# The "Big Impact" Plan for Iraqi WMDs **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 1, 2003, 11:35am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325 "2003-08-01T11:35:16Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 13
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 1:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/241 "2003-08-16T01:48:24Z")
> [@](#): > > Well, in the interest of fairness, Sam, I applaud your tenacity, your willingness to soldier on in the face of… certain doom, your, well, sheer indefatigability at the sport of pitching softballs. Good on ya. You want to insult me, do it in a more straightforward way. In the pit. Your backhanded insults are unwelcome here. As for the tubes being illegal for Iraq to import, I suggest you look up the proscription on ‘dual use’ items. ---
**Author:** ![Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/8edcca/32.png) [@Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hentor_the_Barbarian)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 1:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/242 "2003-08-16T01:56:32Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > \*\*As for the tubes being illegal for Iraq to import, I suggest you look up the proscription on ‘dual use’ items. \*\* Great, thanks! Er… which one? Where? Cite? ---
**Author:** ![RedFury](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/ec9cab/32.png) [@RedFury](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RedFury)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 1:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/243 "2003-08-16T01:59:04Z")
Beyond the whole aluminum tuubes discussion, I’d also like to point out that the major reason they became of such import was the _fake_ Niger yellowcake report. A ‘one and one equals two’ type of deduction. Yellowcake + centrifuge tunes = Saddam Bin Laden’s going be nuclear any minute now! Best invade _yesterday_! 'cept it looks like they were adding zeros all along. **Sam** , you remind me of the old Timex[sup]®[/sup] slogan. Perhaps you remember it as well? You know, the one that went “Takes a licking and keeps on ticking.” Wonder why? 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/8edcca/32.png) [@Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hentor_the_Barbarian)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 2:14am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/244 "2003-08-16T02:14:05Z")
**Sam** , just wanted to add two things: First, I do not honestly wish to insult you, and apologize for joking about it as I did. I did honestly wish to thank and applaud Mr. S for his efforts. Secondly, as I said, ElBaradei is the only one I know who specified where the prohibition came from, and he clearly said: From our analysis to date, it appears that the aluminum tubes > [@](#): > > would be consistent with the purposes stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for manufacturing centrifuges. However, we are still investigating this issue. It is clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council Resolution 687. This, by the way, came from PBS. I thought I remembered him specifying the paragraph in 687 that he felt applied. Again, I recognize that this is relatively minor, compared to the overall deceit regarding the aluminum tubes, but I honestly think it is incorrect to say that Iraq’s possession of these tubes was illegal. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 2:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/245 "2003-08-16T02:34:50Z")
So let me get this straight: Mr. ElBaradei says that “It is clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council Resolution 687.” From this you conclude that Iraq’s importation of these tubes is NOT illegal? As for the ‘taking a licking’, Redfury, I think that’s in the eye of the beholder. Because you are on “Mr. S”'s side, it’s not surprising that you would think his arguments are a slam dunk. It’s all in the perception. I’m not some wild conspiracy theorist - I’m the guy saying that the National Intelligence Estimate of your country contains the best information known outside of Iraq about Iraq’s weapons programs. Aside from the relatively small issues of aluminum tubes and a forged Niger document (which was NOT the sole source of evidence for the ‘purchasing uranium from Africa claim’), I have yet to hear any solid arguments against the UNANIMOUS assessment that Iraq had significant stockpiles of chemical weapons and an active and growing biological weapons capability. Or let’s put it another way: Let’s assume that no claim was ever made about aluminum tubes and uranium sales in Africa. Do you think that the whole case for Iraq’s WMD capability falls apart? If so, you would be in disagreement with EVERY U.S. intelligence service. Now, in hindsight, we can say that they may in fact have been wrong. I’ll wait for David Kay’s assessment before drawing that conclusion, however. But the fact is, before the war pretty much EVERYONE thought Saddam had those weapons. Not finding them caught everyone by surprise. And not just the U.S. - intelligence services in every major western government thought those weapons would be found. So we have a mystery. One that needs to be solved. But this focus on aluminum tubes and attempted African uranium purchases is at best a side issue, and even those issues are not nearly as cut-and-dried as “Mr. S” is trying to portray. As I pointed out earlier, the CIA, DIA, and NSA STILL stand behind that estimate. They aren’t backing down. Neither is Colin Powell. So to assume the issue is settled is simply wrong. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 2:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/246 "2003-08-16T02:34:50Z")
So let me get this straight: Mr. ElBaradei says that “It is clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council Resolution 687.” From this you conclude that Iraq’s importation of these tubes is NOT illegal? As for the ‘taking a licking’, Redfury, I think that’s in the eye of the beholder. Because you are on “Mr. S”'s side, it’s not surprising that you would think his arguments are a slam dunk. It’s all in the perception. I’m not some wild conspiracy theorist - I’m the guy saying that the National Intelligence Estimate of your country contains the best information known outside of Iraq about Iraq’s weapons programs. Aside from the relatively small issues of aluminum tubes and a forged Niger document (which was NOT the sole source of evidence for the ‘purchasing uranium from Africa claim’), I have yet to hear any solid arguments against the UNANIMOUS assessment that Iraq had significant stockpiles of chemical weapons and an active and growing biological weapons capability. Or let’s put it another way: Let’s assume that no claim was ever made about aluminum tubes and uranium sales in Africa. Do you think that the whole case for Iraq’s WMD capability falls apart? If so, you would be in disagreement with EVERY U.S. intelligence service. Now, in hindsight, we can say that they may in fact have been wrong. I’ll wait for David Kay’s assessment before drawing that conclusion, however. But the fact is, before the war pretty much EVERYONE thought Saddam had those weapons. Not finding them caught everyone by surprise. And not just the U.S. - intelligence services in every major western government thought those weapons would be found. So we have a mystery. One that needs to be solved. But this focus on aluminum tubes and attempted African uranium purchases is at best a side issue, and even those issues are not nearly as cut-and-dried as “Mr. S” is trying to portray. As I pointed out earlier, the CIA, DIA, and NSA STILL stand behind that estimate. They aren’t backing down. Neither is Colin Powell. So to assume the issue is settled is simply wrong. ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 10:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/247 "2003-08-16T10:56:19Z")
**elucidator** : > [@](#): > > - I missed something there. I don’t recall reading the part where the coating and specs made them less adaptable for centrifuge use. After you take your exasperation medication, would you point that out? That’s rather a sharper point than it looks, at first glance.\* It is indeed a sharp point, because it would appear to imply one of two possibilities: Powell and his staff are either technically illiterate, or purposefully misleading. Unfortunately, I can no longer access the WP article I linked to earlier that spells out these allegations (you can find the link about half way down on page 4; it was originally supplied by you in a different thread, I believe). I think there was more information in the article than I posted here, but just to repost the relevant section on anodization: > [@](#): > > **An anodized coating is actually a strong argument for use in rockets, according to several scientists in and out of government. It resists corrosion of the sort that ruined Iraq’s previous rocket supply. To use the tubes in a centrifuge, experts told the government, Iraq would have to remove the anodized coating.** Further quotes, taken from ISIS (and also previously posted): > [@](#): > > \*\* The aluminum tubes Zippe used were not anodized or did not have any other type of coating. Uncoated aluminum works well in a centrifuge both in a rotor assembly and as cascade piping. The coating on the outer surface of the tube would be removed during the shaving operation _**[i.e., if the tubes were modified after purchase so as to be used in a centrifuge rotor]**_. An anodized layer on the inside of the tube, however, can result in hampering the operation of the centrifuge, according to an expert involved in the development of Zippe-type centrifuges in the 1950s and 1960s…. > > A technical expert who was involved for two decades in selling equipment to make rocket tubes for military purposes said he does not believe the tubes are for centrifuges. He said combustion chambers of many types of small rockets require tight specifications in their thickness and outer diameter. He also said that anodizing the outer surface of the tube would be expected in a rocket tube to create a smoother surface and prolong the shelf life of the rocket.