand merely argues that based on the amount and severity of evil, the existence of an omnimax god seems unlikely – it just begs belief that such a being could not have done at least something to make things a little less sucky.

_Tries_ to cast doubt on, anyway.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> On the contrary, if an optimal world that includes evil is possible, then the logical POE is disproven (as, obviously, it is then not impossible for god to exist if the world includes evil).
> 
> That isn’t a lemma, it’s the _claim_ of the POE.
> 
> The impossibility in the paragraph you quoted referred to the impossibility claim made by the POE – that omni-god and evil are impossible to coexist.

Doesn’t that kind of depend on which POE you’re talking about? Like, which one do you suppose _I’ve_ been talking about? Let’s check the evidence:

1. I’ve explicitly framed the POE as discussion the intersection or lack thereof of “optimal” possible worlds and ones which resemble ours, where “optimal” explicitly did not necessarily mean “having zero evil”. I seem to recall you commenting positively on that formulation of the POE.

2. I’ve presented examples of logically possible worlds that are not devoid of evil, but still have demonstrably less evil than ours.

What POE does that look like? Admittedly, I have not been going all wishy-washy about how this changes _probabilities_ - my argument definitively proves that we are not and logically _cannot_ be in a possible world that has an omnimax god. However I do this without relying on the fact that the POE usually points out that evil is (indeed) completely impossible. Which I guess means that I am arguing the “evidential” POE, by whatever pointless and arbitrary distinction there is between the two.

So to review:

You) You present a fallacious/unsound argument for the necessity of evil  
Me ) I point out that the argument is fallacious/unsound.

You) Your argument would prove that there is necessary evil, were it sound.  
Me) My formulation of the POE is unfazed by the introduction of necessary evil, despite being logically rigorous and providing absolute disproof if the premises are accepted.

I believe that’s where we stand.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> That thing doesn’t even allow god to walk all the seven bridges in Königsberg without crossing one twice, and I’m supposed to believe it allows him to do all the stuff you claim based on merely your say-so?
> 
> Only if it’s logically possible for the entity to do so. And yeah, you’re gonna say it’s obvious, or perhaps **obvious** or even _ **obvious** _ that this is the case, but really – that don’t make it so.
> 
> Just pretend we’re in Königsberg pre-Euler. Somebody might argue: “God is omniscient, so he knows the way to walk the bridges without crossing one twice; god is omnipotent, so he can walk that path. Hence, god can walk across all seven bridges without crossing one twice. Conversely, if he can’t, he’s either not omniscient or not omnipotent.” I might answer, much as I do now: “Well, there’s obviously some things god can’t do, like creating square circles, even though he’s omnipotent. So he might not be able to walk across the bridges without crossing one twice, and still be omniscient and omnipotent.”
> 
> That’s pretty much the POE – asserting the impossibility of god being both omniscient and omnipotent and yet unable to walk each bridge only once vs. asserting the impossibility of god being both omnipotent and omnibenevolent and yet unable to create an evil-free world – and Leibniz’ answer – pointing out that even given omnipotence, there are things that god can’t do. The argument is unsound when applied to the Königsberg problem, and it is unsound now; the premise, that an omnipotent being can do all it wants to do, just isn’t true.
> 
> Only if it is able to.

This is _probably_ the crux of your argument: something that attempts to give proposition 8 the backing it needs to be something other than a baseless claim.

The thing is, this carries no argumentive weight, because the notion that logical impossiblities are omnipresent and all-pervading is, frankly, stupid - and regarding evil, immediately disprovable. There are myriad examples of people without cancer, which proves that not-having-cancer is logically possible. Same for virtually any problem you can name; the exceptions are very, very rare. Improvements for problems are certainly _physically_ possible in most cases, which proves that they are logically possible as well.

Of course, there could be \*non-\*physical ways that these effect other things; for an obvious example, a lack of horrific death to watch may cause god to get bored, and thus unhappy, resulting in an indirect drop in his happiness when other people’s happiness increases. But I will address this anon.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Regardless everything else, this isn’t right: if a mother inoculates her child against some sickness, she doesn’t want (or like) that it has to suffer being stung by a needle; she wants it to be resistant to some disease. You can’t judge intent without knowing the ends.

BZZT! Review the definition of omnipotence I presented. God can get the universe into any logically possible state _instantly_. This means that he can get the child into the innoculated state without passing through the “stung by needle” state and collecting 200 evil points. Which is to say that for an omnipotent entity, the ends cannot _ **ever** _ justify the means; it’s logically impossible, because the omnipotent entity can by definition achieve his ends with no intermediate steps and no cost, aside from those logically\* necessated by the specific state he entered - as in, he can’t have the universe be in the “the child is innoculated” and “the child is not innoculated” states simultaneously.

So what does this mean? It means that every action that occurs and every situation that comes to pass not only serves one of god’s ends, it _is_ one of god’s ends. Directly. Provably. If pain happens, it’s because god prefers the universe to be in a state where people are feeling the pain, above _all_ other possible world-states.

So yeah, god’s _intent_ can be known trivially, because everything we see is quite literally and provably the physical manefestation of his _intent_. Now, his _motivations_ might be a hair more obscure; he could be causing the pain because he is bloodthirsty, or bored, or because he’s capricious, or malicious, or insane; there’s no way to be sure quite which _specific_ motivation is driving his choice to allow the universe to be in a state where pain is occuring. But we can be certain that that world-state itself is most pleasing to him for one reason or another, above all possible others.

- I’m well aware that you’re probably going to be tempted to grab the “logically possible states only” thing above and run it infor a touchdown, but it’s simply not going to work, as the notion that there are so many contradictions lurking everywhere that there are only one or two logically possible states is provably false.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Since he can do everything he wants…?

Damn near. And you don’t get to just _assume_ that you’ve proven that curing one single child of cancer would cause the world to disappear in a puff of logical contradiction anyway.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> He just as much asserts a logical impossibility: that it is impossible to achieve whatever higher purpose without evil happening.

Ah! Yes! THIS is interesting!

Why? Because when one starts talking about higher purposes, you almost instantly prove that God is not omnibenevolent.

Let’s review what we know about omnipotence. God can attain any possible world-state instantly. Thus, if his end is _achievable_, he can achieve it _instantly_. It’s not about working towards a goal; god doesn’t do that. It’s about selecting a world-state or a collection of legal world-states that optimally satisfies his desires, whatever those desires may be. A situation which can be without loss of generalization be described as the act of selecting a _single_ possible world-state that maximizes his desires.

Remember - single state; no condition in any state can be necessary to achieving any other world-state, becuase that would violate omnipotence. Which means that for there to be a “higher purpose” that necessitates evil in the single world-state, then it has to _directly_ contradict the absence of evil in the _single_ world-state.

Which means that if God were to, say, select the world-state where a hurricane smacks into New Orleans with the result of causing massive amounts of death and suffering, then his mysterous purpose must be _directly_ served by that evil, in the sense that it would be _logically_ impossible for that purpose to be served if the event didn’t occur.

When you have a god that is so completely discarding benevolence in pursuit of his ‘higher goals’ (watching the pretty weather patterns swirl), then he provably doesn’t consider benevolence to be all _that_ important. And thus, he is not omnibenevolent.

Put another way, as mentioned earlier an omnibenevolent god can be defined as one that only selects/allows possible world-states where evil is minimized. If a god ranges outside that set of possible worlds for _any_ reason, then he does not qualify for the title. He might qualify for some _other_ label (‘omniweatherlover’? ‘omninoninterventionalist’?), but not ‘omnibenevolent’.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> This is badly jumbled up. The logical POE asserts that the only world compatible with the existence of an omnimax god is one in which no evil at all exists – which, again, is shown false if there is no such world, i.e. if the optimal world includes some minimum amount of necessary evil. The evidential POE then attempts to argue that we’re not at a minimum amount, by noting that there’s a shitload of it around. Proponents of the evidential POE generally admit that it’s not a rigorous proof, just that the observed amount of evil has severely adverse effects on the likelihood of an omnimax god.

No jumble at all - I am just not walking the general path. There _is_ a rigorous formulation of the “evidential” POE, and that’s the one I’ve been debating. Not that you’ve disproven the traditional “logical” formulation of it _either_ - you _assert_ that there are no possible worlds with zero evil, but the arguments presented largely ignore the implications of omnipotence and criminally overstate the probability that any speculated circumstance would be logically impossible.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> That’s just where you get mixed up; it’s merely intended to counter the argument “it’s logically impossible that my car could be white”.

Then the argument in the OP assumes its conclusion, and even when you _do_ get around to (rhetorically) arguing for the notion that virtually anything imaginable is logically impossible, that argument is still extremely uncompelling.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\
**Post date:** [September 28, 2010, 7:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/244 "2010-09-28T19:05:52Z")

</div>

I really would’ve preferred, instead of typing up another monster, you had replied to this part of the previous post:

[QUOTE=me]  
Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil; Leibniz says, well, even an omnipotent god can’t do anything he wants (like, for instance, create worlds with square circles, or Königsbergs where you have to cross each bridge only once), so your conclusion doesn’t follow.  
[/QUOTE]

Do you agree with this? Disagree? If so, why?

