I want to take up a topic that been something of an ongoing conflict from the first page: namely, the claim that “everyone” believed there were “WMDs” in Iraq prior to the war. In his first response to the OP Sam writes (# 5):
Kimstu replies (# 8)
Werewolf rebuffed Sam’s statement at the top of page 2, and a bit further on down Princhester even threatened to vomit (# 64).
Now, first, a few caveats: I admit that I, as well, have been frustrated by the pro-war side’s insistence that everyone believed Iraq possessed “WMDs” prior to the invasion. After all, politicians who opposed the war – like Robin Cook in England – expressed grave doubts about Hussein’s actual “WMD” capacities. In the media we’ve all read a slew of reports about how dissenting opinions within the US intelligence community were discouraged and so on. And certainly, after 1441 was passed and the inspections resumed, pre-war intelligence came under particularly critical scrutiny and began to “fall apart,” so to speak.
On the other hand, it would appear that Sam isn’t entirely incorrect (although I don’t really know where he got his information). It seems that at the very least, up until the first couple of months of 2003, there was a strong consensus in the entire international community that Saddam was up to no good, was concealing chemical stocks and pursuing clandestine “WMD” programs – at least if Kenneth Pollack is to be believed. The picture he paints is of a much tighter agreement among intelligence specialists/agencies than I, at least, was previously aware of:
So, if one understands the word “everybody” in fairly limited sense – as referring to “everybody” in the upper levels of the international intelligence community – then he is not completely wrong in his claim.
However, I still maintain that many of the specific claims made by the Bush administration, or slipped into the NIE – like the “yellowcake” accusations, or the aluminum tubes assessment – were dubious then and still are. That the intelligence community as a whole overestimated Saddam’s WMD capabilities does not in any way absolve members of the administration from further distorting those mistakes to their own advantage.
whuckfistle:
…is a ridiculous statement on the face of it, and an invitation to glide into the wonderful world of conspiracy theory. But look – it is obviously easier to lie than it is to put into motion a secret operation involving at least several hundred people – many of them specialists – to plant credible evidence of “WMDs,” especially with the international community breathing down your neck and watching your every move. Especially if you anticipate (incorrectly) that you will almost certainly find something you can retroactively exploit to justify your pre-war claims.
In a backwards sort of way, you might be right, at least as far as I’m concerned. As I noted earlier, had they found even so much as a mason jar of gunk forgotten on the back shelf of some researcher’s lab, I doubt we would be having this conversation right now. The anti-war side was arguing that Iraq didn’t possess enough “WMDs” to constitute a serious threat, not that Iraq didn’t possess “WMDs” at all. But naturally, the latter strongly underscores the former, so yeah, we caught a break.
elucidator:
You see?
It’s impossible to hate you, even when you chide my grammar.
Beagle:
Well, in my opinion, the humanitarian argument was the strongest grounds for the war. But even if you felt this way prior to the invasion (and I see no reason to doubt you), this observation is a far cry from the snide, condescending, and flatly bizarre claim:
Finally, I agree with ALE, and suspect that the administration was doing everything in its power to make sure the inspections failed, since only failed inspections would suffice as a casus belli in the international context.
