The concept of a philosophical zombie makes no sense to me

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

That was the premise. You said, “Even if Hawkins succeeds in building a conscious machine…”

True, but I didn’t say anybody knows that it’s properly conscious.

@eburacum45

Perhaps, when we know a little (or a lot) more about consciousness, we will have a ‘consciousness-meter’ that can easily detect the difference. I doubt it will be that simple. It seems more likely to me that we will eventually have to defer the argument, and assume that all beings which act as if they have consciousness actually have it (or that none do).

How could you test for consciousness in another entity?

Well, that’s really what I’m about here. I don’t believe there is any behavioural test—as I said, I consider that almost to be a contradiction in terms. But that doesn’t mean we can’t develop a theory of consciousness, IMO. The problem is often framed in terms of an explanatory gap, which is nothing but the observation that no amount of functional explanation seems to get us any closer to consciousness proper. But we don’t have to stop there.

There’s two ways to frame this gap, in an ontic and an epistemic version—asserting that there is really a fundamental schism in the world (i.e. dualism), or that there is merely a gap in our knowledge of it. In the former case, there’s probably little we can do, so it’s not interesting to me (nor do I believe it to be a consistent possibility—if we postulate such a schism, it becomes difficult to imagine anything that could bridge it, have both parts interact, without the schism itself collapsing). But in the latter case, we can try to discover the gap-bridging principles, and use them to identify those sorts of systems which give rise to consciousness—namely, those which fulfill whatever conditions are necessary for the principles to apply to them.

In order to do so, however, we have to open our eyes to the fact that there is a problem, that there is indeed a gap to be bridged, rather than try to comfort ourselves with vague handwaves that really, there’s no problem, something will happen somehow, don’t worry your little head. That’s simply not how problems should be approached in a proper scientific mindset.

@GIGObuster

But this is reaching for an argument from ignorance, AFAIK the effort of looking at the brain to then make effective AIs is getting results,

Yes, it is. But AI does not imply artificial consciousness. I’m not making an argument from ignorance (and I’m curious what exactly you would point to as being one), I’m highlighting our ignorance, pointing out that we need to address it, rather than try to sweep it under the rug in order to be able to satisfy our preconceptions.

BTW you are not getting the metaphor of the cars, you are actually demanding that experts in other fields should not bother making useful things just because you do not understand them.

No, I’m pointing out the difference between duplicating something and understanding it.

I actually read those and they lost me the moment they used the examples of “Newton looking at philosophy before”, the problem is that he also wasted a lot of time with alchemy and the worst thing was that he hid any progress and most of the failures he had there.

So because one person ended up going down a blind alley, we shouldn’t even leave our rooms? Because there is the possibility of failure, the whole endeavour isn’t worthwhile? Is that really the sort of argument you want to make?

Besides, even while going down that blind alley, Newton still managed to make quite probably the greatest contribution to the development of science by any single person ever. The fact is, without philosophy we wouldn’t have half the science we have today, indeed, we wouldn’t even have a scientific method; what we consider to be that method today is the result of intense philosophical discourse in the last century, discourse which still continues. Only thanks to that discourse can internet scholars everywhere knee-jerk ‘it’s not falsifiable, so it’s not science!’ when seeking for an easy way to reject ideas they dislike.

No convincingly.

OK, would you care to let me know what exactly you didn’t find convincing? Because otherwise, we can end all discussion right here.

[GIGObuster]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

So because one person ended up going down a blind alley, we shouldn’t even leave our rooms? Because there is the possibility of failure, the whole endeavour isn’t worthwhile? Is that really the sort of argument you want to make?

It was their argument, I knew what Newton got for that, and the ones you pointed out “forgot” to mention it, if that was the best they had to counter Krauss, it was a big failure of an argument.

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Besides, even while going down that blind alley, Newton still managed to make quite probably the greatest contribution to the development of science by any single person ever. The fact is, without philosophy we wouldn’t have half the science we have today, indeed, we wouldn’t even have a scientific method; what we consider to be that method today is the result of intense philosophical discourse in the last century, discourse which still continues. Only thanks to that discourse can internet scholars everywhere knee-jerk ‘it’s not falsifiable, so it’s not science!’ when seeking for an easy way to reject ideas they dislike.

His biggest contribution required less reliance on just philosophical considerations, the point here is that not all philosophical considerations are off limits, only that some are really ridiculous.

