The correct place for moral valuation

[Jodi]

ERIS –

Could we say, then, that moral responsibility comes from an unintentional immoral act?-- that is, one which, if it were intended, would be immoral?

I’m going to be careful with the language here, lest we become confused. Generally, I don’t think there is such a thing as an “unintentional immoral act” (leaving aside for now those rare instances involving grossly negligent behavior or a willful disregard for the consequences of your actions). The act does not because “immoral” just because it would be immoral if done intentionally. In other words, since intent is the predicate for immorality, then we cannot speak of an “unintentional immoral act,” because the term is internally inconsistent. Do you follow?

The problem I have with the whole “badness we caused” idea is where along the causal chain are we obligated to stop? Why is it so clear that we hold screen-makers responsible for a child falling to its death (and yes, this is a legal case, but I am not picturing it from a legal view) and not the parent?

I don’t think we do. Do we? There is no rule that a given action will only be caused by one immoral act. If the screen maker knows that the screen is unsafe because it will fall apart at the drop of a hat (immoral act) and the child is inexcusably left alone (immoral act), then why must we say that only one or the other is morally culpable.

Consider the McDonald’s coffee case that received so much publicity, when the “talk on the streets” was often that McD’s wasn’t really to blame. Didn’t the lady cause the coffee to spill in the same manner that the driver in our hypothetical caused the child to die? Assumed individual risks seem to be a moral quicksand… opaque, probably stinky, and tough to get out of.

I’m not following you here. Sorry. I don’t equate causation with moral culpability, as I have said. And I wouldn’t necessarily even consider a case of spilled coffee, no matter how damaging, in the context of morality.

But isn’t this every single action we undertake every moment of our lives?

No. Why should it be? You’re confusing me again, and I’m not taking your point. If I drop a banana peel in a forest, with no reason to think anyone would slip on it, why am I “responsible” in any moral sense if someone does? It’s true the person would not have fallen but for the peel, but that doesn’t mean the fall was my fault.

Why is it absurd to hold my boss responsible for my accident… I mean, I would be driving this way if it wasn’t for him/him/her (I have three bosses!)? Why is it not absurd to hold me responsible and have my insurance rates go up?

What are you talking about here? I’m afraid you lost me.

When assigning a moral responsibility to cover fault we turn toward causality. But my problem is that the causal chain is not one link long, it stretches as far as the eye can see in all directions and skewed diagonals. You can’t get out of its way or cut it at any point, you know?

The fallacy here is that we turn toward causality to assign moral responsibility. I would not do so; I would focus on intent. And I think the mire you’re alluding to is one of the reasons it is not appropriate to focus on consequences (turn towards causality) when apportioning moral fault.

It seems that if we accept morality (or the negative valuation of immorality) to be weighed on intent, and accidents themselves have no intent, then in order to determine the moral weight of the situation following an unintended consequence we need to look for more intent…

Oh, I see. No, I don’t agree with this, since it seems to be predicated on the assumption that all actions must be morally judged, and therefore if you cannot find intent in the actual actions causing the result, then you must cast back to find intent somewhere else. I disagree with this. Why must a true accident be judged morally wrong? There seems to me to be no reason that every bad result must be judged immoral.

To do that, I examine that each of us intend to live our lives, accepting the fact that sometimes shit can happen. If we accept that, and live anyway, could that not conceivably give us all the responsibility to amend accidents instead of stopping at seemingly arbitrary places along a causal chain?

