A new tactic in the Civil War was Cavalry breaking tradition and instead of just leaving the artillery pieces where they were, they’d hook them up and haul them away to where they were needed at that particular time.
OK, how about this - it was the first war where telegraph and rail were used by *both *sides.
I also think it was the first war where “cold steel” cavalry charges against massed infantry were *never *effective.
Actually both sides did use telegraph and rail as well inn the Indian Mutiny, although obviously the rebels use was far less (usually captured lines). Another reason why a small disciplinary action should result in a mutiny.
What the ACW did see was the entire Industrial power of a nation being geared towards war fighting. The North and especially the South became military states with a large portion of their economies, industries and society being geared towards the war which had not been seen even in the Napoleonic wars. Grant specifically mentions this in his memoirs.
And thought (on the English side) that one machine gun per regiment was adequate. And that officers should advance with the infantry. And that infantry could advance against musket fire.
It’s difficult to understand how little they had learned from the American civil war, let alone the European wars in the interm.
Incidentally the post of mine Leo Bloom was quoting when he started the thread sort of touches on this. The Civil War was the first war where a lot of existing technologies “all came together” to fundamentally alter many paradigms of warfare. There are some true “technological firsts” in the Civil War, but some of the more prominent stuff actually happened first in the lower level conflicts of the 1850s–but their use in the ACW represents both in scale and strategic implication a watershed moment.
The biggest thing would be this.
During prior “musket wars” large set piece battles were conducted with masses of infantry exchanging musket fire as they advanced on one another. Good Generals would try to outflank their enemy so that they were hitting them with a massed volley on their flank, where they could not respond as effectively. Then you charged, and primarily used bayonets to break and route the other formation. [I’m going to leave out artillery from this discussion, but not because it wasn’t also very important.]
Musket formations didn’t stand and fire volleys at one another because it was “honorable” per se, but instead because it was determined that massed volleys of musket fire were highly effective because of the limited accuracy at range of musket shot.
During the Civil War this changed, primarily because of two reasons: rifles replaced muskets, and to a lesser degree breech-loading repeating weapons replaced muzzle-loading single shot weapons.
The most common weapon used in the ACW by both sides were rifled muskets, muzzle loading rifles basically that fired largely Minie balls (a round that instead of a ball somewhat resembles a more modern bullet and has improved ballistic characteristics over smooth spherical lead balls.) The Springfield M1861 was the most used weapon of the Civil War and was a rifled muzzle-loader. (The Enfield 1853 was also heavily used and was similar to the Springfield M1861.)
I don’t want to ignore the importance of breech-loaders or repeating rifles in the ACW, but I do not want to overemphasize them. Breech-loaders are obviously much easier to reload than muzzle loaders, and repeating rifles are obviously far more deadly than single shot rifles. Both were used in large numbers during the ACW for the first time, and frequently had a major impact on battles. But since the vast majority of troops on both sides were using rifled muskets, I’ll focus mostly on them.
The biggest difference between a weapon like the Enfield 1853 or the Springfield M1861 and muskets of the Napoleonic War are the rifling, which adds significantly to both range and effective range. During the Napoleonic Wars, Generals down to lower level officers did not expect accuracy from muskets. They expected reloading speed and discipline and trusted in the power of massed yet inaccurate shots. With an Enfield 1853/Springfield M1861, you could generally and reliably pick a target at over 250 yards, aim, fire, and kill. You could do that 3-4 times a minute (the rate of rife of rifled muskets in the ACW was roughly the same as Napoleonic War muskets, roughly.)
So at the Battle of Fredericksburg, one of the key engagements was the Union attempt to take Mary’s Heights. The Confederates on Mary’s Heights were basically sitting atop a hill, behind a wall, several ranks deep along with artillery supporting them. Additionally there were more Confederates above those at the wall, higher on the hill who also were positioned to shoot down the hill.
