# The Lies of Richard Dawkins, Episode 6: Saint Thomas Aquinas **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [February 12, 2009, 8:54pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591 "2009-02-12T20:54:46Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 9
**Author:** ![whorfin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/6f9a4e/32.png) [@whorfin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/whorfin)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 12:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/161 "2009-02-15T00:15:56Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > I’m maybe not getting you fully (it’s late), but how is saying there’s ‘something outside’ the (arbitrary) proposed rules not essentially the same as what I assert, i.e. taking some assortment of things and putting a supernatural sticker on them? I’m not sure I am disagreeing with you–or that what I say is inconsistent with your point–I was trying to focus on a deeper problem with the argument. I was trying to show that we shouldn’t just argue with the ‘supernatural sticker’ on a prime mover, but with the overall argument that we need some kind of a “prime mover” at all (which was what acquinas was really trying to show). My argument is just a subset of yours–that not only is it not supernatural to have things that need no mover (or that move themselves), but that their existence shows that there need not be one, solitary prime mover. To analogize to “greenness”, I saw you as emphasizing one problem with the argument–asking “is green really supernatural?” (a valid point), while I was going beyond that by suggesting that the more important question was to challenge whether the conclusion that “green things (which can’t exist under the way I propose the world works) are necessary to make the world work” isn’t a proof that supernatural green things exist as much as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of an argument that uses the premise that green things can’t exist to show that green things are necessary to make the world work. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 12:49am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/162 "2009-02-15T00:49:05Z")
> [@whorfin](#): > > I’m not sure I am disagreeing with you–or that what I say is inconsistent with your point–I was trying to focus on a deeper problem with the argument. I was trying to show that we shouldn’t just argue with the ‘supernatural sticker’ on a prime mover, but with the overall argument that we need some kind of a “prime mover” at all (which was what acquinas was really trying to show). My argument is just a subset of yours–that not only is it not supernatural to have things that need no mover (or that move themselves), but that their existence shows that there need not be one, solitary prime mover. > To analogize to “greenness”, I saw you as emphasizing one problem with the argument–asking “is green really supernatural?” (a valid point), while I was going beyond that by suggesting that the more important question was to challenge whether the conclusion that “green things (which can’t exist under the way I propose the world works) are necessary to make the world work” isn’t a proof that supernatural green things exist as much as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of an argument that uses the premise that green things can’t exist to show that green things are necessary to make the world work. Actually, my main aim was to show that, where the argument merely amounts to an arbitrary definition of the supernatural, it isn’t a very interesting one to make, thus, when the argument is made, it is presumably in the stronger form of asserting that no existing thing, i.e. nothing within the totality of being, can be its own cause. Of course, then it creates a contradiction in asserting that god can be its own cause/uncaused/unmoved mover, what have you, because that is essentially tantamount to saying that something exists that _is_ its own cause, and we get the whole ‘A and not A, thus x’, where x is any given statement. I’ve merely gotten a little tangled up into the whole natural/supernatural thing, I really only meant to mention it to discount the cases where the argument is essentially question-begging off hand, but that seemed to be not quite as obvious as it appeared to me. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:06am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/163 "2009-02-15T01:06:52Z")
I’ll try once more for clarity: If there are things within the totality of existence that can be their own causes, calling those things supernatural is merely an arbitrary definition, and defines supernatural things as things that can be their own causes, and nothing else. Thus, I take Aquinas’ argument to assert that there are no things within the totality of existence that can be their own causes (which I don’t believe – obviously – but can accept for arguments sake). The fact that things do exist, then, is somewhat puzzling. On the face of it, this seems to imply that there must be at least one thing that is its own cause – however, this either means that the premise of there not being anything within the totality, yadda yadda, is false, or that we are simultaneously asserting that there are no things that are their own causes, _and_ that there is at least one thing that is its own cause. If the premise is false, then, of course, the argument is moot; if we are truly faced with a contradiction, then we can of course conclude that god exists, however we can just as well conclude that he doesn’t, and all other statements we can think of and their opposites, because via the principle of explosion, everything follows from a contradiction. ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/164 "2009-02-15T01:11:19Z")
