Sorry for the invidious inference, Guy Montag. As I said, I didn’t know, so I asked.
As it happens, I do have some familiarity with reading legal writing.
If you’re interested in my commentary on your quotation of the ACLU’s concerns:
-Minimize juditial supervision of federal telephone and Internet surveillance
I’m not clear how judicial supervision is minimized. The requirement to present probable cause for a criminal investigation to a neutral, detached magistrate is not changed by the Act. It is true, however, that the Act has been interpreted to permit an investigation whose primary purpose is counterterrorism to proceed with oversight by a special federal court, not the ordinary federal magistrate. But there is still judicial supervision.
-Expand the ability of the government to conduct secret searches (searches without prior notice to the searched party)
Yes, that’s true. The Act does lengthen the time in which certain searches may be conducted in secert, before notice must be given to the searched party. In an ordinary situation, notice of the warrant is served simultaneous to the search, so a person whose property has been searched is immediately aware of the search.
The specifics, which may be found in 18 USC § 3103(a) et seq, provide that the goivernment may ask a judge for special permission to delay the notice of a search warrant, if and only if “…the court finds reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the execution of the warrant may have an adverse result…”
Even if that’s so, the notice must ultimately be given. It just doesn’t have to be given instantly.
While it’s true that this is a new provision, frankly it doesn’t strike me as that terrifying.
-Includes civil disobedience in the new, broader definition of “terrorism”
This statement appears to be absolutely false and without any support in the actual language of the law.
-Grant the FBI access to sensitive business/student records without having to show ANY evidence that a crime has or even might be committed
This language appears to refer to 50 USC § 1861 et seq. But the law specifies that the material sought must relate to international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, the request must be approved by a neutral, detached magistrate – in other words, the FBI cannot merely dash out on their own and demand records - and, most importantly, an investigation under this section cannot be conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.
-Allow monitoring of communications between people that are detained by the DOJ and their attorney(s), thus violating the formerly-sacred Attorney-Client privilege
Once again, the ACLU language you mention tells only a part of the story. Monitoring of communications can only be done with a judge’s consent, and any information received cannot be transmitted to the prosecutors involved. In other words, if there is good reason to believe that the imprisoned individual is using his lawyer to send messages to people on the outside, in an effort to accomplish terrorism, then the communications can be monitored. But they cannot be monitored by the same team that is prosecuting the person, and no information can be shared between the monitoring team and the prosecution team.
-The much debated military tribunals, which aren’t required to adhere to traditional rules regarding evidence and law
It’s unclear to me where the Patriot Act establishes military tribunals.
-Allow monitoring of people in their churches, on the internet, in bookstores, and in libraries–without requiring that any crime is even suspected.
This is false. The Act accomplishes no such thing.
*-the arrest of Librarians if they reveal to their patrons that they are being monitored. ( tested this on my own today at the library, I asked the library worker if he had heard of the monitoring. His response: A terse “I’m not allowed to discuss that with you.” accompanied by a frown and (to me at least) a defeated sigh) *
Uh huh.
Well, it is true that 50 USC § 1861 (a)(2)(B)(1)(d) provides: “…No person shall disclose to any other person (other than those persons necessary to produce the tangible things under this section) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.”
This means that if the FBI got a judge to approve it, your librarian could be asked to provide tangible records, and, if he later disclosed to you that such a request was made, he could be in violation of this section.
Of course, the request could only be made if, as I said above, your library activities were in furtherance of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and a judge agreed with it.
The FBI could not, in other words, investigate your reading habits just for fun, or jail your librarian with similar abandon. They have to show that you are furthering international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, and they must convince a neutral, detached magistrate of this.
And last but not least, my friends:
–The authority to silence dissent By equating critcism with terrorism! They declare that public debate would “erode our national unity… diminish our resolve… give ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends.”*
Despite the fact that you quote this section, the words you mention do not appear in the Act.
So my take on this, since you ask, is that the ACLU, assuming you’ve quoted them accurately, are in this instance utterly devoid of anything approaching intellectual honesty.