# The "Big Impact" Plan for Iraqi WMDs **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 1, 2003, 11:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325 "2003-08-01T11:35:16Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 12
**Author:** ![Mtgman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/b5a626/32.png) [@Mtgman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mtgman)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2003, 5:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/221 "2003-08-14T17:12:22Z")
WTF? A “vote” for a position on the state of somebody’s arms programs? Can someone tell me why they’re putting stuff like this to a vote? You don’t vote for facts, they either exist or they don’t. An intelligence report is supposed to be based on facts, not some consensus of opinions reached by voting. Especially if the voting system allows some bureaucrat to “overrule” the actual intelligence people. WTF! Enjoy, Steven ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2003, 5:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/222 "2003-08-14T17:58:34Z")
**Mtgman** : > [@](#): > > - WTF? A “vote” for a position on the state of somebody’s arms programs? Can someone tell me why they’re putting stuff like this to a vote? You don’t vote for facts, they either exist or they don’t.\* If only it were so simple. Actually, any piece of evidence can be interpreted in a number of different ways; the aluminum tubes are a case in point. A number of experts looked at them, and each one came to a decision about them based on his own knowledge, experience, background – even his political leanings, perhaps. Chances are good, of course, that when a large number of experts agree on something, they’re right; but they aren’t always, and the history of science is strewn with the wreckage of old theories once consensually believed to be correct, but now discarded. That’s why science is generally acknowledged as _fallible_, and even more so intelligence work. When a majority of experts all agree that, for example, the tubes are unsuitable for use in centrifuges, it is as if each one cast his vote for that particular interpretation. That doesn’t mean, necessarily, that they are correct; perhaps those in the minority will turn out to have been right after all. That’s why, IMO, Albright is so cautious in his conclusions; he’s aware that he might very well be proven wrong. Naturally, the evidence one possesses in the intelligence business is considerably more ambiguous, on average, than the evidence available to scientists, and thus the intelligence information doubly falible. ---
**Author:** ![Mtgman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/b5a626/32.png) [@Mtgman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mtgman)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2003, 8:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/223 "2003-08-14T20:36:49Z")
But that’s where things like confidence levels come in. An intelligence report shouldn’t be like the electoral college. An all-or-nothing type approach based on a simple majority. If some experts disagree, then the confidence interval changes. Disagreements mean you can’t simply state things like “they were for centrifuges”. And administrators don’t get votes at all, let alone the ability to “overrule”. Enjoy, Steven ---
**Author:** ![Squink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/b5e925/32.png) [@Squink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Squink)\ **Post date:** [August 14, 2003, 9:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/224 "2003-08-14T21:58:31Z")
> [@](#): > > administrators don’t get votes at all, let alone the ability to “overrule”. See [Lysenkoism](http://skepdic.com/lysenko.html) for counterexamples. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 2:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/225 "2003-08-15T02:38:38Z")
I may have been premature in conceding the point about aluminum tubes. I’m going to reprint critical sections from a [press release from Geoge Tenet at the CIA](http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/dci081103.html), regarding WMD evidence, aluminum tubes, and in general the National Intelligence Estimate. I’ll highlight significant portions: > [@](#): > > A great deal has been said and written about the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Much of this commentary has been misinformed, misleading, and just plain wrong. It is important to set the record straight. Let me make three points. > [ul] > [li]We stand by the judgments in the NIE.[/li][li]The NIE demonstrates consistency in our judgments over many years and are based on a decade’s worth of work. Intelligence is an iterative process and as new evidence becomes available we constantly reevaluate.[/li][li]We encourage dissent and reflect it in alternative views. [/li][/ul] > We stand behind the judgments of the NIE as well as our analyses on Iraq’s programs over the past decade. Those outside the process over the past ten years and many of those commenting today do not know, or are misrepresenting, the facts. We have a solid, well-analyzed and carefully written account in the NIE and the numerous products before it. > … > **The National Intelligence Estimate remains the Intelligence Community’s most authoritative product.** The process by which we produce NIEs—including the one on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—has been honed over nearly 30 years. It is a process that is designed to provide policymakers in both the executive and the legislative branches with our best judgments on the most crucial national security issues. This process is designed to produce coordinated judgments—but not to the exclusion of differing views or without exposing uncertainties. During coordination, agencies send representatives who are actively engaged and change NIE drafts to reflect better the views of the experts in their respective agencies. It is an open and vigorous process that allows for dissent to be registered by individual agencies in the final product. Indeed, alternative views are encouraged. **Finally, the NIE is reviewed by the directors of US intelligence agencies composing the DCI-chaired National Foreign Intelligence Board, including in this case, CIA, DIA, INR, NSA, DoE, and NIMA.** This rigorous NIE process has served this nation well. > > Building upon ten years of analysis, intelligence reporting, and inspections that had to fight through Iraq’s aggressive denial and deception efforts, including phony and incomplete data declarations to the UN and programs explicitly designed with built-in cover stories, the Intelligence Community prepared the NIE on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. In it we judged that the entire body of information over that ten years made clear that Saddam had never abandoned his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. > > **Nuclear program.** Shortly after the Gulf war of 1990-91 the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US Intelligence Community were surprised at how much more advanced Iraq’s program was prior to the war than had been judged previously. In fact, the IAEA’s 1996 report indicated that Iraq could have completed its first nuclear device by as early as late 1992 had the program not been derailed by the Gulf war. Intelligence analysts reevaluated Iraq’s nuclear program in 1994 and 1997 in light of the body of inspection revelations and seized documents and concluded that Iraq could have a nuclear weapon within a year of obtaining sufficient material and, if unconstrained, would take five to seven years with foreign assistance to produce enough fissile material. Those judgments, to which all agencies agreed, have remained consistent for years. > > The NIE points out that by 2002, all agencies assessed that Saddam did not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile material to make any, but never abandoned his nuclear weapons ambitions. **Moreover, most agencies believed that Iraq’s attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors, magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools** , as well as **Iraq’s efforts to enhance its cadre of weapons personnel and activities at several suspect nuclear sites indicated that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.** Saddam’s personal interest in some of these efforts was also considered. **DOE agreed that reconstitution was underway, but assessed that the tubes probably were not part of the program.** INR assessed that Baghdad was pursuing at least a limited effort to acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities, but not an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons; INR was not persuaded that the tubes were intended for the nuclear program. All other agencies, including DOE, assessed that Iraq probably would not have a weapon until 2007 to 2009, consistent with the decade-old judgment of Iraq needing five to seven years to develop a weapons-grade uranium enrichment capability if freed from constraints. These judgments and the six elements upon which the reconstitution judgment was based were agreed to by those agencies during coordination of the NIE and at the meeting of the heads of all the intelligence agencies before publication. > > **We note yet again that uranium acquisition was not part of this judgment. Despite all the focus in the media, it was not one of the six elements upon which the judgment was based. Why not? Because Iraq already had significant quantities of uranium.** > > **Also it is noteworthy that although DOE assessed that the tubes probably were not part of Iraq’s nuclear program, DOE agreed that reconstitution was underway.** Obviously, the tubes were not central to DOE’s view on reconstitution. > > Even though the tubes constituted only one of the six elements underpinning the other agencies’ judgment on reconstitution, I will discuss it briefly. We need to point out that DOE is not the only agency that has experts on the issue. CIA has centrifuge and rocket experts. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)—the US military’s center for analysis of foreign conventional weaponry—has battlefield rocket experts. These experts, along with those from DOE, were involved in the NIE process and their views were recorded. **All agencies agreed that the tubes could be used to build gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment program, so we are talking about differences in agency views about intent.** > [ul] > [li]\*\*CIA, DIA, and NSA believed the tubes were intended for that purpose. \*\*[/li][li]DOE believed they probably were not part of the nuclear program and that conventional military uses were more plausible[/li][li]INR was not persuaded that the tubes were intended for use as centrifuge rotors and considered artillery rockets as the most likely purpose. [/li][li] **NGIC believed that these tubes were poor choices for rocket motor bodies.