Ansar Rebounds
Following the fall of Baghdad in early April 2003, some 140,000 U.S. forces occupied Iraq. Since then, relative calm has prevailed in the south under British control and in the north, still held by the Kurds. But U.S. forces in Iraq’s center have become embroiled in a guerrilla war with unspecified numbers of irregular fighters who have inflicted a rising number of casualties.
For the first two months, Bush administration officials appeared certain that Saddam loyalists were the culprits behind sniper attacks and mine explosions that killed several soldiers per week. By July, however, after U.S. forces surrounded and killed Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay, officials began invoking the name Ansar al-Islam.
The resurgence of Ansar al-Islam was no surprise. After all, some 300-350 members fled the Ansar compound ahead of the Iraq war, meaning that the group was bound to survive.[60] And as one prisoner during the war stated, “I don’t think the fight with Ansar will be over when America finishes its bombing.”[61]
As if on cue, in late April, clashes took place between a band of Ansar militants and local Kurdish security forces 45 kilometers east of Sulaymaniya.[62] The following month, just after the war’s end, a Kurdish spokesman stated that the group was trying to “regroup in the mountainous Iraqi-Iranian border region,” and that “a number of Ansar members are trying to join another Islamic group” in the region.[63]
Soon after that, Kurdish officials cited an unconfirmed report that several thousand al-Qa‘ida fighters could attempt to resuscitate Ansar’s activities. Further, one Kurdish spokesman lamented that “if the strikes had occurred one year [before], we would have completely destroyed Ansar. They were half expecting the strikes, which gave them plenty of time to disperse, or for their leaders to relocate.”[64] The official also noted that if the group had developed ricin or other chemical weapons, it likely moved them before the attacks. Thus, Ansar al-Islam could still carry out a chemical attack.
Finally, Kurdish officials also expressed fears that sleeper cells were waiting to be activated in the Kurdish enclave and that they could employ tactics such as suicide bombing. Evidence of this came in two wartime operations: the March 22 suicide bombing, carried out by a Saudi, killing an Australian cameraman at a checkpoint near Halabja,[65] and the thwarted suicide car-bombing on March 27 when security personnel shot an assailant before he reached the Zamaki checkpoint.[66]
Ansar’s website, during the war and after, featured a “Letter from the Emir of Ansar al-Islam, Abu ‘Abdullah ash-Shafi‘ to the Muslims of Kurdistan and Iraq and the World.” The missive threatened that “300 jihad martyrs renewed their pledge to Allah, the strong and the sublime, in order to be suicide bombers in the victory of Allah’s religion.”[67]
Kurdish fears appeared to be vindicated in June when Ansar al-Islam announced that it had opened its doors to volunteers to fight the United States in Iraq. In a statement sent to Ash-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper, ‘Abdullah ash-Shafi‘, the group’s local leader, boasted (falsely) that his group had already destroyed ten U.S. tanks.[68]
When a car bomb rocked the Jordanian embassy in Iraq on August 7, 2003, and killed seventeen people, Ansar al-Islam was among the first suspected culprits. According to Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz, no specific information about Ansar’s involvement was available, but he still noted that Ansar had “infrastructure in Iraq, and some of that remains, and our effort is focused on eliminating that.”[69] An Al-Hayat article on the same day iterated Schwartz’s concerns, stating that Islamic militants from Pakistan had infiltrated northern Iraq with the help of bin Laden, and “it was suspected that the Ansar al-Islam group was in connection with the Islamists in Falluja, Tikrit, Bayali, and Baghdad” where attacks against U.S. forces were taking place.[70] Washington expressed fears that the number of fighters might have been in the hundreds.[71] Administration officials also expressed concerns that safe houses and other logistical operations in Iraq were being run by Ansar al-Islam.[72]
Meanwhile, the PUK reported in August that its forces had captured several Ansar militants among some fifty people caught infiltrating northern Iraq by way of Iran.[73] Among them were five Iraqis, a Palestinian, and a Tunisian.[74] Information gleaned from subsequent interrogations has not yet been made public by Kurdish officials.
