# The rationale behind attacking Iraq? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [June 25, 2002, 7:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845 "2002-06-25T07:10:44Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![CyberPundit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/76d3ee/32.png) [@CyberPundit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CyberPundit)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 7:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/1 "2002-06-25T07:10:44Z")
I am having trouble understanding what the precise purpose of a war on Iraq is. There appears to be widesrpead agreement that the main danger isn’t Saddam directly using WMD, which would invite massive retaliation but of him passing WMD to terrorist groups. However I fail to see how exactly a war reduces the chance of that happening. 1. As of now there are two constraints on Saddam passing on WMD to Islamic terrorists: his fear that they will use them on his own regime and his fear of what America would do if it found out. These constraints don’t exist if Saddam is sure he will go. The moment the US decides to fight a war to eliminate Saddam he has no incentive to restrain himself and will probably do his maximum to spread his WMD as far as possible as a final act of revenge. 2. If there is a war and the regime falls there will inevitably be period of anarchy before order is restored. Wouldn’t this be a golden opportunity for Al Quaeda to steal WMD from Iraq? It’s not clear to me how chaos in post-war Iraq helps keep the WMD safe. The bottom line is that a war on Iraq may lead to a situation where Saddam is gone (an excellent thing for sure) but where terrorist groups receive a big boost to their WMD stockpiles. Is that a good bargain? ---
**Author:** ![msmith537](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/d9b06d/32.png) [@msmith537](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/msmith537)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 3:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/2 "2002-06-25T15:56:59Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by CyberPundit \* > > 1. As of now there are two constraints on Saddam passing on WMD to Islamic terrorists: his fear that they will use them on his own regime and his fear of what America would do if it found out. These constraints don’t exist if Saddam is sure he will go. The moment the US decides to fight a war to eliminate Saddam he has no incentive to restrain himself and will probably do his maximum to spread his WMD as far as possible as a final act of revenge. What evidence do you have that Saddam feers terrorists using weapons of mass distruction against his regime? The idea is that we don’t wait for Saddam to develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass distruction and hope he doesn’t use them. Saddam appears to have no constraints on using such weapons, even against his own people. His lighting of the Kuwait oil fields also demonstrated his willingness to strike out at his enemies out of spite, even in defeat. While the US can tolerate Saddam in power, we cannot tolerate a nuclear armed Saddam in power. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by CyberPundit \* > 2) If there is a war and the regime falls there will inevitably be period of anarchy before order is restored. Wouldn’t this be a golden opportunity for Al Quaeda to steal WMD from Iraq? It’s not clear to me how chaos in post-war Iraq helps keep the WMD safe. It is highly likely that a top priority of an operation against Iraq would be to secure or destroy any such weapons. Also, while Saddam has chemical weapons, it is not believed that he has nuclear weapons yet. > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by CyberPundit \* > The bottom line is that a war on Iraq may lead to a situation where Saddam is gone (an excellent thing for sure) but where terrorist groups receive a big boost to their WMD stockpiles. Is that a good bargain? \*\* And how would the terrorists gain access to these weapons? The Saddam Going Out of Bussiness Sale? ---
**Author:** ![smiling\_bandit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/e9a140/32.png) [@smiling\_bandit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/smiling_bandit)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 4:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/3 "2002-06-25T16:01:53Z")
I’m not sure we will attack him. If we can force him to open up and ease the tensions on his end we get everything we want. ---