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> No real religion believes the argument presented in the OP of this thread either, though: if the argument in the OP is correct, then there is no such place as heaven.

Why would you say that? It’s perfectly possible for heaven to be a part of this world, even if it could not exist on its own.

> [@](#):
>
> Besides which, Last Thursdayism relates rather directly to the current argument through the discussion of what it means to be omnipotent. I maintain that any god worthy of the title “omnipotent” _could_ have popped the universe into the state it was last Thursday,

Well, that’s an assertion. You could’ve equally maintained that an omnipotent god could have walked every bridge in Königsberg exactly once; doesn’t mean he can.

> [@](#):
>
> The argument in the OP doesn’t _show_ that there can be an optimal universe in which evil exists - it _asserts_ that, in proposition 8. There is no argumentive support for the statement whatsoever, anywhere at all in the argument; it’s merely a late-game-intriduced premise.

8 merely follows from the fact that, if all simulations have played out, it is not an a priori given that necessarily one of them contained no evil.

> [@](#):
>
> Doesn’t that kind of depend on which POE you’re talking about? Like, which one do you suppose _I’ve_ been talking about?

I was kinda hoping you’d been talking about the one presented in the OP…

And if you’ve been talking about the evidential one, do you then concede that the best of all possible worlds argument goes through for the logical one?

> [@](#):
>
> You) You present a fallacious/unsound argument for the necessity of evil

I haven’t; I’ve presented an argument that comes to the conclusion that there exists a set of circumstances such that it is possible for evil to be necessary.

> [@](#):
>
> Me) My formulation of the POE is unfazed by the introduction of necessary evil,

So, your problem of evil doesn’t have any problem with evil, as such. There’s just too much of it, and you can tell because.

> [@](#):
>
> The thing is, this carries no argumentive weight, because the notion that logical impossiblities are omnipresent and all-pervading is, frankly, stupid

Actually, almost everything is logically impossible – in the sense that the sentences of any language that can’t be derived from some axiom system greatly outnumber those that can.

> [@](#):
>
> There are myriad examples of people without cancer, which proves that not-having-cancer is logically possible.

But it does not prove – and in fact, has no bearing on the question at all – that little Timmy not having cancer is logically possible. See, there are numerous configurations of seven bridges such that you can traverse each exactly once; that doesn’t mean that it’s possible for Königsberg’s bridges to be thus traversable.

> [@](#):
>
> BZZT! Review the definition of omnipotence I presented. God can get the universe into any logically possible state _instantly_.

Only, of course, if it’s logically possible for him to do so.

> [@](#):
>
> So what does this mean? It means that every action that occurs and every situation that comes to pass not only serves one of god’s ends, it _is_ one of god’s ends.

No. If he is constrained by logic at all, he is logically constrained in the ways he achieves his ends. For instance, if he wanted Königsberg to be created the way it was because he liked the geometry, the fact that you can’t traverse each of its bridges only once was completely incidental to his intent.

> [@](#):
>
> I’m well aware that you’re probably going to be tempted to grab the “logically possible states only” thing above and run it infor a touchdown, but it’s simply not going to work, as the notion that there are so many contradictions lurking everywhere that there are only one or two logically possible states is provably false.

Actually, it’s trivially true: for some given axiom system, there is only one set of theorems you can prove from it. Every other set of theorems is logically impossible to derive.

> [@](#):
>
> Damn near. And you don’t get to just _assume_ that you’ve proven that curing one single child of cancer would cause the world to disappear in a puff of logical contradiction anyway.

If I don’t get to assume that (which I’m perfectly fine with), you don’t get to assume that whatever’s convenient to you is logically possible, either.

> [@](#):
>
> Not that you’ve disproven the traditional “logical” formulation of it _either_ - you _assert_ that there are no possible worlds with zero evil, but the arguments presented largely ignore the implications of omnipotence and criminally overstate the probability that any speculated circumstance would be logically impossible.

I’ve stated that the probability may well be infinitesimal; that doesn’t actually change anything.

> [@](#):
>
> Then the argument in the OP assumes its conclusion, and even when you _do_ get around to (rhetorically) arguing for the notion that virtually anything imaginable is logically impossible, that argument is still extremely uncompelling.

This argument:

[QUOTE=me]  
Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil; Leibniz says, well, even an omnipotent god can’t do anything he wants (like, for instance, create worlds with square circles, or Königsbergs where you have to cross each bridge only once), so your conclusion doesn’t follow.  
[/QUOTE]

Does it assume its conclusion?

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\
**Post date:** [September 28, 2010, 9:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/245 "2010-09-28T21:47:17Z")

</div>

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> I really would’ve preferred, instead of typing up another monster, you had replied to this part of the previous post:
> 
> [QUOTE=me]  
> Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil; Leibniz says, well, even an omnipotent god can’t do anything he wants (like, for instance, create worlds with square circles, or Königsbergs where you have to cross each bridge only once), so your conclusion doesn’t follow.

Do you agree with this? Disagree? If so, why?  
[/QUOTE]  
This is logically invalid, given that its conclusion doesn’t follow from its premises. There’s nothing about square circles being logically impossible that makes a world without evil logically impossible, any more than square circles being logically impossible makes _circular_ circles logically impossible.

The fact that god can’t do the logically impossible is not a “gotcha” - it’s been built into the notion of omnipotence from the beginning of the discussion. (It had to be, or **Voyager** backstabs God and it’s all over.) If you think that you can whip out square circles and surprise anyone or trip anyone up, then you obviously are a few pages behind in the debate.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Why would you say that? It’s perfectly possible for heaven to be a part of this world, even if it could not exist on its own.

I happen to be aware of what “possible world” **means**. Under the actual definition, different time-slices are indeed different possible worlds (or ‘world-states’, as I have been calling it to try and remove some of the obfuscation from the argument). Which means that if at some point in the future it’s possible for people to be in heaven, then it’s possible now, and only not happening because god is not interested in people being in heaven.

Of course, you could argue that at that point in the future heaven will be accompanied by a hell, and that heaven is only logically possible because there’s a hell. Of course, for that to make a lick of sense, that would mean that heaven is _connected to_ and _reliant upon_ hell, in an extremely direct manner, since logical possibility is not interested in ephemeral connections. Which would mean that god is _fueling_ his and his followers happiness with the (inarguably) unjustly disproportionate suffering of hell’s victims. Whoops: that’s not omnibenevolet; that’s predatory. Poof goes the argument.

Which means that if the situation in general is better most or all of us are in heaven, then it’s a better world-state than the current one. Poof goes _your_ argument.

That’s how heaven relates to this discussion. Of _course_ the current world-state isn’t optimal in the eyes of Christianity; don’t you remember original sin and all that? Fallen world? Remember that?

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Well, that’s an assertion. You could’ve equally maintained that an omnipotent god could have walked every bridge in Königsberg exactly once; doesn’t mean he can.

Page me when you understand the definition of “omnipotent”, because you are _explicitly_ wrong.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> 8 merely follows from the fact that, if all simulations have played out, it is not an a priori given that necessarily one of them contained no evil.

No, it’s not an a-priori given: it’s an _explicitly proven point_ in the ‘logical’ variant of the POE. Which your argument certainly doesn’t disprove, as you’d realize if you actually tried to write your argument formally.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> I was kinda hoping you’d been talking about the one presented in the OP…

The argument present in the OP is shit. It doesn’t have a clearly stated premise or concusion. Based on what you (sometimes) say its conclusion _is_, it _assumes_ its conclusion in proposition 8. To the degree that it says anything at all it does so by doing **overtly** fallacious trickery with the meaning of “possibly”. If it does not do that then it begins and ends on a “maybe” that has no logical meaning whatsoever.

I’ve talked plenty about the argument in the OP. You don’t seem to like what I say.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> And if you’ve been talking about the evidential one, do you then concede that the best of all possible worlds argument goes through for the logical one?

If by “the best of all possible worlds argument” you mean the one in the OP, it’s fallacious horseshit, and certainly disproves nothing.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> I haven’t; I’ve presented an argument that comes to the conclusion that there exists a set of circumstances such that it is possible for evil to be necessary.

For an unsound and/or fallacious meaning of “possibly”. Sorry, I know how modal logic works. “Fallacious/unsound argument” is an accurate and possibly _charitable_ way to describe the argument in the OP.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> So, your problem of evil doesn’t have any problem with evil, as such. There’s just too much of it, and you can tell because.

Because of the several arguments and proofs I’ve provided to that effect, yes.

Though I will note, you have **also** failed to give me any reason to think that there is any necessary evil at all. You have not presented any refutation at all to the logical POE, besides baseless and unsupported assertions that no, really, curing one child’s cancer is logically impossible, due to the mysterious ways you imagine that logic works. So _all_ forms of the POE stand unassailed by the arguments you have presented so far, not just my preferred one.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Actually, almost everything is logically impossible – in the sense that the sentences of any language that can’t be derived from some axiom system greatly outnumber those that can.

Perhaps this is your problem - this is a **critical** failure to understand how basic logic works.