I think this has less to do with the idea of morality than it does with what we mean by causation. When we speak of causation, we have to use common sense in not making the inquiry too big or too small. For example: Let’s say you shot someone – oh, let’s say RYAN – with a gun. We cannot say “you got up in the morning, and if you hadn’t it wouldn’t have happened, so getting up in the morning must be a cause of the shot” – because the inquiry into causation is obviously too big. Conversely, we can’t say “you aimed the gun, but that alone didn’t cause the shot, so you didn’t do it; you squeezed the trigger, but that alone didn’t cause the shot, so you didn’t do it, etc.” – because the inquiry into causation is obviously too small. So instead we might consider defining “cause” as including every action that both precedes the result and brings the result about. (Getting out of bed did not bring the result about.) And we might further include in “cause” every sub-part of an action that makes up the whole of doing the action. I don’t think such distinctions are “arbitrary,” I think they’re common sense. But it is true that sometimes we may disagree about whether a particular action (intentional or not) actually caused a particular result. IMO there is no bright-line test – can be no bright-line test – in an inquiry that is so fact-driven and that changes in every different case.

[erislover]

The sticker:

No, I don’t agree with this, since it seems to be predicated on the assumption that all actions must be morally judged, and therefore if you cannot find intent in the actual actions causing the result, then you must cast back to find intent somewhere else. I disagree with this. Why must a true accident be judged morally wrong? There seems to me to be no reason that every bad result must be judged immoral.

So our hypothetical driver could just leave the dead child in the road? As you and I would probably agree, no he shouldn’t. But why do we say that? Would it be immoral for him to do so? Would it be just as immoral for him to do so if someone else had run the child over? For in either case the man did not perform an immoral act (as we do agree), so now what? Why can we not simply disregard the action entirely?

I don’t think we do. Do we? There is no rule that a given action will only be caused by one immoral act.

No, of course not. I did present a false dichotomy there, sorry. But in any event, these were negligent acts, not intentional ones (ie the parent nor the screenmaker intended to kill anyone). And yet we are prone to assign to these people responsibility for an action they didn’t intend, and call them immoral if they failed to accept that responsibility.

So what good was intent, then? Why can’t we just scrap it? In the case where there is intent we can (in principle) use the actions in order to assign the moral weight, and in the case where there is not intent we [are seeming to] use the actions in order to assign the moral weight. So why ever mess with intent? Why not say “attempted murder is attempted murder” and who cares if you wanted to do it or not, either way you are still morally obligated to accept the consequence of your action. Culpability seems to become superfluous.

The fallacy here is that we turn toward causality to assign moral responsibility. I would not do so; I would focus on intent.

Sorry, I’m trying desperately to keep the distinction of culpability with intent and responsibility with “things we should do because we were part of unintent”. So, man hits child with car: if he intends it, he is immoral or morally culpable, if he doesn’t, he is morally responsible for some behavior to follow (to aid, or to not aid, follows with some personal estimation of what it is moral to do here).

[Jerevan_Somerville]

*Originally posted by erislover *
So our hypothetical driver could just leave the dead child in the road? As you and I would probably agree, no he shouldn’t. But why do we say that? Would it be immoral for him to do so? Would it be just as immoral for him to do so if someone else had run the child over?

Yes, I think it would be just as immoral. This goes back to the distinction which Jodi introduced, between the harm which occurs and what one does to address it. The act of hitting the child with a car and the act of leaving the injured child in the road are two separate things. It would be immoral for anyone who observed the injured child in the road to leave her there, regardless of what immoral or accidental action caused her injuries. The act of aiding the injured child does not necessarily carry with it the implication of responsibility for the harm done. One situation doesn’t turn on the other; I think they have to be considered separately.

…in any event, these were negligent acts, not intentional ones (ie the parent nor the screenmaker intended to kill anyone). And yet we are prone to assign to these people responsibility for an action they didn’t intend, and call them immoral if they failed to accept that responsibility.

Do you know, I think I like Jodi’s choice of the word reckless to describe behavior which willfully ignores the potential for harmful consequences of one’s actions. This is in itself a type of intent. One may not intend to cause harm, but one has recognized the potential for harm and said, in effect, “I don’t care.” No wonder such people fail to accept responsibility later on; they’ve already excused themselves at the start!