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

OK, would you care to let me know what exactly you didn’t find convincing? Because otherwise, we can end all discussion right here.

I noted already the problem of using Newton as a great example, and the lack of convincing about the main issue comes from the fact that I looked not only at Sceptical Dictionary but at other more important ones like the Stanford Philosophy dictionary and other academics, most are not impressed with this zombie idea, in fact many do not agree much with the implied dualism and only recently there has been a growth of this and it does not seem to be gaining much traction because at the basis there is still just an attempt at getting dualism going again and with no good evidence to support it.

The zombification of philosophy (of mind)

The zombification of philosophy (of mind)

David Chalmers is a famous philosopher of mind. His fame rests in great part on his 1996 book, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. It’s too bad that the crucial idea behind the book, dualism, is hopelessly flawed, and – more surprising yet – that Chalmers got away with one of the most idiotic thought experiments ever, which a lot of people inexplicably seem to think is oh so very clever. This all came back to (my) mind because of a recent article in Philosophy Now by Rebecca Hanrahan (an assistant professor of philosophy at Whitman College in Washington state), who’s finally got the chutzpah to point out the obvious, telling it like it is about Chalmers’ famous “zombie argument.”

Back to Chalmers. He claimed to have revived dualism – despite the generally bad reputation the word has even among philosophers

Incidentally, I would note that mine (or Hanrahan’s, from what I can tell) is not an argument against thought experiments in general. They can be useful to evaluate our intuitions, and – contrary to popular belief – they are not just something that “armchair philosophers” (a redundant phrase if there ever was one) engage in. Scientists from Galileo to Einstein have used thought experiments to sharpen their thinking about the world. But just like any tool, it needs to be used according to reasonable instructions and to solve the appropriate problems, just because all you’ve got is a hammer that doesn’t turn everything into a nail.

As readers of this blog know, I am a scientist with a background in philosophy, and am very sympathetic to the whole philosophical approach to things. But just in the same way I think a lot of scientists do a disservice to themselves and to the public by not taking philosophy seriously, I am also convinced that people like Chalmers don’t help philosophy even a bit, either among scientists or the public. Let’s relegate zombies to B-movies and try to be a little more serious about our philosophy, shall we?

-Massimo Pigliucci Professor of Philosophy at CUNY-City College, New York. (Citing Rebecca Hanrahan - assistant professor of philosophy at Whitman College in Washington state.)

Just a heads up. More will come later, the point here to me is that I do get very winded up when I encounter a subject that in reality most of the experts do not agree with, while a poster has gone like if there is a huge controversy going on, I can grant you that there is one, only that one side is not as strong as you think. I wanted to point out what I had that in store besides the practical angle that I was going for originally; had to release it early because you are claiming that you should end the discussion.

[Mijin]

@GIGObuster

I looked not only at Sceptical Dictionary but at other more important ones like the Stanford Philosophy dictionary and other academics, most are not impressed with this zombie idea, in fact many do not agree much with the implied dualism and only recently there has been a growth of this and it does not seem to be gaining much traction because at the basis there is still just an attempt at getting dualism going again and with no good evidence to support it.

Firstly I don’t see any data to say most academics are against the “zombie idea”.
Secondly, so what if they were? Someone being against an idea does not, in itself, constitute an argument.
Finally there’s a difference between Chalmers’ p-zombie argument, and whether Behaviourism could ever allow us to understand consciousness. It was the latter we were just discussing.

@http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com

that Chalmers got away with one of the most idiotic thought experiments ever, which a lot of people inexplicably seem to think is oh so very clever

I think the fact this blog is using language like this really makes me question its objectivity.
Even if you don’t think p-zombies are a coherent idea, it’s still a very useful thing to think about and fully explain why they can’t exist.
The only reason to call it idiotic would be to implicitly argue “Only idiots think this idea makes sense. You’re not an idiot are you?”

And the assistant professor at Whitman’s point is not far off this.
Chalmers’ argument is not about actual zombies as we know them in fiction. “Zombie” is just a catchy label we’ve re-used for this concept. We do this all the time in language generally, and indeed within science, and she should know that.

[GIGObuster]

@Mijin

Firstly I don’t see any data to say most academics are against the “zombie idea”.

It comes from the big elephant in the room, dualism.

@Mijin

Secondly, so what if they were? Someone being against an idea does not, in itself, constitute an argument.

Not my point, many do get the idea that there are reasons why this should not be considered a debate where both sides have equal merit.