> [@Diogenes\_the\_Cynic](#): > > If he didn’t, then it wouldn’t be a proof of God. It proves an Unmoved Mover, whom he calls God. His work as a whole is an argument and explanation for God. The part in question, the one that Dawkins engages, is a section of it, and in it, the entity needn’t be called God at all–the proof works (or doesn’t) regardless, even if it focuses only on some unnamed cause. > [@](#): > > Not true. Aquinas does not give any such qualified definition, and even if he did, there would be no reason to call it a proof of God. > > Where? Show me the line of argument he uses to get from Prime Mover to omnimax God. We’re focusing on the section of the Summa that is the proof for God’s existence (not his nature). It’s the second question of the first part. If you want an example of where he covers the nature of God, there’s question 6 of the first part, which focuses on God’s goodness. And you’re really missing my point, which is the argument for a Prime Mover stands on its own (or not). Nothing else about the Prime Mover’s nature is necessary in this proof except what is covered. > [@](#): > > It’s already been mentioned several times. Quantum events occur all the time with becing “caused.” Yes, it’s certainly been mentioned. I’m not been adversarial, I’m curious. What’s an example of a quantum event that has no trigger? > [@](#): > > Quantum physics disproves the first premise, and Newton’s First Law disproves the second. An object in motion will stay in motion forever unles acted on by another force. That means infinite motion is possible even under Newtonian physics. An object must be put in motion first. Newton’s First Law does not suggest otherwise. If anything, it’s supportive of Aquinas. Nothing motionless moves, unless something puts it in motion. ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:12am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/165 "2009-02-15T01:12:31Z")
> [@whorfin](#): > > Isn’t it equally valid to say that the entity is constrained by the prohibitions of our universe–but that our universe does not prohibit unmoved movers? Yes, that would be valid, if such entities existed. That would refute the proof. ---
**Author:** ![whorfin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/6f9a4e/32.png) [@whorfin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/whorfin)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/166 "2009-02-15T01:15:04Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Actually, my main aim was to show that, where the argument merely amounts to an arbitrary definition of the supernatural, it isn’t a very interesting one to make . . . I’ve merely gotten a little tangled up into the whole natural/supernatural thing, I really only meant to mention it to discount the cases where the argument is essentially question-begging off hand, but that seemed to be not quite as obvious as it appeared to me. Interesting-you’re making me think (which is always fun)-and I hope I’m seeing your point (well, I didn’t quite–but your second post makes it very clear.–thanks!) I think we effectively agree-except that I might be more charitable about the possibility of acquinas holding a genuine belief that that was how the world works–but we agree that the real unreasonablness is to avoid the logical contradiction by ignoring the possibility that his ‘rules of nature’ were incorrect, rather than accepting the conclusion of a god-shaped hole in the natural world (and hence, of the supernatural) ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:16am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/167 "2009-02-15T01:16:10Z")
> [@DrCube](#): > > 😕 I must be missing something. It seems like you’re just asserting that infinite regress is illogical. I’m not seeing your argument. If the only “things” that exist are things that must have a cause–there are no other things that require no cause–an infinite regress is self-contradictory. The universe would be populated by things that would necessarily have to be traced to a start, which can’t exist. > [@](#): > > They are not supernatural by definition. They are unmoved by definition, but only supernatural by fiat. I think you’re inferring “supernatural” to mean something other than “unexplained by what we know about our physical universe.” It’s not by fiat; it’s the natural conclusion of the syllogism. ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/168 "2009-02-15T01:20:28Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Precisely – supernatural by definition only. Just like everything that is green is supernatural if it is thus defined. The problem is just that the definition is pretty much meaningless due to being arbitrary. I’ve asked the question before: given two things, one supernatural, the other natural, how do you determine which is which? If it merely is the one that could be its own cause, in what way then is the term supernatural meaningful in any other way than as a shorthand for ‘things that can be their own cause’? And in what way does ‘things that can be their own cause’ differ from ‘things that are green’ (other than being perhaps a little harder to catch)? > > In other words, how are you not just putting a couple of things into a box, writing ‘supernatural’ on it, and then claiming that you have proven the existence of the supernatural? I’m not sure how else to explain it. “Supernatural” in this context means something that must necessarily exist unbounded and outside of our physical universe, since our physical universe does not appear to permit it. The proof may or may not hold water, but I’m still missing your point as to how this is an arbitrary classification in this particular proof. If the premise is true, it’s the only logical conclusion. “Everything green is supernatural” is indeed arbitrary. ---
**Author:** ![whorfin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/6f9a4e/32.png) [@whorfin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/whorfin)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/169 "2009-02-15T01:21:00Z")
> [@Stratocaster](#): > > If the only “things” that exist are things that must have a cause–there are no other things that require no cause–an infinite regress is self-contradictory. The universe would be populated by things that would necessarily have to be traced to a start, which can’t exist. But that’s what infinite means–that it always was that way. No start. There’s no start to the number line, even though I can get to any number by going up or down a certain number of units. > [@Stratocaster](#): > > I think you’re inferring “supernatural” to mean something other than “unexplained by what we know about our physical universe.” It’s not by fiat; it’s the natural conclusion of the syllogism. That’s an odd definition of the supernatural–it seems overbroad in that it includes things that people believe to have a perfectly mundane explanation–that they don’t understand, or that science can’t then explain–rather than things beyond the laws of nature (which I see as what Acquinas was getting at). My definition sounds like the one you use in your next post, > [@](#): > > I’m not sure how else to explain it. “Supernatural” in this context means something that must necessarily exist unbounded and outside of our physical universe, since our physical universe does not appear to permit it. -not "beyond our universe till we understand how it fits in–but necessarily outside it ---
**Author:** ![Rolken](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/df788c/32.png) [@Rolken](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Rolken)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/170 "2009-02-15T01:23:52Z")
> [@Stratocaster](#): > > If the only “things” that exist are things that must have a cause–there are no other things that require no cause–an infinite regress is self-contradictory. The universe would be populated by things that would necessarily have to be traced to a start, which can’t exist.I think you’re inferring “supernatural” to mean something other than “unexplained by what we know about our physical universe.” It’s not by fiat; it’s the natural conclusion of the syllogism. I think you’re mashing together the concepts of proximate cause and ultimate cause. There’s not necessarily a tracing to a start implied by the former, and no contradiction. ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/171 "2009-02-15T01:25:19Z")
> [@whorfin](#): > > I see it as slightly different–the argument **stratocaster** is asserting is that (1) “the world couldn’t exist under the rules I propose about how the world works,” and (2) “the world does exist,” > > (3) “therefore, something outside the rules I propose makes the world exist.” > > I offer a replacement for (3), which I will call (3’). “Therefore, the rules I propose about how the world works are wrong, and one way of demonstrating that is that the logical implication of the rules I propose about how the world works is that the world doesn’t exist” > > In this model, the “supernatural” is something that only serves to fix the problem in the conceptualization of how the world works. To put it another way, either the argument is wrong, in which case the world’s existence is consistent with the laws of physics, or logically, we can’t exist unless “the supernatural” makes the world work. I posit that the more reasonable answer is that the argument is wrong. I find nothing wrong with your logic, and I think you got what I was offering. Your conclusion is the same as that of my best friend (an atheist)–if the known laws of physics don’t seem to permit unmoved movers in our universe, and our universe requires them, than we just don’t understand fully the laws of physics. I commend him on his faith in this notion whenever we revisit this. 😉 ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:25am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/172 "2009-02-15T01:25:47Z")