Following the Jordanian embassy attack, there was fear that Ansar was still planning something bigger. Indeed, Bremer stated, “Intelligence suggests that Ansar al-Islam is planning large-scale terrorist attacks [in Iraq] … I think we have to be pretty alert to the fact that we may see more of this.”[75]
On August 13, a number of gunmen attacked U.S. troops in downtown Baghdad and then sped from the scene. Before they left, however, they dropped cards stating “Death to the Collaborators of America—al-Qa‘ida.” This may have been in reference to the Jordanian embassy bombing, or even to the forthcoming bombing at the U.N. compound in Baghdad on August 19, when a suicide bomber drove a cement mixer full of explosives that set off a blast killing seventeen and wounding more than 100 people. While two previously unknown groups claimed responsibility for the attack, The New York Times noted that “the immediate focus of attention was Ansar al-Islam, a militant Islamic group that American officials believe has been plotting attacks against Western targets in Baghdad.”[76]
Ansar’s Network
These operations, in the heart of Baghdad, raised the specter of cooperation between regime remnants and Ansar al-Islam. According to officials interviewed by The Weekly Standard, Ansar cadres were thought to be “joining with remnants of Saddam’s regime to attack American and nongovernmental organizations working in Iraq.”[77] There was much speculation that the Iraqi resistance was being coordinated by ‘Izzat Ibrahim ad-Duri, a Saddam confidant and one of the most wanted Baathists. He was fingered by two captured members of Ansar al-Islam as an instigator of the recent campaign of violence against Americans in Iraq. [78] (However, subsequent reports indicated that ad-Duri was struggling for his life in a battle with leukemia and was probably incapable of coordinating attacks against Americans.)[79]
Meanwhile, a concurrent Newsweek report indicated that “Ansar fighters are joining forces with Baathists and members of al-Qaeda.”[80] That report also indicated that Ansar’s structure was morphing such that each “fighting force is said to be reorganized into small units of ten to fifteen members, each headed by an ‘emir’.”[81] According to this report, Ansar, through its use of cells and contract fighters, had become a microcosm of the larger al-Qa‘ida network, which implements a similar structure worldwide.
Ansar al-Islam’s Iranian connection also gave rise to speculation. In August, suspected Ansar militants and/or al-Qa‘ida cadres continued to stream across the Iranian border. While Kurdish officials arrested some fifty militants in August 2003,[82] it is not known how many have made it across without incident.
Among the infiltrators, some came with fake passports while others had identification from Tunisia and even European countries. Once the infiltrators made it out of Iran, Saddam loyalists were thought to help smuggle them into central Iraq to fight U.S. forces.[83] In this way, it appears that the mullahs ensured continued fighting in Iraq.[84] Iran was also under increased scrutiny for its continued harboring of more senior al-Qa‘ida operatives. Some of these operatives were expelled to their host countries. The whereabouts of others are unknown.[85]
Ansar al-Islam is not only back in Iraq; the group also appears to have gone global—at least, to some extent. Ash-Sharq al-Awsat reported in April that two Tunisians were arrested in Italy for ties to Ansar al-Islam.[86] In August, several suspected Ansar cadres were found with five Italian passports.[87] Italy appears to be a central jumping-off point for Ansar; wiretaps by Italian police confirm this to be true.[88] More recently, Italian intelligence revealed the existence of an extensive al-Qa‘ida support network in northern Italy. The network, established in spring 2002 and based out of Milan, Varese, and Cremona, has reportedly provided funds and recruits to Ansar al-Islam and al-Qa’ida. [89]
But many questions remain about the extent of Ansar al-Islam’s network. Lebanese, Jordanian, Moroccan, Syrian, Palestinian, and Afghan fighters have all fought among the ranks of Ansar. That could mean there is or was a recruiting infrastructure in each country to bring them to northern Iraq. Further, if the group did receive funds from Abu Qatada in London, then Ansar al-Islam also has at least some infrastructure there. If Syria is a staging ground for Ansar fighters, as the Italian wiretaps revealed, then Ansar is one more terrorist organization operating with a wink and a nod from Damascus. And finally, if some funding for the group came from Saudi Arabia, as Michael Rubin suggests, then one can assume that the Wahhabi infrastructure is supporting this group.[90]
Unfortunately, there are no definitive answers to these questions. Ansar al-Islam is a new terrorist group; information about it is still emerging. But one thing is clear: Ansar al-Islam is one of the most dangerous affiliates in al-Qa‘ida’s orbit, with the potential to strike at vital U.S. interests in Iraq. And given its broader links, the group could develop an even wider reach—like al-Qa‘ida itself.
