Let me say this, Razorsharp: I’d be impressed if you actually produced a James Madison speech that act makes any mention whatsoever of the butterfly ballot.
As I posted earlier, one of the main arguments against a national popular vote in the 18th century was that almost nobody knew anyone outside the immediate area where he lived. George Washington was about the only person with any kind of national reputation, and it took the entire course of the Revolution for that to happen. It is also true that many of the founding fathers did not have a high regard for the ability of the mass of the population to make really important decisions, feeling that most would simply be swayed by the nearest demogogue. Such a person could tell a local or regional group any kind of lie, for example, and if the victim ever heard about it, it would be far too late and too far away to do anything.
Today we really have no comprehension of how very long it took for any news to travel. The topmost speed of anything, including communication, was the speed of a horse. Roads were poor or non-existent.
Sorry MLS but that justification just won’t wash. I’m sure that men like Elbridge Gerry wanted to believe themselves and to convince others that the masses were ignorant even of the political giants of the day but to see the truth the elitists had only to look beyond their noses. Literally, because in that room with them were several men with “continental” reputations and even some international fame: Ben Franklin, George Washington, John Dickenson, Robert Morris, John Rutledge, William Livingston, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Alexander Hamilton. These names were known to every American liable to access to a ballot as were the names of men like John and Sam Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, Patrick Henry, John Hancock, George Clinton, Richard Henry Lee, and Henry Knox. In fact, it wasn’t until Madison himself in 1808 that a President was elected that wasn’t already nationally known in 1787.
If not easy it certainly was possible to hold a direct election for President back then even if it did take 2 weeks for news to travel from the capital to the farthest reaches of white settlement even in good weather. What wasn’t a possibility was that the convention was going to stick one into their constitution. I haven’t read the impartially titled * A Brilliant Solution* yet but if Ms Berkin suggests that the popular vote received serious consideration I would suggest you take her opinion with a grain of salt and look at the evidence yourself. Madison’s notes give enough information to reveal that the popular vote plan was used as a stalking horse. It was a scare tactic to drum up support for the electoral college.
Don’t take anyone’s word for it, read the records over. I’ll post my notes on the subject for reference. Notice how quickly Wilson goes from a direct vote to a “practical plan”. Also catch Madison pretending to push the plan while pointing out how disadvantagous to the southern slave states on July 19 and 25. On the 25th he also points out a disadvantage for the small states. Odd way to convince delegates to approve a direct vote.
May 29th, 1787
Virginia Plan introduced. It calls for the Executive to be chosen by the National Legislature.
June 1st, 1787
The Executive is first debated. A single President or an Executive Council are considered.
James Wilson supports election by The People “in theory”.
George Mason supports the idea but finds it impractical. He suggests Wilson consider this point.
John Rutledge proposes election by the upper House of the National Legislature.
June 2nd, 1787
James Wilson produces “practical” plan.
“* that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into -------- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect -------- members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at -------- and they or any -------- of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body -------- person in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested.*”
Elbridge Gerry seems to have proposed to modify this plan to give state legislatures control over the electors.
Hugh Williamson wondered about going to the trouble of electing elecors to vote when the state legislatures already were elected.
Mr Wilson’s proposal was voted down.
June 9th, 1787
Elbridge Gerry proposes election by executives of the states.
Edmund Randolph opposed.
The motion fails 0-9-1.
June 15th, 1787
New Jersey Plan introduced. It calls for election by Legislature.
July 17th, 1787
Govurneur Morris objected to the Executive being chosen by the Legislature. He felt the latter would lend itself to intrigue. He admits some difficulties with a popular election but moves to include them.
Roger Sherman prefered the decision by the Legislature, and raises the “Favorite Son” argument: the fear that people would always vote for a candidate from their state.
James Wilson addresses the arguments against a popular vote. He dismisses the example of the Diet of Poland and offers a choice by the legislature if no majority can be reached.
