I will try to say this without any snark, but the bolded part doesn’t appear to be much. Even wiki has some basic articles which can help.
One simply cannot compare Japan to China in 1941, as you did previously. You do seem to have them confused. Japan was actually quite developed and while it would be absurd to attempt to compare them to the US, they were quite advanced in government and industry. It’s a poor argument to say that if they weren’t comparable the US then they were as bad off as China, which was lacking a modern government and industry.
Japan was able to produce decent military equipment. Early in the war, their aircraft were competitive. Because they were a much smaller economy than the US, they were unable to continue with aircraft development so they fell behind, but they started off with some good planes.
One example of somewhere that Japan was advanced was in carrier doctrine. They had combined their six carriers into a single force, making it the strongest carrier force in the world at that time. They were able to coordinate the assorted torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighters from all the carriers. This was something which took the US several years into the war before we could copy it. They USN wasn’t able to coordinate its carriers at Midway, for example.
That may be the case. I did not offer my opinion and am inviting debate on the matter, which is outside the scope of the OP. It was asked if the use of the A bomb was controversial, and I was just pointing out that it was.
An Iowa-class battleship cost approximately $1.3 billion in today’s dollars, a staggering sum; my just adjusting for inflation honestly understates the matter. Things didn’t cost as much then even inflation adjusted, and weapons systems specifically were proportionately wildly cheaper - a Spitfire, one of the best fighters in the world, cost $400,000 in today’s money. Today you can spend that much on a well appointed Cessna, and it doesn’t come with cannons.
Building the Pacific fleet was like building a really large and technologically advanced city that you had to make float.
But the US had even less to send against Germany in 1942 than Japan. The only area of military capability where the US was world class in late 1941 was the main USN fleet. The USN was on paper a rough peer of the world’s leading navy, the RN, but the big deficiency in terms of numbers relative to the late 1941 RN (there were readiness problems elsewhere, but talking here about just numbers of platforms) was anti-submarine escorts, the most needed naval asset in the fight against Germany.
Otherwise the US hardly had an army in late 1941 compared to the other major combatants, and really just the beginnings of the later huge USAAF either. What the US did have was disproportionately soon engaged mainly against Japan. The US virtually entirely lost a (albeit majority Filipino personnel) 65,000 man army to the Japanese months before US and German ground forces ever engaged (besides some commando activity the US Army first met the Germans in combat November 25, 1942)
Lend Lease has been mentioned as something the US provided early, but that’s not really true either relative to later LL volumes. Around 80% by $ went in 1943 or later.
Not quite to the extent of WWI but somewhat similarly, the US just wasn’t ready to add much to a global war except the main fleet for awhile after the war started. There was some head start in WWII because the mobilization started in earnest in 1940, not after the declaration as it mainly did in WWI. And some lessons had been learned
The total cost of the US war effort in WWII is usually quoted around 300bil (then year 's). Lend Lease as mentioned earlier was around $48bil. USN shipbuilding was around $18bil, merchant shipbuilding around $13bil (but that was used more in proportion to the ~70% of ground and air forces deployed against the Germans and ~90% LL), some overlap between LL and shipbuilding. Of course it cost a lot more on top of ship construction to otherwise equip and operate the USN, which also built an enormous air force mainly deployed against Japan (though not entirely, land based ASW planes v Germany, carrier groups for the small escort carriers in the Atlantic).
Some cost estimates here https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-american-economy-during-world-war-ii/
But I once again doubt there’s any reasonable way to count the US war effort that would have it either 90-10 Germany-Japan, or at the other extreme, 50-50. It was mainly against Germany, just not nearly 90% overall.
