# The South Did Not Have Better Generals **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [May 9, 2002, 11:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184 "2002-05-09T23:29:24Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 13\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Scylla](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/a5b964/32.png) [@Scylla](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Scylla)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 7:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/21 "2002-05-10T19:21:49Z")
Lee lost at Gettysburg really because of bad luck. 1. If JEB had been where he was supposed to be that probably would have been enough 2. Even without JEB if whatssisface would have followed orders and captured the Lutheran Seminary and the Ridge like they could’ve the first day, that would have been that. 3. The round tops were a near thing that could have gone either way. If any of those things were different it woul probably have gone the other way. (Or so is my thinking from having played Sid Meier’s Gettysburg obsessively for a rear and a half (admittedly not the most reliable of source material for this kind of debate.) ---
**Author:** ![John\_Corrado](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/a88e4f/32.png) [@John\_Corrado](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/John_Corrado)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 7:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/22 "2002-05-10T19:26:40Z")
I guess **Sofa** and I had our homelands switched at birth. (Actually, as a Marylander, I feel free to lionize _both_ sides, while being angry at neither. It’s a nice way to live.) Anyways. In response: > [@](#): > > _Sofa said_: > The bottom line is that Grant accepted the disadvantages that the tactical offensive had and did not allow them to reverse his sound strategy, which was to pin down the ANV. Once the Confederates had to build a line around Petersburg, they were through, although it took more than half a year to finish them off. > > Lee was an excellent general, but I give Grant the greater credit because he figured out how to de-claw Lee by taking away all of the initiative through constant engagement. I’m not of as strong a position as **Tamerlane** is, but I generally agree- by the time Grant had been handed control of the Army of the Potomac, Lee was doomed. Sherman’s march to the sea, the capture of the Mississippi, the blockade- Lee’s army was a shell of its former self, lacking in supplies and reinforcements. Grant couldn’t _help_ but win; it was just a question of whether he would choose to save men or save time. And he chose to save time. As for your statement on the deaths of Generals during the war- alright, now you’ve done it. I’m actually going to try and do some serious research to back my statement. But I can’t do that on my lunch break, so you’ll have to wait for this weekend. > [@](#): > > _Sofa says:_ > This is part of the myth I am trying to dispel. Yes, McClellan, Fremont, and The Beast were all terrible generals. But McClellan and Fremont went on to very nearly lose the war by delving into politics–because they were sacked! Burnside was a reluctant army commander; Hooker went back to being a fairly competent corps commander. Most of the really bad ones got their pink slips, although I will concede that there were far too many “political” generals on both sides. But McClellan and Fremont weren’t sacked until they had screwed up _several_ engagements; McClellan had messed up the Penninsular campaign, _then_ almost stole defeat from the jaws of victory at Antietam, and was only sacked a month later because he publicly decried the Emancipation Proclomation (yeah, sure, Lincoln was looking for a reason to drop him, but that means that had he kept his fool mouth shut, he would have stayed in command of the AoP until the next major engagement). Likewise, Fremont had dithered in Missouri as a commander (having the local guerillas hand him his head a few times), _then_ made a muckery as military governor of the state, and _then_ got his ass kicked by Jackson in the Valley before finally being sacked. And to continue- Burnside was a miserable Army commander, but he was no great shakes as a corp commander, either, having been delayed and defeated at Antietam because he didn’t think to check how deep the river was; and later, getting himself bottled up in Knoxville and forcing troops to be peeled off from the Atlanta campaign to go rescue him; and then, finally, completely misleading the Battle of the Crater. Likewise, Butler still had an independent command in '64, in which he managed to get himself trapped by Lee’s army, thus ending Grant’s hopes for defeating Lee without a seige. Yes, the Confederacy had miserable commanders- Huger, certainly. I’m a little harder pressed to call Magruder incompetent- his ruse at Norfolk kept the AoP bottled up for a few weeks, which was enough time for the AoNV to get into place. But the sheer overwhelming _list_ of Union political Generals who proved themselves unable to effectively lead their troops in battle- Schurz, Sigel, Halleck, Fremont, Banks, Butler, McClellan, Burnside, Shimmelpfenning, McCook… yes, they had _a_ purpose- Banks and Butler provided Lincoln political flak, and Schurz and Sigel attracted German immigrants as volunteers, but still- when it comes to those who were rank incompetents in battle or strategic manuevering, the Union numbers run _much_ higher. And **Jonathan** - I definitely believe Stonewall Jackson was a much better strategist than Lee was. Lee saw the issue in a small-picture sense, focusing on how best to defend the state of Virginia from invasion. Jackson saw the issues in a large-picture sense, and understood how best to win the war for the Confederacy as a whole. ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 7:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/23 "2002-05-10T19:27:29Z")