> [@Stratocaster](#): > > I’m not been adversarial, I’m curious. What’s an example of a quantum event that has no trigger? Depending on what exactly you’re after, radioactive decay might fit the bill – it’s purely probabilistic, i.e. for a given atom, there is a given probability of decay at each point in time, but no way to tell when exactly it will decay; nothing _causes_ it to decay. Incidentally, this also supplies us with a nice ‘unmoved mover’ example: if you only consider an isolated atom, it can’t really be said to be moving or not, since you can always pin your rest frame to it, or have it move at some fixed speed relative to it; however, once the atom decays, conservation of momentum means that there now is no inertial frame where both fragments are at rest – if you stay in the frame where the atom was at rest originally, both parts will move in such a way that their respective momentums are oppositely equal; if you pin your rest frame on either of the parts, the other will move relative to it. Thus, we now have uncaused movement from a situation where there was none, and god was on his lunchbreak while all of this happened. ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/173 "2009-02-15T01:26:21Z")
> [@Rolken](#): > > I think you’re mashing together the concepts of proximate cause and ultimate cause. There’s not necessarily a tracing to a start implied by the former, and no contradiction. How so? ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/174 "2009-02-15T01:29:04Z")
> [@whorfin](#): > > But that’s what infinite means–that it always was that way. No start. There’s no start to the number line, even though I can get to any number by going up or down a certain number of units. Missing your point. I understand “infinite.” The numbers in an infinite chain don’t “cause” each other, right? That’s the element that makes the regress illogical. ---
**Author:** ![whorfin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/6f9a4e/32.png) [@whorfin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/whorfin)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:29am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/175 "2009-02-15T01:29:48Z")
> [@Stratocaster](#): > > Yes, that would be valid, if such entities existed. That would refute the proof. Another way of putting that is that the ‘proof’ is only as strong as its premise, that no entity can exist that is an “unmoved mover” However, the ‘proof’ concludes that such entities do exist. That is commonly described as a a reductio ad absurdum, not a proof–an argument whose conclusion contradicts its premise, and is therefore absurd. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/176 "2009-02-15T01:31:40Z")
> [@Stratocaster](#): > > “Everything green is supernatural” is indeed arbitrary. Just as arbitrary as ‘everything that may be its own cause’. ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:36am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/177 "2009-02-15T01:36:55Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Depending on what exactly you’re after, radioactive decay might fit the bill – it’s purely probabilistic, i.e. for a given atom, there is a given probability of decay at each point in time, but no way to tell when exactly it will decay; nothing _causes_ it to decay. Incidentally, this also supplies us with a nice ‘unmoved mover’ example: if you only consider an isolated atom, it can’t really be said to be moving or not, since you can always pin your rest frame to it, or have it move at some fixed speed relative to it; however, once the atom decays, conservation of momentum means that there now is no inertial frame where both fragments are at rest – if you stay in the frame where the atom was at rest originally, both parts will move in such a way that there respective momentums are oppositely equal; if you pin your rest frame on either of the parts, the other will move relative to it. Thus, we now have uncaused movement from a situation where there was none, and god was on his lunchbreak while all of this happened. HMHW, thanks for the examples, and I am really outside of my element here. Can you clarify why this doesn’t signify randomness as opposed to “no cause is required”? The last part of your explanation in particular suggests that “pinning your rest frame” (no idea what that means) influences the outcome–i.e., is a “mover” relative to what occurs. And radioactive decay–is that really uncaused or simply not fully understood. [Per wiki:](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radioactive_decay) > [@](#): > > This is a random process on the atomic level, in that it is impossible to predict when a given atom will decay, but given a large number of similar atoms the decay rate, on average, is predictable…The neutrons and protons that constitute nuclei, as well as other particles that may approach them, are governed by several interactions. The strong nuclear force, not observed at the familiar macroscopic scale, is the most powerful force over subatomic distances. The electrostatic force is