Charles Pinckney argued a popular election would be controlled by a few designing men in the most populous states. He thinks the Legislature the best place to pick the President.
Govurneur Morris replies:
“* It is said that in case of an election by the people the populous States will combine & elect whom they please. Just the reverse. The people of such States cannot combine. If their be any combination it must be among their representatives in the Legislature. It is said the people will be led by a few designing men. This might happen in a small district. It can never happen throughout the continent.*”
He goes on to describe the intrigue to be expected in a legislative election.
George Mason remarks that his opponents are trusting the legislature in some points and putting no confidence in it here. He again argues that a popular election is impractical. He deems it “* unnatural*” and compares it to referring a “* trial of colours to a blind man*”.
James Wilson points out that there are areas where the legislature should not be trusted. He gives appointment of other high officials as another example.
Hugh Williamson repeats that people will only vote for local candidates.
The motion is voted down, 9-1.
July 19th, 1787
Govurneur Morris, during consideration of a term limit on the Executive, points out that no term limit would be needed if elected by The People… He moves to reconsider the mode of the Executive.
Rufus King didn’t favor the term limit and felt that choice by The People was best. He also doubted that a majority would be achieved and felt that electors would best do the job.
William Patterson agreed and proposed each state recieve one to three electors.
James Wilson opined that the idea of election by legislature without a term limit was unpopular and “* he perceived with pleasure that the idea was gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the people."
James Madison confirms the problem of appointment by the legislature without the term limit. He comes out in favor of the theory of election by The People. He dismisses the “local candidate” theory but points out, " There was one difficulty however of a serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes. The substitution of electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.*”
Elbridge Gerry confirms the term limit problem. He argues that people would be mislead in a popular vote and urges electors be appointed by the Executive of each state.
The motion is passed unanimously.
Oliver Ellsworth fleshes out Patterson’s earlier suggestion and moves to include it. Jacob Broome 2nds.
John Rutledge stood for election by legislature with a term limit.
Mr Gerry reaffirms his preference and feels that Mr Ellsworth’s proposal is the best alternative. He fleshes out the ratio a bit further.
The motion is divided. The question to let electors appoint the Executive passes 6-3-1. The question of whether state legislatures will choose the electors passes 8-2. The question of the ratio of electors to states is postponed.
July 20th, 1787
James Madison points out that Mr Elseworth’s proposal doesn’t take into account that someday all of the state will have enough people to have three electors.
Elbridge Gerry reintroduces his proposal for the number of electors for each state. There is some wrangling over the ratio of electors.
Hugh Williamson proposes that a state should be alloted the same number of electors as it has seats in the Lower House.
Mr Gerry’s allotment is passed 6-4.
Mr Gerry and Govurneur Morris move that the restriction “* that the Electors of the Executive shall not be members of the Natl. Legislature, nor officers of the U. States, nor shall the Electors themselves be eligible to the supreme magistracy.*” It is agreed to.
July 21st, 1787
Hugh Williamson moves that electors be paid for their service. This is agreed to.
July 23rd, 1787
William Churchill Houston and Richard Dobbs Spaight move to reconsider appointment of electors by state legislatures.
The motion passes 7-3 and another to discuss the item the next day pases 8-2.
July 24th, 1787
Houston moves to get rid of Electors in favor of appointment by the national legislature. He feels it unlikely that capable men would be willing to serve as Electors in the distant states. Spaight 2nds.
Elbridge Gerry opposes. He asserts that the election would be considered important enough that the best men, the governors of states would serve as Electors. He repeats the dislike for the term limit he feels necessary if the position is appointed by the legislature.
Caleb Strong makes that point that the term limit is not the only check on an appointed Executive. Elections may change the composition of the legislature that picks the Executive and thus he can’t just rely on those who selected him the first time. He feared that Electors were vulnerable to the same weaknesses as the legislature and called for simplicity. He agreed that the best men wouldn’t volunteer to act as Electors.
