Trying to keep in the spirit of open-mindedness that Avalonian and Mr. Svinlesha were kind enough to notice (my thanks go to both of you for your commendations), these are my thoughts. They are not meant to be partisan arguments backed by cites and facts, just gut level observations…
As a political matter, the failure to find WMDs in Iraq has obvious consequences. Notice how the stock of Dick Cheney has fallen drastically (cite is a recent poll in the NY Times, too lazy to look up right now [my wife is calling on me to hurry up with this post and come to bed]). Apparently it is left to Cheney to fall on his sword (deservedly, IMO) by keeping up a brave front of the possibility of a surprise discovery (an October surprise? Yeah, right.) and consequently looking like the troglodyte ideologue that he is. I doubt he much cares about how disliked he is; personally, I think he takes a certain pride in it. But his persistence in believing Chalabi and staking his reputation on such a charlatan has bruised him, perhaps fatally. Good riddance, if you ask me.
Rumsfeld’s personal stock is somewhat better, probably because he’s got such a joie de vivre about his core ruthlessness that so many find endearing. His acerbic persona notwithstanding, Rumsfeld’s Q rating lies in how well he exploits his foes’ pressure points (“Old Europe,” anyone?) and his willingness to pursue the reformation of the Armed Forces to address the threats of the new century. He is to be applauded for his plan to redeploy forces off the DMZ, and his realization that the political costs of some bases located in certain countries (Germany and Saudi Arabia, anyone?) outweighed their military benefits. It’s unfortunate that he became the symbol of American diplomacy, because his talents, when properly channeled, are formidable.
Powell, I suspect, will bail after the first term; the damage to his credibility is considerable after the UN speech. This is an utter tragedy given his symbolism, credentials, and former stature internationally. Rice is still a relative unknown to the masses, but has maintained her standing and will assume Powell’s role if Bush wins a second term.
The consequences of the WMD fiasco are also geopolitical. The doctrine of pre-emptive war lies in ruins as a result of the WMD failure, or at least Bush’s ability to carry it out. Successfully making high-level intensity war still requires the consent of US citizens; Iraq proved there is no force in the world that can stop the American government - when it has the capability to impose its will - except its people. But the people require a sound reason for war, and the main one Bush gave last time was WMDs. Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me will be the mantra if Bush attempts another pre-emptive war under similar circumstances. This means that US strategic options are reduced, but still other options remain.
From an anti-Bush perspective, though, the central character in the drama remains treading water, not comfortably, but not drowning like some of his lieutenants. Or would it be more appropriate to call it a Praetorian Guard?
Apparently, at least right now (maybe not necessarily when it counts in November), support for Bush is still a solid slim majority. His approval rating appears to hold at a slim majority. The support for him is steady - he’s slipped below 50% at times but has never had any sort of catastrophic drop that would forecast the imminent fall of his administration.
The lesson seems to be that the American people will tolerate its leader deliberately lying (as opposed to saying something was not true) if the untruth serves a deeper purpose. I’ll leave it to you readers to decide what that says about the American people.
The American people tolerated Kennedy telling a blatant lie - that the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba had no relationship with the US withdrawal of obsolete missiles from Turkey - because the lie was necessary to preserve the peace. But if the untruth (or lie) does not serve a deeper purpose, the emperor has no clothes. Whether Bush has his dick flapping in the wind because of this WMD issue remains to be seen.
Support for the war itself is still steady at around 65%, but with the Iraqi political situation in doubt, troops still dying, fears of a civil war breaking out, joblessness, and parts of the nation in a state of general instability (though it’s important to point out that certainly not ALL; the Kurdish and Shiite regions have been - relatively speaking - stable), America’s freedom of overt action in the theater of conflict is somewhat limited.
But as I previously said, options are not limited to overt war. This Jerusalem Post article (URL = http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1074745158639) cites a Jane’s Intelligence Digest report (therefore pretty credible) talking about the U.S. deploying special forces to the Bekaa Valley, thus putting them in confrontation with Syrian occupiers and Hezbollah jihadists. The War on Terror continues.
I am not one of those who thinks all is doom and gloom in Iraq. The war has not spread beyond the Sunni regions. Few if any of the catastrophes forecast by the anti-war side materialized; the Arab Street didn’t explode, the oil wells weren’t torched, refugees didn’t flee. When compared to guerrilla wars in Vietnam (vs. France & U.S.) or Afghanistan (vs. Soviet Union), the insurgency left much to be desired. Its significance was enhanced by Bush’s ineptitude in managing how the masses perceived the war, in part because of his mediocre (to be charitable) rhetorical ability, a rather annoying preference for secrecy, and a general dismissal of the importance of establishing a narrative.
