It’s not even the play of the year - it doesn’t stack up to Dwayne Wise’s catch. But it’s a hell of a cool freak accident, and it’s interesting that Bruntlett made that play to atone for an error and a misplay in the same inning. (I saw him make several errors in a game early last season, and not a UTP in sight.) The real story here is that the Mets always find new and fascinating ways to lose, and this may be the crowning achievement, because no National League team had ever lost a game this way.
I hadn’t realized there has been one of these each of the last three seasons. It could be a statistical anomaly, but I wonder if there is a reason they are becoming more common.
The Wiki article linked above described both UTPs by the 1st baseman as “Caught line drive, tagged runner, touched 2nd.”
So the 1st baseman was already moving toward second to catch a line drive between 1st and 2nd base and it may have been quicker to continue to 2nd than wait for one of the fielders to move that way.
Seems unlikely. And ESPN related an anecdote about Neun’s triple play last night: supposedly he refused to throw the ball to the second baseman or shortstop.
Can we offer any other considerations for greatest baseball play(s)?
(Incidentally I see we’re not talking about THE greatest play of baseball since I’m sure we are all in agreement that Willie Mays’s Catch is the hands-down winner.)
Now then. I respectfully submit that with bases loaded, bottom of the ninth with two outs and a full count and your team down by three runs –you hit a walk-off grand salami to win the game, in front of the home crowd no less, to be certainly up there with the UTP.
Chris Hoiles of the Orioles did this in 1996 against the Mariners. There may be others.
My guess (if we assume it’s not an anomaly): Depleted power combined with watered down line-ups, due to the elimination of steroids and other PED’s and having 30 teams, are causing teams to try to manufacture more runs. So they take more chances setting runners in motion creating a higher probability of TP and UTP’s.
That seems very doubtful to me. By the time the 3 snags a liner to the right side and lays a tag on the runner, the 6 should be at or very near second base and ready to take a throw to force the other runner. As a middle infielder, you’re always moving by the time the sound of the crack of the bat reaches you, and there’s no reason he’d break the wrong way on a liner the other way–it’s obvious where the ball’s going from the first jump off the bat, and covering second is the shortstop’s only job on that kind of play. What’s more, for the UTP to happen, the runners were probably going with the pitch on a hit & run sign, which would send the 4 moving towards second before the batter even swung in case it was a double steal. (The big defensive gaps left in the infield is one advantage of the hit & run. With runners going from first and second, the 4 and the 5 are moving towards their respective bags & leaving a whole lot of field for the 3 and the 6 to try to cover.)
So I’m willing to bet that the shortstop and second baseman were both standing there within a few feet of second base, holding out their gloves for a throw and glaring at the showboating first baseman trundling over for his glorious UTP, and thinking, “If that moron doesn’t beat the runner back to the bag, he should be back at AAA tomorrow. Changing tires.”
Probably an anomaly, but I don’t think this is very close to the mark. As a matter of fact it’s the exact opposite of what seems to be happening. Teams have been getting farther and farther away from small ball as the years pass and the “post-PED” era hasn’t really shown any signs of it becoming common again. At least not in the way it was in the 60s, 70s and 80s.
My guess would be that the adoption of station to station baseball and the over-specialization has caused a bump in the opportunities. Players are much less likely to stretch for a double or triple today or steal a base than in the past. This creates more scenarios where there are force plays in order. Also, managers seem much more likely to intentionally walk a player now than in the past to generate a force situation. I wager that runners on 2nd and 3rd, first base open was a more common scenario in decades past.
In short, manufacturing runs actually helps you avoid triple plays by eliminating force out opportunities, not contributes to them.
One thing that might contribute is modern pitching philosophy. The emphasis on the strike out and pitch placement is creating many more 3-2 counts than in years past. Pitchers in previous eras who were expected to complete games and challenge hitters allowed more balls in play and ran the count full less often. More 3-1 and 3-2 counts means more low risk chances to put runners in motion.
While I agree that it’s probably an anomaly, I’m not too sure about your other points. I’d need to see some numbers to back up your assumptions. For one thing, unassisted triple plays only occur when runners are in motion. With no outs, aggressive base running is a prerequisite for a UTP. Your station-to-station example only works for assisted TP’s. While not a stat hound, I have seen the number of players with OPS’s of 1.000 or higher and .900 or higher drop significantly in the couple of years since the steroid era.
Even though I personally witnessed the UTP and it is certainly the greatest play I have ever seen, I still think the greatest play ever was Derek Jeter’s assist in a World Series a number of years ago.
As for the purported decline in hitting allegedly caused by having 30 major leugue teams, that is nonesense. Pitching is similarly diluted.
A little history. Before Babe Ruth, baseball was a matter of getting a hit, stealing a base or getting scrificed, and hoping for another hit. “Small Ball” being the apt description. During the 20s, with the outlawing of the spitter, batting and slugging averages increased enormously, with the NL having a league batting average of .301 in, IIRC, 1931. That was with pitchers batting. Stolen bases disappeared. During the 50s, Richie Ashburn reguarly led the majors with 25-30 SBs and Ty Cobb’s record 96 seened unimaginable. A pitcher who began a game was expected to finish it and was admonished to “pace himself”, i.e. don’t go all out unless the situation reqiired it.
Then in the 60s came the rise of the relief pitcher. The starting pitcher was now expected to bear down all the time and if he ran out of steam in the 7th inning he was relieved. There may have also been change in how rigorously the balk rule was enforced. Hitting declined so drastically that the strike zone was narrowed (in practice, not in theory) and the mound lowered. In the 50s a team would carry maybe 8 or 9 pitchers and several of them would be rarely used except for mop-up situations. So there is perhaps more interest in small ball.
However the UTP on Sunday was the clear result of a manager trying to avoid a DP and needing two runs and figuring that putting two runners in scoring position would improve the odds. Lidge was on the ropes through no fault of his own. An arror by the first baseman, a second erro by the second baseman, arguably a second error by the second baseman, had reduced the three run lead to two leaving a run in and two runners on. I guess the secnd baseman redeemed himself.