**Author:** ![CyberPundit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/76d3ee/32.png) [@CyberPundit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CyberPundit)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 4:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/4 "2002-06-25T16:16:21Z")
“What evidence do you have that Saddam feers terrorists using weapons of mass distruction against his regime?” Well it’s no secret that Saddam and the Islamic fundamentalists don’t like each other and also that Saddam is completely paranoid about any force which potentially threatens his grip on power so it’s no stretch to believe that he wouldn’t want WMD to fall into their hands. "Saddam appears to have no constraints on using such weapons, even against his own people. " The difference is “his own people” couldn’t retaliate with WMD whereas the US can. During the Gulf war threats of retaliation deterred Saddam from using WMD. The issue isn’t whether the world would be a better place without Saddam, no one disputes that it would. The issue is that fighting a war with the intention of eliminating Saddam might mean that terrorist groups are more, not less, likely to obtain WMD from Iraq either through deliberate actions on Saddam’s part(as his parting shot) or through general anarchy. Like I said I don’t see the advantage of a scenario where Saddam is gone but Al Quaeeda has better WMD at its disposal. And proponents of military action against Iraq don’t seem to even acknowledge the problem much less give cogent arguments why the threat isn’t significant. I ---
**Author:** ![CyberPundit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/76d3ee/32.png) [@CyberPundit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CyberPundit)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 4:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/5 "2002-06-25T16:23:30Z")
Missed a couple of points: “It is highly likely that a top priority of an operation against Iraq would be to secure or destroy any such weapons” War is chaos. Iraq is a big country ,chem/bio stockpiles don’t take up that much space and it is doubtful whether the US has that much intelligence on the locations of every single WMD stock. I am not sure how successful such an operation would be. “And how would the terrorists gain access to these weapons? The Saddam Going Out of Bussiness Sale?” When Saddam realizes the game is up for him you don’t think that either his agents or Quaeda agents coudn’t smuggle WMD stockpiles out of Iraq? The Iraqi borders are pretty porous you know. ---
**Author:** ![Bryan\_Ekers](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/bryan_ekers/32/183_2.png) [@Bryan\_Ekers](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bryan_Ekers)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 4:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/6 "2002-06-25T16:33:24Z")
“Because it’s there…” ---
**Author:** ![msmith537](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/d9b06d/32.png) [@msmith537](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/msmith537)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 6:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/7 "2002-06-25T18:06:52Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by CyberPundit \* > When Saddam realizes the game is up for him you don’t think that either his agents or Quaeda agents coudn’t smuggle WMD stockpiles out of Iraq? The Iraqi borders are pretty porous you know. \*\* They can do this now. That’s the whole point. if we do nothing as you suggest, Saddam can continue developing WMD and smuggle them to whomever he chooses. By removing him from power, we can disrupt his development and take control of the situation. What would you propose? ---
**Author:** ![elucidator](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/8edcca/32.png) [@elucidator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/elucidator)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 6:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/8 "2002-06-25T18:36:53Z")
At the end of WWII, we tried, convicted and hanged war criminals. This we defined as making “aggressive war”. We recognized, of course, the right of any nation to respond to military belligerance in kind. But we further declared that defensive war is the only legitimate war. To emphasize our sincerity in this regard, we hanged a few people. If we then indulge ourselves in a “premptive war” we will be committing a war crime, as we ourselves have defined it. Our Leader apparently intends to justify this on the presumption that Goddam Hussein intends to do us dirt. This is foreign policy by way of precognition. Is Miss Cleo going to be offered a cabinet position, or will she be attached to the Defense Department? That’s the legal aspect. The moral dimensions are horrifying to civilized people, and fall under the titanic euphemism of “collateral damage.” Does anyone imagine for a moment that military defeat of Iraq will be accomplished without the deaths of thousand and thousands of Iraqi civilians, who are no more culpable than our own. Fix it clearly in your mind: “colateral damage” is slaughter. It is the massacre of innocents, nothing less, and we should be bitterly ashamed to even contemplate such. In the words of Mr. Jefferson, “I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just.” Amen, brother. Amen. ---
**Author:** ![CyberPundit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/76d3ee/32.png) [@CyberPundit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CyberPundit)\ **Post date:** [June 25, 2002, 7:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/9 "2002-06-25T19:19:00Z")
“They can do this now.” The whole point is that Saddam’s incentives now are different from when the US attacks. I have already explained the two reasons why supplying terrorists would be a bad idea from his own pov now. “What would you propose?” Better intelligence and deterrence(which has proved to work in the past with Saddam). I wouldn’t rule out war but use it more as a threat to get UN inspectors back . You still haven’t explained why a war wouldn’t make things worse from the pov. of terrorists obtaining WMD. The fact is that any war is a huge gamble because it destablizes the very regime that is keeping the WMD secure at the moment. ---