In old school ways of thinking, a massed infantry charge should have easily been able to break through the relatively thin front lines of the Confederates on Mary’s Heights, disastrously breaking their lines and leading to a slaughter. What happened instead is accurate, aimed fire directed at the advancing Union charges (they tried this multiple times) repeatedly routed the Union. Fredericksburg was a disaster for the Union army.
This represented an immense change in warfare: no more would massed infantry charges be the order of the day, instead defensive positions backed by much more accurate weapons made frontal charges against an enemy with a good defensive position almost suicidal. Pickett’s Charge during the Battle of Gettysburg ran into the same problem, except this time it was the Confederates trying to storm defending soldiers behind a stone wall, and dying in huge numbers. (Lee ordered Pickett’s Charge, showing he did not fully learn the lesson he taught the Union at Fredericksburg.)
Now, breech-loaders and repeating rifles, used widely (but not as widely as rifled muskets) basically just makes everything I just said above “even more true” because they are just as accurate but they fire faster and for repeaters, they hold multiple rounds before requiring a reload. A Springfield repeating rifle was highly accurate and could fire 20 rounds / minute. Developments between the ACW and the First World War just reinforced this concept, as repeating rifles became the main battle rifle, machine guns were refined and perfected and produced in mass and etc.
Additionally breech-loaders and repeating rifles also had a big impact on cavalry (which was less important historically as by 1914 cavalry was mostly relegated to history), as those weapons were easily reloaded mounted and created new cavalry tactics that were previously not possible.
This paradigm of dug in defenders with accurate modern weapons being suicidal to attack frontally basically remained true forever, even today. However WWII changed the implications of such a tactic, because increased mobility provided ways to quickly move around stationary defensive groups and either neutralize them or gain a more advantages angle of attack. Additionally, increasing artillery accuracy and mobility, air support, and just generally more effective ways to do mass mayhem also meant defensive groupings represented opportunities to kill large numbers of the enemy at once with artillery fire or air strikes. But it still remains true, if you don’t have air support or artillery, and you are faced with trying to attack a heavily fortified enemy frontally the defenders have a very significant advantage.
Thats a bit unfair. The small amounts of machine guns per regiments was more due to the paucity of funds for the British Army (Britain being a Naval rather than a military power). Officers (especially junior officers) still are in the thick of it. And indeed while the European powers (outside Germany and the UK) paid less attention the the ACW, they did have the experience of several European Wars post 1865, the Franco-Prussian Wars, the Russo-Turkish War, the Autrian-Prussian Wars, Russo-japanese war, the Balkan Wars as well as colonial campaigns against relatively well armed opponents (such as the second Anglo-Afghan war). Hell the Boer’s, armed with magazine fed rifles had caused horrendous casualties amongst Empire troops So the lessons were well known. Indeed most sides avoided frontal assaults when they could, the first few months were wars of maneuver, and incidentally a lot more lethal than what followed on a per capita basis.
What caused the stalemate was i) the increase in lethality in the decade preceding the war of weapons, easily matching the increase between the Napoleonic Wars and the ACW ii)the total war which resulted in such a sheer number of troops (which is where the ACW was a pioneer). This made communication difficult, as armies could no longer be controlled by voice and dispatch rider and furthermore the size of the armies meant coupled with the relatively small size of the front meant that there was no room to maneuver at all. In the wars I mentioned above, the size of the armies was still small relative to the area of operation, so armies could still maneuver or at least attack at weak spots. Not the case in France and Flanders 194-1918.
The way to become a high ranking officer in the North was similar to the south. West Point graduates were given some priority but the main way was to organize a bunch of soldiers for the war. Once you were an officer the way to advance was to survive and win battles. Grant was put in charge of his town’s volunteers because of his mexican war experience and West Point education. He was a lieutenant colonel training volunteers at the start of the war and he did that well so he was promoted. He was put in charge of the entire union army about three years later.