Hugh Williamson calls for legislative appointment with a term limit. He vigorously defended the term limit but allowed that he would agree to a ten or twelve year term.
Gerry moves that state legislatures vote in the same ratio he gave for Electors. He proposes that if no majority is found then the first House could pick 2 out of the top four nominated by the states and the 2nd House could choose the winner. Rufus King 2nds.
Mr Gerry’s motion is greeted with so many nays that no roll is called.
Mr Houston’s motion passes 7-4 and legislative appointment is again penciled in. There follows general disagreement concerning the length of term and religibility of the Executive.
James Wilson proposes a new method of selecting the Executive: He suggests a leaving the choice to a few members of the legislature, no more than 15, drawn by lot.
Govurneur Morris stumps against legislative appointment as the worst alternative. He prefers another mode and offered to consider Wilson’s latest.
Mr Wilson moves to include “* the Executive be chosen every ------- years by ------- Electors to be taken by lot from the Natl Legislature who shall proceed immediately to the choice of the Executive and not separate until it be made.”*
Daniel Carroll 2nds.
Gerry opposes. He dislike leaving it to chance and feels that no form of legislative appointment is a good one.
Rufus King also dislikes the chance of drawing lots. He moves to postpone.
Wilson, who earlier had a motion to postpone voted down 2nds and reiterates his preference for resorting to The People.
Mr Morris points out that the odds of a single state having a majority were slim indeed.
A vote to on whether Mr King’s motion to postpone is in order passes 7-4. Postponement is agreed to.
July 25th, 1787
Oliver Ellsworth attempted to cut through the term limit problem and moved in favor of legislative appointment unless an Executive had served a full term. In that case the decision would be left to Electors chosen by state legislatures.
Elbridge Gerry shares his dislike of legislative appointment yet again, pronouncing it “incurable” and proposes still another plan: appointment by state Executives with advice from their Council or in their absence, Electors chosen by the state legislature.
James Madison, in a long piece, examines the proposals. He now comes out strongly against legislative appointment; the choice would cause tumultuous division in the legislature, the Executive was liable to be dependent on the legislature, and foreign powers would have footing for intrigue ( he gives the Holy Roman Empire and Poland as examples ). He objects to leaving the choice to the state legislatures because it would upset the balance of power between the states and the general government. He rejects appointment by state Executives because he feels them to be open to intrigue as well. He then considers what is left, Electors or The People themselves. He praises the idea of Electors and proclaims they can be made free of cabal and corruption. He then announces he prefers direct election by The People. He now concedes the “local candidate theory” and repeats the concern for loss of influence of the South due to it’s restrictive voting qualifications.
Mr Ellsworth repeats the “local candidate” argument.
Mr Ellsworth’s motion is denied 7-4.
Charles Pinckney moves to include a limited religibility, a person could serve in six of twelve years, in order to make legislative appointment more attractive.
George Mason concurrs and opines that this leaves the Executive independent enough. He then admits there is some cause for concern of foreign influence under legislative appointment.
Pierce Butler clarifies that the pitfalls to be avoided are “cabal at home and influence from abroad”. He feels legislative appointment cures neither. He favors appointment of Electors by state legislatures with the term limit and doesn’t want any ratio of electors. He feels the states should be equal.
Mr Gerry allows that Pinckney’s plan does cure legislative appointment a bit.
Govurneur Morris again argues against legislative appointment. He claims to favor it least and election by The People best. He now comes out in favor of Wilson’s drawing of lots.
Hugh Williamson suggests having each man vote for three candidates in an election of The People as a safeguard against the “Favorite Son” problem.
Mr Morris likes the idea of multiple votes and proposes that each man vote for 2, one of whom is not from his state.
James Madison finds the proposal attractive but worries that voters would use the 2nd vote on someone that couldn’t possibly hurt the chances of their first choice. He raises the possibility of limiting the eligibility of Executives from the same state.
Gerry goes into his “Ignorant Populace” schtick. He claims that the Order of Cincinatti will control every election by The People.