**Author:** ![MHand](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/e5b9ba/32.png) [@MHand](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MHand)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 1:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/10 "2002-06-26T01:51:31Z")
The initial post seems to assume Iraq already has Weapons of Mass Destruction. Iraq has chemical weapons, but does not yet have nuclear weapons or long range missiles. Once Iraq gets nuclear weapons or long range missles, as the OP says, attacking will be too-late. By all estimates, this will happen in 3 to 10 years if Saddam is left unchecked. The ideal way to prevent Iraq from attaining nuclear capabilities is through diplomacy, but that has failed. The next best way is with a threat that never comes to fruition. That’s exactly what we’re doing now. We’re threatening to destroy the Iraqi military if they don’t comply with out demands. Hopefully, Saddam’s generals will be more saine than he is, and will turn his military against him, and oust him, rather than fight against us. For this threat to be credible, it must be real. Lastly, if all other options fail, we must be preemptive. Elicidator seems to think that preemptive war is never justified. By reductio ad absurdom, imagine a ship with a nuclear weapon heading towards New York Harbor. The owners of the ship have declared their intentions to explode the nuclear device when they reach New York. By Elicidator’s argument, we could not attack the ship until it had actually reached New York and exploded its device. Simply amassing weapons and declaring an intent to use them would not justify preemptive strike. This is, of course, absurd. Yet, this is exactly what is happening in Iraq. Saddam is developing nuclear weapons, and has declared his intention of using them against US interests. Once he has a weapon and a missle, to follow the analagy, the ship has arrived at New York. We have a moral obligation to stop that ship from arriving, and to minimize “collatoral damage” in the process. Unfortunately, without the help of Saddam, it will be impossible for us to eliminate “collatoral damage”. ---
**Author:** ![CyberPundit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/76d3ee/32.png) [@CyberPundit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/CyberPundit)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 4:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/11 "2002-06-26T04:20:59Z")
Actually Iraq probably posseses extensive biological weapons perhaps including smallpox. OTOH there is considerable dispute about its nuclear program and many people would dispute the idea that Iraq is 3-10 years away from the bomb. Even if it were I am not sure that Osama with bio-weapons (obtained from a chaotic post-war Iraq) is less scary. The bottom line is that there are risks in leaving Saddam in power and risks in fighting a war to eliminate him. The problem is that people who advocate the latter don’t seem to have the faintest grip on how risky the latter option is which doesn’t leave one with much confidence that they have thought things through. ---
**Author:** ![elucidator](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/8edcca/32.png) [@elucidator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/elucidator)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 6:00am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/12 "2002-06-26T06:00:56Z")
Balderdash, sir! Tommyrot! > [@](#): > > For this threat to be credible, it must be real. > > Lastly, if all other options fail, we must be preemptive. Elicidator seems to think that preemptive war is never justified. By your remark about “never coming to fruition”, you would seem to be implying a bluff. Seeking to unnerve a heavily armed paranoid seems to me a course of action fraught with evil possibilities. Mostly, dead folks. Lots of them. Bad mojo. Elucidator no like. You analogy of the ship does indeed reduce my argument to an absurdity, but the absurdity lies in the premise. You state as a given, the ship is a nuke and _we know it._ No such certainty applies here, despite Our Leader’s much vaunted capacity to scan another world leader’s soul. (Frankly, I’m impressed he even _detected_ Vlad Putin’s soul, much less plumbed its depths.) I did not state that “pre-emptive war” (i.e., Pearl Harbor) is never justified. Only that America has publicly committed our nation to the principle that aggressive war is a crime against humanity, and is punishable as such. Finally, perhaps most importantly, I dare you to show me where Goddam Hussein baldly states “I’m developing nuclear weapons to use on the USA”. Please supply your cite at your earliest convenience. ---