@Mijin

Finally there’s a difference between Chalmers’ p-zombie argument, and whether Behaviourism could ever allow us to understand consciousness. It was the latter we were just discussing.

If the idea’s origin is deeply flawed it is not likely that a fork of it is better.

@Mijin

I think the fact this blog is using language like this really makes me question its objectivity.
Even if you don’t think p-zombies are a coherent idea, it’s still a very useful thing to think about and fully explain why they can’t exist.
The only reason to call it idiotic would be to implicitly argue “Only idiots think this idea makes sense. You’re not an idiot are you?”

And the assistant professor at Whitman’s point is not far off this.

And that is why I pointed at her too, with no insults it should therefore be more objective then according to you:

The Problem With Zombies | Issue 67 | Philosophy Now

Chalmers, Zombies and Dualism

In the last few years dualism has enjoyed a revival, due to David Chalmers’ 1996 book The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Chalmers argues for dualism and against materialism. Materialism is the position that there is only one kind of stuff and/or property in this world, and it is physical, that is, material, in nature. According to the materialists, everything that exists exists in space and time. All there is can be measured or weighed. If the materialists are right, then everything in this world, including us, can be accounted for by science, at least in principle. Our scientists will explain not only how plants change light into energy, but will also unlock the nature of consciousness.

In its most basic form dualism is the position that this world is constituted by more than the physical. According to dualism there is another kind of stuff or property: hence no purely physical explanation of this world could fully account for all that is in this world. Specifically, a physicalist explanation could never account for us, for we are special kinds of creatures: we can’t be reduced to our biological, chemical, or other physical properties. For there is something about us that enables us to feel, love and experience the world. To explain it, we need to go beyond the physical, beyond what can be measured or weighed, and posit another kind of stuff or property – which we call the mind or the mental, or even the soul.

Dualism and materialism are in opposition to each other. If materialism is true, dualism is false, and vice versa. Again, Chalmers’ goal is to undermine materialism and support dualism. To that end, he offers the following argument:

1. We can conceive of a world populated by our zombie twins.

2. Conceivability provides us with a guide to possibility.

3. It is possible that there is a world populated by our zombie twins.

4. If this is possible, materialism is false.

5. If materialism is false, then dualism is true.

Conclusion: There is more to this world than the physical. There is in addition some other kind of stuff or property that accounts for our ability to have conscious experiences.

@Mijin

Chalmers’ argument is not about actual zombies as we know them in fiction. “Zombie” is just a catchy label we’ve re-used for this concept. We do this all the time in language generally, and indeed within science, and she should know that.

---

She does.***

How can the possible existence of zombies prove that dualism is true? To see how this argument works, note that the kind of zombies at issue here aren’t the George Romero, Hollywood type of zombies. They aren’t the undead. Their flesh isn’t rotting, nor do they particularly enjoy the taste of human meat. Rather, they are phil-zombies.

Say you have discovered something about them which forces you to deny that their behaviour is evidence that they possess conscious experiences. What could you have discovered? Given that we have no direct access to another being’s phenomenology, the only thing that you could have discovered is some physical or behavioural fact about these creatures. But this evidence, whatever it may be, will be equally true of us as of them, by definition. So, you could only deny the link between mind and behaviour with respect to these creatures if you were equally willing to deny this link with respect to us real world humans. But to deny this link with respect to us is to embrace solipsism. It is to embrace the position that how others act isn’t evidence as to whether they feel anything, and hence, there is no reason to think that there are any conscious beings other than oneself.
The End Is Nigh

To close, let’s return to the issue of dualism. At most, what Chalmers has shown is that if we could justify our belief in the possible existence of phil-zombies we would have reason to reject materialism and endorse dualism. But I have shown that we can only justify our belief in the possibility of phil-zombies by embracing solipsism. If we reject solipsism, we have to concede that we would never be justified in believing that phil-zombies are possible. Thus Chalmers’ argument for dualism fails. Of course, this doesn’t mean that dualism is false: it only means that Chalmers’ zombie argument gives us no reason to endorse it.

This is a negative conclusion. Is there something positive that can be taken away from this discussion? I began this article by declaring that empirical investigation doesn’t provide us with a guide to possibility. But one thing we’ve learnt is that what empirical investigation does produce, ie our best explanation, is relevant when it comes to justifying our beliefs about what is possible. Via our best explanation, we can generate reasonable beliefs even in contexts outside the actual world. This, as I argue elsewhere, is an insight on which an entire epistemology of possibility can be built.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@GIGObuster

It was their argument, I knew what Newton got for that, and the ones you pointed out “forgot” to mention it, if that was the best they had to counter Krauss, it was a big failure of an argument.