In _actual_ logic, the only way something is logically impossible is if its negation _can_ be derived from the axiom system under discussion. Consider the following axiom system:

A1: Socrates is a man  
A2: All men are sexist

Now, with these axioms in play, is the statement “Lucy Liu is a woman” logically impossible? The answer is of course no: one could add it to the list of axioms without causing a contradiction to be derivable, which is what being “logically impossible” or “logically disproven” means. (The terms are equivalent in meaning.)

This being the case, as you say, the sentences of any language that can’t be derived from some axiom system greatly outnumber those that can. So the vast majority of things are in fact logically _possible_.

Does that help you see the problem with your position?

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> But it does not prove – and in fact, has no bearing on the question at all – that little Timmy not having cancer is logically possible. See, there are numerous configurations of seven bridges such that you can traverse each exactly once; that doesn’t mean that it’s possible for Königsberg’s bridges to be thus traversable.

There is a REASON why the configuration of bridges matters, though. By what Mysterious Ways are you proposing that curing cancer will cause evil to necessarily occur elsewhere, in defiance of God’s will? Keep in mind that causality is completely trumped by God’s power.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Only, of course, if it’s logically possible for him to do so.

Which it is by definition. The definition of omnipotence, specificially - if the starting state is logically possible, and the ending state is logically possible, then any omnipotent entity worth the name can miraculously change things directly from one state to the other.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> No. If he is constrained by logic at all, he is logically constrained in the ways he achieves his ends. For instance, if he wanted Königsberg to be created the way it was because he liked the geometry, the fact that you can’t traverse each of its bridges only once was completely incidental to his intent.

Congratulaions on completely misunderstanding my point, but regardless - you have hit the nail on the head. For god to be unable to cure little Timmy’s cancer, there must be something _about the configuration of the universe itself_ that prevents this from happening without evil being _instantly_ caused elsewhere. Instantly, because a change in time is a change in world-state that God can interfere with to miraculously break causality.

It can be shown that in the _single world-state_ of any given bridge configuration, the configuration of the world-state implies certain things, such as about the crossability of the bridge. Similarly, there are logically inevitable outcomes to curing Timmy of cancer: all other thing remaining the same, the number of people infected with cancer will drop. This is inevitable, unless something else changes; like if for some reason it was _logically necessary_ that there always be N people with cancer, then curing Timmy actually _would_ create a ‘bubble under the wallpaper’ effect and cause cancer elsewhere, negating the effect of curing Timmy. (Er, unless God moved the cancer to Hitler or something.)

The thing about all this, though, is that to make all the current problems of the world necessary, you have to assume a bunch of stuff like that: rules about amount of cancer and numbers of deaths and the like that are _intrinsic_ to the world-state, and beyond God’s ability to effect. Which _seriously_ doesn’t make any sense, since there is no imaginable place for these rules to come from, aside from the arbitrary declarations of a higher power (which contradicts omnipotence pretty badly).

Or to put it succinctly, the logical understructure of the universe doesn’t have Mysterious Ways. It just doesn’t - logical propositions have to come from _somewhere_, and somewhere that makes logical _sense_.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Actually, it’s trivially true: for some given axiom system, there is only one set of theorems you can prove from it. Every other set of theorems is logically impossible to derive.

As noted, “impossible to derive” is not the same as “logically impossible”. In fact Godel proved that that in any sufficiently complex system there are some statements that are _true_ that are impossible to derive!

So yeah, not trivially true; obviously false.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> If I don’t get to assume that (which I’m perfectly fine with), you don’t get to assume that whatever’s convenient to you is logically possible, either.

I don’t have to assume anything; aside from all the other situations that are obviously logically possible I also have all of history to sample **indisputably** possible world-states from. Unless you wish to claim that the level of good, or evil, or whichever in the world has _always been constant_, then we’re pretty much finished.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> I’ve stated that the probability may well be infinitesimal; that doesn’t actually change anything.

You’ve been awfully confident about declaring given possible worlds impossible if you think it’s nigh-certain you’re wrong.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> This argument:
> 
> [QUOTE=me]  
> Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil; Leibniz says, well, even an omnipotent god can’t do anything he wants (like, for instance, create worlds with square circles, or Königsbergs where you have to cross each bridge only once), so your conclusion doesn’t follow.

Does it assume its conclusion?  
[/QUOTE]  
As noted, this formulation technically doesn’t assume its conclusion - it is logically invalid instead. The difference between assuming your conclusion and the logical invalidity here is whether you bother to state your conclusion as a premise or not before baselessly declaring that you’ve proven it to be true.

Although, on consideration, I suppose the argument in the OP could also be considered to be logically invalid instead of assuming its conclusion, if proposition 8 is considered to have been supposed to be an inference rather than a poorly placed premise. Either way it’s blatantly unsound argument, of course, but it does make it unclear which _particular_ slew of errors the argument in the OP is guilty of. Similar ambiguity is present depending on which meaning of “possible” “possible” has in your argument at any given line. As written it pretty explicitly appears to be a deliberately fallacious bait-and-switch, but one could argue that it’s just a very, very poorly written false premise that assumes the conclusion, which is the assumption I’ve been charitably making. There really are a lot of combinations of errors possible here.

If you wanted to avoid all this, you could of course attempt to write your argument _formally_, if not symbolically then at least with a clear premise and conclusion and using unchanging and pre-defined word-phrases placed in formal logic forms. That would allow us to clearly follow the argument, and clearly establish which specific errors and/or assumptions are being made.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2010, 5:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/246 "2010-09-29T05:35:25Z")

</div>

Amusingly, this had turned into a debate among atheists over which is the best ground for disbelieving in our imaginary friend. On the one hand, I agree with **HMHW** that the logical POE doesn’t disprove omnimax. On the other hand, I agree with **begbert2** that the OP doesn’t establish this. On the third hand (heh), **begbert2** seems to believe the OP is arguing evil is necessary, where it’s pretty obvious to me what **HMHW** is asserting is that it’s _possible_ evil is necessary. Or, as I stated earlier, it’s essentially an epistemological assertion that we can’t know to the contrary.

Meanwhile, I’ve tried to redirect the discussion to the evidential problem of intervention, but no one seems to be interested in going there. No problem. It’s **HMHW’s** thread and, as far as I’m concerned, he gets to control the topic. But, this does mean I don’t have anything more to add. Carry on.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2010, 9:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/247 "2010-09-29T09:29:07Z")

</div>

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> This is logically invalid, given that its conclusion doesn’t follow from its premises.

Err, huh? The conclusion is that the original argument’s conclusion doesn’t follow; this is established by a mere observation. The argument that’s being made is of the form of a modus ponens: if P, then Q; P; therefore, Q. P here being ‘god is omnipotent and thus, can do all that he wants to’, and Q ‘he can make a world without evil’. We then note that P isn’t true, since there are things god may want, but can’t do. So, Q doesn’t follow (Q or ~Q does). In what way does this not follow?

Let’s try to clear this up before we get sidetracked along even more blind alleys.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> Amusingly, this had turned into a debate among atheists over which is the best ground for disbelieving in our imaginary friend. On the one hand, I agree with **HMHW** that the logical POE doesn’t disprove omnimax. On the other hand, I agree with **begbert2** that the OP doesn’t establish this. On the third hand (heh), **begbert2** seems to believe the OP is arguing evil is necessary, where it’s pretty obvious to me what **HMHW** is asserting is that it’s _possible_ evil is necessary.

Exactly that, thank you.

> [@](#):
>
> Meanwhile, I’ve tried to redirect the discussion to the evidential problem of intervention, but no one seems to be interested in going there.

Well, I’ve stated where I stand on that issue, so if you want to discuss that, I’m open.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\
**Post date:** [September 29, 2010, 4:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/248 "2010-09-29T16:39:50Z")

</div>

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> > [@begbert2](#):
> >
> > This is logically invalid, given that its conclusion doesn’t follow from its premises.
> 
> Err, huh? The conclusion is that the original argument’s conclusion doesn’t follow; this is established by a mere observation. The argument that’s being made is of the form of a modus ponens: if P, then Q; P; therefore, Q. P here being ‘god is omnipotent and thus, can do all that he wants to’, and Q ‘he can make a world without evil’. We then note that P isn’t true, since there are things god may want, but can’t do. So, Q doesn’t follow (Q or ~Q does). In what way does this not follow?
> 
> Let’s try to clear this up before we get sidetracked along even more blind alleys.

As I said right there in the post you were quoting, right there after the bit you snipped out:

> [@me](#):
>
> The fact that god can’t do the logically impossible is not a “gotcha” - it’s been built into the notion of omnipotence from the beginning of the discussion. (It had to be, or Voyager backstabs God and it’s all over.) If you think that you can whip out square circles and surprise anyone or trip anyone up, then you obviously are a few pages behind in the debate.

This little argument of yours under discussion starts with the sentence, “Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil.” Now, this statement is a statement of what the atheists’ arguments are. That being the case, I assumed that you intended to _actually represent_ those arguments - in which case “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants” clearly actually means “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants that’s logically possible”. Because, as I pointed out in my reply right there, that’s the way the argument actually goes, and pretty much how it _has_ to go.