\*\* and here: > [@](#): > > \*\* An anodized layer is a thin protective coating placed on aluminum that makes the aluminum more resistant to corrosion. However, bare aluminum without any coating is resistant to corrosion by uranium hexafluoride, the process gas in a centrifuge. There are no industrial centrifuges in the world that use anodized rotors. A well known unclassified fact is that anodization is not necessary for a centrifuge. However, anodization is a common practice in military and commercial equipment to protect against weather and the environment. For example, bicycle handlebars are anodized. > > The tubes Iraq acquired in the 1980s for use in its program to indigenously produce a reverse-engineered Italian rocket were not anodized. Most of these tubes did corrode during years of storage. When Iraq started to look for a new supply of tubes in 2000, it decided to order anodized tubes to account for uncertain storage conditions. As a result, anodized aluminum tubes are consistent with a rocket use and not a centrifuge purpose.\*\* Regarding the specifications of the tubes, these quotes taken from the same sources: > [@](#): > > \*\* The dimensions of Zippe-type centrifuges made with aluminum rotors are publicly available. The rotors typically have diameters between 50 and 100 millimeters and a length of about 50 centimeters. Their wall thickness was less than one millimeter. Thus, the dimensions of the aluminum tubes Iraq sought are consistent with centrifuge use, assuming that the tubes would be cut and the walls significantly thinned.\*\* That was in October. As time went on, even this equivocal assessment changed: > [@](#): > > \*\* All experts agree that after modification the tubes could be used as a rotor of a poor quality gas centrifuge. Complicating the realization of this design is that the wall of the tubes is unusually thick, and the tubes’ diameter is not optimal for such a centrifuge. Many centrifuge experts believe that this design would not work as the basis of a centrifuge plant…. > > Some of the characteristics of the tubes are compatible with a centrifuge use, but all of the characteristics fit a use in a rocket that Iraq was producing indigenously. This rocket was based on reverse-engineering a helicopter-launched rocket, large quantities of which Iraq had imported from Italy in the 1980s during the Iran/Iraq war and converted into surface-to-surface rockets. The tubes’ length, wall thickness, and diameter in particular are consistent with a use in this rocket. Although these tubes could be used as a centrifuge rotor if they were cut, the resulting tube would result in a poor quality centrifuge. Its relatively small diameter and thick walls could create new and potentially significant problems that the Iraqis would need to overcome. An IAEA team of centrifuge experts, quoted by ElBaradei in his report to the Security Council, went further, concluding that “it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable redesign needed to use [the tubes] in a revived centrifuge” program. In addition, no one has ever built large numbers of Beams’ centrifuges or produced significant amounts of enriched uranium in a cascade of such machines. An inevitable conclusion is that the CIA analysis tried to design a centrifuge around the tubes rather than determine the use of the tubes from their characteristics. > > The centrifuge design being posited by the CIA has a capacity to enrich uranium that is far below the level Iraq has already demonstrated with different centrifuges. As a result, Iraq would need to build thousands more centrifuges than if it used one of its proven designs. This approach would cause significant delays in building a centrifuge plant and require the procurement of a huge number of other items. Given the number of procurements and the time to test a new centrifuge design and build a plant, Iraq would have to assume its program would be discovered before it was able to produce significant quantities of highly enriched uranium. Given Iraq’s need for both speed and secrecy, its choice of such a strategy would be odd to say the least… > > Powell’s statement on improving specifications and tolerances is also not compelling. The Italian rocket and the reverse-engineered Iraqi rocket have different specifications and tolerances. However, the specifications and tolerances of the two rocket designs are consistent with each other, according to a US expert. > > A German rocket expert interviewed for this effort who had extensive experience with Iraqi conventional armaments, centrifuge, and missile programs in the 1980s said that these types of rockets often have precise specifications and tolerances. He added that there are even US systems with similar specifications and tolerances, contrary to administration claims. In addition, experts said that the higher levels of specifications mentioned by Powell were likely the result of earlier specifications and tolerances not being sufficient to make the reverse-engineered rockets. The conclusion of these experts is that the more exacting tolerances of the tubes ordered by Iraq are not far in excess of tolerances used in rockets…. > > In addition, past Iraqi behavior on setting tolerances of parts undermines confidence in drawing conclusions about these tubes. In many cases, Iraqi scientists and technicians had difficulty determining adequate tolerances of components. As a result, they would over-specify the tolerances of components. > > Thus, dimensions of an object are a much better indicator of an end use than the object’s tolerances. For example, the tolerance of a soda can is relatively precise, but that fact does not indicate the end use of the can.\*\* A table at the bottom of the page compares the various characteristics of the tube with both rocket and centrifuge use. While some characteristics of the tubes _are_ consistent with centrifuge use, others are not; all of them, on the other hand, are consistent with use in rockets. Clearly then, if these sources are to be believed, neither the anodized coating nor the specifications of the tubes support Powell’s contention that they were intended for use as part of a covert Iraqi nuclear weapons program. But he claimed the exact opposite: > [@](#): > > \*\* Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off? > > People will continue to debate this issue, but there is no doubt in my mind, these elicit procurement efforts show that Saddam Hussein is very much focused on putting in place the key missing piece from his nuclear weapons program, the ability to produce fissile material.\*\* Turning now to **Sam’s** argument: > [@](#): > > \*I understand that the DOE has the most expertise in the construction of nuclear weapons, and has the most expertise in determining the suitability of the tubes. No question. > > But that’s not the only criterion here, is it? Once everyone agrees that it’s POSSIBLE that the tubes could be used for that purpose, then other expertise enters into the question. Things like reliability of intelligence sources.\* I feel like this point has already been addressed, but since **Sam** continues to rehash it, let me repost the following: > [@](#): > > \*\* In late 2001, experts at Oak Ridge asked an alumnus, Houston G. Wood III, to review the controversy. Wood, founder of the Oak Ridge centrifuge physics department, is widely acknowledged to be among the most eminent living experts. > > Speaking publicly for the first time, Wood said in an interview that “it would have been extremely difficult to make these tubes into centrifuges. It stretches the imagination to come up with a way. I do not know any real centrifuge experts that feel differently….” > > As an academic, Wood said, he would not describe “anything that you absolutely could not do.” But he said he would “like to see, if they’re going to make that claim, that they have some explanation of how you do that. Because I don’t see how you do it.”\*\* His statement is consistent with the conclusions of the IAEA’s team of experts, quoted above. Given the technical hurdles that Iraq would have to overcome in order to actually use the tubes in the manner posited by the US, Albright notes: > [@](#): > > \*\* One hopes that the CIA has special intelligence information supporting its case about the intended use of these tubes. This possibility, however, appears increasingly remote. The British government said recently in its assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs that “there is no definitive intelligence evidence that [the specialized aluminum] is destined for a nuclear programme.”\*\* His assessment is even more damning in the more recent article: > [@](#): > > \*\* Determining the truth against this background is difficult. I first learned of this case a year and a half ago when I was asked for information about past Iraqi procurements. My reaction at the time was that the disagreement reflected the typical in-fighting between US experts that often afflicts the intelligence community. I was frankly surprised when the administration latched onto one side of this debate in September 2002. My surprise became concern when I was told that this dispute had not been mediated by a competent, impartial technical committee, as it should have been according to accepted practice. I became dismayed when a knowledgeable government scientist told me that the administration could say anything it wanted about the tubes while government scientists who disagreed were expected to remain quiet. > > …the administration has offered few public details about its case or the tubes. It typically restates its views, never answering any technical criticisms of its claims. But publics and other governments need to know the truth, in particular the technical evidence underpinning the administration’s conclusion. A critical question is whether the Bush Administration has deliberately misled the public and other governments in playing a “nuclear card” that it knew would strengthen public support for war.\*\* So please, **Sam** let’s put this canard in the grave. Experts have not said “_There is no possible way that these tubes could be used in that application_” because they are being technically accurate. But they _do_ say things like, “\* It stretches the imagination to come up with a way\*,” and “_I don’t see how you do it_,” which surely must be considered very strong judgements against the administration’s case. ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 11:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/248 "2003-08-16T11:04:10Z")
In addition, I just one to make a couple of comments about the dispute between **Sam** and some of the others here regarding proper board etiquette. **Hentor** : > [@](#): > > - I just wanted to say thanks Mr. S! Fantastic! Your work here has been thoroughly informative, well reasoned, supported by the evidence and well documented. I greatly appreciate your efforts and your erudition. I admire your ability to maintain a civil tongue when I would have been tempted to descend into barbs and jabs.\* First off, thank ye kindly. With me, flattery will get you everywhere. **Sam** and I did go through a period when we were less than civil with one another (or, at least, when I was less than civil with him), but having tangled with **Mr. Stone** on numerous occasions, I’ve finally come to the conclusion that he is sincere in his arguments -even though I disagree quite profoundly with most of them. If I didn’t believe that, I would probably treat him with more contempt, or just ignore him. Since I do believe he’s sincere, I have nothing at all against taking out the time to respond to his points. I do sometimes bait him a bit, but he does it back as well. As far as I can see, that only adds a little spice to the debate – as long as it doesn’t go overboard. **Sam’s** intransigence spurs me to really do my best to make my case. He helps keep my claws sharp, in other words. I’ve learned a lot about the aluminum tubes in this discussion that I didn’t know before, for example, and some of that info I got directly from **Sam**. In addition, this a forum dedicated to debate, and that’s exactly what **Sam** and I are doing. Without him, who would argue the opposite side? Without his input this thread would have died two pages ago, and I for one would know considerably less about these issues than I do now. Finally, if I ever do manage to convince him of the correctness of my position, then I’ll can be sure that my arguments are really watertight – because they will have survived the prodding criticism of a person who is, quite possibly, the most stiff-necked individual in the Great Northwest (which would put him in the running for most stiff-necked individual on the planet). Having said all of that, **Sam** , I do really think that you’ve got a bit of a chip on your shoulder. Most of the comments directed at you thus far have been more in the form of good-natured ribbing, as far as I can tell, rather than serious insults. You seem kinda quick to take umbrage, if you know what I mean. Just my 2 cents. By the way, **Hentor** , I also believe the tubes are illegal. 687 doesn’t list all the items that are prohibited for import into Iraq; were it to do so, the resolution would probably be thousands of pages long. Rather, the text provides a framework within which other, more technical documents, spell out the details of what is and is not prohibited by the resolution. ---
**Author:** ![ElvisL1ves](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/5daacb/32.png) [@ElvisL1ves](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ElvisL1ves)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 1:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/249 "2003-08-16T13:25:55Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > From this you conclude that Iraq’s importation of these tubes is NOT illegal? No, but a reasonable person cannot say it’s a cause for invasion, either. This is a war. People are dead. It’s serious. Those who wanted it have the burden of proof and always have. Please quit trying to backtrack - you must know by now it’s not working. > [@](#): > > I’m not some wild conspiracy theorist - I’m the guy saying that the National Intelligence Estimate of your country contains the best information known outside of Iraq about Iraq’s weapons programs. If you don’t consider that it’s been proven to be consistently wrong, and dishonestly arrived at in the first place, perhaps. > [@](#): > > Aside from the relatively small issues of aluminum tubes and a forged Niger document (which was NOT the sole source of evidence for the ‘purchasing uranium from Africa claim’) Really? What else have you got? Besides the say-so of the same people who offered up the forgery in the first place, that is. > [@](#): > > I have yet to hear any solid arguments against the UNANIMOUS assessment that Iraq had significant stockpiles of chemical weapons and an active and growing biological weapons capability. Other than the people who did know being overruled and silenced by their politically-appointed supervisors, that may be so. > [@](#): > > Or let’s put it another way: Let’s assume that no claim was ever made about aluminum tubes and uranium sales in Africa. Do you think that the whole case for Iraq’s WMD capability falls apart? That’s the _heart of the case_ for their having had an active, serious, real, dangerous program _in operation_ to create nuclear bombs. > [@](#): > > Now, in hindsight, we can say that they may in fact have been wrong. I’ll wait for David Kay’s assessment before drawing that conclusion, however. But you _will_ draw that conclusion, right? No further backtracking? We’ll hold you to it. > [@](#): > > But the fact is, before the war pretty much EVERYONE thought Saddam had those weapons. Most of us, not having direct access to the information itself, were being consistently misled. A large number of us were very strongly suspicious even so. > [@](#): > > Not finding them caught everyone by surprise. And not just the U.S. - intelligence services in every major western government thought those weapons would be found. Most of those services depended on information and assessments supplied to them by the US itself, having comparatively little or no independent means of assessing the situation. > [@](#): > > But this focus on aluminum tubes and attempted African uranium purchases is at best a side issue Hardly. They are at the heart of the question. It is not surprising that you would dismiss them after having had your “100% disproof” challenge accepted and met, though. > [@](#): > > As I pointed out earlier, the CIA, DIA, and NSA STILL stand behind that estimate. They aren’t backing down. Neither is Colin Powell. Nor would they dare to. There’s no political benefit to admitting deception, not when their own powers of seeing what they want or need to see allow them to still hope for vindication, and not when an election season is already started. Keeping quiet and “waiting for the inspections to work” is the only way through this, isn’t it? > [@](#): > > So to assume the issue is settled is simply wrong. When the only way to reach the conclusion you cherish is to start with it and work backward, then yes, it is. **MrSvinlesha** , don’t worry about **Sam** and his behavior. One as quick to claim “ad hominem” when his arguments are dismantled, as routinely happens here, as he is is not in a position to judge others. ---
**Author:** ![Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/8edcca/32.png) [@Hentor\_the\_Barbarian](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hentor_the_Barbarian)\ **Post date:** [August 16, 2003, 1:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/250 "2003-08-16T13:44:52Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > \*\*So let me get this straight: Mr. ElBaradei says that “It is clear, however, that the attempt to acquire such tubes is prohibited under Security Council Resolution 687.” > > From this you conclude that Iraq’s importation of these tubes is NOT illegal? \*\* No, and with all due respect, this may illustrate some of the difficulty you may be having. It tells me that I should go and read Security Council Resolution 687 to see what the evidence for the claim really is. I like to judge things for myself. Show me, don’t tell me, and all that. And **Mr. S** , when I do read 687, I know that it does not specify “no aluminum tubes.” That is not my point. My point is that it specifies that no states may sell or supply war materiel to Iraq. Yes, for rockets, these tubes could reasonably fall into that category. But under the resolution, what did Iraq do wrong? It is sort of like making a law that says liquor stores are prohibited from selling liqour to a minor. When you catch the minor with alcohol, what do you charge him with? ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 18, 2003, 11:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/251 "2003-08-18T11:59:05Z")
**Sam** : At the risk of flogging a horse long-dead, I’m still not quite done with this discussion. > [@](#): > > _Me: \*\* Prior to the war, you argued that Bush had “presented the evidence for the weapons he claimed was there,” often over my vocal objections to the contrary. You only modified your position after it became undeniably apparent that there were no stocks of chemical/biological weapons where Bush claimed there were._\* > > You: **That’s right. I modified my position. I was convinced the intelligence was accurate. Now I’m not sure. What’s so hard to understand about that? These things happen. There were a lot of people that were sure there would be mass starvation in Afghanistan, and that never happened, did it? There were a lot of people predicting thousands of American casualties. That didn’t happen, did it? There were lots of people predicting all kinds of things that didn’t happen.