Because the statute protects religious practice. Even without the oodles of caselaw from Yoder etc., it’s still going to necessary for a plaintiff (or a defendant seeking an RFRA shield to a private cause of action) to plead that such-and-so is his religious practice, a claim for which sincerity is a virtual sine qua non. In other words, if the RFRA user cannot prove that his practice is religiously based, the RFRA offers no comfort – and so by necessity he must claim and prove sincerity.
Why is sincerity a sine qua non of religious practice? Do you think all or even most of the people at Mass sincerely believe they are receiving the actual body and blood of Christ?
I do, but that’s not likely to be relevant. I certainly am convinced that most of the people at Mass sincerely believe that receiving communion is a requirement of their religion, and it’s that belief that is sincere and relevant to the issue of a state RFRA protecting the practice.
I am having trouble imagining a state law that would burden those who believed in the Real Presence but did not burden the reception of communion itself.
(4) They were asked specifically to include language to say that discrimination against gay people would not be infringed, and refused to do so.
(5) Indiana has no state law against discrimination of gay people, unlike some of the other states, and there’s an issue of state law preempting the local laws.
(6) It explicitly allows it to be brought up in private suits and not just against the government.
Isn’t the prior question whether the practice of a religion that forbids this or that form of behavour to its adherents thereby actually forbids the provision of services to or doing business with non-adherents who engage in that form of behaviour? How can the latter impinge on the former? There is a case going through the courts in Northern Ireland on this point at the moment (a baker who refused to provide a cake with a slogan supporting equal marriage).
It was just an example. Let me see if I can break down your position into its more basic components. Are you saying that a belief which is not sincere is by definition not “religious”?
I’m not Bricker, but for me, a belief that is not sincere is not a belief. The point of the sincerity test is (I assume) to prevent people from suddenly claiming they believe something for which there is no evidence of any actual belief.
I know what it’s for, but that definition is rather limiting. I sincerely believe I am a human being. If I was confronted with incontrovertible proof that I am not, I would have a very difficult time changing that belief - probably as difficult a time as someone who was given reason to doubt his religious convictions.
Conversely, I believe in anthropogenic global warming because there is a scientific consensus and I’m not about to do the research myself. If, somehow, the scientific consensus shifted, I’d shrug my shoulders and get on with life. Nonetheless, the belief is there.
IANAL, but I was curious, so I started looking to try to find out if courts often test the sincerity of religious belief. Unfortunately, the First Amendment Center contradicts itself in this article:
But that seems heavily geared towards the context of providing accommodations to prisoners, and might not be applicable to RFRAs.
There’s this:
But that’s from a dissent, not from the prevailing decision of the court.
…so legal Dopers, help a non-lawyer out - what do you think of sincerity tests in the legal system?
So what? I only have to *claim *sincerity to have it be the default assumption. I only have to say “God hates fags” instead of “I hate fags” and it’s up to you to prove I don’t believe it.
The bill’s text defines its usage: * “As used in this chapter, ‘exercise of religion’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” *
In theory, sincerity is a necessary element of any free exercise claim. That is, one brought directly under the First Amendment or federal RFRA. In practice, sincerity is nearly always stipulated (certainly by the time you get to the appellate level.) The only exceptions I’m aware of are prisoner litigation.
I’m no lawyer, but reading the text of the majority opinion in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (which confirmed the validity of the federal RFRA and its applicability against Federal action), I see the words “sincere” seven times, including the phrase “sincere exercise of religion” four times. I find this interesting:
[Quote=Chief Justice Roberts]
Before the District Court, the Government conceded the [respondent’s] prima facie case under RFRA. See 282 F. Supp. 2d, at 1252 (application of the Controlled Substances Act would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise).
[/quote]
(Emphasis added.)
Sincerity of religious intent seems to be a factor in the consideration.
I think you may be unclear on the significance of the term “stipulated”. It means the parties agree. The case you cite makes my point rather neatly.
[QUOTE=Roberts, CJ.]
A religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest receives communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed from plants unique to the region, that contains a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by the Federal Government. **The Government concedes **that this practice is a sincere exercise of religion…
[/QUOTE]
In other words, the Gonzales court didn’t have to decide whether the belief was sincere because that wasn’t in dispute.
By the time you get to the appellate level, the sincerity of the claimant was a fact found by the trial court.
The trial court, it’s true, often sees the parties stipulate the sincerity of the claimant – but that’s because the claimant is often sincere. We hear hypotheticals like, “Well, what if I declare that my religion requires women be bare-breasted in the presence of men, huh. smart guy? Then what?” but those kinds of claims don’t seem to be making it into court.
I’m not aware of any RFRA claim where the sincerity of belief was stipulated at trial and I felt that the party so asserting was actually insincere.
My understanding is that discrimination is allowed unless it’s a protected class, such as age and race. Gender isn’t a protected class under the US constitution, so you can discriminate against women or men, people who smile too much, or people on bicycles. Does it mean you can discriminate against menstruating women? (Leaving aside how you’d tell, without violating their privacy.)
First, it’s more accurate to say “suspect classification” than “protected class”. The latter term lends itself to confusion. Second, constitutional protections (other than race) only protect you against the government.* Private discrimination must be prohibited by statute.
When religious beliefs are in conflict with nondiscrimination statutes, the RFRA will effectively nullify the nondiscrimination statute if the government had a compelling interest in outlawing the type of discrimination at issue, and the statute is the least restrictive means of doing so.
*At least at the federal level. Anyway, for constitutional purpose age classifications are not suspect, but gender classifications are.