If you persist in pretending that the atheists are claiming that God can do the logically impossible, I will be forced to accept that you are explicitly and intentionally misrepresenting us. In which case, this is pretty much a textbook example of a strawman. Strawmen are so easy to knock down, aren’t they?

Does it seem like I’m flip-flopping around here with regard to what your specific errors are? The thing about this situation is, like with the argument in the OP, there are several different ways to define the actual errors in question. The fact that there _are_ errors is not seriously disputable; the question is how one wishes to classify them. Of course I _suppose_ this enables one to play goalpost-move with which specific error it is, in an attempt to claim that any _particular_ accusation isn’t correct, but honestly I don’t see the benefit to this. If one is interested in honest argument 'tis better to actually correct the errors (cleaning up and formalizing the arguments as necessary to isolate and extract them) than to try and dodge a train by hopping back and forth between one rail and the other.

Ball’s in your court.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> Amusingly, this had turned into a debate among atheists over which is the best ground for disbelieving in our imaginary friend. On the one hand, I agree with **HMHW** that the logical POE doesn’t disprove omnimax. On the other hand, I agree with **begbert2** that the OP doesn’t establish this. On the third hand (heh), **begbert2** seems to believe the OP is arguing evil is necessary, where it’s pretty obvious to me what **HMHW** is asserting is that it’s _possible_ evil is necessary. Or, as I stated earlier, it’s essentially an epistemological assertion that we can’t know to the contrary.

He better _hope_ that’s not what he’s arguing, because in order to disprove the problem of evil he needs to show that E is true, and as best I know if all he shows is \<\>E, then he can’t get to where he needs to be. (Not that his argument proves \<\>E as such, but even so.)

Of course, if alternatively he’s using “possible” in its english “X or not X” sense, that is, “it may or may not be true that evil is necessary”, then his conclusion 1) is axiomatically true even without an argument behind it, and 2) it proves/disproves nothing at all, the problem of evil or anything else. So he’d better hope that’s not what he’s trying to say either.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Exactly that, thank you.

Oh dear.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> Meanwhile, I’ve tried to redirect the discussion to the evidential problem of intervention, but no one seems to be interested in going there. No problem. It’s **HMHW’s** thread and, as far as I’m concerned, he gets to control the topic. But, this does mean I don’t have anything more to add. Carry on.

I think I’ve stated my position on this too: omnibenevolence _necessitates_ intervention if it is logically possible for the world to be improved by the intervention. Or put another way, if god sees a fly land on his painting, and he doesn’t like flies on his painting, then he is going to shoo it away. 🙂

The counter to this, though, is the absurd claim that _even with intervention_ the world could not be improved. This seems to be the exact claim that **HMHW** and Leibniz are making, though, so I don’t see how focusing on intervention strengthens the POE in any _particular_ way. If the current evil-laden universe really were optimal, then it would be optimal whether or not it got this way through constant intervention or due to a hands-off approach since the ball was set rolling at creation.

Terms:  
X - ‘it is necessary that X’ - X is true in all possible worlds  
\<\>X - ‘it is possible that X’ - X is true in one or more possible worlds  
E - there is nonzero evil (in the particular possible world under discussion)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\
**Post date:** [September 30, 2010, 5:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/249 "2010-09-30T05:23:59Z")

</div>

**begbert2** , if I’m reading the IEP article on the logical POE correctly, “it may or may not be true that evil is necessary” is a valid defense. Have you read the article? That said, I agree **HMHW** merely assumes this and doesn’t prove it. And that, on it’s face, it’s not a particularly plausible assumption. Whereas Plantinga’s defense is generally considered successful.

As for creation vs. intervention, as I said, I prefer to look at the latter because most thinking Christians accept the Big Bang model. Both of you have noted, as did I in Post #235, that the same issues arise from a logical point of view. If we take an evidential point of view, however, and add in that the NT says God answers prayers, the POE becomes pretty hard to overcome. See, e.g., Voltaire’s [Candide](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Candide). It’s just not a rigorous logical proof. **HMHW** says he thinks this makes it weak as an inducement for the devout to abandon faith. Actually, in my observation, it has created far more skeptics than any line of logical argument. Those seem to appeal mainly to those who already don’t believe.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\
**Post date:** [September 30, 2010, 6:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/250 "2010-09-30T06:46:08Z")

</div>

BTW, **begbert2** , rereading the last few posts, I notice you seem to think **HMHW** believes atheists claim God can do the logically impossible. You’re misremembering. The argument is pretty much exactly the opposite. Indeed, that was the point to which you were originally responding. **HMHW** (also an atheist) takes as given that everyone agrees God can’t do the logically impossible and asserts/assumes creating a world without evil may be one of those things. Whether this assertion/assumption is proven/plausible is the point under discussion from a logical point of view.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\
**Post date:** [September 30, 2010, 10:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/251 "2010-09-30T10:17:04Z")

</div>

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> As I said right there in the post you were quoting, right there after the bit you snipped out:This little argument of yours under discussion starts with the sentence, “Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil.” Now, this statement is a statement of what the atheists’ arguments are. That being the case, I assumed that you intended to _actually represent_ those arguments - in which case “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants” clearly actually means “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants that’s logically possible”. Because, as I pointed out in my reply right there, that’s the way the argument actually goes, and pretty much how it _has_ to go.

Well, in that case, you’d have to show that god’s omnipotence necessarily implies his ability to create a world better than ours – which you can’t, since the only way to do so is via induction, the problems with which Hume noted quite insightfully. All you keep doing is asserting the logical possibility of such a world, which of course is without impact on the argument.

> [@](#):
>
> He better _hope_ that’s not what he’s arguing, because in order to disprove the problem of evil he needs to show that E is true,

No, I don’t. As I already pointed out, the POE poses ~E, the negation of which is ~~E, which is equivalent to \<\>E, which is of course implied by \<\>E. So since \<\>E implies the negation of the POE, showing it amounts to showing the POE false.

One way of showing this would be, using the ‘white car’ analogy in parallel:

1. There is something that is an x and that is P (there is something that is a thing that can have colour and that is white; there is something that is a world and that god can’t create) – this is born out by example, my white walls, or logically impossible worlds.
2. Hence, it is possible for something to be an x and to be P (it is possible for something to be a thing that can have colour; it is possible for something to be a world that god can’t create) – this is an immediate consequence from the preceding.
3. y is an x (my car is a thing that can have colour; a world containing no evil/less evil than ours is a world) – this is born out by experience/definition.
4. Hence, it is possible for y to be P (it is possible for my car to be white; it is possible for a world that contains no evil/that contains less evil than ours to be a world god can’t create) – again, an immediate consequence, from 3 and 2.

That y is possible to be P is equivalent to what was to be proven – that it is not impossible for y to be P (that my car is not impossible to be white, and hence, possibly white; that a world without evil/with less evil than ours is possibly one god can’t create, and hence, there possibly exists evil/at least as much evil as in ours in every world god can create).

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> **begbert2** , if I’m reading the IEP article on the logical POE correctly, “it may or may not be true that evil is necessary” is a valid defense. Have you read the article? That said, I agree **HMHW** merely assumes this and doesn’t prove it.

Well, the proof is simply in noting that god can’t do everything he wants – that’s the same with Plantinga’s argument: god can’t both create a universe in which there is morally significant free will and no evil. I’m using essentially the same reasoning, but don’t see the necessity to anchor it in what I think is a much more dodgy assumption of the existence of free will. Plantinga’s argument is somewhat strengthened in plausibility by giving a concrete example of logical inconsistency; in my argument, such concreteness is missing, but the possibility remains, and as noted, it is only this possibility that matters. So while Plantinga has the more immediate appeal, it is in essence only a special, and thus somewhat weaker, case of Leibniz’ argumentation.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\
**Post date:** [September 30, 2010, 5:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/252 "2010-09-30T17:51:32Z")

</div>

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> **begbert2** , if I’m reading the IEP article on the logical POE correctly, “it may or may not be true that evil is necessary” is a valid defense. Have you read the article? That said, I agree **HMHW** merely assumes this and doesn’t prove it. And that, on it’s face, it’s not a particularly plausible assumption. Whereas Plantinga’s defense is generally considered successful.

On Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense:

1. It depends on one accepting a logically incoherent definition of free will. I don’t, and so I reject his defense.

2. It leads one to immediately ask, “Does god have moral free will?” If he does, then that disproves Plantinga’s assumption that for a creature to have moral free will it has to be able to/inclined to choose evil. And if he _doesn’t_ have moral free will, then it raises the question of whether he _could_ create creatures with moral free will, which would be morally equivalent (to him) to causing evil directly.

3. Independent of the above points, according to the wiki it relies on the premise “There are possible worlds that even an omnipotent being can not actualize”, which as it happens is axiomatically false under the definition of “omnipotent” that I have stated that I am using. So there’s that too.