" Through this sizeable deployment to the Pacific, the U.S. aided the Europe First strategy by defending Australia and New Zealand and thus enabling experienced troops from those countries to remain deployed against German forces.[11] Nonetheless, the inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U.S. was in the war. As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.[17] In early 1944, the military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality. However, despite the majority of American resources going into Europe in 1944, the U.S. still had sufficient resources to mount several major military operations in the Pacific that year: Saipan (June 1944); Guam (July 1944); Peleliu (September 1944); and the invasion of the Philippines at Leyte in October 1944. "
My recollection, which may be wrong, is that the only controversy was whether to drop the first bomb on open water with the Japanese observing, vs just bombing cities. The counter argument wad that there were only two bombs and in case the Japanese didn’t surrender, losing the ability to hit a major strategic target was not worth taking. And Japan was not expected to surrender.
The background context, always important, is that the conversation was being carried out during a time when waves of bombers were flying over and bombing Japanese cities and industrial targets every day, Marines were dying by the thousands, the Soviets were in the war and taking more territory every day and military planners were estimating millions of dead in the seemingly inevitable invasion of the Japanese mainland, which was being actively planned.
What would you do if handed a miracle weapon which offered a chance to stop the madness, with a loss of life no greater than what had already occurred on several previous missions, for far less potential militsry gain?
Yeah I think you pointed that out first and it’s true. Although again rotation policy was one thing, for sure. But the other thing which explains very high individual German fighter pilot scores is simply their fighter units being more effective than most of their opponents for most of the war. That was most true in the early going in the East where a lot of the scores of German super scorers were racked up, but it was also generally true in the West until 1944, and generally true in the East, though much less than earlier, almost till the end.
To nitpick here, few early mark Spitfires, of Battle of Britain fame, had 20mm cannon. They had 8*.303 Browning a/c machine guns. But back to the theme that most war material in WWII was produced later in the war, especially in US case but not only in US case, the bulk of all Spitfires built were armed in part with 20mm. Generally cannon-less Mk I/II accounted for around 2500 give or take of the ~20k Spitfires produced. On later models the most common armament included 220mm, usually either with 4.303 or later on 2*.50 M2 Browning (the standard mg of the USAAF in WWII), sometimes 4*20mm.
Interestingly, one of the most diabolical and effective Allied strategies (yet relatively unknown) was that the early-mid 1944 bombing campaign over Germany wasn’t primarily intended to destroy German targets on the ground. That’s the assumption- if they mass 1000 B-17s and B-24s to go bomb somewhere, that must be the point of the mission.
That wasn’t so- the goal was to mass a shitload of bombers, point them at a target, and basically dare the Luftwaffe to do something about it, while having almost as many fighter groups waiting to shoot down the Germans as they came up to defend. The goal of all this was to destroy the Luftwaffe fighter arm in preparation for D-Day and the invasion of Europe, so that the Allies would have air superiority.
Of course, wrecking German targets on the ground was a very effective secondary goal, but it wasn’t the main goal.
Other than the fact that those sucked? They weren’t any better at shooting down enemy aircraft than the normal bombers, and they couldn’t keep up with them.
They were discontinued for poor performance BEFORE the really bloody part of the air offensive began (August-December 1943); that indicates to me that they weren’t worth their trouble.
Here’s my cite for why it was the primary goal and why:
The YB-40 was heavy and slow, and generally more of a hindrance than help to B-17 raids. Also, even if it had worked as advertized it was obsoleted as soon as the new Merlin powered Mustangs arrived. Once the bombers had a fighter escort that could follow them all the way to Berlin, the need for heavy bomber defensive armaments declined dramatically.
The B-17 never did live up to its ‘Flying Fortress’ moniker anyway. Although a beautiful and highly effective bomber, it was originally thought that its heavy armament load would allow it to fly unescorted daylight bombing raids with acceptable casualties. That never happened. Daylight bombing raids exacted horrible losses on B-17s and their crews.
It was probably all psychological but I read the memoirs of a surviving Luftwaffe fighter pilot and he said that attacking a B-17 was rather like trying to make love to a porcupine that was on fire.
OTOH at the beginning of the Eighth Air Force’s operations, the odds of a bomber crewman making it through the 25 missions without being killed, wounded, or captured before he could be rotated home was one in three. Thing improved considerably as time progressed, which is why the number of missions was bumped to 50 and (I think) even 75 by the war’s end.