Scylla: Apparently your tactic in deconstructing Hersh’s article is similar to the one employed by the administration in presenting the uranium intelligence in the first place. By which I mean you’re saying some things which you seem to understand aint exactly so.
I’ll illustrate…
Here you seem to be conflating two different anonymous sources cited by Hersh. The first, a “former high-level intelligence official”, says the intelligence was “important enough” to be included in the PDB. The second, a “State Department analyst”, is the one who tells us that lower echelon types surmise PDB contents indirectly from conversational snippets of those included in the briefings.
However, later in the post you show that you know very well that two different sources were quoted, and that one of them claimed first hand knowledge. You even break down their statements! Your argument boils down to a semantic one: “Strongly suggestive, but what is this anonymous source actually saying? Is he saying that it was included, or simply that it was judged serious enough to be potentially included, or that he would have judged it serious enough?”
Now, the semantic argument has a valid basis; Hersh’s phrasing is ambiguous. Contextually, I believe it’s clear that the source alleges it was included, but it’s not explicitly stated that way by Hersh. (It’s a pity you didn’t just present this argument without the preceding disingenuous tap dance.)
False portrayal of the article. As you yourself requoted, Hersh cites two anonymous sources “who were there” at the briefing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as verifying that “this time” in addition to the story of the aluminum tubes, the intelligence regarding Nigerian uranium was offered to buttress the argument that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program underway. Hersh later quotes CIA spokesman William Harlow as denying that Tenet briefed the senators on the Niger connection, which contradicts but does not negate those two anonymous sources (presumably senators on the committee).
Well, I guess one could get that impression from the article. It’s certainly the impression you are trying to “sell” us. However, what are we to make of Hersh’s own penultimate paragraph?
(Bolding added for emphasis by xeno.)
It looks to me as if Hersh, far from claiming that the Niger calumny was the key component in the decision to go to war, is making a case that this kind of dissembly propogated all the way to the level of the PotUS is bad diplomacy, bad international PR and bad performance on the part of those who are required to advise and consent to foreign policy.