The fact that (per the wiki) “most philosophers accept Plantinga’s free will defence” doesn’t bother me much: I’ve met philosophers and they’re as human and capable of error as the rest of us. Possibly moreso.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> As for creation vs. intervention, as I said, I prefer to look at the latter because most thinking Christians accept the Big Bang model. Both of you have noted, as did I in Post #235, that the same issues arise from a logical point of view. If we take an evidential point of view, however, and add in that the NT says God answers prayers, the POE becomes pretty hard to overcome. See, e.g., Voltaire’s [Candide](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Candide). It’s just not a rigorous logical proof. **HMHW** says he thinks this makes it weak as an inducement for the devout to abandon faith. Actually, in my observation, it has created far more skeptics than any line of logical argument. Those seem to appeal mainly to those who already don’t believe.

This debate isn’t about the devout, because any intellectually honest devout person would never ever ever use any logical argument to support their god, due to the fact the logical arguments require the discarding of canon and defining God as something wholly dissimilar to any normal conception of the Christian God. As you note, this particular POE defense results in a god who is **incapable** of answering prayers or in any other way improving the world to even the slightest degree - making him a great deal less omnipotent than the average red cross employee. This is obviously not something that any devout person would accept.

As best I can tell logical arguments from god are only made when their proponent has lost sight of the forest for the trees - when they’ve become so enamored of the idea of creating a logical argument for “God” (or refuting a logical argument againt it) that they forget that the word means something to people. And the thing it happens to mean…isn’t supported by _any_ logical argument for God to date. All of them argue for rather absurd toy gods instead, toy gods which have nothing to do with anything.

So yeah - what works or doesn’t work on persons concerned with logical proofs for god has little bearing on what works on normal humans. Having little Timmy die despite hours and days of prayer is more of a faith-shaker than _any_ pageful of symbols and statements. (And for myself, I doubt the average person would see much of a distinction between the logical and ‘evidential’ POEs anyway. I know I certainly don’t.)

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> BTW, **begbert2** , rereading the last few posts, I notice you seem to think **HMHW** believes atheists claim God can do the logically impossible. You’re misremembering. The argument is pretty much exactly the opposite. Indeed, that was the point to which you were originally responding. **HMHW** (also an atheist) takes as given that everyone agrees God can’t do the logically impossible and asserts/assumes creating a world without evil may be one of those things. Whether this assertion/assumption is proven/plausible is the point under discussion from a logical point of view.

You misunderstand - the _specific argument he was asking me to rebut_ asserted that atheists claim God can do the logically impossible. If it didn’t, it couldn’t show that the atheists’ premise was false by pointing at something logically impossible, as it was trying to do.

**HMHW** has been swapping between goalposts like a mofo. It’s understandable if it’s tough to keep up, but one must if they’re going to avoid falling into a trap.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> > [@begbert2](#):
> >
> > As I said right there in the post you were quoting, right there after the bit you snipped out:This little argument of yours under discussion starts with the sentence, “Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil.” Now, this statement is a statement of what the atheists’ arguments are. That being the case, I assumed that you intended to _actually represent_ those arguments - in which case “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants” clearly actually means “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants that’s logically possible”. Because, as I pointed out in my reply right there, that’s the way the argument actually goes, and pretty much how it _has_ to go.
> 
> Well, in that case, you’d have to show that god’s omnipotence necessarily implies his ability to create a world better than ours – which you can’t, since the only way to do so is via induction, the problems with which Hume noted quite insightfully. All you keep doing is asserting the logical possibility of such a world, which of course is without impact on the argument.

You know, all my prior arguments are _still there_. You can assert bullshit like that the only way to do it is induction, but that doesn’t change the fact that history itself provides myraid altenate possible world-states that necessarily stand separately unless you’re stripping omnimax god of his creative and destructive powers as well.

It’s suspicious when you ignore my arguments, but when you start pretending I _never made them_ then I take them as **proof** that they disprove your position.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> No, I don’t. As I already pointed out, the POE poses ~E,

Then you pointed out something totally wrong, then, because at no point does any variant of the POE assert that there is no evil in any possible world. It asserts that there’s no evil in any possible world _that also has an omnimax god in it_, but that’s a completely different statement, as you darn well ought to know by now.

That is, the POE _actually_ has (G -\> ~E) as an axiom. Which can be used do derive (G -\> ~E). Which could _only_ be used to derive ~E if one first shows G, which is not an axiom that any atheist will accept, as it is the statement that God cannot be _imagined_ not to exist in any logically coherent universe.

If the POE actually _did_ assert ~E, then it could be instantly be disproved by glancing around and noting that E is true in our possible world.  
Since you started from an error, nothing that follows from the error can have any argumentive merit and thus it need not be addressed.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\
**Post date:** [October 1, 2010, 4:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/253 "2010-10-01T04:29:04Z")

</div>

**begbert2** , what you say about the logical POE being more-or-less irrelevant as a challenge to the devout (starting with the paragraph “This debate isn’t about the devout …”) pretty much captures why I think it’s not important. I considered making a similar argument several days ago and decided it was too far outside the OP. But, yeah, I agree. And it seems we agree the evidential problem (whether considered as one of creation or intervention) is the real challenge to faith.

Which leaves us with this little thought exercise on the logical POE and the OP’s defense. Frankly, I don’t care very much about that and, so, will stay out of it. All I will add (as a fly on the wall) is that I think I was right that **HMHW** never claimed atheists assert God can do the logically impossible. Review [Post #245](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12966301&postcount=245). You were responding specifically to the Königsberg analogy. In context, this was his often-repeated claim (albeit, never proven) that creating a world without evil may be logically impossible.

I’m not going into the free will issue, as to which I noted earlier I have a position between Plantinga’s and that of both of you. That is, I think I can meet Plantinga, but I would do it on evidential not logical grounds, i.e, what I calll soft or psychological compatitibilism. But this is neither here-nor-there as regards the OP.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\
**Post date:** [October 1, 2010, 8:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/254 "2010-10-01T08:04:47Z")

</div>

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> You know, all my prior arguments are _still there_. You can assert bullshit like that the only way to do it is induction, but that doesn’t change the fact that history itself provides myraid altenate possible world-states that necessarily stand separately unless you’re stripping omnimax god of his creative and destructive powers as well.

I’ve dealt with the ‘world state’ thing before – it’s simply not coherent. Something to my future may be in your present, even though we both share the same present moment. Furthermore, possible worlds include the possibility of making temporal statements, such as ‘it’s possible I had cornflakes yesterday’. If there only was the present world state as a possible world, that statement wouldn’t have any meaning. And in claiming the reality of any world state as a possible world, you still would have to show that it is logically possible for god to create each and every world in its state ex nihilo, and disappear it again, which you have so far only asserted.

> [@](#):
>
> Then you pointed out something totally wrong, then, because at no point does any variant of the POE assert that there is no evil in any possible world.

The argument works equally well with whatever minimum amount of evil you care to specify – as I believe **Voyager** has pointed out, you can simply set that amount to zero to obtain the previously discussed case.

> [@](#):
>
> That is, the POE _actually_ has (G -\> ~E) as an axiom. Which can be used do derive (G -\> ~E).

Which isn’t a problem of evil – it’s perfectly fine with the possible existence of god and the existence of evil. As you say, only if god is necessary does it follow that there is necessarily no evil; if (omnimax) god is merely possible, then it’s also possible for there to exist evil, and the whole thing is self-defeating.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\
**Post date:** [October 1, 2010, 6:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/255 "2010-10-01T18:26:16Z")

</div>

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> **begbert2** , what you say about the logical POE being more-or-less irrelevant as a challenge to the devout (starting with the paragraph “This debate isn’t about the devout …”) pretty much captures why I think it’s not important. I considered making a similar argument several days ago and decided it was too far outside the OP. But, yeah, I agree. And it seems we agree the evidential problem (whether considered as one of creation or intervention) is the real challenge to faith.

Well, I _still_ don’t see a difference between the logical and evidential POEs from a standpoint of what the argument actually is. There is a significant difference in _delivery_: the logical approach attempts to demolish the structure of belief in one swipe of the wrecking ball, and the evidential one instead attempts to send a horde of termites in to eat away at the foundations of faith. That latter being the less confrontational I freely admit it would be less likely to make the average theist become reflexively defensive, and thus may be more effective against the average theist, but the fact remains that, as best I can tell and all delivery aside, the logic behind the two remains essentially the same.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> Which leaves us with this little thought exercise on the logical POE and the OP’s defense. Frankly, I don’t care very much about that and, so, will stay out of it. All I will add (as a fly on the wall) is that I think I was right that **HMHW** never claimed atheists assert God can do the logically impossible. Review [Post #245](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12966301&postcount=245). You were responding specifically to the Königsberg analogy. In context, this was his often-repeated claim (albeit, never proven) that creating a world without evil may be logically impossible.

Nope: recheck the argument:

> [@HMHW](#):
>
> Somebody says, an omnipotent god can do everything he wants, so he can make a world without evil; Leibniz says, well, even an omnipotent god can’t do anything he wants (like, for instance, create worlds with square circles, or Königsbergs where you have to cross each bridge only once), so your conclusion doesn’t follow.