**Jonathan Chance** - Lee thought in terms of defeating the enemy army. Given the situation he was in, this was a mistake. The South lacked the material resources to risk a slugging match, no matter how skilled Lee was in the field. The near catastrophe of Antietam ( and it was bad enough as it was ) is a good example of this. Jackson on the other hand, took a more subtle view. Both after First Manassas in 1861 and after his brilliant Shenadoah campaign in 1862, he proposed a strategy of bypassing the Union army and instead striking at its rear around Washington D.C. at railheads and such to inflict maximum structural damage and undermine Union resolve. His route of Banks in May of 1862 and his march to the Potomac with its perceived threat to D.C. sent complete panic through the Union leadership - Lincoln halted McClellan’s advance and sent him, with Fremont, Banks, and Saxton to cut off and destroy Jackson ( something they would fail to do and indeed were poorly positioned to accomplish ), thus giving Lee and Johnston time to bring up reinforcements and strengthen their position. At this point, with most of the Federal army squatting in front of Richmond and partially immobile, he had a chance to sweep behind Washington and possibly seize Baltimore and/or Philadelphia, destroy factories, rail lines. He urged Davis to reinforce him to the tune of 40,00 men and do just that, transferring the war from the Potomac to the Susquehanna. It is quite possible that once cut off to the north, Washington might have had to have been evacuated. At the very least the the Union would have been put on the strategic defensive. Given the climate of the time, this may well ( likely ) have brought European recognition and so devastated Northern morale as to end the war. But Davis and Lee were obsessed with defending Richmond and refused to release the troops necessary. The fact that McClellan had placed his army in such a place as to be unable to defend the North, failed to get through to them. Instead Lee attacked into the teeth of McClellan’s forces, driving him back at the cost of a quarter of his ( Lee’s ) army and placing placing the Confederacy no closer to a victory. Nope, I think Jackson had superior vision, in at least a grand strategy sense. - Tamerlane ---
**Author:** ![The\_Peyote\_Coyote](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/5f8ce5/32.png) [@The\_Peyote\_Coyote](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/The_Peyote_Coyote)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 7:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/24 "2002-05-10T19:30:55Z")
Sofa King: “Sherman kicked Joseph E. Johnston’s ass in the march to the sea” John Corrado disposed of this claim masterfully, and I would have to agree that Sherman did not kick Johnston’s ass. I would also note that Bruce A. Catton maintained (sorry, I cannot remember in which book) that Jefferson Davis’ decision to can Johnston sealed the Confederacy’s fate as Hood lost Atlanta. With Johnston in command of the Grey, Sherman was stalled outside the city. In his book, “Ordeal by Fire,” Fletcher Pratt presents evidence that Lincoln was so pessimistic in August 1864 he thought he was in danger of losing the election, and the Democrats’ own rhetoric would force them to make peace at any terms. “Grant kicked Lee’s ass, and won the war.” Simply not true. Grant did finally figure out how to beat Lee – and I think he and Union general George Thomas are the most underrated generals in our history – but look at the casuality figures for the 1864 campaigns. There is no way you can call that a Union ass-kicking. Hell, the people and papers called Grant a butcher until it became obvious he had figured out to win. Of course, the North’s superiority in population and industrial production helped. “Furthermore, the North ruthlessly sacked its bad generals (many of them, anyway), while the South merely shuffled the bad ones around to places where they could do the least harm. Southern promotion was rigidly based upon seniority, rather than ability.” Not true. Hooker was kept on after the battle of Chancellorsville in spite of Lincoln’s wishes simply because the Radical Republican faction liked him. smiling bandit: “Lee proved himself incompetant for leading an offensive campaign, where he would be expected to attack. Twice, at Gettysburg and Antietam, he found himself humiliated and evaded complete destruction only by incompetance of the commanding Union General.” At Antietam, the North had the overwhelming advantage, blown by McClellan’s incompetence, of having a copy of Lee’s battle plans. I would ay that Antietam help proves Lee’s ability because his forces pretty much fought the North to a standstill and he was able to save his army crippled IN SPITE OF THE FACT that his enemies knew his exact plans. Had those plans been lost, the war might have had a different outcome – read Harry Turtledove’s novel “How Few Remain.” I agree that Gettysburg is not Lee’s finest hour, but several of his subordinates shared the blame. Stuart should have joined the Army much sooner, so Lee could take advantage of the cavalry, rather than romping about the countryside. Longstreet’s delay in attacking at one key point was critical. Had Lee had cavalry from Day One and had Longstreet executed his orders in a more diligent fashion, that battle might have been different. “Here’s an interesting idea for you: Grant, Sherman and co. were better than Lee not because they were outright more adapted to combat, but