** [/li][/ul] > Not surprisingly, the Iraqis went to great lengths to mask their intentions across the board, including in their efforts to acquire tubes with increasingly higher sets of specifications. Thus, the fact that we had alternative views on the issue would be expected. But the NIE went to great lengths to spell out those views. Many reading these alternative views, however, almost certainly recalled how far Iraq had come in the early 1990s toward a nuclear weapon without our knowledge, making all the factors leading us to the reconstitution judgment more important. So, it looks like the truth is a little more nuanced than either of our positions. I was focusing on the positive evidence, Mr. Svinlesha on the negative. The NIE presented both views. Now, the President’s comments about the aluminum tubes certainly didn’t convey the degree of dissention among experts, and I think he can be fairly criticized for exaggerating the claim. But those of you who state that there is no way the tubes could be used for nuclear weapons development, or even that it’s highly unlikely that they weren’t, are guilty of spinning the data in the opposite direction. The truth would best be stated that the purchase of the tubes was a troubling sign, the way in which they were purchased was extremely suspicious, and intelligence experts are divided as to their ultimate use, although a majority thought they were part of a nuclear weapons program. There is no question, however, that the purchase was illegal and Iraq was in violation of U.N. resolutions in making it. Note that while there was dissention between the major intelligence agencies on the ultimate purpose of the tubes, ALL agencies agreed that Saddam was trying to reconstitute his nuclear program. ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 8:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/226 "2003-08-15T08:25:22Z")
**Sam** : > [@](#): > > - But those of you who state that there is no way the tubes could be used for nuclear weapons development, **or even that it’s highly unlikely that they weren’t** , are guilty of spinning the data in the opposite direction.\* **Sam** , I’m afraid we’re just going to have to keep on disagreeing. And I have to tell you, in all honesty, that you’re not making your case very well. With regard to the aluminum tubes, nothing in the passage you quote above gainsays the claims I’ve been making throughout this debate, as far as I can tell. Let’s take a look, for example, at Tenet’s first three points: [QUOTE] \*\*[ul][li] We stand by the judgments in the NIE.[/li][/QUOTE] \*\*[/ul]So what? In particular, with regard to the tubes, the NIE _does not pass judgement_: it merely lists which intelligence organizations believe the tubes are suitable for uranium enrichment, and which aren’t. [QUOTE] **[ul][li] The NIE demonstrates consistency in our judgments over many years and are based on a decade’s worth of work. Intelligence is an iterative process and as new evidence becomes available we constantly reevaluate.**[/ul][/li][/QUOTE] On the other hand, as has been pointed out in the media with mind-numbing regularity over the last couple of months, the CIA had little new evidence after the exit of the inspectors from Iraq in 1998. It had virtually no information “from the ground,” and was forced to rely on satellite intelligence along with scraps of other information. As a result, the US intelligence community was essentially “flying blind” with relation to the actual situation in Iraq. (There was an article in the NYT about this recently, so if you won’t take my word for it, I’ll try to locate it again.) [QUOTE] **[ul][li] We encourage dissent and reflect it in alternative views.**[/ul][/li][/QUOTE] Indeed, the DOE and INR dissent was included as a footnote in the NIE. But the real question here is the extent to which the _administration_ encourages dissent and reflects it in alternate views, so the point isn’t really relevant. Reading further: > [@](#): > > \*\* This process is designed to produce coordinated judgments—but not to the exclusion of differing views or without exposing uncertainties.\*\* As I’m reading through this, I begin to understand how masterfully Tenet plays the game. Here he points out that the NIE includes dissent and “uncertainties.” That leaves the Bush administration, with its assertions of absolute certainty, kinda hanging high and dry, doesn’t it? > [@](#): > > \*\* Moreover, _most agencies believed_ that Iraq’s attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors, magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools, as well as Iraq’s efforts to enhance its cadre of weapons personnel and activities at several suspect nuclear sites indicated that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.\*\* I contend that this “belief” was build on a great deal of speculation. I have yet to see any convincing evidence otherwise. Albright argues that the assertion that the aluminum tubes were intended for use as centrifuges serves as the “lynchpin” of the assessment that Iraq had “reconstituted” its nuclear weapons program. If they were not intended for centrifuges, the claim that Iraq had “reconstituted” its NW program becomes even more equivocal than it already is. I return to this point below. > [@](#): > > **DOE agreed that reconstitution was underway, _but assessed that the tubes probably were not part of the program_.** As I’ve pointed out now about 5 times. How in hell does this particular sentence change your view concerning the aluminum tubes? > [@](#): > > \*\* All other agencies, including DOE, assessed that Iraq probably would not have a weapon until 2007 to 2009, consistent with the decade-old judgment of Iraq needing five to seven years to develop a weapons-grade uranium enrichment capability _if freed from constraints_.\*\* Groovy, that. Not that it’s particularly relevant to the issue of the tubes, but how long might it take Iraq to develop a nuclear weapon if it was subjected to constant international scrutiny, intrusive inspections, sanctions, and no-flight zones? > [@](#): > > \*\* We note yet again that uranium acquisition was not part of this judgment. Despite all the focus in the media, it was not one of the six elements upon which the judgment was based. Why not? Because Iraq already had significant quantities of uranium.\*\* You’ve highlighted this for some reason; I’m not sure really how it’s relevant to the discussion. Anyway, it’s an even more telling point: despite the fact that the false allegations of an attempted uranium purchase weren’t even included in the NIE, Bush decided to make the claim anyway. > [@](#): > > \*\* Also it is noteworthy that although DOE assessed that the tubes probably were not part of Iraq’s nuclear program, DOE agreed that reconstitution was underway. \*\* From **elucidator’s** link, provided above: > [@](#): > > \*\* A former Energy Department intelligence chief who agreed with the White House claim that Iraq had reconstituted its defunct nuclear-arms program was awarded a total of $20,500 in bonuses during the build-up to the war, WorldNetDaily has learned. > > Thomas Rider, as acting director of Energy’s intelligence office, _overruled senior intelligence officers on his staff_ in voting for the position at a National Foreign Intelligence Board meeting at CIA headquarters last September. > > His officers argued at a pre-briefing at Energy headquarters that there was no hard evidence to support the alarming Iraq nuclear charge, and asked to join State Department’s dissenting opinion, Energy officials say. > > Rider ordered them to “shut up and sit down,” according to sources familiar with the meeting. > > As a result, State was the intelligence community’s lone dissenter in the key National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction, something the Bush administration is quick to remind critics of its prewar intelligence…. > > “It is noteworthy that although DOE [Department of Energy] assessed that the tubes probably were not part of Iraq’s nuclear program, DOE \*agreed \*that reconstitution was under way [emphasis in the original],” CIA Director George Tenet said in a four-page statement defending the NIE on Iraq. It was published Sunday in the Washington Post. > > But officials in Energy’s intelligence office were at odds with Rider, and did not agree that the program was being reconstituted, sources say. In fact, they agreed with the State Department’s view that the nuclear case against Baghdad was weak.\*\* Perhaps worth noting as well is the fact that Rider himself was not a technical specialist, but a “ [long-time human resources bureaucrat](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=33948).” By the way, you should definitely read that article. In it, Albright states categorically: > [@](#): > > \*\* The relevant key judgment in the NIE – selectively declassified by the White House to support its case, which has come under fire in the absence of banned weapons discoveries in Iraq – asserts that Iraq was restarting such a program, and cited its “aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors.” The section includes a parenthetical sentence that says: “DOE agrees that reconstitution of the nuclear program is under way, but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.” > > The inconsistency has puzzled former nuke weapons inspectors. > > “It surprised me that they would agree to a statement that there’s a nuclear weapons program being reconstituted, and then undercut the aluminum tube allegation,” said David Albright, a physicist who worked with U.N. inspectors in Iraq in 1996… > > “We now know, after talking to Iraqi scientists after the war, that these tubes were in fact intended for rockets – and they didn’t have a centrifuge program,” Albright added…. > > He says it’s the linchpin in the administration’s withering argument that Iraq posed an exigent threat to America, particularly since its companion allegation that Iraq recently sought uranium from Africa has largely been discredited in the wake of its belated admission that supporting documents were discovered to be forgeries. > > “On the uranium, they can say, ‘Aw, it’s one piece of information, but the rest holds together,’” Albright said. “_But if the aluminum tubes goes down, they’re finished. I mean, that was the centerpiece of their argument that Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program and posed an imminent threat_.”\*\* These are the points I referred to above. Returning to Tenet’s statement: > [@](#): > > **All agencies agreed that the tubes could be used to build gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment program, so we are talking about differences in agency views about intent.