In this _particular_ formulation of the argument, he’s specifically saying that square circles and Königsbergs _disprove_ the claim that “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants”. This is **explicitly** an assertion that the original POE arguer’s claim is that God can do impossible things, otherwise there would be no contradiction between the fact that he can’t and the claim that god can do what he wants. Thus, since he _is_ saying that I am claiming that god can do the logically impossible, he _is_ attacking a strawman and the argument is garbage.

I freely admit that **HMHW** may have vaguely _meant_ to assert that evil is necessary and thus my conclusion doesn’t follow, but the straight fact is that he didn’t do that. And I’m tired of playing the stupid sloppy fallacious rhetorical argument game: if he wants to argue against me he needs to do it **right**.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> I’m not going into the free will issue, as to which I noted earlier I have a position between Plantinga’s and that of both of you. That is, I think I can meet Plantinga, but I would do it on evidential not logical grounds, i.e, what I calll soft or psychological compatitibilism. But this is neither here-nor-there as regards the OP.

Well, like I said, I don’t see much of a difference between the logical and evidential arguments, so I don’t have much of an opinion on which one a person should choose when debating anybody.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> > [@begbert2](#):
> >
> > You know, all my prior arguments are _still there_. You can assert bullshit like that the only way to do it is induction, but that doesn’t change the fact that history itself provides myraid altenate possible world-states that necessarily stand separately unless you’re stripping omnimax god of his creative and destructive powers as well.
> 
> I’ve dealt with the ‘world state’ thing before – it’s simply not coherent. Something to my future may be in your present, even though we both share the same present moment. Furthermore, possible worlds include the possibility of making temporal statements, such as ‘it’s possible I had cornflakes yesterday’. If there only was the present world state as a possible world, that statement wouldn’t have any meaning. And in claiming the reality of any world state as a possible world, you still would have to show that it is logically possible for god to create each and every world in its state ex nihilo, and disappear it again, which you have so far only asserted.

1. Of course the world-state thing is coherent.

2. Temporal statements actually don’t effect the argument much unless you can come up with a way they effect the amount of evil in the world one way or the other. Can you?

3. I aximatically reject that any god that cannot control the state of the universe could be omnipotent. If you don’t like that, you have three options:  
a) convince me to accept that “powerless, impotent, and completely incapable” = “omnipotent”, or  
b) give up on this tangent,  
c) keep saying things that are axiomatically untrue and prove yourself more wrong with every word.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> The argument works equally well with whatever minimum amount of evil you care to specify – as I believe **Voyager** has pointed out, you can simply set that amount to zero to obtain the previously discussed case.

Reread what I said, and reread what you said. You said that the POE asserts ~E. Do you have _any idea_ what “~E” means? Try reading it slowly. Try writing it english. Here, let me help:

“In each and every possible world it is not the case that there is any evil at all.”

(If you don’t arrive at this as the meaning of “~E”, then you’ll have to go learn something about logical symbology before we can continue this debate.)

Now, assuming we’re on the same page - what does it mean if there’s no evil in any possible world? Well, it means that the statement “our world has any evil at all in it” cannot be true. That is, it’s saying that evil is **impossible**. Including in the world we see around us.

I personally guarantee you that the POE doesn’t assert that there’s no evil in the world we see. Take my word for it.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> > [@](#):
> >
> > That is, the POE _actually_ has (G -\> ~E) as an axiom. Which can be used do derive (G -\> ~E).
> 
> Which isn’t a problem of evil – it’s perfectly fine with the possible existence of god and the existence of evil. As you say, only if god is necessary does it follow that there is necessarily no evil; if (omnimax) god is merely possible, then it’s also possible for there to exist evil, and the whole thing is self-defeating.

No: you are utterly failing to comprehend the POE.

From the top: Axiomatically, any possible world either has or doesn’t have an omnimax god, and either has or doesn’t have (unnecessary\*) evil. This is true before any statements are made: there are four possible categories of worlds (which may or may not be empty sets):

A: Has an omnimax god, has unnecessary evil.  
B: Has an omnimax god, has no unncessary evil.  
C: Has no omnimax god, has unnecessary evil.  
D: Has no omnimax god, has no unncessary evil.

All variants of the POE assert that based on omnipotence and omnibenevolence, category A has no worlds in it; it is the empty set.

All variants of the POE also assert that the universe as we know it has unnecessary evil to some degree, putting it definitively in either category A or category C based on its evil-level alone.

Of course, if both of the above statements are true that our universe is clearly in category C (since A is empty), and thus is not in the set of possible worlds with omnimax gods. QED, so to speak.

As you can see, at no point does the POE claim that category B or D is empty, and if either of them is not empty, then evil is not logically necessary. (In fact, it can readily be shown that at least one of them is _not_ empty, as there must be some possible worlds with minimal evil/zero unnecessary evil.) It also doesn’t claim that gods are impossible, again because B is not claimed to be empty. So merely showing that omnimax gods are possible isn’t enough to disprove it.  
I will note that all of the above consistently uses the modal-logic definitions of the terms-of-art “possible”, “necessary”, “impossible”, and “unnecessary”. If you do not understand these terms, then you will not understand me at all.

- included to avoid confusing the issue with the so-called “logical” vs. “evidential” debate.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\
**Post date:** [October 2, 2010, 5:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/256 "2010-10-02T05:48:05Z")

</div>

**begbert2** , by way of conversation not argument, I will try to explain briefly what I understand to be the difference between the logical and evidential arguments. The IEP articles linked earlier go into more detail and illustrate by example. The logical argument is deductive. The evidential one is inductive. The logical argument says omnimax and the existence of evil is contradictory. The evidential one points to various examples of evil (actually, I prefer the word suffering, but have decided to accept the prevailing term in the literature for purposes of this thread) and says this is very hard to square with the conception of an omnimax god (and especially difficult to square with the Christian God which the NT says answers prayers). The logical argument, if it goes through, is conclusive. The evidential one, by its nature, can be no more than probabalistic. The logical argument admits as defenses anything that’s logically possible, without regard to whether the defense is true or even plausible. The evidential one, by contrast, looks very much to the plausibility of the defenses. OTOH, the evidential argument is subject to an epistemological defense that we don’t have enough information to weigh the probabilities. This is derided by skeptics as the “mysterious ways” objection, but is generally accepted by theists.

As for the Königsberg analogy, I read **HMHW’s** post differently, but I’m not going to belabor the point. Maybe you’re right (though I don’t think so). In any event, I think it’s clear his overall argument is that eliminating evil may be a logically impossible problem, in the doesn’t-have-to-be-true-or-even-plausible sense permitted in a logical debate. Frankly, as far as I’m concerned, that such a remote and implausible proposition can have standing in that context is a pretty compelling argument for chucking it in favor of the evidential approach.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\
**Post date:** [October 2, 2010, 7:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/257 "2010-10-02T07:45:49Z")

</div>

One tweak, to be clear. The sentence “The logical argument says omnimax and the existence of evil is contradictory” means something very strong, not it’s ordinary English meaning (which is something very like the evidential approach). As a logician, you probably realize this, but for the benefit of others (like me) who aren’t, contradictory here means _necessarily_ contradictory. This is why implausible defences are acceptable in the logical approach.

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<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\
**Post date:** [October 2, 2010, 9:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/258 "2010-10-02T09:51:40Z")

</div>

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> In this _particular_ formulation of the argument, he’s specifically saying that square circles and Königsbergs _disprove_ the claim that “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants”. This is **explicitly** an assertion that the original POE arguer’s claim is that God can do impossible things, otherwise there would be no contradiction between the fact that he can’t and the claim that god can do what he wants. Thus, since he _is_ saying that I am claiming that god can do the logically impossible, he _is_ attacking a strawman and the argument is garbage.

I merely point out that when you say, ‘god can do x’, you implicitly claim that x is logically possible, and that may not be the case.

> [@](#):
>
> 1. Of course the world-state thing is coherent.

Because you say so? The thing is, quite simply, that such world states don’t exist in a relativistic universe, which ours observationally is.

> [@](#):
>
> 1. Temporal statements actually don’t effect the argument much unless you can come up with a way they effect the amount of evil in the world one way or the other. Can you?

They may not impinge on the argument at hand, but the inability to make them nerfs the whole concept of modal logic.

> [@](#):
>
> 1. I aximatically reject that any god that cannot control the state of the universe could be omnipotent.

That’s just question-begging then, as what god can and can’t do is exactly what’s under debate.

> [@](#):
>
> Reread what I said, and reread what you said. You said that the POE asserts ~E.

If there is an omnimax god, it does, yes.

> [@](#):
>
> I personally guarantee you that the POE doesn’t assert that there’s no evil in the world we see. Take my word for it.

It asserts that there ought not be any, the contradiction with which is what then implies the nonexistence of an omnimax god.

> [@](#):
>
> A: Has an omnimax god, has unnecessary evil.  
> B: Has an omnimax god, has no unncessary evil.  
> C: Has no omnimax god, has unnecessary evil.  
> D: Has no omnimax god, has no unncessary evil.
> 
> All variants of the POE assert that based on omnipotence and omnibenevolence, category A has no worlds in it; it is the empty set.