John Dickinson claims to have long favored popular election of a Executive Magistrate. He feels the objections to it are less than the objections to all others. He proposes that The People in each state choose a candidate and have another body, the national legislature or Electors, choose from among them.
A motion to alot more time to Williamson’s idea fails 6-5
Mr Pinckney’s motion also fails 6-5.
Gerry and Pierce Butler moved to commit the matter to the Committee of Detail.
James Wilson objects.
John Langdon was in favor.
July 26th, 1787
George Mason examines the proposals. He invokes the “Ignorant Populace” chestnut against popular election. He refers to “* strong arguments*” against appointment by state legislatures or executives. He mentions the accepting and then rejecting the idea of Electors. He rejects Williamson’s attempt to solve the “Favorite Son” question and repeats the charge that the Cincinnatus would control “A popular election in any form”. He rejects the most recent proposal, from John Dickinson, for the opposite of the “Favorite Son”. He rejects it because no candidate unpopular within his own state could win, even if the unpopularity was the reason the rest of the nation favored him. He states that the lottery is so unpopular that it doesn’t bear examination. He concludes that legislative appointment is the only choice left. He felt that a term limit was necessary for this mode and moved to include one in the working document. William Richardson Davie 2nds.
Benjamin Franklin supports the term limit, speaking of it as a promotion from public servant to master.
Col Mason’s motion passes 7-3-1 and a seven year term limit is added to the Legislative appointment.
Gouverneur Morris proclaimed himself now opposed to the entire plan for the Executive. He points out that they were proposing no term limits on Judicial and Legislative officials. He also lands a sarcastic barb in Dr Franklin’s talk of “promotion”.
The Resolution for the Executive passes 6-3-2.
The Resolutions are sent to the Committee of Detail.
August 24, 1787
There is discussion over the method of voting within the Legislature. A joint ballot is voted in 7-4. A requirement that the winner recieve a majority passes 10-1.
James Madison: “* This surely can not be unreasonable as the President is to act for the people not for the States.*”
Daniel Carroll and James Wilson move for popular election.
The motion fails 9-2.
Gouverneur Morris again stumped against legislative appointment. He again claims that the term limit will not make the Executive disinterested because he will strive to please the Legislature in expectation of joining or rejoining it. He moves the Executive be appointed by Electors chosen by The People. Daniel Carroll 2nds.
The motion fails 6-5.
A later motion calling simply for Electors ( however selected ) fails 4-4-3.
September 4th, 1787
The Committee of Eleven delivers a compromise Report. Each state will have the same number of Electors as Congressmen and control over how they are selected. The Electors will meet in the states and vote for 2 candidates, one of which can’t be from that state. The votes will be counted by the Senate, which would pick the winner if no candidate recieved a majority.
James Madison expressed concern that choosing the President and the Vice from the five with the most ballots would lead Electors to use their votes to control candidates for senatoral selection rather than try to form a majority of their own.
Gouverneur Morris agreed.
Edmund Randolph and Charles Pinckney asked for an explanation for the change in mode.
Mr Morris, speaking for himself and the committee, delivered these objections to legislative appointment: 1, it lent itself to intruigue and faction. 2, the “* inconveniency*” of the necessary term limit. 3, it must leave the impeachment of a President to the very body that elected the President. 4, it was unpopular in the convention. 5, many favored a popular election. 6, the need to make the Executive seperate from the Legislature. He stressed again that Electors would be uncorruptable because they would meet seperately.
George Mason didn’t object but felt that lacking a majority of Electors for a single candidate ( which he felt was almost certain ) the Senate was the wrong body to appoint.
Pierce Butler admitted that the plan wasn’t perfect but allowed that it was better than legislative appointment.
Mr Pinckney listed his objections: 1, the Senate would always make the choice. 2, the candidates will be unknown to the Electors who would be unable to judge them. 3, the lack of term limit was dangerous. 4, it would leave the choice to the Senate which was the body that could impeach the Executive.
