# The ethics of majoritarianism **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [February 11, 2005, 11:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564 "2005-02-11T11:57:05Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Captain\_Amazing](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/6de8d8/32.png) [@Captain\_Amazing](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Captain_Amazing)\ **Post date:** [February 11, 2005, 9:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/21 "2005-02-11T21:35:10Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > But their wills are in opposition only if one is allowed to impose his will on the other. Why allow that imposition at all? Doesn’t majority rule actually _cause_ a conflict in rights? You have it backwards. The opposition comes before the imposition. If you and I both want the same thing, or if you want something, and I want something that will end up preventing you from getting what you want, our wills are in opposition. At that point, if we can’t make some sort of compromise, the stronger of us will end up imposing his will on the other. This is inevitable, because there is scarcity in this world, and because what we desire is infinite. Also, there’s something in us that wants to bend others to our will. We like being listened to and respected. We like being told we’re correct. We like convincing others we’re right and wielding power over others. At the same time, we like surrendering our will to others. People like asking other people what to do, and not taking responsibility for themselves. There’s something really reassuring when you’re faced with a hard decision, being told, “Don’t worry, I’ll handle it.” That’s why there’s government in the world, at its most basic. It’s to help protect us from each other and ourselves. ---
**Author:** ![hildea](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/h/ebca7d/32.png) [@hildea](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/hildea)\ **Post date:** [February 11, 2005, 9:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/22 "2005-02-11T21:43:50Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Question 1: What is the principle upon which majority rule has its ethical authority? > [@](#): > > I like the response that it is not ethically based, which makes sense to me (although there might yet arrive a majoritarian who will defend it on an ethical basis.) Someone called? Although, to be precise, I’ll defend majoritarianism as a compromise between an ethical basis and the imperfect real world. I start pretty close to your stance, I imagine: Ideally, everybody should have a right to decide how they should be governed. Everybody should have other rights as well, including right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, to borrow a phrase from your side of the Atlantic ocean. In the real world, we pretty soon come to a point where my rights conflict with yours. This is where I choose majoritarianism, tempered with strong protections of the rights of minorities, as the method most likely to ensure these rights to the best extent possible. > [@](#): > > Question 2: How do you demarcate (if at all) between what the majority may impose upon the minority and what it may not? The Golden Rule, extended version: Imagine that you’ll be born tomorrow, and that you’ve no control of whether you’ll belong to the majority or a minority. Then go create protections for the rights of minorities. Some others have mentioned a constitution as a mechanism for protecting minority rights. A consitution doesn’t in itself protect those rights – one of the most memorable lessons from the history of my own constitution is how it originally contained a vile attempt at ethnic cleansing, and how a principled minority fought to change the majority opinion until that paragraph was finally removed. > [@](#): > > Question 3: What is the guiding principle in the case of majority minorities? This is a difficult one. In principle, the people who are most affected by a desicion should have the most say about it. Except for when they shouldn’t. I’ll have to think more on this one. Thanks for asking difficult questions! > [@](#): > > Question 4: I suspect that, based on limited prior discussions, part of the majority’s authority will be said to arise from a confidence that the majority will be temperate and wise. Nope. I’ll echo my fellow majoritarians here: I don’t have much trust in the wisdom of the majority. Case in point: Look at the people the majority have elected to lead my country. Or yours. > [@](#): > > Why can’t it be, “Here, Peter, here’s a dollar for Paul.”? Why must it be, “Here, Peter, here’s the authority to take a dollar from me and give it to Paul.”