Except, of course, the variant you proposed, (G -\> ~E), which, as we’ve noted, implies G -\> ~E, which is true if, for instance, the antecedent is false (and the consequent is either true or false), i.e. if there’s not necessarily a god; which of course leaves open the possibility of god’s existence. So explicitly, your ‘problem of evil’ asserts that it’s possible that there exists a god in a world which includes evil.

It thus fails as a formalization of the POE, and it remains the case that all one has to show to show the (actual) POE false is the possibility of the existence of evil (in the presence of an omnimax god), and the argument I made two posts back (that you seem to have missed) holds.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![begbert2](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/begbert2/32/3357_2.png) [@begbert2](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/begbert2)\
**Post date:** [October 4, 2010, 6:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/259 "2010-10-04T18:43:55Z")

</div>

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> **begbert2** , by way of conversation not argument, I will try to explain briefly what I understand to be the difference between the logical and evidential arguments. The IEP articles linked earlier go into more detail and illustrate by example. The logical argument is deductive. The evidential one is inductive. The logical argument says omnimax and the existence of evil is contradictory. The evidential one points to various examples of evil (actually, I prefer the word suffering, but have decided to accept the prevailing term in the literature for purposes of this thread) and says this is very hard to square with the conception of an omnimax god (and especially difficult to square with the Christian God which the NT says answers prayers). The logical argument, if it goes through, is conclusive. The evidential one, by its nature, can be no more than probabalistic. The logical argument admits as defenses anything that’s logically possible, without regard to whether the defense is true or even plausible. The evidential one, by contrast, looks very much to the plausibility of the defenses. OTOH, the evidential argument is subject to an epistemological defense that we don’t have enough information to weigh the probabilities. This is derided by skeptics as the “mysterious ways” objection, but is generally accepted by theists.

The evidential argument is an attempt to logically disprove the attempted disproof by theists of the “There is unnecessary evil in our world” premise of the logical POE. That is, the theists attempt to declare the POE unsound using a (usually completely bullshit) argument to prove one of the premises false; the rebuttal is to logically disprove the theists’ (usually completely bullshit) argument.

It all still looks pretty firmly based in logic to me. (And the POE itself still looks firmly based in evidence.) Perhaps that’s my problem.

> [@PBear42](#):
>
> As for the Königsberg analogy, I read **HMHW’s** post differently, but I’m not going to belabor the point. Maybe you’re right (though I don’t think so). In any event, I think it’s clear his overall argument is that eliminating evil may be a logically impossible problem, in the doesn’t-have-to-be-true-or-even-plausible sense permitted in a logical debate. Frankly, as far as I’m concerned, that such a remote and implausible proposition can have standing in that context is a pretty compelling argument for chucking it in favor of the evidential approach.

Depends on how you look at it. If the “evidential” argument disproves the frankly absurd claim that “There is no unnecessary evil in our world”, then that immediately renders the theists’ argument _ **un** _true and _ **not** _ even plausible, restoring the ‘logical’ POE to its unchallenged state.

Basically, you have the ‘logical’ POE. The theists throw up some logically fallacious and incoherent nonsense up to attempt to disprove it. The ‘evidential’ POE sweeps away their nonsense, leaving the ‘logical’ POE to continue proving its point; the evidential argument doesn’t disprove anything on its own. So I have a hard time thinking of it as a _particularly_ separate thing. Though that’s just me.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> > [@begbert2](#):
> >
> > In this _particular_ formulation of the argument, he’s specifically saying that square circles and Königsbergs _disprove_ the claim that “an omnipotent god can do everything he wants”. This is **explicitly** an assertion that the original POE arguer’s claim is that God can do impossible things, otherwise there would be no contradiction between the fact that he can’t and the claim that god can do what he wants. Thus, since he _is_ saying that I am claiming that god can do the logically impossible, he _is_ attacking a strawman and the argument is garbage.
> 
> I merely point out that when you say, ‘god can do x’, you implicitly claim that x is logically possible, and that may not be the case.

What do you suppose happens when I _do_ prove that it’s logically possible for it to be the case?

Not that you’re accepting any arguments to that effect. But let’s just play pretend for a moment and say that I _did_ convince you that better worlds are logically possible. What would that do to your argument?

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> Because you say so? The thing is, quite simply, that such world states don’t exist in a relativistic universe, which ours observationally is.

Okay, fine, I’ll allow you to claim that relatively disproves the notion of such world states, so long as you _also_ admit that that interpretation of relativity is necessarily incompatible with any omnimax god.

Remember, omniscience means that he’s a universal simultanous observer. Unless I misunderstand my relativity, that means that he either _creates_ world-states by the act of observing them - or that he can’t coexist with any universe with relativity.

I recognize that this isn’t normally a part of the Problem Of Evil, but I’ll happily introduce the sister argument ‘the Problem Of Relativity’ in, just to shut you up about pretending that relatively disproves history. That is, God now has been logically shown to not exist in any possible world that has unnecessary evil _or in which relativity applies_ (by your understanding of relativity). So either we are in a possible world where I can use world-state arguments, or we’re in one where you can’t argue for the existence of God. One or the other.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> They may not impinge on the argument at hand, but the inability to make them nerfs the whole concept of modal logic.

I never said you couldn’t make them, so that’s not really a problem for me. You, on the other hand, are saying that possible worlds are disproven by relatively, which _could_ cause a problem for various variants of modal logic…but it’s not _my_ problem.

Compare two possible world-states: the universe as it is now if it came into existence billions of years ago, and the universe as it is now if it was created last thursday. The two universes are _physically_ indistinguishable; all particles have exactly the same position and velocity and are otherwise similarly identical in state.

Now, the logical statement “is this pencil two weeks old” has different truth values in these two universes - well, depending on your definition of the term “two weeks old”. But if the two universes don’t have different levels of evil in them, then they’re equivalent from the perspective of the POE - which essentially allows us to rate evil based on physical world-state _alone_. And there’s no way it’s logically impossible for an omnipotent god to physically reconfigure the world into an exact replica of a different time. A better time. A time with less evil than now. Unless of course you’re arguing that relativity proves there no omnimax god, of course.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> That’s just question-begging then, as what god can and can’t do is exactly what’s under debate.

Right - you’re trying to make god completely impotent and then pretend that your non-capable god disproves the POE. Which is not a disproof of the POE - it’s a failure on your part to understand the argument.

I have this god next to me. It’s a styrofoam cup. It is omnibenevolent and omniscient, but completely impotent - it cannot change the universe to the state it was in last thursday, it cannot end the universe in the next moment, it cannot make humans invulnerable or omnibenevolent, it cannot cure cancer, it cannot make loaves and fishes multiply, it cannot turn water into wine. It can’t even move under its own power.

However, it _can_ do everying that you’ve said “omnimax god” can do to our universe - because you haven’t allowed your ‘god’ to be able to do **anything at all**. Any action at all is “logically impossible” for him, for some mysterious and logically inexplicable reason.

Would you suppose that the existence of my styrofoam cup is a disproof of the POE? It’s a nonmimax god and it _does_ exist, simultaneously with scads of unnecessary evil! Is this the great disproof?

Because I don’t see any real difference between the cup argument and yours, with your god that is mysteriously logically incapable of putting the world in physically possible states.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> If there is an omnimax god, it does, yes.

**You can’t just leave that off.** Have you ever done logic before? Are you vaguely aware that “G -\> ~E” and “~E” are not logically equivalent statements? Do you know what the ‘if’ statement means?

For the love of all that’s dark and evil, I hope you’re not just twitting with me for your own amusement. Among other things, that’s against forum rules.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> It asserts that there ought not be any, the contradiction with which is what then implies the nonexistence of an omnimax god.

It asserts that there ought not be any **if there is an omnimax god**. If there is _not_ an omnimax god, there is no contradiction.

Look, I don’t know what the hell you think you’re doing, but I’m talking about a logical argument here, even using logical symbology. When a person starts to indiscriminately lop the statements of the argument into bits, then the things they say about the argument start being untrue, whether they realize it or not. And no matter how convenient it may be in terms of fallacious rhetoric to misrepresent the argument, that’s simply not going to get you anywhere with me, since I am not going to play along.

> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#):
>
> > [@](#):
> >
> > A: Has an omnimax god, has unnecessary evil.  
> > B: Has an omnimax god, has no unncessary evil.  
> > C: Has no omnimax god, has unnecessary evil.  
> > D: Has no omnimax god, has no unncessary evil.
> > 
> > All variants of the POE assert that based on omnipotence and omnibenevolence, category A has no worlds in it; it is the empty set.
> 
> Except, of course, the variant you proposed, (G -\> ~E), which, as we’ve noted, implies G -\> ~E, which is true if, for instance, the antecedent is false (and the consequent is either true or false), i.e. if there’s not necessarily a god; **which of course leaves open the possibility of god’s existence.** So explicitly, your ‘problem of evil’ asserts that it’s possible that there exists a god in a world which includes evil.
> 
> It thus fails as a formalization of the POE, and it remains the case that all one has to show to show the (actual) POE false is the possibility of the existence of evil (in the presence of an omnimax god), and the argument I made two posts back (that you seem to have missed) holds.