**Author:** ![istara](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/i/e79b87/32.png) [@istara](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/istara)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 6:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/13 "2002-06-26T06:21:34Z")
The other issue that a war with Iraq now is far less likely to garner regional support than the Gulf War did. Most Middle Eastern countries are desperate to trade with Iraq and have signed various agreements. They want Iraq back as a friendly neighbour, not an enemy. So not only would they probably not support a war on Iraq, by contrast they would actively oppose it. At the very least, there would be high-level political mutterings against America taking military action, even if they sat on the fence and didn’t directly protest. However on the ground-level it could be absolutely explosive. Given that one of Al Qaeda’s main bones of contention is America’s military presence in the region - specifically Saudi - increased presence would only flame current and potential Al Qaeda supporters. It would probably also inflame the ordinary people-in-the-street protestors. Unofficial Saudi boycotts of US products at the moment (in protest at Washington’s perceived pro-Israeli bias) have already seen US exports to Saudi Arabia plunge 33 per cent to 2.8 billion dollars in the six month period from September 2001 to March this year. In the first quarter of 2001, US exports to Saudi fell 43 per cent to 986 million from 1.74 billion a year earlier. By contrast, Japanese and European exports have seen significant growth. God only knows what would happen if America now launched a new war on Iraq. ---
**Author:** ![msmith537](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/d9b06d/32.png) [@msmith537](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/msmith537)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 10:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/14 "2002-06-26T10:45:16Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by elucidator \* > I did not state that “pre-emptive war” (i.e., Pearl Harbor) is never justified. Only that America has publicly committed our nation to the principle that aggressive war is a crime against humanity, and is punishable as such. Funny, I thought the Nueremburg trials were about committing genocide and attrocities against civilians, not invading France and Poland. Pearl Harbor is justified but pre-emptively attacking an enemy who is building nuclear weapons is not? > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by elucidator \* > Finally, perhaps most importantly, I dare you to show me where Goddam Hussein baldly states “I’m developing nuclear weapons to use on the USA”. Please supply your cite at your earliest convenience. \*\* Why would he say this and give the US an excuse to attack him? ---
**Author:** ![lno](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/a8b319/32.png) [@lno](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/lno)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 11:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/15 "2002-06-26T11:38:57Z")
> [@](#): > > _Originally posted by MHand_ > Saddam is developing nuclear weapons, and has declared his intention of using them against US interests > [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by msmith537 \* > > > [@](#): > > > > _Originally posted by elucidator_ > > Finally, perhaps most importantly, I dare you to show me where Goddam Hussein baldly states “I’m developing nuclear weapons to use on the USA”. Please supply your cite at your earliest convenience. > > Why would he say this and give the US an excuse to attack him? Then since he has not, **MHand** , you agree that there is no excuse to attack? ---
**Author:** ![sailor](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/a587f6/32.png) [@sailor](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/sailor)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 12:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/16 "2002-06-26T12:53:02Z")
I doubt the USA can get _any_ foreign support if it goes against Iraq. On the contrary, it would probably make Europe more sympathetic to Iraq. I doubt the US would go to war with Iraq under those circumstances. ---
**Author:** ![MHand](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/e5b9ba/32.png) [@MHand](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MHand)\ **Post date:** [June 26, 2002, 5:45pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/17 "2002-06-26T17:45:45Z")
> [@](#): > > Posted by Elucidator: > > You analogy of the ship does indeed reduce my argument to an absurdity, but the absurdity lies in the premise. You state as a given, the ship is a nuke and we know it. No such certainty applies here. Are you denying here that Iraq is trying to create nuclear weapons?! The evidence is overwhelming. As one example, Iraq ordered 6 lithotripters (medical equipment for kidney stone removal) and 120 spare switches. That’s about 100 more spare switches than he could ever possibly need for his 6 machines. The high-precision switches are also necessary for timing the implosive charges in a nuclear fission devise. A google search found this article describing his purchase, but this appeared in every major newspaper: [http://www.iraqwatch.org/wmd/lithotripter.html](http://www.iraqwatch.org/wmd/lithotripter.html) Do you advocate that we let him build nuclear weapons and see what he does with them, before resorting to military action! By then the ship will have arrive at New York, to continue my earlier analogy. If not now, when do you think military action WOULD be justified? How long do we have to wait? ---