almost always significant, and in the case of beta decay, the weak nuclear force is also involved. > > The interplay of these forces is simple. Some configurations of the particles in a nucleus have the property that, should they shift ever so slightly, the particles could fall into a lower-energy arrangement and release some energy. One might draw an analogy with a snowfield on a mountain: while friction between the snow crystals may be supporting the snow’s weight, the system is inherently unstable with regard to a state of lower potential energy. A disturbance would thus facilitate the path to a state of greater entropy: the system will move towards the ground state, producing heat, and the total energy will be distributable over a larger number of quantum states. Thus, an avalanche results. The total energy does not change in this process, but because of the law of entropy, avalanches only happen in one direction and that is towards the “ground state” – the state with the largest number of ways in which the available energy could be distributed. > > Such a collapse (a decay event) requires a specific activation energy. For a snow avalanche, this energy comes as a disturbance from outside the system, although such disturbances can be arbitrarily small. In the case of an excited atomic nucleus, the arbitrarily small disturbance comes from quantum vacuum fluctuations. A nucleus (or any excited system in quantum mechanics) is unstable, and can thus spontaneously stabilize to a less-excited system. The resulting transformation alters the structure of the nucleus. This doesn’t sound (to a confused layman) like an uncaused event. ---
**Author:** ![whorfin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/w/6f9a4e/32.png) [@whorfin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/whorfin)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:37am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/178 "2009-02-15T01:37:41Z")
> [@Stratocaster](#): > > Missing your point. I understand “infinite.” The numbers in an infinite chain don’t “cause” each other, right? That’s the element that makes the regress illogical. That was my point of showing (or defining) that we get from one number to the other by adding or subtracting. One “causes” two in that our definition of two is “add one to one”, and our definition of three is “add one to two”–each defines the number after it, and before it (by subtraction) (one could also say it as, “one” defines all of them–as any number is just a positive or negative sum of ones, which reaches the same result, as we “define” three by adding another 1 to 1+1)–either way, the start point is arbitrary, and the number line is equally infinite whether “zero” is defined at place A, or at place B on the line (which we get to by adding +10,000). The “starting place” does not define the number line–the relationships between numbers define it. ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:39am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/179 "2009-02-15T01:39:30Z")
> [@whorfin](#): > > Another way of putting that is that the ‘proof’ is only as strong as its premise, that no entity can exist that is an “unmoved mover” > > However, the ‘proof’ concludes that such entities do exist. That is commonly described as a a reductio ad absurdum, not a proof–an argument whose conclusion contradicts its premise, and is therefore absurd. I think that misunderstands what is inherent in the proofs’ conclusions. “No entity can exist in our physical world that is an unmoved mover, and such an entity is required for our world to exist” is not contradicted by “Therefore, since we exist, a prime mover must exist unconstrained and outside of our physical world.” ---
**Author:** ![Stratocaster](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/stratocaster/32/16393_2.png) [@Stratocaster](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Stratocaster)\ **Post date:** [February 15, 2009, 1:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591/180 "2009-02-15T01:41:39Z")
> [@whorfin](#): > > That was my point of showing (or defining) that we get from one number to the other by adding or subtracting. > > One “causes” two in that our definition of two is “add one to one”, and our definition of three is “add one to two”–each defines the number after it, and before it (by subtraction) (one could also say it as, “one” defines all of them–as any number is just a positive or negative sum of ones, which reaches the same result, as we “define” three by adding another 1 to 1+1)–either way, the start point is arbitrary, and the number line is equally infinite whether “zero” is defined at place A, or at place B on the line (which we get to by adding +10,000). The “starting place” does not define the number line–the relationships between numbers define it. I don’t see this as analogous. We needn’t add or subtract. We don’t ever have to “get to two.” Numbers are an abstratct representation. But nothing in our universe exists without a cause. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591.md?page=8) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-lies-of-richard-dawkins-episode-6-saint-thomas-aquinas/485591.md?page=10)