** \* You’re missing my point here, I think. Let’s see if I can clarify it. Prior to the war, the administration stated that it knew certain things to be 100% true. Bush claimed, for example, that the information gathered by US and other intelligence agencies “ **left no room for doubt** ” that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. Powell and other administration officials made similar claims. And, as far as I can tell, you also believed them, and argued that they _did_ know what they were talking about, and that the information they provided was unarguably conclusive. Okay, it’s completely reasonable for you to modify your opinion after the war, and to agree that perhaps this information wasn’t 100% certain after all. But what I can’t understand is how you continue to support the administration after this revelation. Before the war, the administration claimed it had _certain knowledge_, as numerous examples quoted in this thread make clear. After the war, the administration has backpedaled, and claimed that, in fact, its information was really only “probable,” or, in the words of Wolfowitz, “murky.” **The lie perpetrated by the administration was the claim that it knew, with complete certainty, that Iraq possessed “WMDs”** , when, in fact, it did not; it only suspected this to be the case, at a level of certainty that has not yet been revealed. It seems to me that the appropriate response to this state of affairs, _especially for someone who previously believed the administration’s claims_, would be something along the lines of, “Those goddamn motherfuckers! They told me they knew, 100%, but now they tell me they didn’t! And I believed the lying bastards!” Even more so if, as you now admit, almost all of your certainty was derived from reports by these agencies. Instead, your response is to simply shrug your shoulders. What gives, o my brother? Look: the CIA estimates may pan out, and we may eventually discover a hidden stock of chemical or biological weapons. But that doesn’t change the fact that they were still only guesswork, estimates with a certain level of probability, nor the fact that the administration lied about that level of certainty prior to the invasion. It claimed probabilities were absolutes. Or, consider this scenario: We know that David Kelly has stated in a BBC interviewed that he believed there was a 30% probability that Iraq had an active chemical weapons program. Certainly, we don’t know if the CIA consensus agreed with Kelly’s estimate, but we do know that Kelly was a heavy-weight in the field (he specialized in Iraq’s weapons programs), so it’s reasonable to assume that the CIA estimate wasn’t much higher (of course, it might have been, but anyway). Consider Bush speaking before the nation, in the SOTU, and stating: “Our intelligence, and the intelligence of other nations, leaves a 70% doubt that Iraq is developing chemical weapons: therefore, we must invade.” Although a more accurate statement, I suspect it would go over like a lead balloon. The fact that there existed even a 1 in 3 chance that Iraq was developing chemical weapons might conceivably be a compelling argument, for some people, that an invasion was necessary. But though such a numerical estimate is most likely fairly accurate, the fact is that Bush lied about it. We were never given a chance to debate the merits of the case, because we were being inundated by a sea of exaggeration, misinformation, and rhetorical deception. Do you get my point, yet? > [@](#): > > \*Me: **…you are correct. I cannot prove with 100% certainty that the administration has willfully deceived the world. I can only construct what I believe to be a very strong case for that assertion. I believe that the case I’ve constructed against the Bush government, in this and other threads, is much, much stronger than the case Bush & Co. was able to construct against Iraq; and I ask again (no doubt once more in vain): why is it that you are so willing to go to war against Iraq on such scanty evidence, but so unwilling to pass judgement on the administration in the face of such strong evidence?** > > You: \*\*Don’t flatter yourself. You think your case against Bush is stronger than the case the entire intelligence community built around WMD in Iraq? Please. > > I was supportive of the war because the evidence is NOT flimsy. When EVERY intelligence agency says they have ‘high confidence’ that Iraq is building stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, and four out of six think they are buying aluminum tubes to enrich uranium, and all six agencies agree that they are trying to reconstitute a nuclear program in some form, that is not ‘flimsy’ evidence.\*\*\* Let me try to clarify this question as well. I have two points I want to raise in response.[ul][li]First off, I was not claiming that my case was “stronger” than the case built by the intelligence community around Iraq. I was making an observation on your tendency to believe literally _anything_ negative about Iraq before the war, while displaying a remarkable intransigence in the face of strong evidence of misdeeds on the part of the Bush administration now. In all fairness, this tendency was common among the majority of pro-war apologists during the run-up to the war. (By the way, upon rereading, I can see why you might have misunderstood me, as my statement wasn’t exactly clear there on that point.)[/li] [li]The NIE report to which you refer in your resply above was, in fact, not available to you prior to the invasion. Thus, your decision to support the war could not be based on the information from the report that you cite.[/ul]Okay, not to harp on this point, but as an example, consider your post, made prior to the war, that I’ve quoted twice already in this thread. I’ve employed it to demonstrate two points: first, to prove that war supporters did make claims of absolute certainty regarding the situation in Iraq before the invasion; and second, to illustrate how information was rhetorically manipulated by war supporters in order to draw false conclusions. Now, I want to add a third point. Although the report you cited was highly suspect, to say the least, you nevertheless employed it in a debate to win a point: for all intents and purposes, judging from the context of the debate then, you believed the article was accurate and credible, even though it was clearly unsubstantiated.[/li] In other words, you and other members of the pro-war club were predisposed before the war to set your faith in any little scrap of information, or misinformation, that reflected Iraq in a bad light. You appeared to believe any piece of unsubstantiated gossip was further grounds for the invasion. Fine. If that is then your standard for judging US policy decisions, I submit that we have far more than mere unsubstantiated gossip with which to indict the current administration. Compared to the evidence you derived from your “smuggled bodyguard,” I have presented pages and pages of reports and testimony from specialists who dismiss the administration’s case with regard to the aluminum tubes. Yet still you balk. So now I ask: why the double standard? Naturally, as always, there are many more points in this debate that I wish to address, but I have to cut it short for now: I’m going to take **Mr. Svinlesha, Jr.** out for his first bike ride, and he’s getting antsy. See y’all later. ---
**Author:** ![Squink](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/b5e925/32.png) [@Squink](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Squink)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2003, 11:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/252 "2003-08-24T23:51:06Z")
It’s looking like there’ll be no “Big Impact” with the biological weapons drones story come september: [Analysts Doubt U.S. Claim on Iraqi Drones](http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&ncid=514&e=4&u=/ap/20030824/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_aerial_weapons). > [@](#): > > the Air Force believed Iraq’s UAV programs were for reconnaissance, as are most American UAVs. Intelligence on the drones suggested they were not large enough to carry much more than a camera and a video recorder, Boyd said. > Postwar evidence uncovered in July in Iraq supports those assessments, according to two U.S. government scientists assigned to the weapons hunt. > “We just looked at the UAVs and said, 'There’s nothing here. There’s no room to put anything in here,”’ one of the scientists said. ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2003, 2:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/253 "2003-08-25T02:23:08Z")
**Mr. Svinlesha:** First, sorry for the late reply to this. I didn’t see this response back when you posted it, and only Squink’s bump caused me to read the thread again and see that you had left another response. On to your points: > [@](#): > > Prior to the war, the administration stated that it knew certain things to be 100% true. Bush claimed, for example, that the information gathered by US and other intelligence agencies “left no room for doubt” that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons. Powell and other administration officials made similar claims. And, as far as I can tell, you also believed them, and argued that they did know what they were talking about, and that the information they provided was unarguably conclusive. Correct. And the NIE says that those claims were assigned ‘high confidence’, and that there was unanimous agreement among all agencies. The evidence was also strong. For example, do you remember the intercepted communications like this? > [@](#): > > (BEGIN AUDIO TAPE) > > (Speaking in Foreign Language.) > > (END AUDIO TAPE) > > Let’s review a few selected items of this conversation. > > Two officers talking to each other on the radio want to make sure that nothing is misunderstood: > > “Remove. Remove.” > > The expression, the expression, “I got it.” > > “Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it comes up.” > > “Got it.” > > “Wherever it comes up.” > > “In the wireless instructions, in the instructions.” > > “Correction. No. In the wireless instructions.” > > “Wireless. I got it.” I still haven’t heard an explanation for that. If Iraq didn’t have these weapons, what does this mean? Remember, Powell played the actual recording for the U.N. There was a second one, recorded at a facility just before U.N. inspectors were going there, in which a supervisor said something to the effect of, “Did you get rid of everything? I’m worried that you left something behind”. So yes, I read the administration’s arguments, I listened to the evidence myself, followed Powell’s presentation at the U.N., and decided that a high degree of certainty was warranted. Note that Powell’s evidence never showed where WMD WOULD be found. In fact, the satellite photos that he showed depicted a facility being cleaned of evidence before the U.N. inspectors arrived. He showed before and after pictures of bunkers showing how they had been sanitized. He showed fresh earth being trucked in and spread aound the facility to mask chemical traces, etc. In other words, he showed a facility where the chemical agents had already left. > [@](#): > > Okay, it’s completely reasonable for you to modify your opinion after the war, and to agree that perhaps this information wasn’t 100% certain after all. But what I can’t understand is how you continue to support the administration after this revelation. Because