? Because Peter needs to be able to say: “Sorry, a dollar isn’t enough. If you don’t give me two, Paul’s children will starve.” > [@](#): > > Question 5: Directly pursuant to Sentient’s quote, upon what principle does a majority have an ethical holding over a geographical area? My instinctive answer is: They shouldn’t. Or at least, their rights should be pretty limited. To take one example: Thanks to luck and Slartibarfast, there’s a lot of oil under the Norwegian Ocean. I can argue that people living in Norway should have a right to set limits on oil drilling here to the extent that it impacts the local environment, but I can’t see that Norway’s population has a greater right to enjoy the wealth from that oil than others on this planet. ---
**Author:** ![Dunderman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ecb155/32.png) [@Dunderman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dunderman)\ **Post date:** [February 11, 2005, 9:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/23 "2005-02-11T21:57:25Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Okay, but you brought up two, and made your point using two. Not really. That was just a colourful image to get the point across that no two people agree on everything. > [@](#): > > But my question remains no matter what number you assign. Rights clash only when some impose their will on others. So, why introduce the unnecessary entity of rights distribution schemes? In other words, isn’t it conceptually simpler to suppress imposition altogether than it is to establish a dizzying matrix of allowable and forbidden impositions, complete with exceptions, penumbras, and interstices? Simpler? Yes. Practical? Possibly, but I think not. I’ll get back with examples when I’m sober. > [@](#): > > But their wills are in opposition only if one is allowed to impose his will on the other. Why allow that imposition at all? Doesn’t majority rule actually _cause_ a conflict in rights? Often, but I consider rights themselves to be an unnecessary entity. > [@](#): > > I think you’ve just highlighted another intrinsic problem with majoritarianism. It cannot extract a consequence for the imposition of will because it, by its very nature, imposes the will of some against others. That is a problem with majoritarianism, yes. Unfortunately, all the other systems have bigger problems. > [@](#): > > I have no problem with that, and it is entirely understandable that Smith, Jones, and Brown will want to decide among one another about how best to deal among themselves. The part I don’t understand is what entitles Smith, Jones, and Brown (ethically anyway) to decide among one another whether Mr. Anderson must move to Somalia, just because they’ve drawn a polygon that includes their property and his? Nothing entitles them, so to speak, but there’s no other practical way to run things. Also note that, as **SentientMeat** pointed out, Smith, Jones and Brown don’t decide that Anderson must move to Somalia but rather offers him a choice: abide by the majority’s will or move to Somalia. It’s an unattractive choice, certainly, but I can’t think of a system that wouldn’t force other choices, just as unattractive. ---
**Author:** ![CarnalK](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnalk/32/486_2.png) [@CarnalK](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CarnalK)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 5:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/24 "2005-02-12T05:31:03Z")
**Liberal** said: > [@](#): > > I like the response that it is not ethically based, which makes sense to me I think you’d usually find ethical arguments centred around universal suffrage and democracy rather than majoritarianism. I guess I’m just paraphrasing better posts above when I say it is a good violence substitute. All things being equal, we can guess that if it came down to brass tacks the majority (or their leader) _could_ force it’s will, so let’s just bypass the fighting. It can break down if the majority decides to use force regardless - such as forcible deportation of a specific coherent minority to Somalia. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 6:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/25 "2005-02-12T06:41:10Z")
> [@](#): > > Your hypothetical of the two men, I think, raises the question of why each may not be free to exercise his own will. If you say that that would cause a conflict of wills, then I think not. After all, if A imposes his will on B, then B is not free to exercise his own will. Likewise, if B imposes his will on A, then A is not free to exercise his own will. So, my question is, why must there be a process to determine how best to compromise the will of one or both? Why not simply a process that ensures each may exercise his own will without imposing upon the will of the other? Because Liberal the real world isn’t that simple. What if A and B own adjacent pieces of property? A wants to build a pig farm on his property. B doesn’t want the smell of pig manure permeating his property. Does A get to impose his will on B (“I can build whatever business I want on my property”) or does B get to impose his will on A (“The smell from your property is not allowed to trespass onto my property.”) Liberal, you often simply ignore problems like this or declare that problems like this won’t exist. But in the real world, they do and cannot be ignored. ---
**Author:** ![Dunderman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ecb155/32.png) [@Dunderman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dunderman)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 8:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/26 "2005-02-12T08:17:05Z")
> [@Priceguy](#): > > I’ll get back with examples when I’m sober. I’m back, I’m sober, so here are the examples. In a fit of drunken rage, Anderson kills Johnson. What to do with Anderson? Smith and Jones want to execute him, Brown wants him to get treatment for his alcoholism and therapy to get over his violent tendencies. Both sides simply cannot get their way, so who gets to decide what happens to Anderson? Smith, Jones, Brown, Anderson and Johnson live along a river. One day, Smith (who lives the furthest upstream) decides to dam off his section of the river. This pisses off Jones, Brown, Anderson and Johnson who want water to drink and fish to eat. Who decides if Smith gets to mess up the lives of the other four? The simplest answer is that the majority gets to decide. If anyone tries to let anyone but the majority decide, the majority can overrule that decision by force anyway. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 10:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/27 "2005-02-12T10:31:58Z")