**Author:** ![Jojo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ecd19e/32.png) [@Jojo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jojo)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2002, 2:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/18 "2002-06-28T02:20:17Z")
There is some doubt as to Iraq’s WMD program. [From this Guardian article:](http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4374656,00.html) > [@](#): > > \*\* Does Iraq have, or is it developing, weapons of mass destruction?\*\* > The case for military action against Saddam Hussein stands or falls on this apparently simple factual question. President George Bush and his deputy, Dick Cheney, backed by Tony Blair, claim there is no doubt that Baghdad possesses and could use weapons of mass destruction, and so, as Mr Bush put it, “inaction is not an option”. > > Most analysts, however, concede that there is considerable doubt about the extent of Saddam’s weapons programme, and about how dangerous it could be to the rest of the world. What is not in doubt is that Saddam has a record of aggressively pursuing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and has had more than three years since the UN weapons inspectors withdrew to try to reconstitute his former nuclear, biological and chemical programmes. > > At the centre of the debate on Iraq’s weapons capability are the inspectors from the now-defunct United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (Unscom), who spent seven years, from 1991 to 1998, attempting to gain access to the regime’s arms facilities. Despite their shared technical background, not all of them can agree on the facts. > > Charles Duelfer, an American who was deputy chairman of Unscom, believes the Iraqis still have dangerous weapons in their arsenal - probably not nuclear warheads, but possibly chemical weapons and, almost certainly and most worryingly, biological agents. > > “The biological issue is the biggest issue and the least understood,” Mr Duelfer says. “[Saddam] has mobile labs, which have the capacity to produce stuff in large quantities, and he’s continuing to build weapons.” > > Mr Duelfer’s judgment is that Iraq “retained a missile capability that could constitute a strategic reserve; how effective that would be is an open question”. > > Not effective at all, says Scott Ritter, who stands as a vocal minority at the other end of the former arms inspector divide. While in Unscom he gained the reputation of being one of its most aggressive sleuths, but he has since sharply shifted tack and is today a leading sceptic on the issue. > > Mr Ritter is sure the Iraqis never succeeded in turning their chemical and biological agents into a weapon that could spray its lethal warhead over a large area. > > “They lacked an effective dispensing mechanism. That requires specific capabilities, like bomblets, and the ability to aerosolise the weapon. Missiles require a precise fusing mechanism which Iraq never had.” > > Although Mr Ritter concedes that 5-10% of Iraq’s known pre-1990 stockpile of chemical and biological arms has not been accounted for, he argues that even if Saddam had tried to hide this remnant of his arsenal “it would no longer be viable”. Weapons built before the Gulf war that slipped through the Unscom net would by now have passed their sell-by date. > > Ali Muhsin Hamid, the Arab League’s ambassador in London, agrees. UN inspectors destroyed 95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and the remaining 5% has been rendered unuseable by the fact that Iraq is prevented under sanctions from replacing equipment needed to deploy them. ---
**Author:** ![MHand](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/e5b9ba/32.png) [@MHand](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/MHand)\ **Post date:** [June 28, 2002, 4:01pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/19 "2002-06-28T16:01:36Z")
> [@](#): > > From Jojo: > There is some doubt as to Iraq’s WMD program. The article you posted has what it calls “a vocal minority” of experts saying that Iraq doesn’t currently have WMD. It says that it is not in doubt that he “aggresively pursuing” WMD, and admits that the majority of the experts (as opposed to the “vocal minority”) think he has chemical or biological WMD. It does not directly mention his nuclear program, and certainly doesn’t contradict my assertion that experts disagree mostly over WHEN, and not IF Iraq will have nuclear devices. ---