I’m confused. Who made what argument? Who are ‘they’? Rovelli mentioned Newton once, as an example of a philosophically well-versed scientist, along with the likes of Einstein, Bohr, etc., whose greatest contributions often came from their philosophical engagement with their subject matter; Ellis mentions Newton as a scientific revolutionary, responsible (among others) for the modern form of the scientific method.

His biggest contribution required less reliance on just philosophical considerations, the point here is that not all philosophical considerations are off limits, only that some are really ridiculous.

As are some scientific theories. Really not sure what you’re trying to point out here.

I noted already the problem of using Newton as a great example, and the lack of convincing about the main issue comes from the fact that I looked not only at Sceptical Dictionary but at other more important ones like the Stanford Philosophy dictionary and other academics, most are not impressed with this zombie idea, in fact many do not agree much with the implied dualism and only recently there has been a growth of this and it does not seem to be gaining much traction because at the basis there is still just an attempt at getting dualism going again and with no good evidence to support it.

First of all, my question specifically concerned your reaction of being unconvinced by my argument that purely behavioural tests of consciousness fall short, because in fact they test only for human-like behaviour; but it is easily possible to conceive of conscious beings whose behaviour is decidedly non-human like.

Second, let’s just nip this attempt to bludgeon the discussion with reference to an imagined consensus in the bud by looking at the actual numbers from the PhilPapers survey:

[
[QUOTE=http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl]
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?

Accept or lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible 331 / 931 (35.6%)
Other 234 / 931 (25.1%)
Accept or lean toward: metaphysically possible 217 / 931 (23.3%)
Accept or lean toward: inconceivable 149 / 931 (16.0%)

[/QUOTE]
](http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl)

So as you can see, while the position that zombies are probably impossible is the leading one, it is very far from being the consensus, and just barely scratches out a majority at a combined 51.6%, about what you’d get from a coin toss. Note also that this includes people who just lean toward one of the possible options; in the poll framed as above, my own view would actually fall into the category of those who lean toward believing that zombies are inconceivable. This is, indeed, a very active topic of ongoing debate, and your attempt to claim otherwise just has no factual basis.

@GIGObuster

Rationally Speaking: The zombification of philosophy (of mind)

That’s not really a very good account of Chalmers’ views. For instance, Pigliucci confuses Chalmers’ dualism with Cartesian or substance dualism, which is what’s got a bad rep in philosophy (justifiably so); however, Chalmers is emphatically not a substance dualist, as shown by, for instance, his article ‘How Cartesian dualism could have been true’, which sort of implies that he doesn’t believe it to be true.

He is a proponent (most of the time) of dual aspect theory, which is, despite the maybe somewhat confusing name, a position of substance monism. He’s also written with some approval about panpsychism and Russellian/neutral monism. Neither of those are anywhere near as controversial as substance dualism, and in fact, have prominent adherents in contemporary philosophy of mind; especially panpsychism has been gaining a lot of steam lately, even among natural scientists such as Giulio Tononi or Christof Koch with their integrated information theory. Frankly, I’m somewhat flabbergasted as to how anyone could read The Conscious Mind and come back with the idea that Chalmers is a substance dualist; needless to say, an article that gets such an elementary point wrong probably isn’t really going to make a huge contribution to its subject.

Also, apart from the concern raised by Mijin, any article including just a bald-faced claim that some argument is obviously idiotic automatically weakens its own position if it does not provide a definite refutation—because if it is so idiotic, then it should be easily debunked.

More will come later, the point here to me is that I do get very winded up when I encounter a subject that in reality most of the experts do not agree with, while a poster has gone like if there is a huge controversy going on, I can grant you that there is one, only that one side is not as strong as you think.

Well, then I hope that now that you know that there is in fact no such expert consensus, you will have some opportunity to unwind.

[GIGObuster]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Also, apart from the concern raised by Mijin, any article including just a bald-faced claim that some argument is obviously idiotic automatically weakens its own position if it does not provide a definite refutation—because if it is so idiotic, then it should be easily debunked.

Well, then I hope that now that you know that there is in fact no such expert consensus, you will have some opportunity to unwind.