With respect to force or violence, it cannot be an ethical justification for majoritarianism for the reasons I’ve stated. But that aside, speaking purely in “practical” terms, violence can be practiced by even a tiny minority, which can overwhelm the majority. Force is irrelevant since _any_ political philosophy or form of government can make force a part of its implementation. Majoritarianism uses force, libertarianism uses force, totalitarianism uses force — only pacifism eschews force, and no one is taking its side. As to the majority deciding things, like in the river example, what is there in majoritarianism to stop Smith from recruiting two of the other men, maybe by bribes or, if you insist, force, and thereby forming a majority, which determines that the river should be turned into sludge? Majoritarianism will have failed to protect the river. And nevermind what happens if there is a tie… Finally, this: > [@Little Nemo](#): > > Liberal, you often simply ignore problems like this or declare that problems like this won’t exist. But in the real world, they do and cannot be ignored. Ignore it? I wrote a short story about it — _Sarah’s Gold_, about a pig farmer and his family, which you can read from my profile’s homepage. But you have not answered your own question. The majoritarian world is chock full of homes that border pig farms, landfills, and even toxic waste dumps. This thread is about them. Why is the majority _in fact_ ignoring the problems that you merely _claim_ I’ve ignored? ---
**Author:** ![Dunderman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ecb155/32.png) [@Dunderman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dunderman)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 11:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/28 "2005-02-12T11:37:16Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > With respect to force or violence, it cannot be an ethical justification for majoritarianism for the reasons I’ve stated. Definitely not, but it does point to majoritarianism being the only practical system, since we’ll end up there anyway. > [@](#): > > As to the majority deciding things, like in the river example, what is there in majoritarianism to stop Smith from recruiting two of the other men, maybe by bribes or, if you insist, force, and thereby forming a majority, which determines that the river should be turned into sludge? Nothing, since it is now the majority’s will. The only way to make sure the “right” thing happens every time is to be an enlightened despot, and definitions of “right” and “enlightened” vary widely. > [@](#): > > Majoritarianism will have failed to protect the river. Certainly. Majoritarianism’s aim is not to protect the river but to carry out the will of the majority. If that will is stupid… well, them’s the breaks. I’m not saying majoritarianism is perfect, barely that it is good, just that it is the best system I know of. ---
**Author:** ![CarnalK](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnalk/32/486_2.png) [@CarnalK](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CarnalK)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 5:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/29 "2005-02-12T17:00:54Z")
> [@](#): > > _Liberal said:_ > But that aside, speaking purely in “practical” terms, violence can be practiced by even a tiny minority, which can overwhelm the majority. That it is why it is my pledge, if elected, to grant equal rights to all Navy SEALS. 😉 > [@](#): > > _Priceguy said:_ > Certainly. Majoritarianism’s aim is not to protect the river but to carry out the will of the majority. If that will is stupid… well, them’s the breaks. I’m not saying majoritarianism is perfect, barely that it is good, just that it is the best system I know of. Right. It’s also why you would not normally hear majoritianism defended in practical terms without addressing the protection of individual rights. Just like you wouldn’t ignore all majority needs in practical libertarianism (e.g. a common defence of national borders). I don’t say this to compare the ideologies - merely to note that “pure” varieties rarely make it to the constitution. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 5:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/30 "2005-02-12T17:28:13Z")
> [@Priceguy](#): > > Definitely not, but it does point to majoritarianism being the only practical system, since we’ll end up there anyway. That’s the main part of what you’re saying that I disagree with, and I believe that there are sufficient counterexamples of totalitarian or oligarchical civilizations to destroy the premise altogether. Majoritarianism is not at all any ultimate goal toward which all things are headed — the majority may easily be subjugated to the will of a few renegades or one tyrant for that matter. ---
