[QUOTE=Bricker]
I’m hesitant only because I’m not prepared to agree that “politicization of the Justice Department” is a crime in and of itself.
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At higher levels, I absolutely agree. Not only would criminalization of general politicization be pragmatically impossible, it would undercut the republican foundations of the executive branch. Sound bites and slogans aside, much of what goes into (or, IMHO, should go into) the choice of whom to vote for is the broad policies and practices that one assumes one’s candidate will put in place. This, however, generally applies to higher-level, policy implementing and direction-setting appointees.
Below that level, however, down in the realm of career bureaucrats and associateships, it starts to undercut the agencies’ overall societal purpose. It’s admittedly not exactly clear-cut where that line is/should be, and I wouldn’t be surprised (though not in agreement with) if a cogent rational exists for unfettered politicization throughout. But while I don’t think it impermissible to pass over someone who lists Klan membership on a resume, I think party affiliation or political persuasion (even if by proxy) is not a valid criterion for hiring.
This, I believe, is at the core of the investigation(s). I may be abysmally wrong or have my news stories confused, but I thought that hiring practices at that level are subject to legislative guidelines, guidelines that specifically prohibit such practices. Hence my assumptions – that the investigation wasn’t questioning the very political decision-making process of choosing a Supreme Court nominee, but looking into possible practice violations.
A second area under scrutiny—political influence over prosecutorial discretion—also has (IMHO) permissible and impermissible aspects. The executive branch sets the agenda and priorities of the office, and it follows that prosecutors will follow that lead – again, it’s part of the republican establishment. However, while increasing or decreasing the intensity focused on a particular vice is acceptable, it is completely different to increase prosecutorial pressure based on the political affiliations of a candidate. In addition to possible legal consequences, the practice’s overall affront to republican ideals is sufficient (IMHO) to pierce the privilege. That is, if it is not already a barred practice, it should be. There may be no immediate repercussions for those involved, but the interest in revealing the practice outweighs the interest in preserving the privilege. (Again, all of this is based on the premise/assumption that there is sufficient cause to suspect such actions took place.)
This is why I said that these particular doings may have the unfortunate consequence of unduly expanding or contracting the doctrine. While I want advisors to feel safe enough so as to provide candid advice, I don’t want them safe enough to provide such advice contrary to the principles of good government. While I believe a very strong argument could be made that this particular area should not enjoy such protection, it is too easy to conceive of a situation where piercing the protection itself can be abused, and the fear of such could quell discussion.
[QUOTE=Bricker]
It strengthens the privilege discussed in Nixon, since Nixon makes clear that the due process concerns of a criminal trial trigger an especially high counter-interest.
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To turn this inside out (without, I think, altering it), executive privilege is actually weaker (relatively speaking) in Nixon/criminal proceedings, since the rights and protections of the accused set a very high standard for the preclusion of testimony. In an investigation, however, while the government has an interest in prosecuting violations, that interest may not be strong enough to overcome the privilege. Did I understand that correctly?
[QUOTE=Bricker]
Not “right-leaning” judges. Textualist judges, however, should be less inclined to find expansions of the privilege.
I should point out, though, that it’s unworkable to insist upon strict textualist readings when you disagree with the end result sought and broad, “living constitution” readings when you are in favor of the end result sought.
…
Well, I’m a textualist at heart, so I’m uncomfortable with the whole concept of executive privilege
in this context. It’s not clear to me that it’s existence is obvious from the text of the Constitution, and I think its judicial creation was in error.
[/quote]
If by “results sought” you refer to the tarring and feathering of Rove, I am in complete agreement that at the appellate level, the outcome of a particular case should not sway the analysis in the ruling. However, if the results sought are interpretation and establishment of doctrine, then careful, reasonable, and rational analysis should not be fettered by the unworkable and irrational chains of strict textualism. The Amendment process’s inability to cope or account for such weaknesses does not save strict textualism from forming an unreasonable basis for interpretation.
This, of course, this does not give “whole cloth” license to make things up to suit the moment. While I’m certainly not advocating a strong “living constitution” vantage point (that is, I do not fall into the one-or-the-other camp because both wings have severe fundamental flaws), I think this is one of the multitude of areas that should be “read into” (for lack of a better phrase at the moment) the framework and fabric of the Constitution.
This is why I’d be fascinated to see a Scalia opinion. For consistency, shouldn’t he completely eviscerate the privilege? There are relatively few cases, so the privilege does not have a longstanding tradition. There are also several dissimilarities in this particular instance to find that those cases do not apply. The privilege is, as noted by the quite from Nixon, nowhere to be found in the Constitution.
I’m not trying to play Gotcha Ya with Scalia. In contrast, though second to Rehnquist I think his analytical gymnastics are of Olympic caliber. I must admit to intuitive doubt that he would nullify the privilege, and reading his analytical path to that conclusion would be a fascinating read.
[QUOTE=elucidator]
Isn’t there a bit of a sticky widget w/r/t executive privilege covering conversations and consultations with the executive? For instance, if it is applied to the Justice Dept buggering, doesn’t that mean that it was discussed with the President, that is, he received political advice from Rove regarding it? And doesn’t that directly imply that the President knew about such goings-on?
And, conversely, if Rove is to say the President knew nothing about it, then that means there is no executive privilege to assert: the President was not consulting with Rove on the matter, as he didn’t know anything about it.
Doesn’t seem he can have it both ways.
[/quote]
Is it unreasonable to extend the privilege to conversations and machinations among advisors? If advisors should be free to candidly share their advice with the president, shouldn’t they be as free to discuss such things with each other? The president’s time is limited, and before Rove (or whoever) goes in to advise him, shouldn’t he have unfettered advice from his colleagues? How far down does the privilege go? This highlights why a “living” interpretation of the Constitution can be as poppycockian as strict textualism.
ETA: I really need to refresh before posting.