# The Number Three---not a human conception

**URL:** <https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453>\
**Category:** Great Debates\
**Created:** [November 4, 2001, 6:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453 "2001-11-04T18:16:41Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 9\
**Page:** 1

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**Author:** ![jesse\_morrison](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/bcef8e/32.png) [@jesse\_morrison](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jesse_morrison)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 6:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/1 "2001-11-04T18:16:41Z")

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About a year ago, I read (on the net) an interview. The two people being interviewed were Richard Dawkins and Stephen Pinker.

The interview was not about the number three, but one of the two people being interviewed brought up the number three, and made the statement, that the number three was not conceptualized by the human mind, but had always existed.

They said that the origin of “three” had been debated by mathmaticians and philosophers for a long period of time.

I have not been able to find anything on this subject, I am not sure how I would go about it, also I have not been able to find this interview again.

Does a computer work with three things (0 + 1 + programme)?

Does sexual selection work with three things (male + male + female selector)?

Are the above two related, and are they related to the question of where did the number three come from?

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**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 6:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/2 "2001-11-04T18:28:11Z")

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The idea is that 3, a number, is an abstraction, a universal like the color “white” or the emotion “angry.”

[This page](http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~owl/rand.html#4.1) goes into some detail about universals.

> [@](#):
>
> I have here two white pieces of paper. They are not the same piece of paper, but they have something in common: they are both white. What there are two of are called “particulars”; the pieces of paper are particulars. What is or can be common to multiple particulars are called “universals”; whiteness is a universal. A universal is capable of being present in multiple instances, as whiteness is present in many different pieces of paper. A particular doesn’t have ‘instances’ and can only be present in one place at a time (distinct parts of it can be in different locations though), and particulars are not ‘present in’ things.  
> …  
> Also understand that I don’t by a “universal” mean a certain kind of word, idea or concept. I mean the sort of thing that you attribute to the objects of your knowledge: Whiteness itself is the universal, not the word “white” and not the concept ‘white’. I do not attribute my concept of whiteness to the paper; I do not think that the paper has a concept in it. I attribute whiteness to the paper; i.e., I think the paper is white. Whiteness is not a concept; it is a color. When I have the concept of whiteness in my mind, I do not have whiteness in my mind (no part of my mind is actually white). I say this because the confusion between concepts and their referents is all too common, both inside and outside Objectivist circles; as, for example, when someone says, “Democracy is a nice concept . . .” Democracy is not a concept, it is a form of government!

Also of interest is the classic division that universals present:

> [@](#):
>
> The philosophical questions about universals are
> 
> (1) Do universals (as defined above) exist?
> 
> (2) If not, why does it seem as if they do? (i.e., why do we have all these words and ideas apparently referring to them and knowledge apparently about them?)
> 
> (3) If they do, does their existence depend on the existence of particulars?
> 
> The people who answer #1 “Yes” are called “realists”, and those who answer #1 “No” are called “nominalists”. The nominalists then have to go on to answer #2. How they answer it determines what kind of nominalists they are. The realists have to go on to answer #3. Those who answer #3 “Yes” are called “immanent realists” …, while those who answer #3 “No” are called “Platonic realists” or “transcendent realists”.

And I think computers work with three things: 0, 1, and NAND logic; at least, your entire computer (not including the power handling devices and fans) should be expressible with those three things.

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**Author:** ![AHunter3](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ahunter3/32/368_2.png) [@AHunter3](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/AHunter3)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 6:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/3 "2001-11-04T18:50:55Z")

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The number three represents “neither” in response to a “this” or “that” decision. It represents “up” in response to a “left” or “right” decision. It represents “no” in response to “would you rather be stabbed or shot?”

Three takes the previous pair, concatenates them into a single choice, and posits the other.

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**Author:** ![jesse\_morrison](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/bcef8e/32.png) [@jesse\_morrison](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jesse_morrison)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 7:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/4 "2001-11-04T19:16:01Z")

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Most researchers that study the emotion of envy, say this emotion is universal. Does this mean the emotion of envy is not a concept? My question is—why do humans have this emotion? Is envy a Darwinian adaptation, if so, what is the benefit? Can envy be a universal and an adaptation?

