Yes.
From the L.A. Times, “Sorrow Trailed a Veteran Who Saved a President and Then Was Cast in an Unwanted Spotlight [Home Edition],” Author: DAN MORAIN, Date: Feb 13, 1989, Start Page: 1, Section: View." I don’t have an unpaid link to the document, unfortunately.
Thanks for the perspective. Note that I was directly responding to Marley’s question of whether or not we (the contemporary we) owe him a debt.
It’s definitely a case of using someone as a means to an end, sending Kant and the non-consequentialists into apoplectic fits. From a utilitarian point of view, the utils lost to the destruction of his life are smaller than the utils gained from the current shape of society. I believe consequentialists can acknowledge the flaws and weaknesses inherent to their calculations, but in a sort of meta-c/b/a conclude that on balance, assuming that the individual weighings are done in a rational, analytical, and open manner, the net benefit of their approach will yield more utils over the long term.
I’m not staunchly in favour of his outting, nor of the overall tactic. As in my first post, I think it was a dickish thing to do. But if I were as wrapped up in the movement and actively working for its cause (and assuming a much greater perspective and understanding of the issues supported this contention), I daresay I would take a tarnishment of my ethical pedestal and make a similar choice.
I lived with a bunch of lesbians, once, long ago. At their invitation, I participated in a Gay Pride celebration. Oddly enough, I am not a lesbian. I am not even gay.
The part of this that I find displeasing is that the court, and subsequent courts as well have accepted the contention that if a person appears newsworthy, to the news media, they are “public persons” and thereby de jure less than fully protected by the laws of the nation.
If you meet the Good Samaritan on the road, go ahead and say whatever you want about him. He’s just a publicity seeking attention whore.
Tris
Dick move on Milk’s part, period. You don’t throw someone into the struggle if they don’t want to be in it. And yes, there is a difference between being in a parade and being thrust into the interview-spotlight. Just like there would be a difference between someone marching on Montgomery and someone giving a speech to the crowd at that march. Not everyone has what it takes to be a King or Rosa Parks. And that’s their choice.
I share the intuition that this was a dickish move on Milk’s part. But I find that when it comes to privacy as between individuals, I have a hard time defending my intuitions with rational arguments.
Privacy as between private citizens is very different from privacy between citizen and state. Privacy as between citizens and government refers to two related concepts: First, a private sphere in which the government ought not interfere. That is, the distinction between that which is public (e.g. subject to democratic control) and that which is not. And second, the idea of preventing the government from having certain information in order to guard against abuse of government power (e.g. not having lists of who owns guns). This form of privacy is easy to rationally defend, though there are clearly arguments on both sides.
Privacy as between individuals is murkier, I think. Neither of the above ideas of privacy directly apply to privacy as between individuals. Privacy between individuals is not about power and prophylactics against abuse of power. It is about more slippery concepts of dignity, shame, freedom from judgment of peers, freedom to deceive, and decorum. In particular, I have a hard time pointing out exactly what is troubling about the revelation of private facts about a person gained without violating that persons reasonable expectations of privacy, especially when those facts are of public concern.
What I find intuitively troubling is the obvious fact that revelation of these private facts exposed Oliver Sipple to irrational public prejudice. But one man’s irrational public prejudice is another man’s righteous community judgment. And surely the lion’s share of responsibility for the community’s reaction is born by the community, not the person who allowed the community to know the information. Here’s the thought experiment I’ve been mulling over: Is the revelation that a particular person of unknown sexuality is heterosexual troubling if that person didn’t want his sexuality known? My intuition is that it is troubling, but I can’t put my finger on what is actually wrong about it beyond reference to some murky concept of privacy. What about revealing that someone is single? Or that someone smokes cigarettes? What is the principled justification for which information can be shared without an individual’s permission and which cannot? What is the support for the principle that we ought to have the authority to determine who shares what information about ourselves with others?
Come witness the hypocrisy inherent in the system!!!11
:rolleyes:
As far as the OP goes, in this case the needs of the many do not outweigh the needs of the one. Milk did wrong here.
Regardless of one’s views on the morality of Milk’s action or the right to privacy, this completely misses the point. The right to privacy which SCOTUS has found/invented is the right to make private decisions for yourself without interference from the state. It is not the right to restrict the speech of others when they want to talk about the private decisions you have made.
Unethical, if understandable. Do recall that Milk was a man who pretty much expected to be killed for being gay; in essence he was in a war scenario.
