It is a fascinating line of thought and this and many related issues are addressed in Richard Dawkins’s “the extended phenotype”.
The basic concept being that gene expression can have local effects (e.g. that make red hair, or dark skin etc) but they can also have effects that extend beyond the individual (e.g. simian social systems, the making of a beehive or a beaver dam or the behaviours of an ant colony). These are all things that may assist the genes in their passage to the next generation.
No reason why our altruistic behaviour cannot be thought of in much the same way. The degree of altruism and the range to which that is extended (e.g. first/second cousins etc) will throw up a range of “success” from the gene’s point of view upon which natural selection can work.
Ants and bees are eusocial animals, which is a very unique adaptation for precisely the reason you point out. Altruism has evolved in nature a few different times, and what it comes down to is that evolutionary pressure acts on the GENE level, not the individual level.
If you are a drone or worker ant or bee, you carry the same genetic code that your queen does. The worker bee is not in competition with the queen bee any more than your heart cells are in competition with your gametes, which are the only cells that reproduce. The fact that most of the bees are sterile is necessary for this to work.
In fact there is a theory that this is why menopause evolved in humans - it allowed older women to live past reproductive age and use their experience to aid the group without competing with younger women. This is in contrast to the dynamics of other social animals, where older females are the only ones allowed to breed until a younger couple supplants them at the end of their life.
I agree with this. I think looking at evolutionary biology and seeing how it affected our societies is fascinating, but we should be building a society that lets us grow past those limitations.
That’s not correct. Worker ants and bees share 75% of their DNA with each other, and with any new queens the colony produces - whereas if they reproduced themselves they would only share 50% with their offspring. So overall they can pass on more of their genes by serving the colony than by reproducing themselves, which probably helps explain how colonies/hives developed.
This happens because females in those species have two sets of chromosomes, while males have only one. Fertilised eggs all receive the same paternal chromosomes (assuming the queen only mated with one drone) and one of the two sets from the queen, and develop into either workers or new queens, while unfertilised eggs receive one of the two sets of chromosomes from the queen (they have no father) and develop into drones.
You are right, I was thinking of this article I’d read recently about colonies of African bees who had mutated into reproducing through cloning. So those bees ARE all very close to genetically identical, which is a temporary advantage but could prove disastrous in the longer term.
I think you’re making your division in the wrong place. Humanity very likely does count for nothing in the cold equations of an uncaring physical universe: but both humanity itself and individual humans can and IMO should count a great deal for humans.
(So should the cats, and a lot of other living creatures, leaving out in some cases the part about individuals; but that’s off topic for this thread.)
We did; because we’re a social species, and we need a sense of justice for societies to work.
But it’s not only a matter of “some right to that which they created.” To quite a lot of people, that sense of justice means also that small children who’ve created nothing yet but piss and shit are also entitled to care; and for a sizeable number of people, it means also that letting other adults starve in the middle of plenty, even if they didn’t create the plenty, is not only unwise in the sense that it increases the chances they’ll whack you over the head to get some of it, but is also just plain wrong.
These to me aren’t really the same issue as whether people should get enough to eat. Society should indeed reward those who improve the lives of others, and discourage those who bring misery to others (though it gets complicated, because a lot of people do both of those things in different ways and/or to different people.) But there are multiple ways of accomplishing this; just as there are lots of ways to get a child to contribute to the family and to use basic table manners besides making them go without food or a fit place to sleep.
Should is never going to be universally agreed upon because humans don’t share a set of universal moral axioms.
That’s interesting. If you think of the hive as a single organism, these parthenogenetically-reproducing workers are like a cancer - and an infectious one at that.
I think if you burrow down deep enough we probably do. Human societies will have rules about killing people; about sexual behavior; about who gets to use what, and how to transfer such rights.
We don’t all have the same ones, of course.
Society doesn’t require universal agreement in order to function.
The purpose of “should” – the purpose of exploring moral intuition in groups – is to build a political coalition large enough to make a difference. Or at least to bring some minimum stability to policy.
There are, aha, potential downsides to that process.
But really, moral intuitions aren’t the primary place where things break. It’s facing reality as it actually is where people have serious problems. Not all, certainly, but a goodly chunk of difference in our moral intuitions stems from different beliefs about what will happen. A lot of disagreement about plain factual matters gets subsumed in moral language and argument.