Hugh Williamson was concerned that the President would be dependent on the Senate for another term. He felt limiting the Senate’s choice to the 2 leading candidates would be the least to be done to lessen this dependence.
Mr Morris explains that the main benefit of Electors is their incorruptability. He attempts to seperate this from the rest of the Executive debate. Adjustments such as a term limit could be made to this mode as easily as any other.
Abraham Baldwin thought the plan was looking better than when he first saw it. He felt as time went by and people grew more familiar with residents of other states that the Electors would more often reach a majority.
James Wilson repeats earlier reasons to favor this mode over legislative appointment. He also dislikes the Senate involvement and suggests the Legislature as the contingency plan.
Mr. Randolf prefered legislative appointment. He also complained that the Senate was inappropriate. He worried that states close to the capital would have an advantage in that body.
Mr Morris replied that the Senate was preferred because it was smaller, the President would be beholden to less people. He expressed confidence that the President would seek reelection through competence.
September 5th, 1787
Charles Pinckney repeated his objections from the day before.
Elbridge Gerry ** doesn’t** object to the new mode but warns his final approval will depend on the powers delegated to the Executive.
John Rutledge opposed the new mode. He felt it empowered the Senate overmuch and he restated his support for a term limit. He moved in favor of legislative appointment.
The motion failed 8-2-1.
George Mason repeated his objection to Senate involvement. He felt that the Executive and the Senate in colusion could unbalance the government. He moved to waive the majority requirment and take whomever got the most votes. Hugh Williamson 2nds.
Govurneur Morris tried to downplay the chances of not reaching a majority. Each Elector has 2 votes so 1/4 of the total is considered a majority. If the sitting President is popular, he will get the majority, if he is not then his opponents are likely band together to remove him.
Col Mason makes the point that those that feel a failure to reach a majority is unlikely should be willing to give way on the eventuality with those who don’t.
Roger Sherman claims the advantage of the “small” states in the Senate is balanced by the advantage of the “large” states in nominating the candidates to it.
Col Mason’s motion is denied 8-2.
James Wilson moved to place the contingency appointment in the entire Legislature instead of the Senate.
James Madison felt it imperitive that the contingency be made as unlikely as possible and fleshed out the “Big Neighbor” argument. States with more people would have more Electors. With those votes “big” states could keep any candidate from a majority and and send the question to the Legislature where they also have more votes. Madison felt that if every state had an equal say in the contingency then the populous states would be motivated to settle the question in the electoral college.
Edmund Randolph and John Dickinson object that senatoral appointment makes that body overpowerful.
Mr Wilson’s motion fails 7-3-1.
Mr Madison and Hugh Williamson move that election in the college require a pluality of 1/3 at the minimum.
Elbridge Gerry objects that this leaves the selection in the hands of three or four large states.
Mr Williamson counters that in the senate 1/6 of the population living in seven states could make the selection.
The motion fails, 9-2.
Mr Gerry proposes yet another scheme. The Legislature as a whole would select six Senators and seven Representatives to appoint the Executive.
Rufus King opined that the greater influence of the “small” states in the senatoral appointment ( compared to their influence in the entire Legislature ) was balanced by the greater influence of the “large” states in choosing the candidates placed before it. He also reminded the delegates that the representatives of the “small” states had agreed to lessen the power of the Senate by forbidding it to originate tax bills.
George Mason moved to have the Senate choose from the top three. Mr Gerry 2nds.
Mr Sherman found this limitation to make the whole mode unacceptable. He preferred the top seven or thirteen candidates be eligible.
The motion fails 9-2.
Richard Dobbs Spaight and Mr Rutledge moved to have the top thirteen candidates eligible for senatoral appointment.
The motion fails 9-2.
Mr Madison and Mr Williams move to lessen the requirement of majority of Electors to a majority of votes. Should some Electors fail to cast a ballot this would make refference to the Senate less likely.