Well, we might start with the tort elements of invasion of privacy, which I don’t know off the top of my head anymore, but which a quick Google suggests are covered in Restatement (2nd) Torts 652D, Publicity Given to Private Life:
Comment b, at 386 (1977):
I offer the comment text to show that what must be “highly offensive” is not the fact of the matter revealed in the publication, but whether a reasonable person would be highly offended by having such revealed about him. In other words, we don’t question whether it’s “highly offensive” that someone is gay, but whther it’s highly offensive to a reasonable person, secretly gay, to have his orientation revealed.
And I’ll add, on edit: I have no particular expertise in civil law, so I welcome correction from those more experienced than I.
Bricker, I’m curious to know what tangible damages Sipple sustained. Did he lose his employment?
I do think Milk behaved selfishly and unethically, btw, if that’s what the debate is. But I don’t think I have enough information to believe that the court was wrong to have considered him a public figure. You say “presumably by virtue of having saved Ford from assassination,” but I’m not prepared to accept that that was the basis of the court’s reasoning.
And Herb Caen was also a bit of a dick.
His parents refused to speak with him after the disclosure, a period of estrangement that went on for several years.
Actually, it was a basis. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (1984).
(That latter point was based on a question raised by the column: Ford thanked Sipple by personal letter but did not invite him to the White House; the column speculated that Ford did not do this because Sipple was gay.)
I am not suggesting that the law does not protect individual’s privacy interests. It clearly does in many contexts. Indeed, many states probably would have allowed suit against Milk because they reject the notion of involuntary limited public figures.
I am suggesting that the reasons for protecting this interest are not entirely clear. The tort of invasion of privacy seems to be primarily concerned with causing offense. But generally speaking, causing mere offense is other contexts is not actionable. What makes it actionable in the privacy context is some underlying privacy interest, the support for which remains unclear.
As usual, some other smarter person has said it better than I could. Check out Judge Posner’s discussion of privacy here. I don’t agree 100% with what Posner has to say, but I think he raises some fascinating issues that undermine my intuitive valuation of the privacy interest.
While I’ll accept that such would be a recompensable civil tort, it strikes me as an intangible, at least insofar as it doesn’t seem to admit of a specific monetary valuation for the purposes of demanding a remedy.
Again, I find this less than satisfying. It certainly speaks to the motivation of the newspapers, but it seems to not address whether performing an act of heroism converts a private person into a public person. Or if it does, then any closeted gay firefighter who went into a burning building to rescue a trapped resident would seem to be subject to being outed against his will.
I’m wondering if, between the day of the excitement, and the time he was outed, did Sipple encourage continuation of the public recognition that the event brought him? Did he lobby for a medal? Did he get a tattoo on his chest in the shape of a medal, with the caption: “This is where my medal would be if I was wearing a shirt”?
There is something that bugs me about this:
It seems to imply a belief that someone can be drafted, against his will, to be a poster child in a policy debate. That strikes me as wrong.
I think the court is saying that the issue was a matter of public concern.
I think there is a significant difference between doing an act maliciously to hurt someone, and doing the same act without malicious intent. If someone outed Sipple because they wanted him to suffer for being gay simply because they feel that gays should suffer that would have been wrong. Simply because it is wrong to want to cause pain to another human who has done no wrong. Milk still bears responsibility because he knew his actions would have negative implications for Sipple. However, he gets off a little bit easier because his intention wasn’t to cause pain to Sipple. That was simply an unfortunate side effect. It makes him cold and calculating on behalf of his cause, not evil.
The only time I support outing is if someone is actively participating in the discrimination of the group they secretly belong to.
So, Charlie Crist signs that anti-gay legislation? Charlie Crist’s habits in the gay bars of Florida are fair game.
So, nasty move. I can understand it, but I don’t support it.
Remember that this was in the 1970s before we had had the great debate on the subject of outing, so the political climate on the question within the movement was quite different. And the situation was so fraught that it’s easy to see how Milk and co might have felt justified.
From our standpoint now, though, it’s pretty clear that it was a dickish thing to do. Alas, angels of perfect purity tend to be few in number.
You mean like deciding who knows about your sex life without having it blabbed all over by the city supervisor?
How is that not making a private decision for yourself, and having a member of the government overrule it?
Regards,
Shodan
I’ve never understood that as an explanation for bad behavior. You don’t have to be an angel to do the right thing.
I think the important distinction there is that he wasn’t acting in his capacity as a city councilman when he outed Sipple. If Milk told someone to shut the hell up, it wouldn’t be a violation of the first amendment just because Milk held government office.
That said, I agree that Milk’s action was ethically indefensible.