** Why do you highlight this? Are you simply willfully ignoring my arguments and supporting links? I grow weary, **Sam** , of repeating myself. While experts do not rule out the possibility that the tubes _might_ be modifiable, they consider it **highly unlikely**. Review Wood’s comments on this issue, posted earlier. Tenet is blatantly spinning the point, here. Returning to your arguments, then: > [@](#): > > - The truth would best be stated that the purchase of the tubes was a troubling sign, the way in which they were purchased was extremely suspicious, and intelligence experts are divided as to their ultimate use, although a majority thought they were part of a nuclear weapons program.\* I have to give you this, **Sam** : you’re a brilliant rhetorician. This is both your strength and your weakness. We could also put it like this: certain persons – namely, “Joe” at the CIA and Rider at DoE – created a purposefully misleading impression that the tubes were intended as part of a nuclear weapons program, bluntly ignoring the objections to that view raised by technical experts. The Bush administration then employed these claims in an even more unambiguous manner, in a blatant attempt to mislead the American public into believing that Iraq had an ongoing, covert nuclear weapons program. At the time, you believed it to be the case. I did not, because I felt the evidence was not strong enough. After the fact, the evidence has all but evaporated, unsurprisingly. Looking back in the rear-view mirror, it would appear that I was right and the administration was wrong. Does it not bother you just a little bit that I, a non-specialist with no access to secret intelligence info, am nevertheless capable of out-guessing the CIA and the Bush administration? Am I somehow smarter than the entire US intelligence community? Or is it possible, just possible, that we were all being purposefully mislead? > [@](#): > > - There is no question, however, that the purchase was illegal and Iraq was in violation of U.N. resolutions in making it.\* So what? For the second time, **we did not go to war because Iraq purchased some aluminum tubes for an illegal rocket development program**. Certainly, the were tubes illegal, but a rocket program **does not constitute an imminent threat to US territorial integrity**. However the US government claimed that they were **evidence of a cover Iraqi nuclear weapons program** , and thus a potential threat justifying military intervention. It did so over **the objections of the vast majority of specialists**. Fucking hell: **even I thought their evidence was weak**. To claim that I’m “spinning the evidence” when I, along with experts such as Woods and Albright, claim that it’s highly unlikely the tubes were intended for use in centrifuges, is ridiculous and flies in the face of reason. Finally, note: I have addressed several specific questions to you in this thread. You have simply chosen not to answer them. Your posts simply reiterate the administration’s talking points. Repeating them over and over again does not make them true, and for the debate to continue in any meaningful sense, you must also respond to the questions I ask you. I’m not going to waste my time responding to point after point in your posts, if you will not do me the courtesy of responding in kind. Please review my post of 08-12-2003 02:12 PM answer the questions I asked directly of you there. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 10:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/227 "2003-08-15T10:38:34Z")
> [@](#): > > Please review my post of 08-12-2003 02:12 PM answer the questions I asked directly of you there. As you wish. > [@](#): > > First off, you challenge us to come up with a statement made by the administration that has proven to be “100% wrong,” and try to support you argument thusly: > > ## quote: > > ## If you had said, “So, where the proof of WMD?”, or I had said, “They’re definitely there!”, then you’d be right. The burden of proof would be on those making the claim. > > Now, as you know, the government has said exactly that, i.e., “They’re definitely there!” So certain were they that they launched a “preemptive war” to get at them. And in fact, prior to that war – as I’ve pointed out at least twice in this thread alone – you also made such claims. Clearly then, by your own words, the burden of proof for those claims lies with you, and with the current administration. Okay, first of all, the administration’s bold assertion that WMD were there did not refer to nuclear weapons or a nuclear program. Bush spoke of ‘evidence’ that Iraq was rebuilding its nuclear program, and referenced the aluminum tubes. The more certain elements had to do with biological and chemical weapons programs. Let’s refer back to what the NIE has to say about them: From the NIE Key Judgements: > [@](#): > > We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX; its capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved. > > An array of clandestine reporting reveals that Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry. > > Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents–much of it added in the last year. > > The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles. We assess that they possess CW bulk fills for SRBM warheads, including for a limited number of covertly stored Scuds, possibly a few with extended ranges. > > We judge that all key aspects–R&D, production, and weaponization–of Iraq’s offensive BW program are active and that most elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf war. > > We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives. > > Chances are even that smallpox is part of Iraq’s offensive BW program. > > Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents. > > Baghdad has established a large-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability. > > Baghdad has mobile facilities for producing bacterial and toxin BW agents; these facilities can evade detection and are highly survivable. Within three to six months [Corrected per Errata sheet issued in October 2002] these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war. The following bullets are listed as ‘High Confidence’: > [@](#): > > High Confidence: > [ul] > [li]Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.[/li][li]We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs.[/li][li]Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.[/li][li]Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grad fissile material[/li][/ul] That’s about as certain as it gets in the intelligence business, as least in the unclassified parts. And by the way, while there was some dissention over the nuclear program and aluminum tubes, as far as I know the conclusions above were _unanimous_. So if the DOE and State are such unimpeachable sources when it comes to aluminum tubes, do you accept their judgement with respect to chemical and biological weapons? If not, why? So now I have two questions for you: 1. Do you think it was unreasonable for George Bush to base his decisions on the NIE? 2. If not, do you think it was reasonable to use relatively certain language, given what the intelligence community reported to him? > [@](#): > > Those of us who mistrust the administration have been waiting patiently for at least 8 months, if not longer, for them to produce some of that proof. We demanded that the proof be produced, in fact, before the invasion was launched. And how, pray tell, was proof to be produced? Iraq wasn’t exactly an open country. Let’s phrase the question this way: Assuming the NIE was the absolute best the intelligence community could do, do you think it was inappropriate to act on the information in it? And remember, try to put yourself in a decision-making position BEFORE the war, when we didn’t know that the WMD would be found. Forget about the conspiracy theories, and alll the rest. Let’s assume everyone involved was acting sincerely, to the best of their ability, with the best interests of the country involved. You’re the president, and you get handed this assessment. You’re told, “This is the best information we have”. Are you going to sit back and say, “Well, not good enough. Everyone go home, and let’s hope Saddam doesn’t have all this stuff.” > [@](#): > > We were met with scorn. We were told that the administration had already produced overwhelming proof to support its case, and that we would deny the existence of that evidence even if they rubbed our noses in it. And so on. Well, before the war it sure looked that way. If I were to look at that information again, not knowing what I do now about the lack of WMD found, I’d make the same judgement I did before the war. And so would a lot of other people. Sometimes you just have to play the cards you’re dealt. > [@](#): > > So this is my first question to you: what accounts for the sudden shift in your position? Why did you argue, before the war, that the administration possessed absolutely certain knowledge about Iraq’s weapons – such certain knowledge, in fact, that our only option was to go to war – only to now claim, afterwards, that it is impossible to possess such knowledge in the intelligence business? New information. The administration thought they knew where this stuff was. The intelligence services were sure it was all there. Now, there’s more data. So you re-evaluate. That’s what grownups do. I can’t ignore the fact that no WMD have turned up, so I have to question the quality of the intelligence before the war. So does the CIA, the NSA, and all the rest of them. > [@](#): > > Prior to the war, you argued that Bush had “presented the evidence for the weapons he claimed was there,” often over my vocal objections to the contrary. You only modified your position after it became undeniably apparent that there were no stocks of chemical/biological weapons where Bush claimed there were. These “protestations of innocence” you present now are little other than an act of shameless historical revision, Gorgonzola. That’s right. I modified my position. I was convinced the intelligence was accurate. Now I’m not sure. What’s so hard to understand about that? These things happen. There were a lot of people that were sure there would be mass starvation in Afghanistan, and that never happened, did it? There were a lot of people predicting thousands of American casualties. That didn’t happen, did it? There were lots of people predicting all kinds of things that didn’t happen. The real world is complex. It has ways of throwing curveballs at even the best estimates. But that isn’t an excuse to be paralyzed into inaction at all times. You do the best you can with the information you have. > [@](#): > > I