**Author:** ![CarnalK](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnalk/32/486_2.png) [@CarnalK](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CarnalK)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 5:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/31 "2005-02-12T17:36:12Z")
> [@](#): > > _Liberal said:_ > Majoritarianism is not at all any ultimate goal toward which all things are headed — the majority may easily be subjugated to the will of a few renegades or one tyrant for that matter. Totally correct. Proponents of majoritianism would do well not to assume some social evolution that has a goal of greatest aggregate happiness. Societies manage all sorts of temporary equilibriums. ---
**Author:** ![Dunderman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ecb155/32.png) [@Dunderman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dunderman)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 6:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/32 "2005-02-12T18:11:50Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > That’s the main part of what you’re saying that I disagree with, and I believe that there are sufficient counterexamples of totalitarian or oligarchical civilizations to destroy the premise altogether. Majoritarianism is not at all any ultimate goal toward which all things are headed — the majority may easily be subjugated to the will of a few renegades or one tyrant for that matter. I didn’t mean to imply that majoritarianism is a goal of any sort, just that human civilizations tend to gravitate towards majoritarianism. I believe history bears this out. Also, when the majority is subjugated, it is always through a system that neither you nor I support. Therefore, given that we have to have a system at all, that system tends to become majoritarianism. ---
**Author:** ![Dunderman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ecb155/32.png) [@Dunderman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dunderman)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 6:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/33 "2005-02-12T18:14:47Z")
> [@Priceguy](#): > > Also, when the majority is subjugated, it is always through a system that neither you nor I support. Therefore, given that we have to have a system at all, that system tends to become majoritarianism. On a re-read, this doesn’t make sense. Allow me to rephrase. When the majority is subjugated, it is always through a system that neither you nor I support. Therefore, I think we can agree that to both of us, majoritarianism is preferrable to any alternative. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 6:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/34 "2005-02-12T18:32:42Z")
> [@Priceguy](#): > > I didn’t mean to imply that majoritarianism is a goal of any sort, just that human civilizations tend to gravitate towards majoritarianism. I believe history bears this out. Aztecs: absolute ruler. Babylonians: monarchy. Egyptians: pharaoh. Mayans: totalitarian ruler. Romans: emperor. Chinese: emperor. Japanese: emperor. Minoans: monarchy. Hittites: kingdom. Mycenaeans: kingdom. Israel: kingdom. Judah: kingdom. Persia: supreme leader (rahbar). Various and sundry Arabian and African civilizations: kingdoms and totalitarian leaders. […fast forward…] Nazi Germany: facsist. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: totalitarian. People’s Republic of China: totalitarian. Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, People’s Republic of Korea: totalitarian. Sudan: despotic. And on and on. Even one counterexample is sufficient to destroy a generalized premise, but with this many, if you do not change your mind, then we are at the end of our debate. > [@](#): > > Also, when the majority is subjugated, it is always through a system that neither you nor I support. Therefore, given that we have to have a system at all, that system tends to become majoritarianism. But I don’t even support majoritarianism. I think it is tyrannical. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 6:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/35 "2005-02-12T18:33:58Z")
> [@Priceguy](#): > > On a re-read, this doesn’t make sense. Allow me to rephrase. > > When the majority is subjugated, it is always through a system that neither you nor I support. Therefore, I think we can agree that to both of us, majoritarianism is preferrable to any alternative. No. We can not. Do you seriously expect me to support a political theory that has neither any ethical nor practical justification? ---
**Author:** ![Dunderman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/ecb155/32.png) [@Dunderman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dunderman)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 7:02pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/36 "2005-02-12T19:02:13Z")
> [@Liberal](#): > > Aztecs: absolute ruler. Babylonians: monarchy. Egyptians: pharaoh. Mayans: totalitarian ruler. Romans: emperor. Chinese: emperor. Japanese: emperor. Minoans: monarchy. Hittites: kingdom. Mycenaeans: kingdom. Israel: kingdom. Judah: kingdom. Persia: supreme leader (rahbar). Various and sundry Arabian and African civilizations: kingdoms and totalitarian leaders. […fast forward…] Nazi Germany: facsist. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: totalitarian. People’s Republic of China: totalitarian. Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, People’s Republic of Korea: totalitarian. Sudan: despotic. And on and on. Even one counterexample is sufficient to destroy a generalized premise, but with this many, if you do not change your mind, then we are at the end of our debate. Once again: I didn’t say that all societies are based on majoritarianism, just that human civilization tends to gravitate towards majoritarianism. Count the number of majoritarianist societies five thousand years ago, and then count them today. Humanity moves towards majoritarianism. > [@](#): > > No. We can not. Do you seriously expect me to support a political theory that has neither any ethical nor practical justification? Ethical justification: Majoritarianism is the system with the best chance to make the maximum amount of people maximally happy, since it follows the will of the maximum amount of people. Practical justification: Any system that does not follow the will of the majority is inherently unstable as a majority of people is going to be displeased with it. ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 7:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/37 "2005-02-12T19:26:38Z")
> [@Priceguy](#): > > Once again: I didn’t say that all societies are based on majoritarianism, just that human civilization tends to gravitate towards majoritarianism. Count the number of majoritarianist societies five thousand years ago, and then count them today. Humanity moves towards majoritarianism. I reckon you’re talking about European style societies, because if you mean Asian-Indian style societies, then you are equating majoritarianism and [cronyism](http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/2002/0624sum.htm). European population (with the exception of Muslim Albania) is declining. From 728 million in 2000, it is expected to fall to 556 million in fifty years. Meanwhile, China’s population already comprises a significant chunk of the whole earth’s, and theocratic populations are the next fastest increasing. Even Mexico is a one-party state, with the National Revolutionary Party holding power for the last 50 years. And tenuous majoritarian systems, like Russia or Chile, could fall before I hit submit. Rome was a republic for a while, and reverted. America (and its hegemonic influence) is too young to consider it the end of the historical road. It would be like capturing a random day from the stock market, and projecting a trend. Your position on this particular matter is honestly so full of holes, that I simply cannot understand why you continue to hold it. I would have changed my mind long ago. > [@](#): > > Ethical justification: Majoritarianism is the system with the best chance to make the maximum amount of people maximally happy, since it follows the will of the maximum amount of people. I disagree. It follows a _compromise_ of the will. Within the majority, there might be strong disagreement about what flavor ice-cream people should eat: 33% might say chocolate, 33% strawberry, and 33% vanilla. It might end up requiring everyone to eat Neapolitan so that people have to buy three times as much to get what they want. To achieve the maximum amount of happiness for the maximum amount of people, you must allow every person to pursue his own happiness in his own way so long as he does not abridge the right of others to do the same. > [@](#): > > Practical justification: Any system that does not follow the will of the majority is inherently unstable as a majority of people is going to be displeased with it. But how is that practical for the minority? We’ve already been over this. By imposing its will, the majority is practicing tyranny. That is no more practical than totalitarianism. ---
**Author:** ![CarnalK](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/carnalk/32/486_2.png) [@CarnalK](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CarnalK)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 7:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/38 "2005-02-12T19:32:41Z")
> [@](#): > > _Liberal said:_ > To achieve the maximum amount of happiness for the maximum amount of people, you must allow every person to pursue his own happiness in his own way so long as he does not abridge the right of others to do the same. I thought you said you didn’t want this to be a Libertarianism versus Majoritarianism thread? ---
**Author:** ![Liberal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/848f3c/32.png) [@Liberal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Liberal)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 7:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/39 "2005-02-12T19:39:50Z")
> [@CarnalK](#): > > I thought you said you didn’t want this to be a Libertarianism versus Majoritarianism thread? That’s right, but I allowed for comparisons of the two for clarity. In this case, it clarifies what I mean by maximal benifit for the maximal number — i.e., 100% getting the most they possibly can, as opposed to merely a majority. ---