So what good was intent, then? Why can’t we just scrap it?..I’m trying desperately to keep the distinction of culpability with intent and responsibility with “things we should do because we were part of unintent”. So, man hits child with car: if he intends it, he is immoral or morally culpable, if he doesn’t, he is morally responsible for some behavior to follow (to aid, or to not aid, follows with some personal estimation of what it is moral to do here).

I think I understand the way you are using these two terms:

moral culpability: one intends to do something immoral – usually something which causes harm to another – and acts accordingly. Whether one actually succeeds is irrelevant. In this definition I would include acts of recklessness, because to me they involve an intention to disregard the potential for harm.

moral responsibility: some harm/misfortune comes about which one did not intend, but because one was somehow involved as a causal agent, responsibility for the result accrues – usually under circumstances in which one would be judged morally culpable if the result had been intended.

So intent is important because it helps distinguish between these two definitions. Beyond these we have been debating something we might call the moral obligation to redress harm done: when does this obligation apply (to intentional/reckless acts? unintentional acts?) and to whom (direct causal agents? ancillary agents? by-standers/on-lookers?)

And there, I think, is all that I can manage for today. I’ll look forward to talking to you both tomorrow!

Cheers, J.S.

[Jodi]

ERL –

So our hypothetical driver could just leave the dead child in the road?

Wait a sec; let’s not confuse the acts we are weighing as moral/immoral. Are we judging the act of hitting the child? IMO, the morality of that turns (largely) on intent – i.e., was it a true accident? Or are we judging the act of leaving the child in the road? IMO, then we must decide whether leaving an injured child in the road or not is an immoral act. I think we can agree that it is, for the driver at least. But the morality of that act – the requirement you stop and help – IMO springs from an obligation to rectify or minimize the damage we do. It is unrelated to the morality of the original act. In other words, what JEREVAN said.

But why do we say that? Would it be immoral for him to do so? Would it be just as immoral for him to do so if someone else had run the child over? For in either case the man did not perform an immoral act (as we do agree), so now what? Why can we not simply disregard the action entirely?

The act of running the child over, may or may not be immoral. That is a different question from whether the failure to stop and help is or is not immoral. These a different inquiries, and the one depends on the other only to the extent that we might impose a moral obligation to help on the person who caused the harm (intentionally or accidentally), while we might not impose that moral obligation upon a third party who did not cause the harm. (Though we might impose that moral obligation upon third parties as well, under a different theory, such as, say, that all adults hvae the moral duty to assist children in danger or need.)

And yet we are prone to assign to these people responsibility for an action they didn’t intend, and call them immoral if they failed to accept that responsibility.

Again, these are different inquiries. By “responsibility” do you mean acceptance of the fact that, intentionally or not, you caused the harm in question? Because we might well determine that it is “immoral” to fail to accept responsibility for the consequences of our actions. But again – this is a different question than whether the act causing the consequences was itself a moral or immoral one.

So what good was intent, then? Why can’t we just scrap it?

Because we can’t usually judge morality without it. We cannot decide that a person is morally culpable for a truly accidental act. We can decide a person is morally culpable for failing to take responsibility for that act – but that failure to take responsibility is itself a separate intentional act, that we judge separately. I mean, surely you can see that implicitly when we judge someone immoral for failing to accept responsibility, we are juding his/her willful (intentional) act. What if the party did not take responsibility because he/she was retarded, and did not understand the consequences of his/her acts? That wouldn’t be an immoral act, would it? No – because he/she does not intentionally deny responsibility.

In the case where there is intent we can (in principle) use the actions in order to assign the moral weight, and in the case where there is not intent we [are seeming to] use the actions in order to assign the moral weight.

No no no no – absolutely wrong. Each event is judged independently, based on intent. But the failure to help is a different act than running over the child. The failure to accept responsibility for having run over the child is, again, a different act.

Why not say “attempted murder is attempted murder” and who cares if you wanted to do it or not, either way you are still morally obligated to accept the consequence of your action. Culpability seems to become superfluous.