I do think that as a military matter, the insurgency is all but crushed, unless it can somehow alter the strategic paradigm (doubtful when its symbol was pulled out of a hole begging for his life on TV). The insurgency appears to be retreating after its burst in November, as illustrated in the dramatic decrease in attacks since Saddam was caught. The insurgency is still dangerous on a tactical level, but America seems inured to the steady drip of casualties. Foreign fighters must resort to killing Muslims more than Americans, limiting their popularity among Iraqi citizens.
In the absence of a spectacular attack or catastrophic deterioration in security, the 65% figure will probably hold. The major problem now is the political situation, and obviously questions surrounding the transfer of power. IMHO, the fact that Sistani is flexing his muscles is an indication that the Sunni-fueled insurgency is severely beaten.
The political matter is serious and tense, and if the UN really wants to make a comeback in the eyes of America, it has the opportunity to do so by acting as a broker between Bremer and Sistani, while reassuring the Kurds and Sunnis. If the UN finds the courage to go back into Iraq and the wisdom to help, Democrats can finally legitimize their calls for internationalization and point out how much more well positioned they will be to get diplomatic support than Bush is - a potentially compelling rationale for moderate voters in 2004, IMHO.
War supporters can plausibly argue that America’s strategic situation in the theater of conflict has improved dramatically as a result of the war. If special forces are deployed in the Bekaa Valley to confront the Syrian army and Hezbollah, Syria is surrounded these special forces, the Israelis on the Golan Heights, Turkey, and American forces in Iraq. This may have Syria wondering about a change of policy, as recent rumors of a possible limited rapproachment with Israel have been floated. With any luck, Arafat will die soon, but if special forces actually deploy to the Bekaa Valley, the Palestinian Authority is put in an even more strategically untenable position than it already is.
Libya is an obvious good news story. Iran’s political crisis is slowly coming to a boil, and it recently agreed to limited IAEA inspections. The House of Saud has been brought into direct low-level conflict with jihadists, and are paying a heavy price.
The failure to find WMDs and its resulting consequences also must be weighed against the benefits of what we actually have learned as a result of the war. Yes, the war has proven that U.S. intelligence apparently sucks, and furthermore may well have been cherry-picked by certain ideologically driven members of the administration as well as the C-in-C.
But without the war, I contend, we would have no idea of the nature of the threat facing the U.S. Obviously this is a YMMV premise, but I really have a hard time believing Gadhafi, no matter how much of a good boy he seems like he was trying to be, would let American inspectors prance into his country and take everything he’s got to Knoxville, and grant access to shitpiles of documentation that tells a disconcerting tale about the open market in components, material, and know-how. The bulk of the credit on the Libya deal should go to Blair, the good cop to Bush’s bad cop, with the UN being the obvious loser because the agreement did not come within its auspices.
Apparently, what we have found so far in Libya, and according to accounts about that Pakistani rogue physicist from Musharraf, suggests that various facets of weapons (components, funding, designs, material, technology, physicists, etc.) are dispersed, thereby preventing a “smoking gun” in any one country. If this is the case, this is very bad, and it indicates that while pre-emptive war is not a panacea to WMD proliferation, we can certainly no longer put our fate in the hands of treaties whose frameworks can not adequately address the threat, nor multilateral institutions whose resolutions can’t be implemented without threat of force, which can only really supplied by the U.S. What was it that Clauswitz (I think) said? “Diplomacy without force is like music without instruments.” Pithy, and correct.
As for me personally, I admit I’m conflicted. Bush resonates with me because he at least recognizes the situation in the MENA was untenable in the long term, and he had the guts (or hubris, YMMV) to confront a failed status quo. I have no doubt that the war probably caused a great deal of anger in the Arab world, but this anger - so far - has not translated into actual political ramifications. The political behavior of Arab states has been to move closer to the US position.
But my complaints about Bush are growing. His most unforgivable flaw is that he can only articulate what America is against, not what it is for (at least not effectively). Under his watch, he has not prepped the political ground for a future president by avoiding the explicit acknowledgment that our addiction to cheap oil has played a significant role in our current situation in the MENA region. I disagree with almost all of his domestic stances.
And finally, as a war supporter, I am forced to hold him ultimately responsible as C-in-C for the WMD failure. All the blame should not be heaped on the intelligence community; it was obvious after 9/11 that heads should have rolled, and they did not. Bush, one way or another, must be held accountable.