Ironclads predated the US Civil War (France, for example, built one huge one to offset the fact that they couldn’t build as many ships as England), but it was the first time ironclads got significant testing in combat. By the end of the war, it was fairly apparent that broadsides weren’t going to work anymore. The problem was that everyone decided they would start using rams instead - which also didn’t work.
Ramming was not due to US Civil war experience, but due to the fate of the Austrian flagship at the Battle of Lissa in 1866.
Martin Hyde, that was a very good and informative post.
Until the ACW, the role of cavalry was threefold. 1) forcing and attacking breeches in the enemy’s line, B) attacking the enemy’s flanks, and III) disrupting the enemy’s lines of communications. On the one hand, Pickett’s Charge proved that role 1 was shown to be obsolete the new technologies, but on the other hand, JEB Stuart’s cavalry raids using roles B and III have been said to have lengthened the war by a year.
I’ve seen a mortar or two from the ACW, which suggests to me the artillery branch came up with the idea of indirect fire at that time.
- Make that Italian Flagship.
What constitutes proper tactics depends on what you’re facing.
Although it’s NOT something introduced in the US Civil War (indeed, it was a primary driver of Alexander the Great’s success), discussions of tactics should touch on combined arms. The basic idea is to have a variety of troop types (tools) and then use the right tool for the job at hand, opposing a target with a toll that will work best against it.
So if enemy infantry disperses and lies down to minimize the effects of your artillery, you want to move cavalry in close, which forces them to stand up and form to resist a charge, at which point your cavalry does NOT charge, but continues to threaten while you bombard. And so on – in a later era, if enemy anti-tank guns attack your tank formation, pull your tanks back and use artillery or airpower to hit the gun positions. Play your strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses, and don’t hurl your weaknesses against his strengths.
As far as technology goes, I’ll throw in:
[ul]
[li]Naval mines[/li][li]Turreted warships[/li][li]Long-ranged sniping (there was at least one confirmed kill over a mile of distance)[/li][li]Traversed trenches[/li][li]Wire defenses (some battles featured simple wire entanglements [not barbed, as far as I know])[/li][li]Forced-draft ventilation (USS Monitor and the shaft for the Crater mine)[/li][/ul]
Among many others.
Which battles were majorly impacted by breech-loading or repeating rifles? My impression was that there were a few small-scale skirmishes where breech-loaders had an impact, but nothing that one would call a major battle.
No, that’s why it took 20 years for navies to realize it didn’t work. It was because of the US Civil War that it was tried in the first place.
Particularly, because gun technology had not really caught up with armor technology. Although the CSS Virginia was designed with a ram before she fought the USS Monitor, the ramming craze really took off when those two ships demonstrated that cannon shells would bounce off their armor*, and the race was on to find some way to harm the other side’s ironclads.
*See here:
Source of quote: James Ford Rhodes, History of the Civil War, 1861–1865
If you read my entire post what you’d note is I was mentioning that in context, my post was primarily about the importance of rifled muskets. I was just pointing out, lest a stickler came by, that yes breech-loaders and repeating rifles were used in large numbers for the first time during the ACW, and I didn’t want to ignore that–but they were much less important than rifled muskets (which constitute about 85% of my post’s subject matter.)
One clear example that I am familiar with (because I live close to there) is the battle of Gettysburg, A smaller number of Union troops held off a larger Confederate force on the first day the battle due in large part to the fact that the Union force consisted of a lot of cavalry men armed with repeating rifles. This made the Confederates think that they were fighting a much larger force than they actually were and made them a bit more hesitant to charge their lines.
Once the battle really kicked into high gear though it was mostly rifle-muskets against rifle-muskets (for the infantry guys at least). Repeating rifles just cost too much to make and there weren’t that many of them on the battlefield. While the repeating rifles didn’t have much of an effect on the all out slug fest that followed, they did allow the Union troops to hold off the Confederate advance long enough for Union reinforcements to arrive. The entire battle would have been significantly different if the Confederate forces had been able to completely overrun the Union forces on that first day.