**Author:** ![Jojo](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/ecd19e/32.png) [@Jojo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jojo)\ **Post date:** [June 29, 2002, 2:55am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845/20 "2002-06-29T02:55:08Z")
Look, we all agree that Saddam is not to be trusted. In 1991, Saddam took the decision to begin hiding his weapons. They were dismantled and the components were spread all over Iraq. Then they began to actively obstruct the work of the weapons inspectors: [In an interview with Frontline](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/ritter.html) Scott Ritter said: > [@](#): > > The Iraqis opted to play lip-service to compliance. They said that they would accept the provisions of the Security Council Resolution, yet at the same time they accepted it, in April, 1991, there were high-level meetings in which Iraq made strategic plans for concealing the existence of their entire biological weapons program, their entire nuclear weapons program, the bulk of their modern chemical weapons production program, and their entire indigenous missile production capability. > > **Will you describe the Agricultural Ministry incident in July 1992, and the significance of it.** > > Well, in order to understand the agricultural ministry you have to actually go back in time, to December, 1991, when the special commission, together with the United States, worked in concert to develop techniques for searching for Iraq’s hidden weapons capabilities. And we started what we called the great SCUD hunts, sending large, intrusive teams in, to comb Iraq for missiles, parts of missiles, production capability, and documents, basically trying to replicate on the ballistic missile front the success that the IAEA had on the nuclear front. And we kept running into dry holes, banging our head against the wall, not having great success. > > _…snip…_ > > the first target we hit, agricultural ministry. Surround it, and the Iraqis say, ‘You can’t come in.’ And we say, Well, you’ve got to let us in. I mean, we’re the United Nations. We’ve been through this already. There was Resolution, 707–you remember, you tried this with the IEA, there was international crises? We don’t want to go down that path again. Now, we want in, let us in. Oh, no. This is a ministry, this is a symbol of our national sovereignty. > > And we said,’ All right, you want to play that game? We’re parking. We’re surrounding it. Nobody’s going in and out unless they run through our inspectors. ‘The Iraqis went,’ All right, we’ll play that.’ > > And we said–‘OK. Security Council, they’re not letting us in.’ Nothing. Day goes by–‘Excuse me, gentlemen, we’re parked out in front of the agriculture ministry. They’re not letting us in. We want to do an inspection.’ Silence. Nothing. > > Now the situation starts to deteriorate, because the Iraqis are looking around and nothing’s happening. All right. Let’s jack up the pressure. Demonstrations started occurring. First, small demonstrations. Then, as each day goes by, the demonstrations get bigger, and bigger, and bigger, until we literally have thousands of Iraqis storming the agricultural ministry, egging our cars, stoning us, not stoning but throwing rotten vegetables at us, shaking the cars. And the Security Council’s doing nothing. Zero. > > And, ultimately, we got to a situation where the Iraqi security service brought in somebody who tried to stab an inspector, through a window, and at that point the lives of the inspectors were at risk and we had no other choice than to withdraw the team. The Security Council did nothing. It was fascinating. > > And, of course, once we were through with the team the Iraqis were through with the archive. So, weeks later, when Rolf Ekeus, the security council and everybody came up with a compromise solution, and a team reappeared at the agriculture ministry, and were let in; of course they found nothing. They did find some rooms where nothing was there, but we found no documents. A very embarrassing situation, and a frustrating one. > > And it pretty much signaled that UNSCOM had to start changing the way it did business, because our ability to mobilize these teams–We proved that we had the operational and technical capability of mobilizing the team on short notice and sending it to targets. The problem was, we were echelons ahead of where the Security Council was, in terms of being prepared to deal with that kind of crisis. So we had to scale our operation back and start approaching the Iraqis from a different angle. > > So, the agriculture ministry was a watershed event. By 1995, the weapons inspectors were almost ready to give up because they weren’t finding anything. But then came the defection of [Hussein Kamel.](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/experts/defectors.html) > [@](#): > > Hussein Kamel was Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law. In August 1995, he and his brother - who was Saddam Hussein’s other son-in-law - fled Iraq, driving their families across the border to Jordan. Kamel had been the head of the military industrial commission in Iraq and was chief developer of Iraq’s special weapons program. He was one of the few trusted confidantes in Saddam Hussein’s inner circle. But Kamel had an ongoing competition and feud with Saddam’s oldest son, Uday and he feared for his continued status, and even safety. > > What Kamel divulged about Iraq’s weapons programs was shocking. Kamel described where the materials and facilities were, what was built, the existence of an extensive biological weapons program, the existence of a far more extensive nuclear program than was ever known, who was running Iraq’s deception operations and, how they worked. > > Incredibly, however, six months later, Kamel returned to Iraq having become dissatisfied with his situation in Jordan. Saddam Hussein, his father-in-law had asked him back, promising that he and