Well, I did mention that philosophy is indeed important, it just so happens that some issues Philosophy deals with are not as important as they were before, and this is not as important as before.

But speaking of debunking, what I have to comment here is that the zombie idea is coming back like a bad penny, and the coin toss is not what it seems.

The support for the p-zombie argument is indeed only 23.3%. Implying that the “Other” goes there is really silly, among the other opinions we could include even more rude comments, realizations that “I’m not even wrong” or “I humbly do not know” or “I’m on the fence on this one” What I did take also from the survey is that most would not think much about duality as the philosophers surveyed are overwhelmingly atheistic (72.8%).

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@GIGObuster

The support for the p-zombie argument is indeed only 23.3%.

But that’s almost a quarter of experts that don’t agree with what you intended to tout as a consensus! Compare this to other, meaningful instances of expert consensus, such as the acceptance of evolution by biologists, the acceptance of relativity and quantum theory among physicists, the acceptance of climate change among climate scientists, and so on. Nowhere will there be anything near a quarter of dissenters; to call such a thing a consensus is simply preposterous. What it is is a hotly debated area—note also, for instance, that there is no general agreement among those that disagree with the idea of zombies, regarding e.g. whether they are conceivable or not. In a consensus situation, where most of the experts have settled views on a matter, those views will tend to agree—they obviously are very far from doing so in this case.

This is not an instance of me, the rogue internet crusader, attempting to manufacture debate to create some legitimacy for my pet issue; this is, quite simply, a very much open topic in the philosophy of mind.

What I did take also from the survey is that most would not think much about duality as the philosophers surveyed are overwhelmingly atheistic (72.8%).

Atheism is in no way opposed to dualism. For instance, Chalmers himself, in his reply to the survey, identifies as ‘lean toward: atheism’.

[GIGObuster]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

But that’s almost a quarter of experts that don’t agree with what you intended to tout as a consensus!

It is still a small minority.

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Atheism is in no way opposed to dualism. For instance, Chalmers himself, in his reply to the survey, identifies as ‘lean toward: atheism’.

That was just a note towards putting in perspective the idea that the "Other"s where automatically in favor of dualism; true, not all atheists oppose dualism, but dualism is placing cause somewhere where it doesn’t belong. Most atheists do not agree with that and I looked at atheistic sites with discussions on dualism before.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@GIGObuster

It is still a small minority.

Well, to me, a quarter is quite a substantial fraction, but to each their own, I guess. Regardless, even the majority has not arrived at a consensus; and in fact, a larger majority considers zombies to at least be conceivable, which I think most detractors in this thread have denied.

That was just a note towards putting in perspective the idea that the "Other"s where automatically in favor of dualism; true, not all atheists oppose dualism, but dualism is placing cause somewhere where it doesn’t belong. Most atheists do not agree with that and I looked at atheistic sites with discussions on dualism before.

Your implicit assumption that accepting the zombie argument implies dualism is erroneous: as I said, while Chalmers accepts a form of property dualism, he’s not a substance dualist, and there are many other possible views on the issue. (The idea that dualism is ‘placing cause somewhere it doesn’t belong’ is also, to the extent that it’s intelligible, debatable; in accounts of property dualism, for instance, causality is not any harder—but also not any easier—to explain than in physicalism, or other brands of materialism.)

[GIGObuster]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Well, to me, a quarter is quite a substantial fraction, but to each their own, I guess. Regardless, even the majority has not arrived at a consensus; and in fact, a larger majority considers zombies to at least be conceivable, which I think most detractors in this thread have denied.

But that was the point of the Philosophers I quoted, there are problems when assuming that being conceivable makes it a done deal.

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Your implicit assumption that accepting the zombie argument implies dualism is erroneous: as I said, while Chalmers accepts a form of property dualism, he’s not a substance dualist, and there are many other possible views on the issue. (The idea that dualism is ‘placing cause somewhere it doesn’t belong’ is also, to the extent that it’s intelligible, debatable; in accounts of property dualism, for instance, causality is not any harder—but also not any easier—to explain than in physicalism, or other brands of materialism.)

Yes, but I’m have to say that going to many sources that make an overview of the issue, like Standford and Wikipedia mention duality as one big reason why the p-zombies were proposed, that part of the history of this item can not be ignored.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@GIGObuster

But that was the point of the Philosophers I quoted, there are problems when assuming that being conceivable makes it a done deal.