Jonathan Schanzer is a Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This article draws upon his forthcoming monograph, Al-Qaeda’s Affiliates: Exploiting Weak Central Authority in the Arab World (The Washington Institute).
[1] Colin Powell, remarks to the U.N. Security Council, Feb. 5, 2003, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm; Stephen F. Hayes, “Saddam’s al-Qaeda Connection,” The Weekly Standard, Sept. 1-8, 2003.
[2] Congressional Record, 108th Congress, 1st sess., “Iraq Intelligence,” July 15, 2003, at http://levin.senate.gov/floor/071503fs1.htm.
[3] Al Gore, remarks at New York University, Aug. 7, 2003, at http://www.moveon.org/gore-speech.html.
[4] Agence France-Presse, July 30, 2003.
[5] The New York Times, Aug. 7, 2003.
[6] Paul Bremer news conference, Aug. 2, 2003, quoted at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/08/08/nyt.gordon/.
[7] Michael Rubin, “The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Dec. 2001, at http://www.meib.org/articles/0112_ir1.htm.
[8] The New York Times, Jan. 13, 2002; author’s interview with Barham Salih, Washington, D.C., Jan. 10, 2002.
[9] Los Angeles Times, Dec. 9, 2002.
[10] The Kurdistan Observer, Jan. 14, 2002, at http://home.cogeco.ca/~observer/14-1-03-memorandum-kurd-islam-qaeda.html.
[11] Los Angeles Times, Feb. 5, 2003.
[12] NewsMax.com, Mar. 18, 2002, at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/3/18/74151.shtml; The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 15, 2002.
[13] The Jerusalem Report, Nov. 18, 2002; The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 2, 2002; Le Monde, Nov. 13, 2002.
[14] Los Angeles Times, Apr. 28, 2003.
[15] Rubin, “The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan.”
[16] Agence France-Presse, Dec. 4, 2002.
[17] Author’s interview with Barham Salih, Jan. 10, 2003; The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 15, 2002.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Colin Powell, remarks to the U.N. Security Council, Feb. 5, 2003, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm.
[20] The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 9, 2002.
[21] Iraqi Kurdistan Dispatch, July 5, 2002, at http://www.ikurd.info/news-05jul-p1.htm.
[22] The Washington Post, Sept. 5, 2002.
[23] Kurdistan Newsline, July 23, 2002, at http://www.puk.org/web/htm/news/knwsline/nws/kurdlead.html.
[24] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat (London), Dec. 6, 2002.
[25] Associated Press, Dec. 15, 2002.
[26] At http://www.nawend.com/ansarislam.htm (site no longer available).
[27] Author’s interview with Barham Salih, Jan. 10, 2003.
[28] The New York Times, Feb. 6, 2003.
[29] Al-Hayat (London), Aug. 22, 2002; Los Angeles Times, Dec 9, 2002.
[30] The Washington Post, Dec. 12, 2002.
[31] Author’s interview with Barham Salih, Jan. 10, 2003.
[32] Author’s interview with PUK representative, Washington, D.C., Mar. 2003.