I believe they acted in good faith, presenting the best evidence that they had. I don’t believe this was a con job. I think they were as surprised as anyone when that stuff wasn’t found. And, I believe it’s still an open question. We may still get evidence that largely exxonerates the administration. > [@](#): > > Before the war, the administration claimed it had certain knowledge, as numerous examples quoted in this thread make clear. After the war, the administration has backpedaled, and claimed that, in fact, its information was really only “probable,” or, in the words of Wolfowitz, “murky.” I think you’re conflating the claims. I don’t recall that Wolfwowitz said that claims that Iraq had chemical weapons were ever ‘murky’ or ‘probable’. And everyone in that administration STILL believes that those weapons were there, and likely still are. Considering the growing evidence that there is a still a large-scale underground military operation going on in Iraq by the Fedayeen, why won’t you even acknowledge the possibility that perhaps those weapons are well hidden and still in their control? > [@](#): > > The lie perpetrated by the administration was the claim that it knew, with complete certainty, that Iraq possessed “WMDs”, when, in fact, it did not; it only suspected this to be the case, at a level of certainty that has not yet been revealed. This may come down to a matter of semantics. Is it a ‘lie’ to say you have absolute certainty when six out of six intelligence agencies say they have ‘high confidence’ (their highest classification) that those weapons exist, that you have audio recordings of people actually hiding the stuff, satellite photos, and reams of logical evidence with respect to Saddam’s behaviour? We might disagree on that, and that’s fine. If it’s a ‘lie’, it’s a lie of a different order than making totally false claims or forging evidence to take your country to war. It’s more like an overzealous choice of words. But I’m reasonably comfortable in accepting that _given what we knew at the time_, the word ‘certain’ was acceptable. Which of course is why I’m so confused by the lack of WMD at this point. Because looking at that evidence in hindsight, it STILL looks like certainty to me. Unless you want to argue that evidence like that phone conversation was forged. > [@](#): > > It seems to me that the appropriate response to this state of affairs, especially for someone who previously believed the administration’s claims, would be something along the lines of, “Those goddamn motherfuckers! They told me they knew, 100%, but now they tell me they didn’t! And I believed the lying bastards!” Even more so if, as you now admit, almost all of your certainty was derived from reports by these agencies. Well, that’s your response because you are predisposed to wanting to feel that way. For me, it’s more like, "You guys had better have a damned good excuse for this, and by the way, your credibility is shot with me unless you can come up for a satisfactory explanation. So if you start coughing up evidence of WMD in Syria or Iran, you’re going to have to do a hell of a lot better than you did last time. " > [@](#): > > Instead, your response is to simply shrug your shoulders. What gives, o my brother? I’m not shrugging my shoulders. It’s just that, when I look back at Powell’s presentation and all the evidence, including evidence other countries presented, including my own brain looking at Saddam’s behaviour, it STILL makes sense. So why haven’t those weapons been found? I don’t know. I want answers. > [@](#): > > Look: the CIA estimates may pan out, and we may eventually discover a hidden stock of chemical or biological weapons. But that doesn’t change the fact that they were still only guesswork, estimates with a certain level of probability, nor the fact that the administration lied about that level of certainty prior to the invasion. It claimed probabilities were absolutes. Hey, if massive stockpiles of weapons were found, the administration was right. They were certain they were there, and they were. What more do you want? You not only want them to be there, but you wanted them to be found on day 1, and you wanted evidence that the administration knew exactly where to look and found them right where they thought they’d be? Anything else allows you to level charges of lies and coverups? If they are there, the administration will be vindicated. I don’t recall them ever saying they knew where every ounce of those weapons were, or that they could track their movements 24/7. Saddam was clever. A midnight move or a shell game move timed to coincide with gaps in satellite coverage could have moved those weapons. You want to use that possibility as a reason to call your own government a bunch of liars, fine. For me, I recognize that intelligence is an inexact proposition, especially when you are trying to gain information in a country like Iraq with a paranoid security apparatus and decades of experience in hiding things. > [@](#): > > Or, consider this scenario: We know that David Kelly has stated in a BBC interviewed that he believed there was a 30% probability that Iraq had an active chemical weapons program. > > Certainly, we don’t know if the CIA consensus agreed with Kelly’s estimate, but we do know that Kelly was a heavy-weight in the field (he specialized in Iraq’s weapons programs), so it’s reasonable to assume that the CIA estimate wasn’t much higher (of course, it might have been, but anyway). Consider Bush speaking before the nation, in the SOTU, and stating: “Our intelligence, and the intelligence of other nations, leaves a 70% doubt that Iraq is developing chemical weapons: therefore, we must invade.” Although a more accurate statement, I suspect it would go over like a lead balloon. You do know that a lot of this is now under suspicion? Andrew Gilligan apparently did some ‘sexing up’ of his own, and the BBC is now being investigated. And this illustrates your own bias. You chastise me for accepting the word of Colin Powell and the NIE, but you are willing to buy that 30% figure, because it was claimed by a BBC writer that a single arms expert had told him that. > [@](#): > > The fact that there existed even a 1 in 3 chance that Iraq was developing chemical weapons might conceivably be a compelling argument, for some people, that an invasion was necessary. But though such a numerical estimate is most likely fairly accurate, **the fact is** that Bush lied about it. We were never given a chance to debate the merits of the case, because we were being inundated by a sea of exaggeration, misinformation, and rhetorical deception. Now who is making statements of certainty based on flimsy evidence? It’s now certain that Bush lied, huh? No doubts? We know it for sure. > [@](#): > > First off, I was not claiming that my case was “stronger” than the case built by the intelligence community around Iraq. I was making an observation on your tendency to believe literally anything negative about Iraq before the war, while displaying a remarkable intransigence in the face of strong evidence of misdeeds on the part of the Bush administration now. In all fairness, this tendency was common among the majority of pro-war apologists during the run-up to the war. (By the way, upon rereading, I can see why you might have misunderstood me, as my statement wasn’t exactly clear there on that point.) And you were equally willing, as soon as weapons were not immediately found, to declare Bush a liar and the whole thing a put-up job. Perhaps we tend to see what our biases lead us towards. > [@](#): > > The NIE report to which you refer in your resply above was, in fact, not available to you prior to the invasion. Thus, your decision to support the war could not be based on the information from the report that you cite. No, but the essential conclusions in it were made public, and now that the NIE report itself has been declassified, we can see that it corroborates what Powell said. For instance, in re-reading his presentation to the U.N., here’s what he said about the aluminum tubes: > [@](#): > > Most U.S. experts think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Other experts, and the Iraqis themselves, argue that they are really to produce the rocket bodies for a conventional weapon, a multiple rocket launcher. > > Let me tell you what is not controversial about these tubes. > > First, all the experts who have analyzed the tubes in our possession agree that they can be adapted for centrifuge use. Second, Iraq had no business buying them for any purpose. They are banned for Iraq. > > I am no expert on centrifuge tubes, but just as an old Army trooper, I can tell you a couple of things: First, it strikes me as quite odd that these tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. > > Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so. > > Second, we actually have examined tubes from several different batches that were seized clandestinely before they reached Baghdad. What we notice in these different batches is a progression to higher and higher levels of specification, including, in the latest batch, an anodized coating on extremely smooth inner and outer surfaces. Why would they continue refining the specifications, go to all that trouble for something that, if it was a rocket, would soon be blown into shrapnel when it went off? > > The high tolerance aluminum tubes are only part of the story. We also have intelligence from multiple sources that Iraq is attempting to acquire magnets and high-speed balancing machines; both items can be used in a gas centrifuge program to enrich uranium. That’s pretty must exactly what the NIE said. And notice that last part. Remember when we were talking about how the DOE might say that they don’t believe the tubes are intended for a centrifuge, even though they _could_ be used for it, but the CIA differed? Take a look at that last paragraph. The CIA had other intel showing that Iraq was collecting other centrifuge parts. Now let’s say you’re an analyst. You find evidence that they are collecting magnets, rotor parts and other things for a nuclear program. But they’re lacking the tubing to make critical pieces. But hey presto, along comes a shipment of ‘rocket tubes’ that are suspiciously spec’d, and which all agencies agree COULD be used in a centrifuge. Can you see where that conclusion might be drawn, and why another agency, which may