**Author:** ![BrainGlutton](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/82dd89/32.png) [@BrainGlutton](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/BrainGlutton)\ **Post date:** [February 12, 2005, 8:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564/40 "2005-02-12T20:13:19Z")
This excerpt from “Why There Will Be No Revolution in the U.S.,” by Michael Lind, in the _New Left Review,_ 2/1/99, might be of interest to you, **Liberal.** From [http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=1013:](http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=1013:) > [@](#): > > **Two Conceptions of Democracy** > > If [Daniel] Lazare’s critique of the U.S. constitutional system depended entirely on his ideology-influenced misprisions of American political culture and American political history, then it would deserve to be dismissed. The most important aspects of Lazare’s critique, however, are based on a conception of democracy, which in theory (if not in Lazare’s own theory) has no necessary connection to the ideology of the socialist left. > > Lazare never makes explicit his own conception of the ideal constitution. From his writings, it appears that his conception of the good constitution rests on two premises. The first is that a “demos” is a more or less coherent community. The second assumption is that relatively simple majoritarian institutions are the most adequate vehicles for the expression of the sovereign will of the demos. Lazare’s ideal constitution, it would seem, would establish a unicameral legislature in a unitary state, with a majority of the legislators free to abrogate the constitution and promulgate a new one whenever they chose to do so. This conception explains Lazare’s insistence that federal systems and complex constitutions are either deluded responses to groundless fears of majority tyranny or sinister contraptions devised by machiavellian elites to neutralize democracy. “Can a people divided and conquer itself?” Lazare write (p. 27). “Is stable self-government really to be achieved through self-fragmentation?” (p.27). > > If this is a fair statement of Lazare’s views, as I believe it is, then Lazare belongs in the older and more influential of the two traditions of thinking about democracy. The oldest and most prevalent conception of democracy identifies it with the will, or in another version the interests, of a numerical majority. Most centrist liberal and progressive proposals for constitutional reform, along with those of the radical left, have been based on this assumption. 7 **There is, however, a minority tradition in political thought, which questions the identification of democracy with majority rule.** The nineteenth-century American theorist and South Carolina Senator John Calhoun, with his idea of “the concurrent majority,” is one of the key figures in this minority tradition. 8 So are twentieth century theorist of “consociational democracy,” like Arend Lijphart and Lani Guinier, most of whom are found on the center-left and share nothing in common with Calhoun except for a concern with the plight of numerical minorities.9 > > The consociational theory of democracy differs from the majoritarian theory in two key respects. First, unlike majoritarians, consociationalists take seriously the possibility that a given political community may be made up of two or more enduring, distinct communities defined by extra-political characteristics, such as regional, racial, or religious identities. The second difference follows from the first. Consociationalist theory rejects the assumption that simple majoritarian constitutional structures are necessarily the best. In countries with a complicated regional or ethnic make-up, complicated democratic instititutions may be necessary. > > **Concessions and Consensus** > > From the consociationalist perspective, a given constitution may be less important as a set of rules for the self-government of a majority than as what the philosopher John Gray calls a modus vivendi, a treaty among various groups, which may have a long history prior to that of the national or multinational polity in which they find themselves as a result of coercion or choice. In particular countries, particular compromises embedded in the constitution as a concession to this or that sub-national group will cause the constitution to deviate to a greater or lesser degree from the Platonic ideal of a democratic constitution. In some cases the deviations may be unjustifiable (like the concessions made to slave-owners or less populous states in the U.S. constitution). In other cases, though, the concession may be reasonable and legitimate—particularly if the alternative to an idiosyncratic constitution is not a simpler, more majoritarian constitution, but secession or other kinds of civil strife. > > For many (though by no means all) majoritarian theorists, the purpose of democracy is to “express” the “will” of the more or less unitary “people”—a Rousseauian General Will that somehow (perhaps by mental telepathy) has formed apart from, and prior to, elections and debates among elected officials. For adherents of consociationalism, the purpose of democracy is not the expression of a pre-existing national will, but the formation of a consensus among sub-national groups—substantial minorities, as well as majorities. Elections, negotiations among parties within the legislature, negotiations among houses of a government with separation of powers, even negotiations between levels of government—all of these may be legitimate stages in the cobbling together of a political consensus. To oversimplify matters, it might be said that majoritarians see legislation as the product of a political consensus, whereas consociationalists see a political consensus as the product of the legislative process. > > The emphasis that consociational democracy puts on consensus suggests that as a rule supermajorities should be preferred to simple majorities. A program enacted by a bare majority, against the bitter opposition of a near-majority, is likely to be lacking in legitimacy, in practice if not in