just want to stress one point: by December 2002, the DOE – that agency within the government that possesses “virtually the only expertise on gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs in the United States government,” according to the ISIS report I cited earlier – had concluded that the tubes were unsuitable for use as uranium centrifuges. They stated as much in the NIE, supported by the State Department’s own BIR. The administration chose to simply ignore this assessment, relying instead on the assessments of “agencies specializing in electronic surveillance, maps, and foreign military forces.” As Albright notes, scientists who dissented with the government’s view were expected to simply remain silent. Albright is not exactly a non-partisan player in this. I like the way you take her word as absolute gospel, and distrust everything from the other side. Even if the story about the researcher at the DOE is true, it may not be the whole story. There may be other elements involved. And that does not explain the conclusions of the CIA, NSA, NGIC, and the DIA that the tubes probably WERE destined for a nuclear program. Do you have explanations for that? The DOE did not say the tubes could not be used for enrichment. They said it was unlikely that they would be used for that. They agreed that they COULD be. You asked in your other message how DOE could possibly have agreed that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program if it disagreed about the tubes. Read this relevant paragraph again: > [@](#): > > Moreover, most agencies believed that Iraq’s attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors, magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools, as well as Iraq’s efforts to enhance its cadre of weapons personnel and activities at several suspect nuclear sites indicated that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. So you have this shipment of tubes. At the same time, you pick up heightened activity at suspected nuclear sites. You notice that more people are being employed in suspicious roles. We don’t know what specific intelligence they have that’s classified, but it might be pretty damning. And one of the reasons why the CIA may have concluded the tubes were for a nuclear program is precisely because of other, corroborating intelligence. Intelligence not available to, say, Madelaine Albright. > [@](#): > > These facts indicate to me that the administration was well aware that the tubes were probably not intended for use in a nuclear weapons program, but they nevertheless continued to argue that they were. Only now, months after the invasion, have we been able to uncover the details of a controversy that should have been brought up, and thoroughly resolved, BEFORE the US invaded Iraq. No, the administration knew that there was dissent between the various agencies. I WILL fault them for not making that dissent clearer in Bush’s speeches. But reasonable people can take either side of that dispute, unless you think the State Department and DOE should always trump CIA, NSA, and DIA. > [@](#): > > ## I also want to repost Albright’s conclusion: quote: > > ## Perhaps we will eventually learn that Iraq actually planned to hide a centrifuge purchase in a rocket procurement program. Such cleverness is well within Iraqi capabilities, although Iraq rarely chooses to build a poor product when it can build the same item significantly better in less time. Such a revelation, however, will not vindicate the CIA analysis, which is viewed as atrocious and deceptive by many experts on centrifuges and Iraqi rockets. > > By this I take Albright to mean that even if the administration gets lucky and stumbles over evidence that the tubes really were intended for centrifuges, such a discovery would have no real bearing on the deceptive practices it employed with regard to these tubes prior to the invasion. Does she offer any proof that this conclusion is viewed as ‘atrocious’? By whom? > [@](#): > > But you are correct. I cannot prove with 100% certainty that the administration has willfully deceived the world. I can only construct what I believe to be a very strong case for that assertion. I believe that the case I’ve constructed against the Bush government, in this and other threads, is much, much stronger than the case Bush & Co. was able to construct against Iraq; and I ask again (no doubt once more in vain): why is it that you are so willing to go to war against Iraq on such scanty evidence, but so unwilling to pass judgement on the administration in the face of such strong evidence? Don’t flatter yourself. You think your case against Bush is stronger than the case the entire intelligence community built around WMD in Iraq? Please. I was supportive of the war because the evidence is NOT flimsy. When EVERY intelligence agency says they have ‘high confidence’ that Iraq is building stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and four out of six think they are buying aluminum tubes to enrich uranium, and all six agencies agree that they are trying to reconstitute a nuclear program in some form, that is not ‘flimsy’ evidence. Unlike you, I am not predisposed to believing that evil forces are at work behind the scenes, manipulating data and subverting justice. I assume that this is a very large collection of professionals who know a hell of a lot more than I do, and this is their considered opinion. Of course, when agencies like the EPA, NOAA, or other government agencies that support YOUR belief make statements, you tend to believe them, right? Is it only the intelligence community that must be treated with instant suspicion and nit-picked with a fine comb for any sign of flaw? ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 10:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/228 "2003-08-15T10:40:57Z")
…Continued > [@](#): > > ## Continuing: quote: > > ## As far as I can tell, the BUSH LIED! crowd’s evidence is this: WMD have not been found. That’s pretty much it. > > Oh yeah. Well, that certainly isn’t very much, is it? > > But I can’t believe you would make this statement in the face of so much other evidence we have produced beyond the conspicuous lack of “WMDs.” Your evidence so far has been nitpicking about the niger uranium claim and the aluminum tubes. How about you tear apart the NIE judgement on biological and chemical weapons? After all, that’s what we expected to find. We never expected to find nuclear weapons. We expected to find caches of Vx, CycloSarin, Anthrax, and other WMD. Based on the NIE, do you not think that was a reasonable expectation? > [@](#): > > ## quote: > > ## I know of no evidence that would allow you to draw the conclusion that the administration fabricated a casus belli. > > None? Nothing at all, Sam? Nothing in Powell’s presentation to the UN, or in the SOTU, or in the numerous public statements made by members of this administration? You mean that we have absolutely no reason to be suspicious? > > Are you actually bothering to read what your debating opponents have posted? Yep. I read them. So far, I’ve agreed that the language about the tubes was a little strong. A big brouhaha was spawned over the ‘16 words’, which never specifically referred to Niger. How about we attack the meat of the claim, which was that Iraq still had extensive stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, mobile bio labs, and a program to rapidly build up production of such weapons. That claim seems a LOT more solid than the nuclear claim, and yet we didn’t find any of those weapons, either. Do you have an explanation for that? > [@](#): > > ## quote: > > ## Now, in the interim, if more information has come to light to make the aluminum tubes-as-centrifuge-parts less likely, that’s fine. Did the administration know it then? > > As I have clearly demonstrated, such information did surface, and the administration did know it. They knew that two agencies out of six dissented. The majority view held that the tubes were probably intended for a nuclear program. All six agencies agreed that it was possible. > [@](#): > > ## quote: > > ## And once again, I’d point out that the information about the tubes was not constructed by the administration - it was the conclusion of the CIA, NSA, and DIA. How can you fault an administration for relying on information from its own intelligence agencies, even if that information later turns out to be false? > > To repeat: while some agencies regarded the “tubes as centrifuge” theory as plausible, those best qualified to make the assessment – at the DOE – did not. They’re “unanimous” conclusions were shared by experts at the IAEA. The Bush administration was aware of these facts – the dissention of the DOE was included in the NIE published after the war. Now, how does the DOE magically become ‘the most qualified’? Because they dissented, I guess. That elevates them in your book. But it’s not clear that they had access to all the intel the CIA did. They may not have had the context from years of parallel analysis into Iraqi behaviour. The NGIC is expert in rockets, and they felt the tubes were not good candidates for a rocket program. > [@](#): > > I think all of these factors, taken together, argue strongly for the probability that the administration overstepped its limits, and moved from “spinning” information to outright lying with regard to the tubes. And the tubes are only one of a number of questionable assertions made by the administration in the run-up to the war. The tubes were a MINOR part of the issue. Read the NIE - even with the tubes, they felt that Iraq was 5-7 years away from enriching enough material for their own bomb. More threatening was the possibility of getting fissile material from another country, in which case the NIE conclusion was that Iraq could have a bomb in as little as ‘months’. There was also worry about drone aircraft delivering bio weapons, Vx getting in the hands of terrorists, Iraq training al-Qaida and other terrorists in how to make chemical weapons, etc. Lots and lots of problems. Focusing on the tubes allows you to pick at the weakest part of the intelligence assessment, but it was by no stretch of the imagination the most important part of the case, and the other evidence is much, much stronger. Let’s talk about that, shall we? > [@](#): > > I could be wrong, of course; but wouldn’t a congressional investigation help us figure that out? I’m already on record as saying I favor such an investigation if WMD are not found. Not because I think the Bush administration is a bunch of filthy liars, but because they relied on a National Intelligence Estimate that would then appear to be flawed, and that’s a problem that needs correcting. ---