because they worked their way up the ranks.” Lee did work his way up through the ranks. He was a captain in the Mexican War. After the failure of his West Virginian campaign, he served as a staff officer. He did not assume command of the Army of Northern Virginia until 1862, and that only because Joe Johnston was wounded. And, frankly, I do not see how anyone can accuse Lee of not knowing how to handle his forces. Read about the Battle of Chancellorsville sometime. mintygreen: “On the other hand, Southern generalship is vastly overrated. When you’re fighting a defensive war, it’s not all that hard to fight to a draw, which is essentially what the South did again and again in the first couple years. But if you’re going to win a war against a foe with superior manpower and resources, you’ve got to do more than just hold your own in trading shots, and there’s scant evidence that the Confederates were all that good at going on the offense.” The decision to fight a defensive war was a political decision. The Southern leadership wanted to secede from the Union, not conquer Yankee territory. During the West Virginia campaign in 1861, Lee (and this campaign, admittedly, was one of his worst failures) refused to march through Union territory because, as Pratt said, “he had high-minded ideas in those ideas about entering enemy territory.” Furthermore, the defensive strategy would have succeeded had Davis and the other secessionists persuaded Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland come over to the Southern’s side. Read the early chapters of Pratt’s “Ordeal by Fire.” He outlines how Lincoln persuaded those states to stay, more or less, on the Northern side. Had Davis had more political savvy he might have persuaded some of the border states to join the Confederacy. I think that had Maryland and Kentucky alone, hell maybe Kentucky alone, come over the South, the Confederates would have won. They would have had the perfect defense in an Ohio River line. Johnathon Chance: I would argue that a mark of a superior general is the ability to detect superior talent in subordinates and allow them to use it. ---
**Author:** ![The\_Peyote\_Coyote](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/5f8ce5/32.png) [@The\_Peyote\_Coyote](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/The_Peyote_Coyote)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 7:35pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/25 "2002-05-10T19:35:45Z")
Sofa King: “Sherman kicked Joseph E. Johnston’s ass in the march to the sea” John Corrado disposed of this claim masterfully, and I would have to agree that Sherman did not kick Johnston’s ass. I would also note that Bruce A. Catton maintained (sorry, I cannot remember in which book) that Jefferson Davis’ decision to can Johnston sealed the Confederacy’s fate as Hood lost Atlanta. With Johnston in command of the Grey, Sherman was stalled outside the city. In his book, “Ordeal by Fire,” Fletcher Pratt presents evidence that Lincoln was so pessimistic in August 1864 he thought he was in danger of losing the election, and the Democrats’ own rhetoric and political platform would force them to make peace. “Grant kicked Lee’s ass, and won the war.” Simply not true. Grant did finally figure out how to beat Lee – and I think he and Union general George Thomas are the most underrated generals in our history – but look at the casualty figures for the 1864 campaigns. There is no way you can call that a Union ass-kicking. Hell, the people and papers called Grant a butcher until it became obvious he had figured out to win. Of course, the North’s superiority in population and industrial production helped. “Furthermore, the North ruthlessly sacked its bad generals (many of them, anyway), while the South merely shuffled the bad ones around to places where they could do the least harm. Southern promotion was rigidly based upon seniority, rather than ability.” Not true. Hooker was kept on after the battle of Chancellorsville in spite of Lincoln’s wishes simply because the Radical Republican faction liked him. smiling bandit: “Lee proved himself incompetant for leading an offensive campaign, where he would be expected to attack. Twice, at Gettysburg and Antietam, he found himself humiliated and evaded complete destruction only by incompetance of the commanding Union General.” At Antietam, the North had the overwhelming advantage, blown by McClellan’s incompetence, of having a copy of Lee’s battle plans. I would say that Antietam proves Lee’s ability because his forces pretty much fought the North to a standstill and he was able to save his army crippled IN SPITE OF THE FACT that his enemies knew his exact plans. Had those plans been lost, the war might have had a different outcome – read Harry Turtledove’s novel “How Few Remain.” I agree that Gettysburg is not Lee’s finest hour, but several of his subordinates shared the blame. Stuart should have joined the Army much sooner, so Lee could take advantage of the cavalry, rather than romping about the countryside. Longstreet’s delay in attacking at one key point was critical. Had Lee had cavalry from Day One and had Longstreet executed his orders in a more diligent fashion, that battle might have been different. “Here’s an interesting idea for you: Grant, Sherman and co. were better than Lee not because they were outright more adapted to combat, but because they worked their way up the ranks.” Lee did work his way up through the ranks. He was a captain in the Mexican War. After the failure of his West Virginian campaign, he served as a staff officer. He did not assume command of the Army of Northern Virginia until 1862, and then only because Joe Johnston was wounded. And, frankly, I do not see how anyone can accuse