not have that additional intel but is more a technical resource, might disagree? > [@](#): > > Okay, not to harp on this point, but as an example, consider your post, made prior to the war, that I’ve quoted twice already in this thread. I’ve employed it to demonstrate two points: first, to prove that war supporters did make claims of absolute certainty regarding the situation in Iraq before the invasion; and second, to illustrate how information was rhetorically manipulated by war supporters in order to draw false conclusions. Now, I want to add a third point. Although the report you cited was highly suspect, to say the least, you nevertheless employed it in a debate to win a point: for all intents and purposes, judging from the context of the debate then, you believed the article was accurate and credible, even though it was clearly unsubstantiated. Didn’t you just to the same thing with Kelly’s quote? > [@](#): > > In other words, you and other members of the pro-war club were predisposed before the war to set your faith in any little scrap of information, or misinformation, that reflected Iraq in a bad light. You appeared to believe any piece of unsubstantiated gossip was further grounds for the invasion. Well… I will say that I am more predisposed to trust the claims of the Bush administration than you are. Time will tell whether I was right, you were right, or the truth is somewhere in between. And I think it’s disingenuous of you to say that my judgement was bsed on little scraps of unsubstantiated information. I don’t call satellite photographs and public playing of intercepted phone conversations that clearly show people working to deceive the U.N. ‘scraps of unsubstantiated information’. That evidence still looks damned good. As for other things that DO fall in that category… Well, when you already have reams of evidence showing that something is true, then other, less solid pieces of information take on new weight when they indicate the same thing. > [@](#): > > Fine. If that is then your standard for judging US policy decisions, I submit that we have far more than mere unsubstantiated gossip with which to indict the current administration. Compared to the evidence you derived from your “smuggled bodyguard,” I have presented pages and pages of reports and testimony from specialists who dismiss the administration’s case with regard to the aluminum tubes. Yet still you balk. So now I ask: why the double standard? We’ve been over this. The testimony you offered is compelling. So is the testimony of the intel community. So there is room for interpretation and disagreement here. Hell, Powell even said so during his U.N. speech. He admitted that other experts did not concur, but he personally was convinced they are wrong. As far as I know, he still stands behind that conclusion. Once again, I will concede that in hindsight Bush’s own rhetoric was too strong in many cases. Powell’s claims about the tubes showed an adequate amount of respect for the opposing opinion. Bush, in his speeches, did not do the same. ---
**Author:** ![rjung](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/45deac/32.png) [@rjung](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rjung)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2003, 5:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/254 "2003-08-25T05:56:21Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > > > [@](#): > > > > “Remove. Remove.” > > The expression, the expression, “I got it.” > > “Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it comes up.” > > “Got it.” > > “Wherever it comes up.” > > “In the wireless instructions, in the instructions.” > > “Correction. No. In the wireless instructions.” > > “Wireless. I got it.” > > I still haven’t heard an explanation for that. You haven’t been looking hard enough, **Sam.** Writer William Pitt pokes an overlooked hole in this piece of evidence, in a [hypothetical cross-examination](http://www.ddh.nl/pipermail/wereldcrisis/2003-February/003436.html) of Powell’s speech: > [@](#): > > This was, indeed, one of the more disturbing aspects of your presentation. This was one of three intercepted transmissions you used. You offered for the other two a date stamp, a temporal context for when it was captured. On this one, you did not. Could this have been a recording taken between 1991 and 1996, a time period we know Iraq was actively hiding material from inspectors. **Why did you not offer a date for when this was recorded?** ---
**Author:** ![quixotic78](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/q/3ab097/32.png) [@quixotic78](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/quixotic78)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2003, 6:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/255 "2003-08-25T06:04:39Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > **We may still get evidence that largely _exxonerates_ the administration.** Nothing to add here, really. I just found this [emphasis added] to be a funny Freudian slip 😛 ---
**Author:** ![Sam\_Stone](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/ecccb3/32.png) [@Sam\_Stone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sam_Stone)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2003, 6:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/256 "2003-08-25T06:40:55Z")
> [@](#): > > You haven’t been looking hard enough, Sam. Writer William Pitt pokes an overlooked hole in this piece of evidence, in a hypothetical cross-examination of Powell’s speech: Your insinuation is that Powell was misleadingly playing a tape that was recorded years ago, and passing it off as something fresh? Do you have any evidence of that, other than that a timestamp wasn’t offered? Besides the other two recordings were just as damning (in my opinion the one where the supervisor expresses worry that something might have been forgotten before an inspector arrives is even more damning), and those were provided with timestamps. I’m not drawing any conclusions about them. I point them out as a fundamental problem for the ‘Bush lied!’ theory. I have never heard them explained away. **quixotic78:** Yeah, I caught then when I re-read it. Pretty funny. ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2003, 9:47am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/257 "2003-08-25T09:47:17Z")
**Sam** : > [@](#): > > - Correct. And the NIE says that those claims were assigned ‘high confidence’, and that there was unanimous agreement among all agencies.\* **Sam** , the phrase “_high confidence_ ” does not mean “_100% certainty_.” Had Bush chosen to actually tell the **truth** about what was known prior to the war, he (and other members of his administration) would not have said there existed “ **no room for doubt** ” that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, etc. He would have said, “we believe with a ‘high level of confidence’ that Iraq possesses these weapons.” Clearly, even a high level of confidence leaves some room for doubt. Speaking for myself, I’m not exactly sure what the phrase “high confidence” means in the context of an NIE report. 90% sure? 80% sure? 30% sure? I don’t know. What I do know, however, is that the administration claimed to be “100%” sure; and I also know that it has turned out that they were, in fact, not – again, I remind you (and anyone else reading this thread) that, thus far, US intelligence reports are batting **ZERO**. They’ve found nothing – not even 10% of what they claimed was there before the war. If you would care to review the report itself, you will also note that its language is clearly equivocal, sprinkled with words like “probably,” and “possibly.” You are walking down a dark street and are eyewitness to a murder. Afterwards, you are asked by the police to identify the murderer in a line-up. Because it was dark, you feel that you cannot be 100% sure that the 3rd fellow from the left did it; but you are reasonably sure – you have a “high level of confidence,” that it was him, and you point him out. At the trial, you are asked to testify. Even though the street was dark, and your vision murky, you nevertheless claim that you are 100% certain that the suspect committed the crime. You know that he only “probably” committed the crime, but you testify before your peers that he did it, and that there exists “no room for doubt” that he is guilty. Have you, or have you not, lied? In response to your interpretation of Powell’s UN presentation: > [@](#): > > - I still haven’t heard an explanation for that. If Iraq didn’t have these weapons, what does this mean? Remember, Powell played the actual recording for the U.N. There was a second one, recorded at a facility just before U.N. inspectors were going there, in which a supervisor said something to the effect of, “Did you get rid of everything? I’m worried that you left something behind”.\* I’ve deconstructed portions of Powell’s speech in a previous thread. I can repost it here, if you like. (In fact, I think I will later.) Regarding this particular piece of evidence, all I can say is: I don’t know what the explanation for it is. Neither, I suspect, do you. Of course, it _could_ be evidence that the Iraqi government is seeking to intentionally hide nerve agents from UN inspectors. On the other hand, it could be that they are attempting to sanitize old documents (recordings of wireless communications from, say, 1987, for example), in attempt to retroactively deny, or at least limit, implications that they might have been involved in producing the stuff _then_. Or it might even be something else. Consider, for example, this [this story](http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twr147e.htm), told by Scott Ritter: > [@](#): > > \*\*There’s another story I want to tell you about our investigations of biological weapons systems. In September 1997 Diane Seaman, biologist and investigator extraordinaire, did a no-notice inspection of the Iraqi national standards laboratory, where they do food testing. She went in the back way, and ran into two gentlemen with briefcases coming down the stairs. They panicked when they saw her, and tried to run away. She chased them down, grabbed them, and seized the briefcases. She handed the briefcases to one of her subordinates, told him to get it out of there, then held off the Iraqis while the guy escaped with the briefcases. > > In our headquarters, we opened the briefcases and saw they contained documentation from their Special Security Organisation, Saddam’s personal presidential security group. It’s like the US Secret Service, but much more brutal. I’d been investigating them for a while. Earlier we’d gotten a very detailed report that the Special Security Organisation were using troops from Saddam’s bodyguard unit to shuttle biological agent back and forth between certain facilities. When we investigated the report, we found it to accurately describe people and places. We took samples and never found any evidence of biological agent, but the SSO remained an organisation we were concerned about. Now we suddenly had in our possession a briefcase belonging to the SSO, taken from guys trying to sneak out of the building. Even more incredible, the document letterhead said Special Biological Activity. > > We were thinking we’d hit a home run. We rapidly began to translate - and I mean rapidly - and saw things like ‘botulinum toxin reagent test kits’, and ‘clostridium perfingen reagent test kits.’ Both of these are agents developed by Iraq for weapons. We organised a meeting with the Iraqis, telling them we wanted to talk about this. The Iraqis refused, saying it had nothing to do with our work. > > So we went to the headquarters of the Special Security Organisation, which happened to be right near the presidential palace. We were stopped at gunpoint, threatened, and forced to terminate the inspection. This led to a major confrontation. The world got ready for war. But then we started a detailed translation of the document and found it wasn’t about biological weapons at all, but about testing food: these are reports of the samples that people take of every piece of clothing, every bed linen, every piece of food, anything that comes into contact with the president and his inner circle. They have botulinum toxin reagent because botulinum toxin is a food poisoning. Same with the clostridium perfingen. The whole document, the ‘special biological activity’, was about presidential security. > > Truth matters little to how the story continues to be spun. This incident is still cited on national television and radio as an example of Iraq’s continued work in biological weapons.\*\* Things aren’t always what they appear to be. That’s what makes intelligence-gathering such a “murky” business. To my eye, the section you cite above, taken by itself, isn’t particularly conclusive; it’s merely circumstantial. One can easily put together a circumstantial case for Iraq’s continued possession and development of “WMDs”, but if we’re going to go to war, I need a lot more than a circumstantial case – I need **proof**. Strong proof. War, and the horrors it brings, should always be the last option. > [@](#): > > - So yes, I read the administration’s arguments, I listened to the evidence myself, followed Powell’s presentation at the U.N., and decided that a high degree of certainty was warranted.\* You did not. You listened to the evidence, etc., and decided that **100%** certainty was warranted; so certain were you that you supported war as the only reasonable option, and argued that anyone who disagreed with you was being stubbornly unreasonable. Now you’re backtracking and claiming that you only had a “high degree of certainty.” > [@](#): > > - Note that Powell’s evidence never showed where WMD WOULD be found. In fact, the satellite photos that he showed depicted a facility being cleaned of evidence before the U.N. inspectors arrived.\* No, they did not. Powell’s photos depicted a facility, period. _He_ claimed that the facility was being cleaned of evidence prior to UN inspector arrival. He provided literally no solid evidence to back up that claim; even the “decontamination trucks” he identified in the photo later turned out, upon closer investigation, to be **fire trucks**. As far as that goes, he was constructing a case out of thin air. I’ll address this more directly in my next post. > [@](#): > > - Because I believe they acted in good faith, presenting the best evidence that they had. I don’t believe this was a con job. I think they were as surprised as anyone when that stuff wasn’t found. And, I believe it’s still an open question. \*Yes, I know that you believe this. I’m asking you: in the face of so much contrary evidence, why do you continue to believe it? What might it possibly take to change your mind, I wonder? Taped conversations of Powell and Bush agreeing to misrepresent evidence? What? > [@](#): > > - I think you’re conflating the claims. I don’t recall that Wolfwowitz said that claims that Iraq had chemical weapons were ever ‘murky’ or ‘probable’. And everyone in that administration STILL believes that those weapons were there, and likely still are.\* From the [NYT](http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/27/international/worldspecial/27CND-POLI.html?ex=1061956800&en=1b5575cd7c808e9a&ei=5070): > [@](#): > > \*\* Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, defending the Bush administration’s justification of the Iraq war, said today that intelligence on terrorism is by its nature “murky,” and that the United States may have little choice in the future but to “act on the basis of murky intelligence” if terror attacks are to be prevented. > > Mr. Wolfowitz appeared on three television programs today, carrying a message about the progress he had witnessed on a recent tour of Iraq. But he was pressed on each to defend the intelligence that portrayed Iraq as holding banned weapons that posed an imminent threat — weapons that have yet to be found. > > “I think the lesson of 9/11 is that if you’re not prepared to act on the basis of murky intelligence, then you’re going to have to act after the fact, and after the fact now means after horrendous things have happened to this country,” Mr. Wolfowitz said on “Fox News Sunday,” referring to the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States.\*\* Anyway, **Sam** , even the NIE you quote uses both “probably” and “possibly” in assessing Hussein’s potential possession of chemical weapons programs/ stocks. > [@](#): > > - Considering the growing evidence that there is a still a large-scale underground military operation going on in Iraq by the Fedayeen, why won’t you even acknowledge the possibility that perhaps those weapons are well hidden and still in their control?\* Okay. I acknowledge the possibility that chemical/biological weapons are well hidden and under the control of the Fedayeen. Do you have any evidence – even a scrap of evidence – that this is the case? > [@](#): > > - This may come down to a matter of semantics. Is it a ‘lie’ to say you have absolute certainty when six out of six intelligence agencies say they have ‘high confidence’ (their highest classification) that those weapons exist, that you have audio recordings of people actually hiding the stuff, satellite photos, and reams of logical evidence with respect to Saddam’s behaviour? We might disagree on that, and that’s fine. If it’s a ‘lie’, it’s a lie of a different order than making totally false claims or forging evidence to take your country to war.\* First off, let’s separate these claims. What I’m _not_ saying: the administration forged evidence. What I _am_ saying: the administration lied about the evidence it had, and purposefully mislead the American public with regard to its conclusiveness. The lie may not be related to forging evidence; I’ve never claimed otherwise. The lie **is** on the order of “making totally false claims,” however, because that is exactly what the Bush administration has done. > [@](#): > > - But I’m reasonably comfortable in accepting that **given what we knew at the time** , the word ‘certain’ was acceptable. Which of course is why I’m so confused by the lack of WMD at this point.\* I’ll bet you are. Funny, isn’t it, that I’m not. > [@](#): > > - Because looking at that evidence in hindsight, it STILL looks like certainty to me. Unless you want to argue that evidence like that phone conversation was forged.\* No, I want to argue that the phone conversation was purposefully misinterpreted to support the administration’s goal, which had been decided upon long before the evidence had been gathered. More later. ---
**Author:** ![rjung](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/45deac/32.png) [@rjung](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/rjung)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2003, 6:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/258 "2003-08-25T18:23:28Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Sam Stone \* > Your insinuation is that Powell was misleadingly playing a tape that was recorded years ago, and passing it off as something fresh? Do you have any evidence of that, other than that a timestamp wasn’t offered? We still haven’t found any WMDs in Iraq, have we? > [@](#): > > I’m not drawing any conclusions about them. I point them out as a fundamental problem for the ‘Bush lied!’ theory. I have never heard them explained away. You make the mistake of assuming Powell’s presentation was sincere and truthful. Sure, he didn’t mention the bogus Niger yellowcake story, but the other stuff he was tossing around was just as questionable. Where _are_ those mobile chemical weapons labs, or those active bioweapons factories, that Powell was banding around? Where are those massive stockpiles of anthrax and Vx Saddam was supposed to have? ---
**Author:** ![Mr.Svinlesha](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/22d042/32.png) [@Mr.Svinlesha](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mr.Svinlesha)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2003, 8:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/259 "2003-08-25T20:13:42Z")
On Powell’s Speech to the UN _These are excerpts from a reply I posted to **december** months ago, on the second page of [this thread](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showthread.php?threadid=189236&perpage=50&pagenumber=1)_: It’s interesting that you mentioned Colin Powell’s speech to the UN back then. I would like to point out that Powell’s presentation didn’t convince anybody who wasn’t already convinced; there was at least one long thread in which it was discussed extensively, and there you can easily see that not everyone accepted his conclusions. I’ve taken the opportunity to go back over the presentation again with the benefit of