Take something like guaranteeing enough food to eat as a convenient example.
Political revolutions that promise The People a minimum morally-demanded standard often enough end up starving millions of their own people. Violent revolutionaries wouldn’t get within a thousand miles of real political power if the general public could tell the difference between economic reality and empty moral posturing.
“Minors” is a broad term. Are we talking about a toddler in his/her “terrible twos” or a teenager with a tendency toward sociopathy? Everyone is born self-centered (to a degree at least) and has to learn empathy, respect for the rights of others, etc. So to make things simple, it depends on the degree of maturity. No, I don’t include a young developmentally backward child who has the chance to “grow out of it” in my definition of hatred, but for example a maniacal teenager such as the character in the book and film “We Need to Talk About Kevin”, yes, I would hate a person like that whether or not they were under the age of majority.
In general, the hatred I described above refers (as was insinuated in my post) to people like murderers, rapists, abusers, and generally people who use their superior strength and authority to harm the weak, vulnerable and dependent. I didn’t mean to say that I wish everyone who is not the nicest person around dead just like that.
I think that is one of the appeals of Objectivism (Rand), Libertarianism, and free market economics in general. Goods and services are produced by people, skilled in the production of those goods and services. The government can mandate “everyone should have enough to eat”, but if you don’t have skilled farmers and ranchers producing enough food, people aren’t going to get to eat. People can talk about “morality” and “happiness” all they like. But at the end of the day, society has limited resources and chooses what is important by what people are willing to pay for.
Thank you - I appreciate the clarification (I mean, I guessed that was your intent, but I think it was a worthwhile point to pull into focus)
What makes you think the range of answers falls on a spectrum at all? How do you account for,
- My life is worth more than any other thing
- My kids/family are worth more than anybody else
- People I know are worth more than people I never meet or see
- People are worth more according to popularity among other people
- People are worth more who leave a legacy
- People are worth more who acquire more wealth
- People are worth more according to the prestige of their parents
- People are worth more according to their beliefs
- People are worth more according to the amount of suffering they go through
- It is for God to determine the worth of a human life
etc.
I imagine most people think a question of worth is personal, that worth is like beauty; worth is found in the eye of the beholder. What is a human life worth to society at large? How can you begin to answer the question when each member of society has their own opinion?
~Max
I was asking about the intersection between human worth, however you define it, and the limits of physical material constraints. Or how one either rebukes or agrees with the cynical old saying “-that and a nickel will get you a cup of coffee”.
Even with an economic framing, the reality is that all the physical materials are scattered unequally across multitudes of individuals, each with their own individual opinions about human worth.
For example The Emperor of Qin had plenty of material (and human!) resources at his disposal, but he chose to commit them to a hopeless quest for personal immortality.
~Max
Yes.
I’m a fairly strong free market proponent myself. But the archetypical internet libertarian comes off like a religious zealot, preaching from their sacred texts.
Actually I think that’s one case where there is some legitimate and important difference in moral intuition, and that difference absolutely EXPLODES into wildly divergent beliefs about how the world works. It ends up undermining the arguments they’re trying to make.
“This is the morally correct economic system!!!1!”
“lol buddy i disagree with that”
“Well… it’s ALSO the best system to get you whatever stuff you claim to want almost definitely.”
That sort of argumentative backpedaling is not particularly convincing to anyone else. There are some strong and compelling arguments in favor of broad-based, even radical, economic liberalization, even for people with strong progressive ideals. But they’re abstract. It takes a long time to lay out the theoretical and empirical arguments. An honest argument for more market freedom doesn’t shy away from coordination failures in markets. It makes the case that the coordination failures from intervention tend to be, on average – NOT all of the time – worse than the original problems they’re trying to fix, compounding one coordination failure with another. It’s based in cost-benefit analyses, and the observation that actual political intervention can result in the exact opposite effect from ideal intervention, even in cases where there is fairly broad consensus on best practices. It digs into differences in necessary and sufficient conditions when assigning praise or blame, reward and punishment, and focuses on likely counter-factuals to the world in front of us: what would happen instead of what does happen. It focuses not just on the seen, but the unseen effects of policy changes that hide below the surface.
And so… yeah.
A genuine conversation on that topic is incredibly difficult to achieve.