Well, and other philosophers argue that conceivability implies possibility, at least for phenomenal concepts. All that just to say: there’s an active discussion of the issue.

Yes, but I’m have to say that going to many sources that make an overview of the issue, like Standford and Wikipedia mention duality as one big reason why the p-zombies were proposed, that part of the history of this item can not be ignored.

The argument—as any argument—must stand and fall on its own merits (or lack thereof), not because of its association with what you seem to view as a disreputable intellectual stance. Just because I fell in with the wrong crowd in my youth, doesn’t mean I’m not now a perfectly nice guy that always keeps his hedges trimmed and lawn mown.

On this note, maybe we could at least make an effort to try and get back to the original topic of the thread, the zombie argument. Or, perhaps, to frame things somewhat more widely, the fact that there is something crucial we do not, at this moment, understand at all in how brains give rise to minds: there is, in any account of physiological and physical processes, not a hint of conscious experience; thus, the attempt to explain consciousness in these terms contains, at present, an important gap, fittingly called the explanatory gap. All I’m really arguing for is that we need to be honest about its existence, rather than trying to handwave it away and assuming that more of the same will at some critical point just somehow explode into consciousness, when it hasn’t shown any hint of going in that direction so far—indeed, when nobody even has any inkling about how things could somehow start to move in this direction.

The problem here is somewhat unique in the sense that nobody even knows what a solution could conceivably look like; but that’s no reason to either invoke the mystical, or deny that there is any problem, no matter the contortions of logic one has to put oneself through. We need to take seriously the possibility that we’re going about this the wrong way, that we might need a new set of concepts to even properly frame the discussion.

This is, after all, the way things have evolved historically: knowledge production used to be largely mythopoetic in nature, until the first vestiges of empiricism arose in ancient greek, which then continued to evolve, often by leaps and bounds, such as the mathematization of science by Galileo, and Newton’s realization that sublunar and supralunar spheres can be treated in a unified manner, etc., up to the creation of today’s magnificent, organic corpus we call the scientific method. But there’s no reason to suppose things stop there, to fetishize this mass of congealed history and philosophy as being the one, true, and absolute method of knowledge generation—it never has been that, nor is it ever likely to be (it just takes the realization that if this method is the only means of knowledge generation, we could never have developed it, since it’s certainly a piece of knowledge itself).

[GIGObuster]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Well, and other philosophers argue that conceivability implies possibility, at least for phenomenal concepts. All that just to say: there’s an active discussion of the issue.

And the active discussion has less weight as it was in the old days.

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

The argument—as any argument—must stand and fall on its own merits (or lack thereof), not because of its association with what you seem to view as a disreputable intellectual stance. Just because I fell in with the wrong crowd in my youth, doesn’t mean I’m not now a perfectly nice guy that always keeps his hedges trimmed and lawn mown.

The problem is that denying the past history does get one that tries to live a clean life also into trouble.

As for the rest, it does seem that there is an effort going on making those gaps bigger so a god can be put there.

Just keeping things in historical perspective.

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

[SNIP]

This is, after all, the way things have evolved historically: knowledge production used to be largely mythopoetic in nature, until the first vestiges of empiricism arose in ancient greek, which then continued to evolve, often by leaps and bounds, such as the mathematization of science by Galileo, and Newton’s realization that sublunar and supralunar spheres can be treated in a unified manner, etc., up to the creation of today’s magnificent, organic corpus we call the scientific method. But there’s no reason to suppose things stop there, to fetishize this mass of congealed history and philosophy as being the one, true, and absolute method of knowledge generation—it never has been that, nor is it ever likely to be (it just takes the realization that if this method is the only means of knowledge generation, we could never have developed it, since it’s certainly a piece of knowledge itself).

Yes, and that is commendable, but it is not good IMHO to think that we can go to the same river twice, science marches on. And many philosophers do take into account the latest research to make philosophy relevant.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@GIGObuster

And the active discussion has less weight as it was in the old days.

So now, you’ve gone from ‘the topic is basically settled’ to ‘the discussion doesn’t matter anyway’. I really wonder what your interest is in trying so hard to stifle any debate on the matter.

The problem is that denying the past history does get one that tries to live a clean life also into trouble.

C’mon, this is ridiculous. If you think there’s something wrong with the argument, then mount an attack, but this sort of smear just isn’t doing your cause any favours.