Actually, attempted murder is a good example, because it is an intentional crime. You cannot “accidentally” try to kill someone. So would you say that a person who accidentally almost shoots someone in the head is equally morally responsible as a person who almost shoots someone in the head because he/she was trying to kill the person, and just missed? Because that appears to be what you are saying when you say intent is not morally relevant. “Culpability” is something different; it means responsibility, and intent does not impact who is responsible for – i.e., who actually caused – the event. But I see from the below that you are using the terms differently:

Sorry, I’m trying desperately to keep the distinction of culpability with intent and responsibility with “things we should do because we were part of unintent”.

Using those defintions, let me try to parse this out:

1. Man hits child with car. We have a moral tenet that it is wrong to hit children with cars. Our inquiry is: Is man culpable (immoral)? In order to decide, we must ask if he intended to hit the child, or if it was merely an accident. If he did not intend, he is not culpable (immoral) for hitting the child. But he is in either case responsible for (to blame for) the event.

2. Man hits child with car, but then does not stop to help child. We have a moral tenet that it you must attempt to fix/help cure/rectify damage that you caused. Our inquiry is: Is man culpable (immoral). We must ask if he intended to fail to help the child, or if it was merely an accident (i.e., he didn’t see her). If he did not intend, he is not culpable (immoral) for failing to help the child. But he is in either case responsible for (to blame for) failing to help. This is a different question than No. 1.

3. Man hits child with car; passerby does not stop to help child. Do we have a moral tenet that passers-by must stop to help, or not? If we do, we must ask if the passerby intended to fail to help. Culpability flows from that. This is a different question than No. 1 and No. 2.

So, man hits child with car: if he intends it, he is immoral or morally culpable if he doesn’t, he is morally responsible for some behavior to follow (to aid, or to not aid, follows with some personal estimation of what it is moral to do here).

Right.

[erislover]

Here it is again! (keeps popping up) “We have a moral tenet that it you must attempt to fix/help cure/rectify damage that you caused.” See, in the case of murder we can say that even if the act failed we still hold one responsible for intent, so no action is necessary (technically, of course we usually use action as a means to discover intent, but in principle it isn’t necessary). And yet this moral tenet is based explicitely on action. Without action it is not immoral or moral to do anything as you walk by a child.

What I’m saying is in principle it is possible to ignore intent in the first place and go straight for the action. And why not, since we level the morality on action in the second case?

[Jodi]

ERL –

And yet this moral tenet is based explicitely on action. Without action it is not immoral or moral to do anything as you walk by a child.

I don’t think it’s accurate to say the moral tenet is “based explicitly on action.” It is based on the idea that if you do something wrong, you should right it if you can. Now, the idea of “doing something wrong” itself implies an actual action, but that is not the basis for the tenet. We do not kill people because we consider that it is, as a moral matter, wrong to do so. We do not even try to kill people because we consider that it is, as a moral matter, wrong to do so. We try to correct our mistakes because we consider that it is, as a moral matter, right to do so. That is not “based on action.” The tenet is based on morality; the action gives rise to the obligation (or opportunity to fulfill the moral tenet.

What I’m saying is in principle it is possible to ignore intent in the first place and go straight for the action.

Sure it is, but then how do you evaluate morality at all?

And why not, since we level the morality on action in the second case?

Again, we are not “leveling the morality on action” in the second case. The action gives rise to a situation in which a moral choice must be made. The fact that if the action did not occur, the moral choice would not have to be made, does not mean the existence of the moral choice (in the abstract) depends on the triggering action occurring. It does not. I may hold it as a moral tenet that I must try to save to get my child out if my house catches on fire. That moral precept does not change or depend on my house actually catching fire.

[erislover]

Hmm… I’ll have to think about that for a bit.

[Jodi]

For what it’s worth, I’ve been thinking about it a bit as well.