Bolding mine - I’ll get to it in a moment.

You are completely and utterly failing to comprehend the POE. The POE is not _interested_ in disproving God in all possible worlds. It does not **want** to prove ~G. The reason it doesn’t want to is because it doesn’t _need_ to - it is only concerned about disproving omnimax gods in _our_ universe. You know, the one with all the evil around in it everywhere? That one? You may have heard of it.

Now for the bolding - you are either doing more fallacious rhetorical worldplay with the word “possibility”, or you have no idea what the hell you’re talking about. Consider the following very-simplified situation:

The set of possible worlds has exacly two members; worlds W1 and W1. The only notable difference between the two is that in one of them the ball is red, and in one of them the ball is not red. (Designated symbolically as R and ~R respectively.

So:  
in W1, R is true, and ~R is false.  
in W2, R is false, and ~R is true.

With me so far?

So: in this scenario, R is false, ~R is false, ~R is true, ~~R is true, \<\>R is true, \<\>~R is true, ~\<\>R is false, and ~\<\>~R is false (to cover all the bases). That is, in the english vernacular, everything is possible and nothing is impossible - when looking at the set of all possible worlds.

So: R is ‘possible’, in logical vernacular.

Does that mean that it’s ‘possible’ (english vernacular) for R to be true in W2? By your argument, it does. By your argument you’ve just disproved the statement “in W2, R is false, and ~R is true.”

I’ll just stop here and ask, do you see anything wrong with this? You _should_, obviously, but I’m asking if you _do_.

The POE talks specifically about what’s going on in _our_ world, using observable evidence about the evil in _our_ world as a cite. In its original form it doesn’t even _mention_ other possible worlds; the modal logic stuff was tacked on afterwards by people who tried to use it to slip fallacious rhetorical wordplay into the argument, but if you cut through the crap, it remains a fact that the POE is only about what’s going on in W2. What’s possible but not actually true in W2 is no nevermind to it.

Now, if you _did_ want to prove ~G, then you _could_ try to do that; but you’d use the kind of arguments **Voyager** was giving earlier. You wouldn’t use the POE.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![PBear42](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecccb3/32.png) [@PBear42](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PBear42)\
**Post date:** [October 5, 2010, 5:07am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/260 "2010-10-05T05:07:03Z")

</div>

**begbert2** , I don’t know which of us is right (and, of course, it’s possible we’re both wrong), but we seem to be interpreting the evidential argument rather differently. But, as I said, I wasn’t proposing to open an argument about that, not least because it’s off-topic. Instead, I’m going to move along. You guys have fun.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\
**Post date:** [October 5, 2010, 5:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-best-of-all-possible-worlds/553190/261 "2010-10-05T17:49:46Z")

</div>

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> What do you suppose happens when I _do_ prove that it’s logically possible for it to be the case?
> 
> Not that you’re accepting any arguments to that effect. But let’s just play pretend for a moment and say that I _did_ convince you that better worlds are logically possible. What would that do to your argument?

Well, the argument, as such, would still stand – it would still be possible for god to be both omnimax and for evil to exist in the world. However, if you proved that there exists a world in which there is less evil than in ours, then god obviously wouldn’t actually _be_ omnibenevolent.

> [@](#):
>
> Okay, fine, I’ll allow you to claim that relatively disproves the notion of such world states, so long as you _also_ admit that that interpretation of relativity is necessarily incompatible with any omnimax god.

I have no problem in admitting that. Hell, I believe an omnimax god is incompatible with himself! Of course, one could assume the position that relativity may be necessary for any universe to exist at all, i.e. may be a logical necessity, in which case it would just be impossible for god to know things he logically can’t know – things that are causally removed from him. But that’s besides the point.

> [@](#):
>
> I recognize that this isn’t normally a part of the Problem Of Evil, but I’ll happily introduce the sister argument ‘the Problem Of Relativity’ in, just to shut you up about pretending that relatively disproves history.

I haven’t claimed anywhere that relativity disproves history, or any such nonsense. Your causal past is set in stone, barring time- or FTL-travel. A global history, i.e. a list of which events follow which, regardless of their occurrence in spacetime, however, is simply not a meaningful concept.

> [@](#):
>
> That is, God now has been logically shown to not exist in any possible world that has unnecessary evil _or in which relativity applies_ (by your understanding of relativity). So either we are in a possible world where I can use world-state arguments, or we’re in one where you can’t argue for the existence of God. One or the other.

Thankfully, the problem of evil or relativity isn’t what we’re discussing here.

> [@](#):
>
> I never said you couldn’t make them, so that’s not really a problem for me. You, on the other hand, are saying that possible worlds are disproven by relatively,

No, I’m saying that your world-states are an incoherent concept in a relativistic universe, _and_ that they don’t have anything to do with how possible worlds are commonly understood in valuations of modal logic.

> [@](#):
>
> which _could_ cause a problem for various variants of modal logic…but it’s not _my_ problem.

Nah, relativity’s perfectly fine with modal logic – it’s just your world states that don’t fit.

> [@](#):
>
> Now, the logical statement “is this pencil two weeks old” has different truth values in these two universes - well, depending on your definition of the term “two weeks old”. But if the two universes don’t have different levels of evil in them, then they’re equivalent from the perspective of the POE - which essentially allows us to rate evil based on physical world-state _alone_.

The problem is, we only know _one_ of those worlds to be logically possible (whichever the one is that we’re in, that is).

> [@](#):
>
> And there’s no way it’s logically impossible for an omnipotent god to physically reconfigure the world into an exact replica of a different time.

This is again just an unsubstantiated assertion. Tell me, what logically possible means would god use to rewind the universe?

> [@](#):
>
> However, it _can_ do everying that you’ve said “omnimax god” can do to our universe - because you haven’t allowed your ‘god’ to be able to do **anything at all**.

I’m not saying god _can’t_ do anything of the things you allege he can do; I’m merely saying that it’s _possible_ that he can’t, simply since there _are_ things he can’t do. Again, I refer back to the argument I made a couple of posts ago, which you seem to accept.

> [@](#):
>
> **You can’t just leave that off.** Have you ever done logic before? Are you vaguely aware that “G -\> ~E” and “~E” are not logically equivalent statements? Do you know what the ‘if’ statement means?

Oh, come on, you’re not just gonna pretend I forgot all I wrote in [this post](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=12925314&postcount=177), are you? The fact of the matter is that you can leave the ‘G’ part completely implicit, as long as the context is understood. The discussion that’s at hand here is, in a word, whether or not the existence of an omnimax god implies that there can’t be any evil; concentrating on the second part is merely a way to save writing. You did the same thing some posts back:

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> in order to disprove the problem of evil he needs to show that E is true,

> [@begbert2](#):
>
> Now for the bolding - you are either doing more fallacious rhetorical worldplay with the word “possibility”, or you have no idea what the hell you’re talking about.

No. It’s simply that the formalisation of the problem of evil you proposed yields a true statement if there exists a world in which god exists, and there is (whatever amount of) evil (and of course, that world may be ours), a possibility which is precisely antithetical to the logical problem of evil (which asserts that both the existence of an omnimax god and the existence of evil can’t be true).

I’ve got no idea where you were trying to go with the red balls, incidentally, and what any of that had to do with what you bolded in my post. Basically, the possibility that a ball is red or not does not impinge on whether or not it is actually red; \<\>R is true in any world, whether or not R is, as long as R isn’t necessary. If you mean to say that if the ball in some world is not red, then \<\>R isn’t true (in that world), then that’s just the same error you made earlier, that P -\> P. \<\>R is not a claim about that specific world; it’s a claim about _every_ world.

The bolded part in my post referred to the inadequacy in your proposed formalization of the POE – that the implication yields a true statement when god isn’t necessary, i.e. when he’s contingent; so that if in some world (ours, for instance), an omnimax god exists, and evil also exists, as long as god doesn’t exist in every possible world, G -\> ~E is a true statement. Which of course means that the existence of evil doesn’t mean that there’s no god (only that there’s _not necessarily_ a god), which is the opposite of what you’d want a POE to say.

If it’s hard to see, just work through the argument: your formalization says, ‘if there is necessarily a god, then there is necessarily no evil’. In true modus tollens form, we observe that there is, in fact, evil, and hence, not necessarily no evil. This means that the antecedent must be false – that there is not necessarily a god. Of course, this means that it’s still possible for there to be a god – in short, the existence of evil means that there possibly is a god – and the argument has gone officially nowhere.

> [@](#):
>
> The POE talks specifically about what’s going on in _our_ world, using observable evidence about the evil in _our_ world as a cite.

No, in its original form, it asserts the incompatibility of a set of propositions – that god is omniscient, that he is omnipotent, that he is omnibenevolent, and that there exists evil. Of course, this last one is derived from observation; however, this is a claim of logical impossibility, and hence, a claim about impossibility in all conceivable circumstances – taking into account modalities when discussing this is merely natural.

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