**Author:** ![Desmostylus](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/c57346/32.png) [@Desmostylus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Desmostylus)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 12:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/229 "2003-08-15T12:08:02Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > \*\*The following bullets are listed as ‘High Confidence’: > > > [@](#): > > > > - Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions. > > > > - We are not detecting portions of these weapons programs. > > > > - Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles. > > > > - Iraq could make a nuclear weapon in months to a year once it acquires sufficient weapons-grad fissile material > > That’s about as certain as it gets in the intelligence business, as least in the unclassified parts. And by the way, while there was some dissention over the nuclear program and aluminum tubes, as far as I know the conclusions above were _unanimous_. So if the DOE and State are such unimpeachable sources when it comes to aluminum tubes, do you accept their judgement with respect to chemical and biological weapons? If not, why?\*\* Well, _after_ the fact, how can those judgements possibly be accepted? They’re _wrong_. If your question was meant to be about pre-invasion intelligence, it’s _still_ unsupportable bullshit. The evidence _did not fucking exist, except in the minds of the faithful_. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > **And how, pray tell, was proof to be produced? Iraq wasn’t exactly an open country. Let’s phrase the question this way: Assuming the NIE was the absolute best the intelligence community could do, do you think it was inappropriate to act on the information in it? And remember, try to put yourself in a decision-making position BEFORE the war, when we didn’t know that the WMD would be found.** I think the above is your entire argument in a nutshell. No proof, act on suspicion. Negative _evidence_ was available, via the CIA, the UN inspectors, etc. Just didn’t suit the admin. And your final sentence is a typical lie: “And remember, try to put yourself in a decision-making position BEFORE the war, when we didn’t know that the WMD would be found.” It should be restated as “And remember, try to put yourself in a decision-making position BEFORE the war, when we didn’t know that **there were no WMDs** ”. ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 2:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/230 "2003-08-15T14:02:51Z")
**Sam** : First off, thanks for replying to my arguments. Secondly, the “Albright” I’ve been referring to thus far is not Madeline; it’s David Albright, a former UN inspector and head of ISIS. He’s the one that wrote the report I referred to earlier; he was also probably involved in the report from ISIS you cited earlier as well. Regarding the “evidence” for Iraq’s possession of chemical/biological weapons: well, first off, you’re moving the goal post again, I think. I got involved in this thread primarily because you wanted someone to provide one piece of evidence that was “100% wrong,” and I suggested that the aluminum tubes might be something close to that. But okay. We can expand the discussion if you like, but for every new issue the picture becomes more complex. Regarding the NIE “key judgements”: > [@](#): > > \*\* We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF (cyclosarin), and VX; its capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.\*\* Now, for months, I’ve been asking: on what basis the CIA has made this assessment? Do you know? Can you produce for me any credible evidence that this is the case? Or must I merely accept it on faith? The CIA tells me: Baghdad’s back in the chemical business again. Alright, let’s just say for the sake of argument that I’m doubtful. Where’s the evidence? > [@](#): > > \*\* An array of clandestine reporting reveals that Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limited CW agent production hidden within Iraq’s legitimate chemical industry.\*\* This claim doesn’t really mean all that much to me. What sorts of chemicals and equipment? Are there legitimate uses for them? Is there evidence that Iraq _has_ begun to produce these chemicals, and how reliable is it? Or is it the case that virtually any large chemical industry would meet the criteria used here? > [@](#): > > \*\* Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents–much of it added in the last year.\*\* Note the use of the word “probably” in this sentence, and the qualifier, “we have little specific information.” That’s a far cry from Bush’s statement, on the eve of the invasion, that “'_intelligence gathered by this and other governments **leaves no doubt** that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised_.” And what of the DIA report that concluded there exists ‘‘no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing or stockpiling’’ chemical weapons? And so on. I need more than just the assessments; I need to see at least _some_ of the evidence they’re based on. I think it might be worth repeating here as well that David Kelly, the deceased British weapons expert, was quoted in an interview as saying that he believed there was a 30% chance that Iraq had some sort of chemical weapons program, and that the chances were “somewhat higher” that they had an active biological weapons program. That’s a chance of less than one in three. Back to your reply: > [@](#): > > - That’s about as certain as it gets in the intelligence business, as least in the unclassified parts. And by the way, while there was some dissention over the nuclear program and aluminum tubes, as far as I know the conclusions above were unanimous. So if the DOE and State are such unimpeachable sources when it comes to aluminum tubes, do you accept their judgement with respect to chemical and biological weapons? If not, why?\* I don’t accept State’s and DoE’s conclusions about chemical and biological weapons because I have thus far not seen any evidence. With regard to the tubes, I’ve now seen much evidence both for and against, and I side with Albright, Woods, and the other experts at the DoE. I call this process of looking at evidence, weighing it, and passing judgement, “Thinking for myself.” > [@](#): > > - So now I have two questions for you: > > 1. Do you think it was unreasonable for George Bush to base his decisions on the NIE?\* Of course not. But on the other hand, I’m not convinced that the decision to invade Iraq was based on the NIE. I think the NIE report is being exploited as a pretext for the unprovoked invasion of another sovereign state as part of a far-reaching, global strategy promoted by neo-conservative forces in the government. > [@](#): > > - > 1. If not, do you think it was reasonable to use relatively certain language, given what the intelligence community reported to him?\* **Sam** , in all honesty, no. I think there is overwhelming evidence that the administration overstated their case, to put it mildly, in the run-up to the war. And I think the lack of evidence discovered after the war bears this suspicion out. > [@](#): > > - And how, pray tell, was proof to be produced? Iraq wasn’t exactly an open country.\* And here we are again. Before the war, the pro-war side claims absolute proof. Now, after the war, they prevaricate. It would have been fine if y’all had said, “Well, okay, anti-war protestors, you’re right: we don’t really have compelling proof of Iraqi misdeeds. We merely have sneaking suspicions, but we feel that we must act on those because…” and so on. You did not. You claimed you had absolute, compelling proof, and that there could exist “no doubt” that Iraq possessed these weapons. Don’t you understand that you can’t go back now, afterwards, and admit that you didn’t have that proof without giving the lie to your previous claims? In fact, it’s already too late. The mere fact that the US cannot locate _any_ stockpiles of “WMDs” clearly reveals that they didn’t know for sure in the first place. Think about it: let’s say that CIA intelligence says there is a large stockpile of chemical munitions at X. Then, the matter is simple; travel to X and unveil to the world this stockpile. Apparently, the US doesn’t have that information, however. _None of the prewar intelligence has panned out_. None, **Sam**. Zero. Nada. Zip. Nuthin’. So even if US forces happen to stumble across a chemical munitions dump tomorrow, that really means nothing. The claims of certain knowledge made prior to the invasion have been revealed as false _already_. > [@](#): > > - Let’s phrase the question this way: Assuming the NIE was the absolute best the intelligence community could do, do you think it was inappropriate to act on the information in it? And remember, try to put yourself in a decision-making position BEFORE the war, when we didn’t know that the WMD would be found.\* Well, I’d probably not be a very good president, but in answer to your question…if by “act on the information in it” you mean launch an unprovoked war without UN approval, then yes, I think it was unquestionably inappropriate. For lots of reasons. > [@](#): > > - Forget about the conspiracy theories, and alll the rest. Let’s assume everyone involved was acting sincerely, to the best of their ability, with the best interests of the country involved. You’re the president, and you get handed this assessment. You’re told, “This is the best information we have”. Are you going to sit back and say, “Well, not good enough. Everyone go home, and let’s hope Saddam doesn’t have all this stuff.”\* I’m really the wrong person to ask this question of, since I have no desire to sit in the Oval Office. But there are a range of options between “going home” and going to war, are there not? > [@](#): > > - Well, before the war it sure looked that way. If I were to look at that information again, not knowing what I do now about the lack of WMD found, I’d make the same judgement I did before the war. And so would a lot of other people. Sometimes you just have to play the cards you’re dealt.\* I beg to differ. It did not look that way at all. And I think time has shown, at least thus far, that my assessment was more accurate than yours. > [@](#): > > - New information. The administration thought they knew where this stuff was. The intelligence services were sure it was all there. Now, there’s more data. So you re-evaluate. That’s what grownups do. I can’t ignore the fact that no WMD have turned up, so I have to question the quality of the intelligence before the war.