I think we can agree that there are two types of moral principles: There are moral imperatives (“You shall tell the truth”). There are moral prohibitions (“You shall not steal”). But there are also contingent moral imperatives/prohibitions. (“If you get married, you shall be faithful to your spouse/If you drink, you shall not drive.”)

I don’t think that the fact these imperatives/prohibitions are contingent makes them consequence-dependent, because in every case where the pre-condition is met – you get married; you drink – you are subject to the moral imperative/prohibition.

[erislover]

No, it isn’t the contextual morals that get to me, it’s assigning moral responsibility to people based on actions for which they are not morally culpable, and honestly I wouldn’t hold someone responsible for helping a kid that just got run over by some other guy… or for someone who isn’t morally culpable in the first place, to be more general. I would expect them to to be nice, but I wouldn’t think they were immoral for not doing anything. A creep, maybe, and no one to hang around, but I just can’t say he is immoral.

In the case of an honest accident—I mean, who keeps their eyes on the road 100% of the time?—I have a hard time feeling that I should make someone morally obligated to help (well, not make them, but consider that they are). Practically speaking this is rough, because anyone could run over anyone and say, “Hey, he just jumped out, ain’t my fault,” or “Hey, the gun just went off in my hand,” but I also don’t like the premise of holding people responsible for accidents. I mean, isn’t that why we call them accidents? (apart from the word’s loose usage in reference to automobile collisions)

But, well, I guess this is where I would say that I don’t hold them morally responsible, but it is a pragmatic legal option. Hmm.

[Jerevan_Somerville]

*Originally posted by erislover *
No, it isn’t the contextual morals that get to me, it’s assigning moral responsibility to people based on actions for which they are not morally culpable, and honestly I wouldn’t hold someone responsible for helping a kid that just got run over by some other guy… or for someone who isn’t morally culpable in the first place, to be more general. I would expect them to to be nice, but I wouldn’t think they were immoral for not doing anything. A creep, maybe, and no one to hang around, but I just can’t say he is immoral.

Ah, this helps. I think this where my views diverge from yours, eris. I think anyone who observed/found the injured child in the road, and passed by, would be culpable for not rendering assistance – that such a person has a moral imperative to do something, regardless of how the child came to be in that state or who (if anyone) is responsible. However, there is some common ground here: I think all three of us are looking at this particular situation as separate from the original event (in which the child was injured).

In the case of an honest accident—I mean, who keeps their eyes on the road 100% of the time?—I have a hard time feeling that I should [consider] someone morally obligated to help. Practically speaking this is rough, because anyone could run over anyone and say, “Hey, he just jumped out, ain’t my fault,” or “Hey, the gun just went off in my hand,” but I also don’t like the premise of holding people responsible for accidents.

By this last (italicized) phrase I assume you mean, “requiring a person to offer assistance/redress for an ‘honest accident’ in which they were involved.” Again, I think this is where our views diverge. Jodi and I are saying that the concept of rendering aid/offering redress for harm done is separate from the event which caused the harm.

Or to put it another way: “Hey, the gun just went off in my hand” and caused harm to someone else. The gun-wielder has a moral imperative to render assistance to the injured party, not because he’s holding the gun but simply because he witnesses another human being in distress and has the power to help. “No one is saying that his injury is your fault – accidents happen – but how could you just sit there and let him bleed to death?”

But, eris, I do comprehend your discomfort and to a degree share it. I think this brings us back to what Libertarian said a while ago, about the private nature of morality. In order to decide what kind of culpability, responsibility and/or obligation accrues to someone, we have to make judgements about what s/he really intended. This is uncomfortable because we could get it wrong; what if we don’t have enough evidence to be certain what the intention was? What if we incorrectly assign culpability/responsibility/ obligation because we lack sufficient information? What if, as you suggest, we end up “forcing” someone to redress an issue for which they actually bear no culpability or responsibility – either because our information is insufficient or, more importantly, the precepts by which we are making moral judgements are faulty? Wouldn’t that make us (individually or collectively) culpable/responsible because we have wrongly imposed this requirement on someone? Ultimately, we can never fully know, in all situations, how well a person is able to distinguish between good/bad intentions (conscience?) and put them into into action. (The last sentence doesn’t exactly express what I’m getting at, but it’s the best I can do right now.)