As for the rest, it does seem that there is an effort going on making those gaps bigger so a god can be put there.

Nobody’s even mentioned god until you came into the thread. Virtually none of the serious philosophical discussion I’ve seen on the issue has had any religious overtones. As you note, the majority of philosophers is atheist. I’m an atheist. Seriously, there’s no good reason at all to try and shoehorn this issue into some weird kind of apologetics.

Just keeping things in historical perspective.

And when has ‘historical perspective’ ever had any bearing on whether an argument is sound? Even if it had been brought up by Hitler himself, neither source nor original context decides whether it’s right or not.

Yes, and that is commendable, but it is not good IMHO to think that we can go to the same river twice, science marches on.

Another remark I can’t really parse. What river, and who’s stepping into it twice?

[GIGObuster]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Another remark I can’t really parse. What river, and who’s stepping into it twice?

The river going over twice in this case is the idea of the p-zombie (actually it is a rebirth), And one confusing thing is from your last paragraphs on Galileo, Newton and the scientific method, they are not clear to me, as you said, “there’s no reason to suppose things stop there, to fetishize this mass of congealed history and philosophy as being the one, true, and absolute method of knowledge generation—it never has been that” but then we get the p-zombie again, and it seems that we are going back to that congealed history.

Physiological zombies are logically incoherent and me and other philosophers then think that they are impossible then, and this point is about 20 or more years old.

[Mijin]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

The problem here is somewhat unique in the sense that nobody even knows what a solution could conceivably look like; but that’s no reason to either invoke the mystical, or deny that there is any problem, no matter the contortions of logic one has to put oneself through. We need to take seriously the possibility that we’re going about this the wrong way, that we might need a new set of concepts to even properly frame the discussion.

Very well put. That’s exactly my perspective on the issue.
I’ve been fortunate enough to work in the field of neuroscience, but WRT subjective experience I recognize there is still an explanatory gap there.
And it’s a fundamental gap; it’s not a “filling in the details” kind of thing.

The lack of progress in that area suggests to me a very different paradigm is required here.

@GIGObuster

Physiological zombies are logically incoherent and me and other philosophers then think that they are impossible then, and this point is about 20 or more years old.

Even the most eminent and learned of humans can be wrong, so just “so-and-so believes X” is not enough, I want to hear the argument. If it’s been so soundly refuted, what’s the best refutation?
And don’t just say “It’s Dualism”.

[Trinopus]

@Mijin

. . . Even the most eminent and learned of humans can be wrong, so just “so-and-so believes X” is not enough, I want to hear the argument. If it’s been so soundly refuted, what’s the best refutation?
And don’t just say “It’s Dualism”.

I second the request. I don’t get the arguments exactly. I hate to have to ask for the ideas to be dumbed down…but…that’s the only way I’ll cope with them.

As far as I can tell, a p-zombie is perfectly possible. It’s just that no method exists of telling them apart from any other person.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@GIGObuster

The river going over twice in this case is the idea of the p-zombie (actually it is a rebirth),

First of all, the idea that because an argument has been discussed in the past, it shouldn’t be allowed to be discussed again, is of course patently ridiculous. If an argument re-emerges, and causes a widespread discussion among experts, then it’s obviously the case that those experts believe that the matter hasn’t been settled. What are you gonna do, wag your finger and say, nuh-uh, you had your chance, move along now, nothing to discuss here?

Second, your assertion that the matter was settled 20 years ago and has only now re-emerged is, once again, also simply false; and once again, I wonder where you get the confidence to make these bald assertions, while apparently being wholly unencumbered by the actual facts of the case. Since the zombie argument came to be proposed in the 90s, and especially since Chalmers’ formulation in The Conscious Mind in '96, there’s been a steadily increasing stream of publications on the matter, as can be clearly seen in the google ngram for ‘zombie argument’.

And one confusing thing is from your last paragraphs on Galileo, Newton and the scientific method, they are not clear to me, as you said, “there’s no reason to suppose things stop there, to fetishize this mass of congealed history and philosophy as being the one, true, and absolute method of knowledge generation—it never has been that” but then we get the p-zombie again, and it seems that we are going back to that congealed history.

I was referring to the scientific method, and how people these days have a tendency to mischaracterize it as some immutable standard by which all discussion has to be assessed.

Physiological zombies are logically incoherent and me and other philosophers then think that they are impossible then, and this point is about 20 or more years old.