\* You perhaps realize that your argument contradicts itself at this point. You’ve spent the first half of your post, if I understand you correctly, defending the quality of the intelligence before the war. Now you are admitting that I was correct to doubt that intelligence. If, as you say, “\* Iraq wasn’t exactly an open country\*,” then how can you simultaneously defend the level of certainty expressed in these pre-war assessments? Or did you suddenly discover that Iraq wasn’t open after the war? > [@](#): > > - Albright is not exactly a non-partisan player in this. I like the way you take her word as absolute gospel, and distrust everything from the other side. \* C’mon, **Sam** , let’s not play this game. It gets sterile. We can question the objectivity of each other’s sources all day. Anyway, I have not taken Albright’s word as “gospel.” I’ve read his arguments – hell, you cited him yourself when posted that first link to ISIS, noting that his report was more “balanced” that the article I had quoted. I was taken aback when, after perusing your report, I discovered how old it was; and, surfing onto the ISIS homepage, I found Albright’s considerably more recent summary of the aluminum tubes controversy. I figured since you cited ISIS as a balanced source, you would accept Albright’s version of events as at least balanced and worthy of consideration. To my knowledge the CIA has not yet responded to the specific allegations made by ISIS and the NYT. Albright, in particular, is careful to qualify his views by admitting that the CIA, NSA, etc., might have other information. However, he also points out that 1) they attempted to support their claim concerning the tube on a purely technical analysis; 2) the analysis did not stand up under critical scrutiny; and 3) the CIA has not produced any other information whatsoever to support its claims. In fact, Albright calls for the CIA to release any other information it might have so as to assess the issue more fully. Your comments lead me to suspect that you aren’t reading the linked material very carefully. > [@](#): > > - And that does not explain the conclusions of the CIA, NSA, NGIC, and the DIA that the tubes probably WERE destined for a nuclear program. Do you have explanations for that?\* With regard to the CIA, see the linked article about “Joe” above. I have no explanation for the opinions of the other agencies, but as has been noted before, the real experts on the question were found in the DoE. Unless, of course, you dispute Albright’s claim regarding that. > [@](#): > > - The DOE did not say the tubes could not be used for enrichment. They said it was unlikely that they would be used for that. They agreed that they COULD be.\* I’ve responded to this canard about twice now, and I’m not going to do so again. Go ahead and cling to it, if it’s that important to you. > [@](#): > > - So you have this shipment of tubes. At the same time, you pick up heightened activity at suspected nuclear sites. You notice that more people are being employed in suspicious roles. We don’t know what specific intelligence they have that’s classified, but it might be pretty damning.\* Or it might not. You have no idea, yourself, and are merely speculating. I am asking you to build a case on _what we know_, rather than on _fantasies of what might be_. > [@](#): > > - I WILL fault them for not making that dissent clearer in Bush’s speeches.\* I think you are right to fault Bush for citing questionable information as if it were absolute. But we clearly disagree about how serious this is. I view the fact that Bush twisted or exaggerated evidence in order to mislead the country into war (admitted now even by you) as an impeachable offense. > [@](#): > > - But reasonable people can take either side of that dispute, unless you think the State Department and DOE should always trump CIA, NSA, and DIA.\* Well, I think that in this particular question regarding the tubes, which is where the expertise of the DoE lies, its voice should probably weight pretty heavy. I wouldn’t expect the DoE to trump the NSA with regard to signal intelligence, on the other hand. Does that sound reasonable? > [@](#): > > - Does she offer any proof that this conclusion is viewed as ‘atrocious’? By whom?\* No, Albright merely claims that the many experts view the CIA analysis as atrocious and deceptive. But both Albright and the NYT claim that it is the **unanimous** conclusion of experts at the DoE that the tubes are unsuitable for use as centrifuges, and explains why. I take his word for it, at least this far. ISIS draws a lot of water for me anyway, because it has always struck me as serious and non-partisan in its technical analyses. More later, time permitting…. ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 4:22pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/231 "2003-08-15T16:22:01Z")
Continued… > [@](#): > > - Don’t flatter yourself. You think your case against Bush is stronger than the case the entire intelligence community built around WMD in Iraq? Please.\* Yes, I do. The list of incriminating evidence against the Bush administration is growing incredibly long. I don’t quite know what it will take to get you to see that, however. We have articles from WorldNewsNet and the New York Times, as well as the report by Albright, that strongly incriminate the administration’s claims regarding the aluminum tubes. We’ve been arguing back and forth about it for three pages now. Just when you were about to agree, you suddenly flipped back again. I honestly can’t make heads or tails of the flimsy excuses you’ve used to justify your _volte face_. If it’s this difficult to convince you that something suspicious was going on with regard to the tubes, I can’t imagine what it will take to convince you of the rest. Tell me, for example: how do explain away the fact that sections of Powell’s presentation to the UN were plagiarized from a twelve-year-old graduate thesis? Or is that just another “nit-pick?” > [@](#): > > - I was supportive of the war because the evidence is NOT flimsy. When EVERY intelligence agency says they have ‘high confidence’ that Iraq is building stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons…\* …then you are taking the word of these agencies, _without evidence_. The fact that 10 million people believe the Sun circles the Earth is not evidence that the Sun circles the Earth. > [@](#): > > _… and four out of six think they are buying aluminum tubes to enrich uranium, and all six agencies agree that they are trying to reconstitute a nuclear program in some form, that is not ‘flimsy’ evidence._ Indeed, you are correct. It is not “flimsy” evidence. It is not evidence at all. > [@](#): > > - Unlike you, I am not predisposed to believing that evil forces are at work behind the scenes, manipulating data and subverting justice. I assume that this is a very large collection of professionals who know a hell of a lot more than I do, and this is their considered opinion.\* I’m not “predisposed” in that manner either, **Sam**. But the simple facts remain:[ul][li] during the run-up to the war, the administration made many dubious claims; [/li][li] prior to war, the administration was unable to support these claims. After the war, it has still been unable to support them;[/li][li] there have been many reports in the media that members of the intelligence community have felt pressured to produce information that supported the administration’s agenda;[/li][li] the administration sat up alternative “shadow” agencies to produce intelligence information more in line with its own thinking; and[/li][li] virtually no claims made by the administration regarding Iraq’s ties to Al-Queda or its “WMDs” have gone undisputed.[/ul]And I am at a loss, **Sam** , as to how one might explain away these facts as simple, well-meaning mistakes on the part of a benevolent and professional government.[/li][QUOTE] - Of course, when agencies like the EPA, NOAA, or other government agencies that support YOUR belief make statements, you tend to believe them, right? Is it only the intelligence community that must be treated with instant suspicion and nit-picked with a fine comb for any sign of flaw?\* [/QUOTE] Oh, I get it. My judgements are subjective, biased, and flawed. You, on the other hand, are a paragon of objectivity; you judge all sources with an impeccable even-handness, regardless of whether or not they are in agreement with your presuppositions. I guess that’s why you were accusing Albright of bias, earlier, but take George Tenet at his word, unquestioningly. > [@](#): > > - Your evidence so far has been nitpicking about the niger uranium claim and the aluminum tubes. \* Brilliant, **Sam** , brilliant as always. I’ve got to hand it to you. Actually, my evidence goes on for pages and pages. Here, at this juncture, we’ve been discussing the aluminum tubes. Elsewhere I’ve discussed Bush’s uranium claim. I’ve posted in-depth analyses of the misleading rhetoric used by Powell in his address to the UN. In this thread, earlier, I posted a series of statements made by Bush, and Powell, that appear to be highly misleading, if not downright false. They are but a small selection of the lies that slithered out of this administration before the war. We have the OSP. We have WHIG (which hasn’t been mentioned yet, but will be soon no doubt). We have the obvious fact that none of the information the administration had prior to the invasion has proven to be reliable. And what have you got? A **Debka** report and David Kay’s smile, as far as I can see. Yeah, you’re right **Sam**. I’m just busy picking _nits_, me. > [@](#): > > - How about we attack the meat of the claim, which was that Iraq still had extensive stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, mobile bio labs, and a program to rapidly build up production of such weapons. \*Alright, let’s do that. The labs, as we know, have proven to be a big nothing. Please provide your evidence that Iraq had extensive stockpiles of chemical/biological weapons, or programs to rapidly develop them. Note: NIE assertions that such evidence exists _are not_ the same as the evidence itself. Note as well: this case is to be made without reference to any of the info David Kay may or may not uncover _ex post facto_, since the claims of certainty were made before the war. > [@](#): > > - That claim seems a LOT more solid than the nuclear claim, and yet we didn’t find any of those weapons, either. Do you have an explanation for that?