Make no mistake, it wasn’t excellent generalship, superior tactics or better equipment that won the war in the East. It was sheer numbers, pure and simple.
Even in Operation Bagration, widely considered one of the stellar Soviet triumphs, the Soviets outnumbered the Germans 4:1 in men, 10:1 in armored vehicles, and 5:1 in aircraft.
It’s true that the Soviets did do some strategic and operational things very well- the anticipated the Kursk attacks, and prepared for them, and they did accomplish a double-envelopment at Stalingrad, but in both cases, the Germans hobbled themselves; at Kursk, they neither attacked early like Manstein proposed, and they didn’t press the attack after Prokhorovka, due to Hitler’s pulling troops out to the Invasion of Sicily. Had they done either of those things, it’s possible that the battle may have been very different- the Germans were very close to breaking through in the south pincer, and the Soviets weren’t prepared when Manstein wanted to attack. At Stalingrad, Hitler’s crazy personal insistence that Stalingrad be conquered pinned the 6th Army in place and allowed it to be surrounded. Had that not been the case, I think the Germans would have pulled out much earlier and not allowed themselves to be surrounded, making the battle much different.
Getting back to this thread, I have this question for people who say that “All the US did was fly over Japan, drop the bombs, fly away, and call it war.” Are you saying that the Normandy landings, the Battle of the Bulge, the invasion of Italy, the invasion of North Africa, the Great Raid, The Battle of Iwo Jima and pacific island hopping in general never happened? The Soviet Union declared war on the Japanese when the West had almost already defeated them.
I’m not sure if Das Boot is all that controversial in the UK. During the 1990’s & early 00’s the television series was repeated on BBC every five years or so. It also was re-released as a really long movie in the 1990’s, though perhaps that was mostly in arthouse cinemas.
It may very well have been a niche opinion, but one held by a niche that otherwise loves War movies.
And you have to understand that this crowd didn’t think it was a bad movie per se - they were offended that it had been made. I’m certain a less ‘wargaming nerd’ bunch in Britain might have enjoyed it.
The same could be said of the war in the West, if you want to go that route.
Your figures are flatly wrong, fullstop. Among the reasons it is widely considered one of the stellar Soviet triumphs are the successful use of strategic deception (maskirovka) in convincing the Germans the coming offensive would occur in the Ukraine, not Belorussia, the successful application of deep battle theory, a theory dating back to the 1920s in the Soviet Union resulting in the Germans being kept off balance as to the actual directions and objectives for a long time into the offensive, the liberation of all of Belorussia, and most significantly the virtual complete destruction of Army Group Center as well as isolating Army Group North (later renamed Army Group Courland) in Latvia and Estonia.
Manstein’s proposed earlier attack at Kursk wasn’t anything like the clash of the titans that the battle eventually became; he wanted to and tried to pinch off the salient in spring but was stopped cold at Belgorod by Soviet forces who were quite prepared for him. The Germans were nowhere close to achieving a breakthrough at Kursk when the offensive was called off, though Manstein insists in his memoirs that he was and blames the failure to make a breakthrough on the usual cause - Hitler. Don’t get me wrong, Hitler was indeed responsible for a huge number of failures and mistakes made during the war; but he also made for a convenient scapegoat for every German failure during the war (especially as he was conveniently dead), even the ones that he wasn’t actually responsible for. Just how far the Soviets were from being defeated at Kursk is clearly demonstrated by the fact that they launched massive offensives both north and south of the Kursk salient right on the heels of the German defeat using huge uncommitted reserve forces.
A further US contribution - I would add in that in the bomber war in Europe it was the US that started daylight bombing which while not strategically vital, forced the German air force to throw many fighters at the bombers and many were shot down that way which paved the way for allied air dominance.
Ditto – my British colleagues take the piss out of me sometimes about it, but I just offer them a Hershey bar and real silk stockings, and we’re all friends again.
