Is that an option! “I’m the winner!” Woo-hoo! Sodas and hot-dogs my place! Plus a costume competition!
We’ll debate if .999… = 1
I dunno, I think **Mangetout **and **Trinopus **may have tripped on that transporter a few too many times. And, I warned them not to get in it together (you remember The Fly, don’t you?). 
Grin! Good point. There are some things I do not want to be an exact duplicate of!
(Now, I’m a “furry.” Could we merge me with a nice ferret or something?)
In this kind of discussion ISTM that both sides always accuse the other of magical thinking.
Your position may sound to some like magical thinking; being able to exist in N places at the same time, the possibility of immortality etc.
But personally I think this is a kind of ad hominem. As long as no-one starts talking about chakras or whatever, we’re all trying to formulate a scientific (or at least formal) conception of how personal identity works.
So you now understand why Question_A and Question_B are separate questions.
Because Question_A: Is Mijin still Mijin, can be fuzzy, and subjective. Who’s to say?
But Question_B: dead or transported, is at most one of those alternatives with nothing between.
Time coordinate is special. This is not a fudge for the hypothesis, this is consistent with how we treat all objects.
If there’s a coin at X=1, X=2 and X=3 and they share the time coordinate, that’s 3 coins. But a coin sharing spatial coordinates but with 3 contiguous time coordinates? That’s 1 coin.
i.e. still experiencing something.
I understand what you’re trying to say; that there are different levels of experience / consciousness, sure I agree.
But I’ve been very clear; I’m talking about whether someone’s experiencing anything at all, or is dead. I’m talking about that line. And I’m talking about a fully-formed, fully-functional person being at the destination, and whether I’m now seeing out of those eyes.
Well, I’m still alive. The distinction (and lack of “homunculus”) is very clear when we talk about Question_A and Question_B as outlined above.
If I lose all my memories, am I still Mijin (Question_A)? Well, that’s debatable, maybe I’m a “new person” now. Am I still experiencing something, am I still alive (Question_B)? Of course, yes.
Why? The two are exactly the same: what got transported? All of you, or maybe just most of you. How much is “enough?”
If we can ask Plato’s question about surgically removing more and more of a person – and wonder, “When does it stop being a person?” – why can’t we perform exactly the same process via a bad transporter. Instead of removing your arm with a bone-saw, I remove your arm by not properly transporting it to the destination.
Arm missing: still “you?” Yes.
Okay… Keep going. In due course, it won’t be “you” any longer but a stripped down carcass.
Why does transporting get a special category to itself that surgery doesn’t?
If I have a massive head injury this afternoon, and later make a full recovery, but with significant amnesia and alteration of personality traits, etc, someone will be experiencing stuff, but that someone will only partly be me; the other part will have ceased to be.
I don’t see how it is relevant or useful to draw the wrong line in the right place - survival of ‘me’ as a person isn’t about whether there is a 150-pound blob of flesh walking and talking amongst the crowd - it’s about whether or not the mental function of that organism is ‘me’ - and for that, the only bright lines are at the extremes.
It doesn’t. The point at which you strip enough pieces off that the person dies is where you draw the line in that example.
To what extent a person is “me” is explicitly not the question being put to you, I’ve made that very clear.
I think you both are trying to answer the question you wished you had been asked.
I’m talking about a fully-functioning, conscious, seeing, hearing person at the destination transporter pod. There can be no “partial” in this situation; you can’t occupy part of a brain. Either you transported or you didn’t.
You can’t occupy part of a brain, but part of you can.
No… You have not.
Please do not presume to do my thinking for me.
Why not? Why can there not be a partial transportation? I’ve given several examples, and so has Mangetout. I transport you, but one arm fails to materialize. Partial transportation, but you’re still “you.” I transport you, but you end up with severe mental difficulties and dislocations, memory loss, etc. But you’re still “you.” I transport you, and the result is wholly acerebral. You aren’t “you” any more, nor anyone at all. Somewhere in there, the failure is absolute. But where?
You say the line is sharp and exact. I say it’s mussy and fuzzy and hard to establish. I acknowledge there is a line.
Why do you think you’re right and I’m wrong? You keep declaring this to be so, but you can’t give a reason.
I don’t know if it’s your fault, my fault, or both of our faults, but clarity is not being attained here.
I don’t think Mangetout will take kindly about you not wanting to become a Trinopus-Mangetout hybrid. You seem to be implying that he’s some sort of real-life furry.
If you prefer, I’ll let you jump in the transporter with me—then you can at least be half “God’s gift to women”! 
Cognitive science philosophy professor, Susan Schneider, warns against the transhumanist idea of uploading your consciousness into a SAI being (this, I believe, correlates well with transporters and perfect clones).
I’ll heed her warning.