\* How about:”_That’s about as certain as it gets in the intelligence business, as least in the unclassified parts…. Iraq wasn’t exactly an open country_.” Sound familiar? How about the possibility that the case was over-interpreted by those who wanted to see things that simply weren’t there? Does the following ring any bells, for example? > [@](#): > > \*\*By the way, the Bodyguard Israel smuggled out of Iraq brought some startling information with him which, if verified, is very troubling: > > 1. Saddam’s underground weapons caches are in bunkers that were built by Chinese engineers. That would explain China’s reluctance for an invasion - it may turn out to be very embarrassing to them. > > 2. Saddam has more SCUD missiles\* - provided by North Korea. If North Korea is smuggling missiles to Iraq, it could also be smuggling Plutonium. Now that we can no longer track North Korea’s plutonium, this is an incredibly dangerous hazard, and is just one more reason why the world can no longer rely on containment. > > Another argument the anti-war folks have been using is that ‘containment works’. Well, it clearly doesn’t. It looks like Saddam has built a pretty sophisticated infrastructure right under the U.N.'s nose, has smuggled in missiles, and God know what else. Clearly, the status quo is unacceptable.\*\* > > – _originally posted by_ **Sam Stone** Watch now carefully how it works. First **Sam** references some story about a bodyguard smuggled out of Iraq, and states “IF verified, [it] is very troubling…” Indeed, it might be, but the operant word is **IF**. After all, **IF NOT** , then the report means nothing. Not surprisingly, by the end of his post, this unconfirmed and highly suspicious report (which also turned out to be totally false) has been re-construed as evidence that containment doesn’t work; proof that Saddam has a “_sophisticated infrastructure right under the UN’s nose_.” “CLEARLY, THE STATUS QUO IS UNACCEPTABLE…” _if, of course, the report is true_. Somehow between the begin and the end of your very short post you forgot about that bothersome “IF,” eh, **Master Samwise**? Or did you merely hope that no one would be able to see through your rhetorical sleigh-of-hand? > [@](#): > > - They knew that two agencies out of six dissented. The majority view held that the tubes were probably intended for a nuclear program. All six agencies agreed that it was possible.\* They knew that the DoE was that agency that contained the highest level of expertise regarding the question. They knew that the experts at the DoE had ruled unanimously against their claims. They knew that all the technical evidence, taken together, did not make a strong case for the tubes. They knew that IAEA also dissented from that view. They knew that the specifications and the anodized coating actually constituted evidence _against_ their use as centrifuges, but cited them as evidence _for_ their use as centrifuges. They had made it known, apparently, that scientists who disagreed with their assessment were to keep their mouths shut. You agree yourself that the administration overstated its case with regard to the tubes. Yeah, you’re right, **Sam**. I’m just picking nits here. > [@](#): > > - Now, how does the DOE magically become ‘the most qualified’? Because they dissented, I guess. That elevates them in your book.\* No. They did not “magically” become the most qualified because the “dissented.” David Albright has made this claim. I’ve even quoted it in this thread (You see? I _knew_ you weren’t reading my posts ;)). If you believe it to be wrong, please explain why. You can reference back to Albright’s statements to start with. Who knows? You may be right. > [@](#): > > - The tubes were a MINOR part of the issue. Read the NIE - even with the tubes, they felt that Iraq was 5-7 years away from enriching enough material for their own bomb.\* Now **Sam** ; how can the Iraqis enrich material without centrifuges? Centrifuges made from tubes you yourself admit are the weakest link in the administration’s case? And by the way, you left out the conditioning phrase, “if freed from constraints.” And the rest of this is just smoke, anyway. We can talk about the other elements of the case – gladly, as far as I’m concerned – but they don’t really have a bearing on whether or not the administration lied about the tubes. > [@](#): > > - More threatening was the possibility of getting fissile material from another country, in which case the NIE conclusion was that Iraq could have a bomb in as little as ‘months’. There was also worry about drone aircraft delivering bio weapons, Vx getting in the hands of terrorists, Iraq training al-Qaida and other terrorists in how to make chemical weapons, etc. Lots and lots of problems. Focusing on the tubes allows you to pick at the weakest part of the intelligence assessment, but it was by no stretch of the imagination the most important part of the case, and the other evidence is much, much stronger. \*You mean to tell me that you seriously consider the “_drone aircraft delivering bio weapons_” claim to be a **stronger** part of the assessment than the claims about the tubes? Are you serious? ---
**Author:** ![vibrotronica](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/v/a9a28c/32.png) [@vibrotronica](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/vibrotronica)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 7:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/232 "2003-08-15T19:43:03Z")
> [@](#): > > Now, how does the DOE magically become ‘the most qualified’? Because they dissented, I guess. That elevates them in your book. The Department of Energy is not “magically” the most qualified department to comment on nuclear issues–it simply is the most qualified by the virtue of its history and mission. Please refer to the DOE history page: [http://ma.mbe.doe.gov/me70/history/overview.htm](http://ma.mbe.doe.gov/me70/history/overview.htm) > [@](#): > > The origins of the Department of Energy can be traced to the Manhattan Project and the race to develop the atomic bomb during World War II. > > \\_ > > The Atomic Energy Commission was specifically established to maintain civilian government control over the field of atomic research and development. During the early Cold War Years, the Commission focused on designing and producing nuclear weapons and developing nuclear reactors for naval propulsion. > > \ > > In response to changing needs in the mid 1970’s, the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 created two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to regulate the nuclear power industry and the Energy Research and Development Administration to manage the nuclear weapon, naval reactor, and energy development programs. > > However, the extended energy crisis of the 1970’s soon demonstrated the need for unified energy organization and planning. The Department of Energy Organization Act brought the federal government’s agencies and programs into a single agency. > > \ > > In the 1980’s, nuclear weapons research, development, and production took a priority. > > \ > > Today, the Department of Energy contributes to the future of the nation by ensuring our energy security, maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile, cleaning up the environment from the legacy of the Cold War, and developing innovations in science and technology. The DoE are the people who produce American nuclear weapons–they are the ones who invented nuclear weapons in the first place. Have a look at their field offices and see if any of them look familiar: [http://ma.mbe.doe.gov/me70/history/DOE\_site\_links.htm](http://ma.mbe.doe.gov/me70/history/DOE_site_links.htm) > [@](#): > > Ames Laboratory > … > Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory > Los Alamos National Laboratory > … > Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory > … > Sandia National Laboratory > … > Y-12 National Security Complex (Oak Ridge, Tennessee) They’re not “magical”, they’re just the experts. What other government agency is better qualified to comment on matters concerning the production of nuclear weapons than the people who actually produce the nuclear weapons? ---
**Author:** ![elucidator](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/8edcca/32.png) [@elucidator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/elucidator)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 9:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/233 "2003-08-15T21:38:26Z")
**Mr. S** > [@](#): > > …They knew that the specifications and the anodized coating actually constituted evidence against their use as centrifuges, but cited them as evidence for their use as centrifuges… I missed something there. I don’t recall reading the part where the coating and specs made them less adaptable for centrifuge use. After you take your exasperation medication, would you point that out? That’s rather a sharper point than it looks, at first glance. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 9:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/234 "2003-08-15T21:55:58Z")
I understand that the DOE has the most expertise in the construction of nuclear weapons, and has the most expertise in determining the suitability of the tubes. No question. But that’s not the only criterion here, is it? Once everyone agrees that it’s POSSIBLE that the tubes could be used for that purpose, then other expertise enters into the question. Things like reliability of intelligence sources. How much to weight things like readings of inventory levels, vehicular traffic around suspect sites, etc. How much Iraq in the past has been willing to sacrifice in order to disguise weapons activities. For instance, Iraq may have decided that if they ordered tubes to the exact specifications for a centrifuge, they would be found out immediately. But if they ordered tubes that \*looked like rocket tubes, but which were still barely within spec for use in a centrifuge, then they could fool agencies like the DOE. In all of these latter judgements, the DOE is probably the least qualified to pass judgement. The CIA is probably the most qualified. This is what the CIA does best - gather reams of disparate information and analyze it looking for patterns. For instance, let’s say the walls of the tube were too thick. They’d have to be milled with special carbide-tipped milling machines. But suppose the CIA also knew that Iraq had recently ordered carbide-tipped milling blades, claiming they were for their oil industry? That’s the kind of stuff that can elevate the assessment of what these tubes were for. Only if the DOE had said, “There is no possible way that these tubes could be used in that application” should their judgement be taken as definitive. As long as they admit the possibility, then corroborating evidence becomes key. And DOE would be almost completely out of the loop when it comes to that stuff. Do you think the CIA just ignores DOE’s input? Do you think they all pass judgement in a vacuum, and then compare notes after the NIE is written? No. It’s an iterative process. I’m sure CIA took the DOE’s data, and used it to refine their own estimate. They still concluded that those tubes were probably destined for a nuclear program, and the NGIC, DIA, and NSA concurred with their opinion. That also doesn’t mean the CIA has to be right, of course. And Tenet makes one admission that could provide some insight into the judgement of all