Lee of not knowing how to handle his forces. Read about the Battle of Chancellorsville sometime. mintygreen: “On the other hand, Southern generalship is vastly overrated. When you’re fighting a defensive war, it’s not all that hard to fight to a draw, which is essentially what the South did again and again in the first couple years. But if you’re going to win a war against a foe with superior manpower and resources, you’ve got to do more than just hold your own in trading shots, and there’s scant evidence that the Confederates were all that good at going on the offense.” The decision to fight a defensive war was a political decision. The Southern leadership wanted to secede from the Union, not conquer Yankee territory. During the West Virginia campaign in 1861, Lee (and this campaign, admittedly, was one of his worst failures) refused to march through Union territory because, as Pratt said, “he had high-minded ideas in those days about entering enemy territory.” Furthermore, the defensive strategy would have succeeded had Davis and the other secessionists persuaded Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland to come over to the Southern’s side. Read the early chapters of Pratt’s “Ordeal by Fire.” He outlines how Lincoln persuaded those states to stay, more or less, on the Northern side. Had Davis had more political savvy he might have persuaded some of the border states to join the Confederacy. I think that had Maryland and Kentucky alone, hell, maybe Kentucky alone, come over the South, the Confederates would have won. They would have had the perfect defense along an Ohio River line. Johnathon Chance: I would argue that a mark of a superior general is the ability to detect superior talent in subordinates and allow them to use it. ---
**Author:** ![Tamerlane](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tamerlane/32/7602_2.png) [@Tamerlane](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tamerlane)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 7:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/26 "2002-05-10T19:38:46Z")
**Sofa King** - Dunno. I think Lee’s army was weakened enough that he couldn’t reallly afford to detach enough forces to make a difference. Even if he could, Grant could have just feinted ( or if need be actually attacked ) and forced Lee to recall them to bolster his vulnerable position. Once stung, Lee would likely have been reluctant to try it again. It may be that hindsight is 20-20, but I still think bloody messes like The Wilderness and Cold Harbor were unwarranted on the face of it. But hey, I’ll agree to disagree ;). - Tamerlane ---
**Author:** ![The\_Peyote\_Coyote](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/5f8ce5/32.png) [@The\_Peyote\_Coyote](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/The_Peyote_Coyote)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 7:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/27 "2002-05-10T19:39:14Z")
Sorry about the double post. ---
**Author:** ![kniz](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/c37758/32.png) [@kniz](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/kniz)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 8:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/28 "2002-05-10T20:25:01Z")
I think that the following has to be taken into consideration when discussing Lee’s ability as a general and also as to whether he was better on the defense. > [@](#): > > _Book Review of_ [**Davis and Lee at War**](http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/woodav.html) _by Steven E. Woodworth_ > > In **Davis and Lee at War** , he concludes his study of Davis as rebel commander-in-chief and shows how the lack of a unified purpose and strategy in the east sealed the Confederacy’s fate. > > Woodworth argues that Davis and Robert E. Lee, the South’s greatest military leader, had sharply conflicting views over the proper conduct of the war. Davis was convinced that the South should fight a defensive war, to simply outlast the North’s political and popular support for the war. By contrast, Lee and the other eastern generals–notably P.G.T. Beauregard, Gustavus Smith, and Stonewall Jackson–were eager for the offensive. They were convinced that only quick and decisive battlefield victories would prevent the North from eventually defeating them with its overwhelming advantage in men and materials. > > Davis and Lee, Woodworth shows, shared a mutual respect for each other for most of the war. But it was respect mixed with a stubborn resistance to the other’s influence. The result of this tense tug-of-war was Davis’s misguided pursuit of a middle ground that gave neither strategy its best chance for success. The war finally ground to a bloody conclusion with Davis as indecisive as ever and virtually blind to how little confidence his generals had in his leadership. ---
**Author:** ![Tranquilis](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tranquilis/32/3639_2.png) [@Tranquilis](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tranquilis)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 8:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/29 "2002-05-10T20:29:29Z")
> [@](#): > > _Originally posted by Sofa King \* > \*\* That same cite I offered above claims that 132 Union generals either resigned or had their appointments cancelled, out of a total of 583. Compare that to the 24 CSA generals who were similarly disposed of._\* Alternate explanation: The Union had a much higher percentage of excrable generals, _necessitating_ the sacking, rather than the sacking actually being a proper plan of management. ---