his family would be safe. Within a few days of returning, Saddams two daughters were forced to divorce Kamel and his brother. Within hours, Kamel, his brother, his father, his sister and her children were all killed. This added new impetus to the weapons inspections but the problem was that the US government was not supportive enough, not pro-active enough. In the first link above, Scott Ritter says: > [@](#): > > Suddenly, Hussein Kamel defects, and it’s out there, laid before the world: Iraq is cheating, Iraq is lying, Iraq has not complied, and not complied in a big way. What are you going to do about it? Now, all the brakes are off. We started running, and almost immediately we ran into a brick wall called the United States Government, because the U.S. Government went, You want to do what? When? How? > > And what we were talking about was UNSCOM moving out of the realm of just being an assessor of intelligence to UNSCOM getting actively involved in the collection of intelligence, and using techniques and methodologies that it normally only associated with national governments, not with international organizations, not with a bunch of guys with blue hats and funny sounding names. So what is required is a more effective version of UNSCOM (an UNSCOM with teeth) not necessarily an all out war in which thousands of innocent civilians will be killed. One last quote from Scott Ritter: > [@](#): > > The U.S. wasn’t a big supporter of UNSCOM to begin with, at that point in time; we were merely a means of implementing the continuation of sanctions. So, suddenly, you had to fall in love with UNSCOM all over again, and decide that you were willing to go to war for the inspection process. But they didn’t really understand the inspection process. I mean, you had the Secretary of Defense doing what I think were extremely tacky demonstrations: holding up a bag of sugar: This is a bag of anthrax. It would kill the entire–Well, thank you very much, Secretary of Defense, but what does that really mean? What does the Iraqi biological weapons capability truly, honestly speaking, what do they have? The answer is, you don’t know, do you? No one knows. UNSCOM has an idea, and what they have is seed stock: the ability to reconstitute a biological weapons program. But we’ve destroyed their biological weapons factories. We have inspectors monitoring the others. > > Yeah, there’s a handful of Special Security Organization guys, running around with briefcases that have plans and ideas for larger activity. Iraq’s not clean, in any sense of the word. But there’s not this great factory. Don’t hold up a bag and say that’s what the threat is. You’ve oversimplified it, and when you oversimplify, and you come under sharp criticism, you’ll fall to pieces. > > _…snip…_ > > **Who killed UNSCOM?** > > Well, there’s a large number of players involved here. You have Iraq, which was not complying fully with Security Council resolutions. What I mean by fully is they weren’t letting UNSCOM complete that last few percentage points to get us up to 100 percent. > > So, Iraq is complicit, but that’d been happening for eight years. UNSCOM was alive and well and breathing for seven years. So, you can’t say that Iraq killed UNSCOM because Iraq behaved the same way throughout, and UNSCOM still existed. > > The Security Council created UNSCOM under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, and that carries with it a promise to enforce its own law, and the Security Council wasn’t enforcing its law, and that helped to perpetuate this cycle of cheat-and-retreat confrontation, and then, backing down. > > You could say the Security Council killed UNSCOM, but again, that’s a process that’s been taking place for years, and UNSCOM was still alive, well, breathing, kicking, doing its job. > > Now we come down to the final two players. You have an executive chairman who, for whatever reasons, has become enamored with the support of the United States. You have a United States administration, the Clinton Administration, which, as we’ve seen with Madeleine Albright’s unfortunate statements of 1997, have decided to pervert international law and say that it doesn’t matter what Iraq does with disarmament, we’re going to keep economic sanctions in place. > > Now, these sanctions are becoming harder and harder to defend, on two fronts. One, what good are they doing? Are they having an impact on the target, Saddam Hussein? The answer is no. Who suffers under sanctions? Innocent Iraqi people. Thousands of children under the age of five die every month because of these sanctions, and while the American public might be oblivious to this, believe me, the rest of the world is not, and the longer we continue this program of economic sanctions targeted against Iraq, the more isolated the United State becomes. > > But Richard Butler had come to a decision that we couldn’t carry out certain activities without the support of the United States, that the United States was somehow our No. 1 backer in the Security Council, and he allowed the United States to start calling the shots. An inspection a little too confrontational, Richard? Why don’t we pull the plug on it, buddy, and stop it. [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-rationale-behind-attacking-iraq/115845.md?page=2)