the agencies - after the first Gulf war, the U.S. intelligence community was disturbed to find that Iraq’s WMD programs were far more advanced than they had thought. They had erred on the conservative side. So this time around, they may have been too aggressive in assigning malicious intent to that wide body of disparate intel. I would hang tough for another month or so, and then have this discussion again. David Kay should have made his presentation by then, and we’ll be able to see how well it matches up against the NIE. From what I understand, he’s developed a very strong case for biological weapons, a somewhat less strong case for chemical weapons, and somewhat less than that for nuclear. So the aluminum tube issue may not go away, but I think we’ll have a much better understanding of what Iraq was up to with chemical and biological weapons. At that point, I would support a congressional investigation into whatever errors came out of the NIE, for the purpose of improving America’s intelligence gathering capability. But one thing seems clear to me so far - President Bush acted on the considered advice of his intelligence experts. He did not fake this. He did not create a threat out of whole cloth to help out Cheney and his buddies. The Bush administration listened to their security briefings, and made the judgement that it had to be acted on. At that point, they prepared a case to take to the world. In a couple of identified but small areas (so far), I would admit that they probably over-sold the intelligence. But that doesn’t make the evidence fake. **Mr. Svinlesha:** We’re going 'round in circles here. Yes, I tend to trust the judgement of the intelligence community, until given evidence otherwise. That means I’m now on the fence, because the evidence so far is not matching those estimates. I’m also aware that intelligence is an inexact science, and also involves a lot of evidence that is classified. So at some point you just have to accept the conclusions offered. You’re unwilling to do that. Fine. I would point out that the Clinton administration accepted these estimates, as has every other administration. The NIE is the report that the government uses to shape policy, and it’s been that way for a long time. If that’s not good enough for you, what would you suggest? ---
**Author:** ![Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/8edcca/32.png) [@Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hentor_the_Barbarian)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 10:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/235 "2003-08-15T22:44:47Z")
I just wanted to say thanks Mr. S! Fantastic! Your work here has been thoroughly informative, well reasoned, supported by the evidence and well documented. I greatly appreciate your efforts and your erudition. I admire your ability to maintain a civil tongue when I would have been tempted to descend into barbs and jabs. ---
**Author:** ![elucidator](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/8edcca/32.png) [@elucidator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/elucidator)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 11:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/236 "2003-08-15T23:03:05Z")
Before someone does this in an unfriendly fashion, **Hent** , I advise you that quite a few Dopers regard it as unseemly to post remarks of praise, however deserving thier focus. (I believe I’ve heard it called “toadying”. Ribbit. Neee-deep.) I have no intent to scold. Merely to pre-emptively point this out so that some surly sumbitch has no excuse to rag on you about it. Of course, if you include such remarks in passing, while posting to serious intent on a related subject, you would be entirely “in bounds” to say something like “Big Svin rocks!”. For instance. ---
**Author:** ![quixotic78](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/q/3ab097/32.png) [@quixotic78](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/quixotic78)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 11:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/237 "2003-08-15T23:41:11Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > **Once everyone agrees that it’s POSSIBLE that the tubes could be used for that purpose, then other expertise enters into the question.** I might have missed this, but did any of the agencies give confidence levels (or something like that) for the possibility of these tubes being used for centrifuges? I mean, it’s POSSIBLE that I could use a roll of toilet paper as a centrifuge tube – it meets the tube criterion, at least. However, one could perhaps quantify this possibility as having a one in a billion chance of being true. Still possible, of course. I guess what I mean is – what is meant by “possible” in this context? \*\* > [@](#): > > For instance, let’s say the walls of the tube were too thick. They’d have to be milled with special carbide-tipped milling machines. But suppose the CIA also knew that Iraq had recently ordered carbide-tipped milling blades, claiming they were for their oil industry?\*\* That’s a cute little scenario. Now, do you have any evidence that this (or something like it) is what happened, or have you decided to do away with the pretense of looking at facts? \*\* > [@](#): > > Only if the DOE had said, “There is no possible way that these tubes could be used in that application” should their judgement be taken as definitive.\*\* But I thought intelligence was murky and never definite… I know **Big Svin** has pointed this out, but it’s odd how sometimes you regard intelligence as murky and other times regard it as rock solid, depending on what’s convenient to your argument. 'Tis a page straight out of _The Book of Rummy_, no two ways about it. \*\* > [@](#): > > Do you think the CIA just ignores DOE’s input? Do you think they all pass judgement in a vacuum, and then compare notes after the NIE is written?\*\* Do you think the DOE ignores the CIA’s input? That’s a double-edged sword you’re playing with. Be careful. \*\* > [@](#): > > I would hang tough for another month or so, and then have this discussion again.\*\* If you insist, but is any new [evidence](http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=evidence&r=67) (link provided for the convenience of the Bushies) really going to present itself? Are the tubes gonna change? What exactly will salvage your shredded argument? \*\* > [@](#): > > President Bush acted on the considered advice of his intelligence experts. He did not fake this. He did not create a threat out of whole cloth to help out Cheney and his buddies.\*\* STOP SAYING THIS!!! No one here, outside of possibly **Reeder** , believes this! Jesus Christ, man, did you have this straw man surgically attached to you at the hip? Let it go! The case that IS made is that the Bush Administration _cherrypicked_ the intelligence. If it painted Iraq in a bad light, it was rock solid; if it seemed to exonerate Iraq, it was relegated to a footnote (if that). Look into the OSP (Office of Special Plans) that poster **SimonX** has explored in a number of threads. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 11:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/238 "2003-08-15T23:45:20Z")
> [@](#): > > Of course, if you include such remarks in passing, while posting to serious intent on a related subject, you would be entirely “in bounds” to say something like “Big Svin rocks!”. For instance. And I would point out to you that if your goal is to get your opponents to concede points to you, then you might want to restrain yourself from jumping around giving each other high fives and “IN YOUR FACE!” comments when someone does so. Not only is it childish, but it makes it less likely in the future that people will be willing to concede arguments. It’s just another little incivility that tends to have a chilling effect on reasonable discourse. And we’ve got more than enough of that around here in the first place. ---
**Author:** ![elucidator](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/8edcca/32.png) [@elucidator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/elucidator)\ **Post date:** [August 15, 2003, 11:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/239 "2003-08-15T23:52:17Z")
What?! What!? My innocence is sorely slandered, woe is me. I was merely offering **Hentor** a pointer on ettiquete and delicacy, sort of like Emily Post. As you may know, the diplomatic and tactful demeanor common to Texans is the stuff of legend. ---
**Author:** ![Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/8edcca/32.png) [@Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hentor_the_Barbarian)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 1:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/240 "2003-08-16T01:37:09Z")
**Elucidator** , I agree with said rule of etiquette, and appreciate you calling it to the fore. Go right on quoting regulations, Mr. Saavik. But surely there are occasions when someone has so thoroughly and completely, er… covered a topic that one simply has to admire and applaud the degree of contribution to the combatting of ignorance that has been made. No? Well, in the interest of fairness, **Sam,** I applaud your tenacity, your willingness to soldier on in the face of… certain doom, your, well, sheer indefatigability at the sport of pitching softballs. Good on ya. Okay, well I do have one thing to add. I have hesitated because it is largely moot, and likely, if anything, to lead to a sidebar. I posted this before, but nobody but myself seems interested. However, recognizing that either way, this matter is not casus belli, I do not believe that the possession of the aluminum tubes (as war materiel) was prohibited as is often claimed. I believe that their sale or supply by other states was prohibited under 687, thusly: from [UN SC Resolution 687](http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm) > [@](#): > > Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of: > > (a) Arms and related materiel of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment; This is the resolution that Mohamed ElBaradei referenced in identifying the tubes as prohibited even for their application to rockets. I read it to say that States shall prevent the sale by their folks. How is it to be read to apply to Iraq rather than other States? How is it to be read to prohibit possession of these tubes as war materiel? Is there some other resolution that more clearly says “Iraq may not purchase or possess these tubes?” How can Iraq be said to have done anything wrong based on this wording if they possess aluminum tubes for rockets? All hail Big Svin! Viva Svin the Shiv! [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325.md?page=11) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325.md?page=13)