**Author:** ![Captain\_Amazing](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/6de8d8/32.png) [@Captain\_Amazing](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Captain_Amazing)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 9:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/30 "2002-05-10T21:04:29Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Scylla \* > \*\*Lee lost at Gettysburg really because of bad luck. > … > If any of those things were different it woul probably have gone the other way. > \*\* Well, that’s true, but Lee also made a bad decision that probably cost him the battle, and that was ordering Pickett to charge instead of letting Longstreet execute a flanking maneuver. If Longstreet HAD flanked, that could have turned the battle the other way. ---
**Author:** ![Sofa\_King](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/58956e/32.png) [@Sofa\_King](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sofa_King)\ **Post date:** [May 10, 2002, 9:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/31 "2002-05-10T21:11:41Z")
You know what, **Scylla** , your recollection is starting to ring all sorts of chimes in my head… but I can’t remember who it was who died in that fashion. Stuart [definitely got shot](http://www.moc.org/Articles/jebstory.html) at Yellow Tavern on May 11, 1864, and was returned to Richmond, where he died the following day. Just a note on Grant’s admittedly bloody trail through Virginia in 1864. Yes, it was terrible, there is no doubt of that, but it was in large part due to the rifled musket which was almost universally in use at the time. The Minie ball allowed the musket to be loaded quickly–as many as five times a minute–but it had far better accuracy and range than did the smoothbore musket. Unlike the wars of the 20th century, where artillery was the battlefield king, the Minie ball accounted for the vast majority of battlefield injuries. However, it was nearly impossible to control American (often conscript) units in the field without keeping them in a relatively tight line. You could throw out skirmishers, to harass your enemy, but you could not attack with them. Thus, attacking units had a number of disadvantages. When on the advance, they often could not reload, and had to take their lumps starting from hundreds of yards away. Then, when they arrived before the enemy, reduced in numbers, it was very difficult to induce troops to attack hand-to-hand. More often, they would simply line up in front of one another at close range and shoot until one side broke. If they did close to bayonet range, the attacker was often hampered both by reduced numbers and whatever obstacle the defenders were hiding behind (and by 1864, those guys were digging trenches every chance they got–one of R. E. Lee’s nicknames was “The Ace of Spades”). These were the disadvantages of the tactical offensive. Grant’s partial solution for this was the ever-present left-hand flank–both as a tactical maneuver and as a strategic turning movement–left handed so that the Union rear would always be toward the supply lines of prevailing roads and the rivers draining to Chesapeake Bay. Because attacking troops broke and ran so often, it was necessary to keep large numbers of troops in reserve. As a defender, Lee had to worry less about this. This is why so many Union troops asked some variant of the question, “if we outnumber them so damned much, how come they always show up with a line just as long as ours?” One of Lee’s finest advantages was that he rarely had to attack, and when he did, it was usually a counterattack delivered upon tired and confused troops. When he _did_ have to attack frontally, as when he sent Picket straight up the stovepipe at Gettysburg, he got pummeled just as badly as Grant later did. ---
**Author:** ![Little\_Nemo](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/little_nemo/32/3120_2.png) [@Little\_Nemo](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Little_Nemo)\ **Post date:** [May 11, 2002, 2:01am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/32 "2002-05-11T02:01:55Z")
Another factor that goes far towards explaining the relative superiority of Confederate over Union forces in the early years of the war was the availability of experienced NCO’s and line officers. When the war started, both sides had to increase the size of their armies by bringing in as many new men as possible. But when the nation split in 1860, the Northern soldiers stayed in an existing army while the Southern soldiers helped form a new army. This meant that the South could mix their new recruits in with a cadre of experienced soldiers in all their units. In the North, on the other hand, there was a small minority of existing all-experienced units alongside a large majority of newly formed all-recruit units. The result was that the average Confederate unit was better than the average Union unit at the start of the war. ---
**Author:** ![Sofa\_King](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/58956e/32.png) [@Sofa\_King](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sofa_King)\ **Post date:** [May 11, 2002, 10:22am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184/33 "2002-05-11T10:22:34Z")
That’s a salient point, **Little Nemo**. Jackson had to drop the idea of a consecutive movement against both Shields and Fremont at Cross Keys/Port Republic largely because of the enfilade fire of one regular Union unit of artillery placed at the Lewiston Coaling. The effectiveness of the regulars was further underscored when it was later discovered that Jackson outnumbered the federals something like 11,000 to 3,000 in that battle–Shields’ entire force was not fully advanced by the time Jackson attacked them. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/the-south-did-not-have-better-generals/108184.md?page=1)