theory. Nor is it that much more legitimate in theory, if one rejects the majoritarian fiction that fifty-one percent of a population speaks for the whole. Every numerical minority in a society cannot be placated. But no effect should be spared to coopt substantial minorities, if social peace hangs upon the result. > > Consociational democrats are much more likely than majoritarians to view the constitutional polity as something fragile and in danger of “Balkanization” into lesser communities along subnational lines. The fact, noted above, that party systems in democracies tend to perpetuate and reinforce regional and ethnic and religious divisions within nations only strengthens the fear of consociated theorist that ill-designed democratic arrangements will exacerbate rather than avert civil strife. > > \ > > **Consociationalism and Constitutionalism** > > If we think of constitutions as compromises among different groups living in the same territory, groups that may agree on little more than the desirability of continued co-existence, then we would not expect them to resemble one another closely, any more than we would expect a treaty between Britain and Iceland to contain most of the provisions of a treaty between Australia and Indonesia. As Adam Ferguson wrote, “Laws, whether civil or political, are expedients of policy to adjust the pretensions of parties, and to secure the peace of society. The expedient is accommodated to special circumstances…” 10 The irreducible diversity of constitutions reflects the irreducible diversity of nations and the regions, ethnic groups, linguistic communities and religious denominations into which the populations of the world’s states are divided. > > Proponents of consociational democracy, then, tend to be very cautious about suggesting that only one or a few models of constitutional democracy are legitimate. Asked to devise an abstract blueprint for an unnamed democracy, most contemporary theorists of consociationalism would be likely to propose a parliamentary system with legislators elected by one or another method of proportional representation. But any consociational theorist worth his salt would probably reject the exercise, on the grounds that, as there are no generic countries, there can be no generic constitutions. In most circumstances, PR might be preferable to plurality voting. However, in countries where PR might lead to formation of parties along narrow regional, ethnic or religious lines, plurality voting might deter the direct translation of social difference into political conflict, by encouraging the coalescence of interests into two stable parties based on crosscutting alliances. Similarly, as a general rule, parliamentary democracy may be better than presidential democracy. But in newly-democratized countries with royal or dictatorial traditions, a quasi-regal president, invested by popular election with plebiscitary legitimacy, might be more effective than a prime minister or chancellor in imposing civilian authority on recalcitrant armed forces and bureaucracies. > > With these qualifications in mind, it is possible to make some cautious generalizations about the suitability of different constitutional structures in light of the rival theories of democracy. The institutions best suited for the creation of a consociational “consensus” are not necessarily those best adapted to the expression of a majoritarian “will.” > > **The Spectre of Direct Democracy** > > The majoritarian theory of democracy itself comes in several versions. One, associated with Edmund Burke, holds that elected representatives should do what they believe is in the best interest of their constituents whether the constituents agree or not. This view is less influential than the “mandate” theory, according to which an “instructed” representative is bound to carry out the wishes of the majority that elected him. If the “mandate” is that of a party rather than an individual, the appropriate form is Westminster democracy, in which the winning party should face few constitutional restrictions in enacting a complex program which is assumed to have been endorsed, down to its details, by a majority (or, in some cases, a plurality) of the electorate. Taken to an extreme, the mandate theory would encourage the elimination of legislatures altogether, and their replacement either by direct democracy, in the form of referenda on particular issues, or elective dictatorship. (Something like this conclusion was drawn by early twentieth century U.S. Progressives, whose puritanical horror of legislative log-rolling led them to favor strong, “nonpartisan” executives, like city managers, as well as initiative and referendum). > > For obvious reasons, the theory of consociational democracy emphasizes the primacy of a legislature (whether unicameral or bicameral) that reflects the diversity of legitimate interests in a complex and divided society in its very make-up. To be genuinely representative, a legislature must be sufficiently large, and it should be elected by methods that do not misrepresent the actual distribution of opinions, values and interests in the electorate (almost all theorists of consociational democracy prefer forms of proportional representation to the first-past-the-past or plurality voting system for this reason). [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564.md?page=1) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-ethics-of-majoritarianism/289564.md?page=3)