That doesn’t make this discussion moot, of course, but it does make it hard to know how to apply, in practice, the ideas we have been discussing in the abstract.

[Triskadecamus]

I consider morals and ethics to be different in much the same way as Lib describes. I do not think that human moral judgment can apply to others specifically, but do think that hypothetical examples can be reasonably considered from the moral, and ethical point of view. Moral judgment is only authoritative when moral authority is granted, and for me that means the authority of the Lord. For non believers it might not exist at all, or might be attributed to conscience, custom, or some other philosophic construct. Ethical judgments are granted authority by civil compact, such as law, implemented by the consent of the governed or imposed by the enforced will of the powerful. In both cases, such judgments may be considered unfit by those who deny the authority to which such judgment is ascribed.

I think a hypothetical driver, even if obviously inattentive in his operation of a motor vehicle is not morally responsible for the accidental injury of a child in the roadway. He might well, given some levels of inattention, be ethically responsible. I think a passerby who willfully ignores a drunk knocked off the road by another driver is morally responsible for the harm done by his own callous disregard, and ethically responsible as well.

The obviously different case, in the OP of tossing bricks over a wall seems to me to be much clearer in level of culpability. Throwing bricks is not the problem, it is the callous disregard for the possible consequences which fails of moral, and ethical responsibility. It is not reasonable to assume that I will be uniformly attentive and unfailingly correct in my operation of a car, and accidents do not, of themselves imply morally culpable failings. Throwing bricks is an obviously risk producing behavior, and the intervening wall presents an easily avoidable risk to non participants.

Acting with intent to do harm is morally reprehensible, and ethically culpable. Desiring to do harm is morally reprehensible, but ethically unremarkable. In the first case failure to accomplish intent does not mitigate the moral failure. If harm occurs in the second case, without any act on the part of the person who desired to do that harm, no ethical failure has been perpetrated. However in the same case, feeling pleasure because of such harm is a moral failure, despite the lack of ethical responsibility.

I don’t suppose for a moment that real world situations will conform to the standards I propose here, and cannot claim that I live up to them myself.

Tris

[Measure_for_Measure]

I hope I’m not restating anything:

1. Another example is the distinction between attempted murder and murder 1. Both are premeditated. The actions of the perpetrator in both cases are identical (in this thought experiment). It’s just that in the latter case, the murderer is successful.

Legally, a successful murder carries a heavier sanction than attempted (but unsuccessful) murder.

Morally, this makes no sense, ignoring the practical issue that if the person actually kills another this becomes another piece of evidence indicating intent. (However, practicalities matter, as do social attitudes for that matter.)

2. Provisional Stance: Link morality to virtue. The virtuous one is both benevolent (intends well) as well as reasonably careful.

If you are not “reasonably careful”, you are negligent.

The person who throws a brick over a fence is negligent. Their moral culpability is proportionate to the probability that their brick will hit someone (given their information) times the damage that the brick could do (which is death, actually).

But in order to assert negligence, some notion of a reasonable person must be constructed. Otherwise the stupidity defense would over-ride the accusation of negligence. (eg. I didn’t know that pointing a rifle at a crowd would be a bad idea.)

3. It is the act of careless driving which forms the basis of condemning our hapless driver. The fact that his car hit the child is merely the proof. (Or rather, it is merely evidence of negligence, and not necessarily good evidence at that.)

[Tars_Tarkas]

*Originally posted by erislover *
It is as if consequence initiates moral judgement, while intent merely “makes it worse.”

But you wouldn’t agree with that assessment, would you?