The motion fails 7-4.
Mr Dickinson moves to clarify the wording to make it clear that a majority of Electors is necessary rather than a majority of votes as sought by the previous motion.
The motion passes 9-2.
Col Mason expressed his unhappiness that the chosen mode was aristocratic.
September 6th, 1787
Rufus King and Elbridge Gerry move to exclude officers of the federal government from serving as Electors.
This is agreed to.
Mr Gerry never seems to run out of proposals. His latest is a further contingency on the contingency plan. Should a sitting President, or anyone else, fail to gain a majority of electoral votes then the issue would be decided in the Legislature rather than the Senate.
Mr King approves of the plan. He thinks it a good compromise and unlikely to be used often.
George Read disagreed, indicating that the issue wasn’t settled.
Hugh Williamson approves of the seperation of Executive and Senate.
Roger Sherman liked the Resolution as it stood but was still willing to consider changes. He introduces the idea of voting in the Legislature by states, as the populous states have the advantage in Electors.
Govurneur Morris praised the new plan.
James Wilson gives an extended diatribe against the dangers of the overpowerful Senate as proposed.
Mr Morris replies by comparing the new proposal to the previous agreement and finds the Senate no more powerful. For the electoral part of the argument he maintains that the Senate is no more powerful if it appoints a President out of the top five vote-getters only if there is no majority than if it shares appointment with the House and chooses any citizen.
Hugh Williamson repeats that the problem is provisional appointment by the Senate.
Alexander Hamilton shares his dislike of the general plan but feels that the new proposal is better. While he feels it necessary with Legislative appointment, he doesn’t favor a term limit. He thinks the Executive will use his power of appointments to subvert the government if ineligible and use corrupt influence upon the Legislature if reeligible through them. He thought failure on the part of the Electors to reach a majority was likely and so no hope for Legislative appointment, even as a contingency. He was in favor of taking the winner of a plurality of electoral votes. He states that the argument against it is that too few votes could win but that the Senate could appoint the man with the fewest votes.
The voting on the Report begins.
Selection by Electors, their numbers fixed by Congressional representation, who shall be appointed as each state legislature directs.
This motion passes 9-2
Richard Dobbs Spaight and Mr Williamson move that the Electors meet at the capital.
This motion fails 10 -1
For the Electors to elect a majority of Electors must be reached rather than a majority of actual votes.
This motion passes 8-3
If no majority is reached then the Senate will decide the question.
This motion reached a 7-1 majority before the vote call was stopped.
James Madison moved that a quorum of 2/3 of the Senate be necessary for this. Charles Pinckney 2nds.
Nathaniel Gorham objected that this might delay the choice for a long time.
This motion passes 6-4-1
Mr Williamson suggests that the choice be made in the House with voting by state.
Mr Sherman agreed, since it was his idea in the first place, and so moved.
George Mason agrees.
The motion passes 10-1
Govurneur Morris suggests that the sitting President only be allowed to be relected by the Electors and should he fail to reach a majority he should be ineligible for contingency appointment.
A seperate motion to have the House decide between 2 candidates that tied in the electoral college passed 7-3-1
September 7th, 1787
Elbridge Gerry moved that in the contingency appointment in the Legislature, no state should cast a vote with less than three members. If a state had less than three Representatives it’s Senators would fill in. Also that a majority of all states be necessary rather than just those present. James Madison 2nds.
George Read objected that states with a single Representative would have no vote if any of it’s Congressmen were ill or absent for another reason.
Mr Madison pointed out that a single Representative was no less vulnerable.
“* He thought it an evil that so small a number at any rate should be authorized, to elect. Corruption would be greatly facilitated by it. The mode itself was liable to this further weighty objection that the representatives of a Minority of the people, might reverse the choice of a majority of the States and of the people. He wished some cure for this inconveniency might yet be provided.*”
Elbridge Gerry withdrew the three member requirement and the majority of all states was agreed to.