hindsight. I was surprised to discover how tentative and unconvincing his evidence really was. The speech is rhetorically brilliant in its innuendo; you come away thinking you’ve been presented with incontrovertible proof, when really all you’ve been presented with is hearsay. To begin with, Powell moves adroitly between attempts to prove that the Iraqis were violating 1441, on the one hand, and that they possessed “WMDs,” on the other. Note well, these are in actuality two separate issues. Powell mixes them handily, though, so that they segue into one another; evidence that the Iraqis were “hiding something” is therefore automatically taken as evidence that the thing they were hiding was some sort of “WMD.” Consider this example: Powell plays a recording of a discussion between two unidentified individuals, allegedly members of the Iraqi military, and then provides the following interpretation of their conversation: > [@](#): > > \*\* First, they acknowledge that our colleague, Mohamed ElBaradei, is coming, and they know what he’s coming for, and they know he’s coming the next day. He’s coming to look for things that are prohibited. He is expecting these gentlemen to cooperate with him and not hide things. > > But they’re worried. “We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it?” > What is their concern? Their concern is that it’s something they should not have, something that should not be seen. > > The general is incredulous: “You didn’t get a modified. You don’t have one of those, do you?” > > “I have one.” > > “Which, from where?” > > “From the workshop, from the Al Kendi (ph) Company?” > > “What?” > > “From Al Kendi (ph).” > > “I’ll come to see you in the morning. I’m worried. You all have something left.” > > “We evacuated everything. We don’t have anything left.” > > Note what he says: “We evacuated everything.” We didn’t destroy it. We didn’t line it up for inspection. We didn’t turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up. > > “I will come to you tomorrow.” > > The Al Kendi (ph) Company: This is a company that is well known to have been involved in prohibited weapons systems activity.\*\* Let us assume that Powell is telling the truth with regard to the identity of the two people involved in the discussion. What might we reasonably conclude from this piece of evidence? Well, I submit that we might conclude that the Iraqis had some sort of vehicle which they wished to keep secret, and that’s about it. It is modified in some way – maybe to produce rocket fuel? Not illegal, necessarily, but perhaps something the Iraqi regime prefers to keep secret. Powell asks rhetorically, “ What is their concern?” and then answers for us, “Their concern is that it’s something they should not have, something that should not be seen.” This “something that should not be seen” _could_, conceivably, be connected to weapons prohibited by the cease-fire agreement. But it might not. _We are in fact given no solid evidence one way or the other_. But Powell cleverly insinuates that this is the only reasonable answer to his question, by noting that the Al Kendi (ph) Company is “well-known” to be involved “prohibited weapons systems activity.” But what sort of activity would that be, specifically? Biological, chemical, or nuclear? It is almost redundant to point out that this section of Powell’s report provides us with no evidence of the supposed “stockpiles” of “WMDs” whatsoever. It is, rather, intended to show that the Iraqis were still not complying to the letter with 1441, although it scarcely passes as proof of that. But again, Powell conflates these two issues so that a conversation between low-level military personnel is later hooked back into his presentation as yet one more piece of evidence that Iraq has massive stockpiles of prohibited weapons. Here’s another example of the technique in action: > [@](#): > > \*\* Our sources tell us that, in some cases, the hard drives of computers at Iraqi weapons facilities were replaced. Who took the hard drives. Where did they go? What’s being hidden? Why? There’s only one answer to the why: to deceive, to hide, to keep from the inspectors.\*\* Right. We are now to understand that the _only possible explanation_ for some missing hard drives is that Iraq is attempting to hide massive stockpiles of deadly chemical weapons from the inspectors, in order to one day give them to terrorist or use them against the US. Or, finally, consider the satellite photos. In one example, Powell presents us with photos of the Taji munitions dump, and explains that some of the sites at the dump show the “unmistakable” signatures of chemical weapons dumps. But please allow me to ask: if such signatures are so unmistakable, and so easily identified by satellite surveillance, how can we explain our current inability to locate these dumps now, after the war? After all, as Powell states, there are only 65 such sites in all of Iraq. It’s not like you can just hide chemical weapons in a cave; they must be carefully monitored in case of leakage, and so on – hence the “unmistakable signatures.” Well, I could go on, but I have a wife and a jigger of Bailey’s waiting on me. What is significant about this entire debacle, on the other hand, is precisely the warning many of us gave prior to the war, regarding Bush/Wolfowitz’s so-called “doctrine of preemptive defense:” it can be easily employed to justify a war even when there is, in reality, no real threat. Powell’s presentation is just one example of the way in which intelligence can be manipulated to such nefarious ends. _After a few intervening posts, I continued on page 3_: How could the Iraqi regime prove its innocence (with regard to “WMDs”) when, as is obvious to any reasonable person, the US government employed slander, innuendo, exaggerations, half-truths, and out-right lies to prosecute its case, exploiting as well the full weight of a right-wing media to spin, distort, and otherwise misconstrue the facts and ignore unpleasant truths? The Iraqi government was forced to respond to an unrelenting barrage of the most outrageous charges – such as, for example, its alleged possession of “unmanned drone aircraft,” or its purchase of uranium from Niger – and at the same time, every protestation of innocence was scoffed at. Even absence of evidence was presented as proof – proof that the Iraqis were “hiding” “WMDs” from UN inspectors. Thus, Colin Powell cites the Taji inspection, which failed to produce _any evidence of Iraqi noncompliance whatsoever_, as proof of an advanced Iraqi effort to conceal their so-called “WMD” stocks. Having presented satellite photos of what he claimed to a be a chemical weapons dump, he then goes on to accuse the Iraqis of “sanitizing” the site before the unscheduled arrival of a team of UN inspectors: > [@](#): > > \*\* Now look at the picture on the right. You are now looking at two of those sanitized bunkers. The signature vehicles are gone, the tents are gone, it’s been cleaned up, and it was done on the 22nd of December, as the U.N. inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right. > > _The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing_. > > This sequence of events raises the worrisome suspicion that Iraq had been tipped off to the forthcoming inspections at Taji (ph). As it did throughout the 1990s, we know that Iraq today is actively using its considerable intelligence capabilities to hide its illicit activities. From our sources, we know that inspectors are under constant surveillance by an army of Iraqi intelligence operatives. Iraq is relentlessly attempting to tap all of their communications, both voice and electronics.\*\* For Powell, apparently, the absence of “WMDs” at the bunkers does not imply that maybe, just maybe, intelligence had misinterpreted the activity at the dump; no, no, not at all – it serves as proof that the Iraqis are also deceiving the inspection teams. But note well that Powell has not offered hard evidence; as he says himself, he has merely raised a “worrisome suspicion.” How is one to respond to these sorts of accusations? Even in the absence of “WMDs,” Powell sees “WMDs.” (It may be remembered that after Powell’s presentation, the Iraqi government did debunk this particular piece of evidence, pointing out that the dates on the satellite photos were wrong. Into the memory hole _that_ goes; after all, nobody can believe a word they say, anyway, while Powell’s credibility is, of course, impeachable). [Additional note: this particular claim was also disputed by Blix and UN inspection teams.] So, in a nutshell, my point has little or nothing to do with shifting the burden of proof; on the contrary, I am asserting the existence of a smear campaign against Iraq on the part of the Bush administration, one that Iraq had virtually no chance to counter. At the same time, every attempt on the part of Iraq to meet the demands of the UN was met with contempt, and declared “not good enough;” I do not believe that they had failed to fulfill a single one of their obligations under 1441 before the start of the war, and had agreed to every single US demand. When it was discovered that some of their missiles were in violation of 1441, they immediately began to dismantle them. They had granted inspectors completely unfettered access not only to their weapons dumps, but even to the various presidential palaces, an act equivalent to the US government granting a team of Iraqis free reign to inspect the basement of the White House, the Congress, and the Pentagon for incriminating evidence. And finally, after balking on allowing scientists to be interviewed outside the country, they finally even acquiesced to that demand as well. On top of that they provided thousands and thousands of pages of documentation on their so-called “WMD” programs. Incredibly, all of this was framed by US officials as evidence of Iraqi non-compliance and dismissed. ---
**Author:** ![PatriotX](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/c4cdca/32.png) [@PatriotX](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/PatriotX)\ **Post date:** [September 23, 2003, 3:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325/260 "2003-09-23T03:45:24Z")
Did the ‘Big Impact’ impact yet? Did I miss it? [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325.md?page=12) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-big-impact-plan-for-iraqi-wmds/192325.md?page=14)