I think both consequence and intent initiate moral judgement. You may intend to save someone’s life, but if you do so by killing children the the consequences of your action make your action immoral, even if the initial life was saved. Oppositely, you could just intend to kill children, and that would be morally wrong as well. If i was a better writer, i could probably explain this better.

Since anyone can get into accidents, why should luck assign moral responsibility? Could we not say that everyone was guilty of accidents? In a society where all things are subtly influenced by all people (sure, the road-owner bears responsibility, but not the tax-payers who subsidized the project?),

didn’t think of them, throw them on the blame pile too, along with the city planners that mapped out the road, and automobile engineers that haven’t invented hovercars yet.

anything deemed negative or “bad” without intent (in order to assign responsibility/blame) is therefore the fault of everyone. Isn’t that an assumed risk of living?

Yes, as part of society, you have to accept responsibility (in part)for everything that happens in it. You may think that since you did not directly affect something, you had no part, but you are responsible for indirect effects. You could have petitioned for a cleaner road near the child’s house, you could have put a refferendum on the ballot that bans automobiles on that road, or any number of other things.

[erislover]

Then why should we hold a person involved in an accident morally responsible for doing something about it? It was no more his fault than mine (if we aren’t going to assign moral culpability to him).

[Jerevan_Somerville]

eris, this may be not be the main focus of your debate with Tars, but in my estimation we don’t hold the driver “morally responsible for doing something about” if he hasn’t brought about the event through intent or recklessness (as defined earlier). Causing the event and doing something about the result of that event are separate issues. A person whose actions inadvertently – that is, without intent or recklessness – brought about or contributed to an event does not accrue any more responsibility to do something about it than the innocent on-lookers, because as you say, it was no more his fault than theirs.

However, both he and the on-lookers have an equal moral imperative to render assistance to the child by whatever means (if any) are available. They share this moral imperative because that is a responsibility one bears for being a member of human society, as Tars might say. Or to put it on a more pragmatic level: if I were laying on the pavement, bleeding, I would hope that someone – and I wouldn’t care who! – would render first aid and call an ambulance, and save the debate about who’s to blame for later.

[Triskadecamus]

When a person is injured, and I am present, it does not make me guilty of causing the harm to him. However, my innocence does not absolve me of all responsibility. I have still the same social obligations if they were hit by another person’s car, or shot, or struck by lightning. I am (in my own evaluation) morally responsible to render aid to that person, in the very least to summon those resources my community maintains for the purpose of providing emergency car for injured or sick people. I might have more, or less responsibility if I am particularly skilled, or trained in providing such aid, or the person is a child.

Legal responsibility is less clear. If I have witnessed a criminal act I can legally be required to give information, but the law in most places does not require me to act to aid a victim of accident or crime. Although I hold that moral considerations do require such action, I do not favor legal requirements that my own values be enforced on others. (Separation of church and state, and whatnot)

Many people would feel ethically compelled to make some effort to help an injured person, and many would judge someone who simply walked (or drove) away from such a situation to be ethicly deficient. The judgement by the general society is not subject to codified law, and represents a censure by reason of ethics, enforced only in proportion with concensus. In some ways that is the most powerful of ethical forces.

Tris

[Tars_Tarkas]

*Originally posted by erislover *
**Then why should we hold a person involved in an accident morally responsible for doing something about it? It was no more his fault than mine (if we aren’t going to assign moral culpability to him). **

Because if you are directly responsible for an accident, you have the responsibility of being the instrument of destruction. Many factors may have lead to you driving down that road (so in essence you are not wholey responsible) but when push came to shove it was you driving down the road, not the multitudes that set up life so you were driving at that instant. Now, if it is an accident that wasn’t immediatly advoidable (like the rock hitting the child incident) then we can’t just say “Whatever may have happened in life, it is your fault now” and instead have to open responsibility up to a broader scope. People who share blame here may share such a minute quantity (how would it be measured? Milli-shames?) that defining it would make no difference, but the idea of them being involved cannot e simply discarded.