Most of the books read that it takes two for envy, and three for jealousy. I question this assumption.

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**Author:** ![ultrafilter](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/3d9bf3/32.png) [@ultrafilter](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ultrafilter)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 7:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/5 "2001-11-04T19:45:14Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by jesse morrison \*  
> **Most researchers that study the emotion of envy, say this emotion is universal. Does this mean the emotion of envy is not a concept?**

Well, there’s a bit of difference between the actual emotion of envy, and the concept we have in our heads of that emotion. There’s a quote I like: “The map is not the territory.” Unfortunately, I forget who said it.

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**Author:** ![erislover](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/71e660/32.png) [@erislover](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/erislover)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 7:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/6 "2001-11-04T19:57:59Z")

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**Ultrafilter** , it is an awesome quote (I don’t know who said it either) but it is a trap that is much easier fallen into than avoided, because often the _reference_ and the _referent_ are not intuitively distinguished. I consider it a problem of language myself, whereas the word “is” can be used to equivocate **or** to assign, as in the following (programming example):

```auto

{
int a = 13;
bool b = (a == 13);
}

```

The first “sentence” would easily translate as “‘a’ is ‘13’,” that is, “assign 13 to a.” Whereas the second example, “a is 13” is a process of equivocation; that is, we may use “a” every time we use “13.” (actually, it is an evaluation, “can we use a for 13,” but that is not strictly necessary for understanding).

In these two cases, which is the map and which is the territory? The distinction is not quite as clear as pointing to California and then pointing to a map of California, where the distinction between the two is much more clear than “which is thirteen and which represents 13?” Especially when we consider that “13” is itself a symbol, possibly, when used outside the delimiters.

Such a mess is the spoken and written word. 🙂

**Jesse** , you say, “Does this mean the emotion of envy is not a concept?” Precisely! That isn’t to say we cannot have a concept of envy; merely that an instance of envy is not a concept.

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**Author:** ![ultrafilter](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/u/3d9bf3/32.png) [@ultrafilter](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ultrafilter)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 8:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/7 "2001-11-04T20:08:31Z")

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> [@](#):
>
> \*Originally posted by erislover \*  
> \*\ ***Ultrafilter** , it is an awesome quote (I don’t know who said it either) but it is a trap that is much easier fallen into than avoided, because often the _reference_ and the _referent_ are not intuitively distinguished. I consider it a problem of language myself, whereas the word “is” can be used to equivocate **or** to assign, as in the following (programming example):
> 
> ```auto
> 
> {
> int a = 13;
> bool b = (a == 13);
> }
> 
> ```
> 
> The first “sentence” would easily translate as “‘a’ is ‘13’,” that is, “assign 13 to a.” Whereas the second example, “a is 13” is a process of equivocation; that is, we may use “a” every time we use “13.” (actually, it is an evaluation, “can we use a for 13,” but that is not strictly necessary for understanding).\*\*

Interesting. I would never read “int a = 13;” as a declarative statement, but as an imperative, so that problem had never occurred to me.

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**Author:** ![jcgmoi](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/a9adbd/32.png) [@jcgmoi](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/jcgmoi)\
**Post date:** [November 4, 2001, 9:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/8 "2001-11-04T21:33:23Z")

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**ultrafilter** said:

> [@](#):
>
> There’s a quote I like: “The map is not the territory.” Unfortunately, I forget who said it.

See Count Alfred Korzybski, the originator of the cult of General Semantics, a precursor of the cult of Dianetics.

For an entertaining (as I recall, it’s been years) view of GS, read A. E. Van Vogt’s SF stories, the best being the first, _The World of Null-A_.

Here’s [an interesting looking site](http://www.sundial.net/~rogerr/nulla.htm) that takes on GS, Van Vogt and null-a.

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**Author:** ![Hamlet](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/hamlet/32/2818_2.png) [@Hamlet](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Hamlet)\
**Post date:** [November 5, 2001, 1:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-number-three-not-a-human-conception/91453/9 "2001-11-05T01:45:53Z")

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As I learned in my higher education (Schoolhouse Rock):

Three is a magic number.