[33] Author’s interview with PUK official, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1, 2003.
[34] The New Yorker, Mar. 25, 2002.
[35] The Guardian, Aug. 23, 2002.
[36] “Ansar al-Islam,” Iraq News Wire, no. 8, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Sept. 1, 2002, at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iraq&ID=INW802.
[37] The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 2, 2002; Los Angeles Times, Dec. 9, 2002.
[38] The International Herald Tribune, Feb. 7, 2003.
[39] Powell, remarks to the U.N. Security Council, Feb. 5, 2003, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm.
[40] The Washington Times, July 30, 2003.
[41] Confirmed by source at the Pentagon.
[42] Matthew Levitt, “Placing Iraq and Zarqawi in the Terror Web,” Policywatch. no. 710, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Feb. 13, 2003, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2003/710.htm; author’s interview, Dec. 10, 2003.
[43] The Washington Post, Sept. 5, 2002.
[44] Milliyet (Ankara), Jan. 7, 2003.
[45] Powell, remarks to the U.N. Security Council, Feb. 5, 2003, at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm.
[46] The New York Times, Feb. 10, 2003.
[47] Treasury Department statement regarding the designation of Ansar al-Islam, Feb. 20, 2003, at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js48.htm.
[48] Author’s interview with PUK official, Washington, D.C., May 2003.
[49] “USWAR/Ansar al-Islam Attacks PUK Positions,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), Mar. 26, 2003, at http://www.irna.com/en/head/030326094847.ehe.shtml (site no longer available).
[50] Associated Press, Aug. 12, 2003.
[51] Author’s interview with PUK official, May 2003.
[52] Associated Press, Mar. 31, 2003.
[53] Agence France-Presse, Apr. 9, 2003.
[54] The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2003.
[55] Author’s interview with PUK official, May 2003.
[56] Agence France-Presse, Mar. 25, 2003.
[57] United Press International, May 9, 2003.
[58] An-Nahar (Beirut), May 21, 2003.
[59] Agence France-Presse, Aug. 13, 2003
[60] The New York Times, Aug. 13, 2003.
[61] The Boston Globe, Mar. 19, 2003.
[62] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, Apr. 22, 2003.
[63] Author’s interview with Kurdish spokesman, Washington, D.C., May 20, 2003.
[64] Author’s interview with PUK official, Apr. 1, 2003.
[65] Kurdish Media, Mar. 25, 2003, at http://www.kurdmedia.com/news.asp?id=3635.
[66] Author’s interview with PUK official, Apr. 1, 2003.
[67] At http://www.nawend.com/ansarislam.htm (site no longer available).
[68] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, June 13, 2003.
[69] Associated Press, Aug. 8, 2003.
[70] Al-Hayat, Aug. 7, 2003.
[71] Agence France-Presse, Aug. 14, 2003.
[72] The New York Times, Aug. 13, 2003.
[73] Reuters, Aug. 12, 2003.
[74] The New York Times, Aug. 13, 2003.
[75] Ibid., Aug. 10, 2003.
[76] Ibid., Aug. 20, 2003.
[77] The Weekly Standard, Sept. 1-8, 2003.
[78] Associated Press, Oct. 30, 2003.
[79] The Washington Times, Oct. 31, 2003.
[80] Newsweek, Oct. 13, 2003.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, Aug. 18, 2003.
[83] Agence France-Presse, Aug. 17, 2003.
[84] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, Aug. 18, 2003.
[85] Middle East Newsline, Aug. 21, 2003.
[86] Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, Apr. 3, 2003.
[87] The New York Times, Aug. 13, 2003.
[88] Los Angeles Times, Apr. 28, 2003.
[89] “Ansar Al-Islam’s European Base,” American Foreign Policy Council, Oct. 31, 2003, citing Corriere della Serra (Milan), Oct. 27, 2003.
[90] Rubin, “The Islamist Threat in Iraqi Kurdistan.”