And it’s never been widely accepted. And if you think there’s a logical inconsistency, then by all means, point it out.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

As far as I can tell, a p-zombie is perfectly possible. It’s just that no method exists of telling them apart from any other person.

Hmm, so are you meaning to say that we could all be zombies? The usual answer to this is that at least in the case of everybody for themselves, we know that we’re not zombies—there is, manifestly, something it is like to be me, to me. So while there’s no third person way to assess the difference between zombies and conscious beings, there is a first person way.

I’ve got a feeling though that you’ll disagree with that, since otherwise, if you agree that zombies are possible, and nevertheless believe that there’s something like consciousness at all, then you’re disagreeing with physicalism, and I don’t think you do.

[Trinopus]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Hmm, so are you meaning to say that we could all be zombies? The usual answer to this is that at least in the case of everybody for themselves, we know that we’re not zombies—there is, manifestly, something it is like to be me, to me. So while there’s no third person way to assess the difference between zombies and conscious beings, there is a first person way.

Yes, that’s the usual answer. I know I’m not a zombie…but how do I know if my neighbor is or isn’t?

On general principles, I don’t figure I’m unique, so I wouldn’t posit that everyone’s a zombie except me. But there might be some small number of people who lack consciousness – or perhaps lack some portion of it – just as there are sociopaths who lack conscience.

Who knows what kinds of cognitive birth defects are possible?

I’ve got a feeling though that you’ll disagree with that, since otherwise, if you agree that zombies are possible, and nevertheless believe that there’s something like consciousness at all, then you’re disagreeing with physicalism, and I don’t think you do.

This is the link I’m simply not getting. This entire thread has often involved reasoning of the sort, “If you accept X, you must also accept Y,” and this necessity has never been made clear to me.

Why can’t I believe that non-conscious or semi-conscious people might exist, due to some birth defect…and also believe that consciousness is a physical process? I would simply hold that there is something physically wrong with those people whose consciousness is impaired.

ETA: I don’t actually hold the belief that there are such persons, by the way. I just don’t see any contradiction to my world-views if they did happen to exist.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Trinopus

This is the link I’m simply not getting. This entire thread has often involved reasoning of the sort, “If you accept X, you must also accept Y,” and this necessity has never been made clear to me.

Why can’t I believe that non-conscious or semi-conscious people might exist, due to some birth defect…and also believe that consciousness is a physical process? I would simply hold that there is something physically wrong with those people whose consciousness is impaired.

The zombie argument comes in various strengths. One is the behavioural zombie: a being that replicates every behaviour of a conscious being, without being conscious itself. This is not a threat to physicalism—there could be some relevant physical fact that is missing in those that merely behave as if conscious.

It does, however, open up some interesting questions regarding the effectiveness of consciousness: if it is not necessary to give rise to any kind of behaviour, then it’s hard to see how it could have evolved at all—evolution acts only on physiological and behavioural aspects of an organism, so it doesn’t care at all whether there’s a light on inside or not. This leads to an argument I’ve heard referred to as the Darwinist argument against materialism: if evolution is not effective in shaping our phenomenology, i.e. if there is no selection pressure acting on what things feel like to us, then it becomes wholly inexplicable why our subjective experience should be appropriate to a given situation at all—i.e. why, for instance, being hurt should inflict pain, and being in pain should feel bad.

Without any effectiveness of subjective experience in shaping our behaviour, then we might just as well enjoy the feeling of pain, and hate the feeling of happiness, etc., while our behaviour would be entirely unaffected. So why is it that our phenomenology is appropriate to the situation, and bad situations tend to feel bad?

But the argument we’ve mainly discussing here concerns a kind of zombie that is a physical isomorph of a conscious being, like for instance you. So this would be a being that is in every respect physically identical to you, but nevertheless lacks all conscious experience. Such a being seems to be conceivable: there is no inconsistency involved in imagining it, just as is the case with the behavioural zombie. But then, or so the argument goes, it is also possible. But if some being can exist for which all the physical facts are identical, but which nevertheless differs along some dimension, i.e. that of mental experience, then there are facts which are not determined by the physical facts—you can’t, just by looking at the physical facts, determine whether a being is conscious or not. But physicalism posits that the world is exhausted by the physical facts; so if such a being is possible, physicalism can’t be true.

Does that help in any way? If not, perhaps refer to the formal version of the argument I gave in response to RaftPeople, and try to pinpoint your difficulties there.