There is so much crap you say about how shitty and stupid the USA is … but WW2 … well, not really.
It was the best thing that could have happened to European Theater of WW2:
[ul]
[li]from an Allied point of view (France lost, UK about to loose)[/li][li]from a German point of view (getting rid of Hitler and after war treatment)[/li][li]from Europe a not becoming a Communist part of Russia (Russia would/could have just rolled on and cleaned up)[/li][/ul]
That’s just talking about Europe, never mind the Pacific.
It does seem that for awhile, especially during the Bush administration, that USA bashing was becoming europes national sport.
Ir remember they were bragging how stupid Americans were. How fewer Americans have passports. How fewer Americans speak more than one language.
How bad our health system is.
Absolutely. I’ve never denied that. Most of the Western Front success was due to overwhelming numbers and airpower, and also that past a certain point, the Germans were sort of sandbagging it in the West, in hopes that the Western Allies would conquer more of Germany than the Russians would.
They’re from the Wikipedia article. Roughly 850,000 Germans vs. 2,300,000 Russians, roughly 500 German AFVs vs 5000+ Russian ones, and 1300 German aircraft to 5300 Russian ones. I rounded up, but close enough.
All that’s true, and yes, they managed to get such an overwhelming superiority vs. Army Group Center without the Germans realizing it through masirovka, BUT… they still managed to attack with better than a better than 1:1 ratio further south (Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive) simultaneously. It wasn’t a matter of concentrating forces and starving other areas to get the local superiority, it was getting a crushing superiority in one place, and maintaining superiority everywhere else as well. That makes generalship a lot easier, I suspect.
Fundamentally the Russians did Bagration right, but even on the secondary fronts, they still outnumbered the Germans, even where they were strongest.
I think you’re confusing the Third Battle of Kharkov with an earlier attempt to reduce the salient. The Third Battle of Kharkov was more intended to stem the post-Stalingrad Soviet offensives, and set the stage for Kursk later- it’s what created the salient in the first place.
What I was talking about was Manstein wanting to go on the offensive immediately after the muddy season was over, but instead, the offensive got delayed by multiple months, giving the Russians a chance to dig in and move more forces into the defense.
I would second this. The French tactics were horrible, and their ability to respond was= also horrible.
The British were not a lot better. Blitzkreig (now known as combined arms) was something the Allies in the Great War were on top of, and they let that advantage slip.
As for the OP, I don’t think anyone who has any knowledge of history under estimates the American contribution. Roosevelt was a politician first and he knew how to tread- however he did so cleverly that Russia and the UK were getting great amounts of hardware from the USA. The Americans did save Australia’s arse- and NZ for that matter from the Japanese.
However, looking back, the Soviet Union did take the heavy lifting on the eastern Front. They could not (probably) have done so without the American aid and their constructing ports in the middle east to enable supplies to arrive.
It is arguable that American military strength was inconclusive in the Great War- in the Second World War it was essential.
I’m not seeing those figures anywhere in the wiki article. On initial forces engaged:
This gives only a 2:1 superiority in manpower, 7.5:1 in aircraft and 7.3:1 in tanks and assault guns at the beginning of the offensive, when the Germans were critically weak in armor and mobile reserves due to their deployment to meet the expected offensive further south. Strength in total for German forces is given as
and Soviet forces as
No, I’m not talking about Third Kharkov. I’m talking about Manstein’s actual failed attempt to reduce the Kursk salient in spring:
Manstein went on the offensive immediately after the muddy season was over and got his ass handed to him trying to push past Belograd; the Russians were already dug in and had enough force to stop him cold. You’re confusing the continual postponements of Operational Order No. 6 with the fact that Operational Order No. 5 was actually carried out and failed.
Just a joke also. [Much better stuff includes rancid yak butter, the crunchy layer at the bottom of a damp sugar packet, the left-over comb from an overwintering beehive, and tile grout.]
